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Abstract 
This PhD thesis examines the role of oppositional forces in selected countries during their 
democratization period and explores how the choices and strategies of the opposition to 
enhance its competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent increase the likelihood of electoral 
autocracies to turn into electoral democracies. The dynamics of oppositional behavior and its 
role in protracted transitions are an important determinant for the processes of 
democratization by elections. My study concentrates on the game level (electoral 
competition/opposition choices) and analyses the various types of strategic choices and 
decisions employed by the oppositional forces in order to enhance their bargaining position 
for the inter-active dialogue with the meta-game level (incumbent position). By using 
examples of Ghana, Slovakia and Uganda I demonstrate how the selection of adequate 
strategic choices enables the opposition to improve its position and that the resulting “self-
reinforcing” dynamics contribute to democratization of the society. The variation of actors’ 
choices when faced with the collapse of authoritarian regimes is not random as historical 
legacies at least initially shape the resources and expectations that help actors to define their 
interests and to select the ways and means to acquire political power. The operational tactics, 
behavior, and strategies applied by the oppositional forces in all selected case studies show 
many similarities and offer an interesting basis for a global approach for comparison of 
democratization processes and societies. The presented findings have been generated mainly 
from the conducted qualitative interviews with actors relevant to the transition processes 
during field research stays in all three countries of reference.  
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Abstrakt 
Diese Dissertation untersucht die Rolle oppositioneller Kräfte in ausgewählten Ländern im 
Zeitraum ihrer Demokratisierung und analysiert wie Wahlmöglichkeiten und Strategien der 
Opposition zur Steigerung ihrer Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gegenüber den Amtsinhabern die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, Wahlautokratien in Wahldemokratien zu verwandeln, erhöht. Die 
Dynamiken oppositionellen Verhaltens und deren Rolle in langwierigen Transitionen sind 
eine wichtige Determinante für den Demokratisierungprozess durch Wahlen. Meine Studie 
konzentriert sich auf die Ebene des „game level“ (Konkurrenz bei Wahlen/ 
Handlungsmöglichkeiten der Opposition) und untersucht verschiedene Typen strategischer 
Wahlmöglichkeiten und Entscheidungen, die von den oppositionellen Kräften angewandt 
werden, um ihre Verhandlungsposition für einen interaktiven Dialog mit der Meta-Ebene des 
Wettbewerbs/ Handlungsspielraums (Amtsinhaberposition) zu verbessern. Anhand der 
Beispiele Ghana, Slowakei und Uganda zeige ich wie die Selektion von adäquaten 
strategischen Wahlmöglichkeiten es der Opposition ermöglicht, ihre Position zu verbessern 
und dass die daraus entstehenden „selbstverstärkenden“ Dynamiken zur Demokratisierung der 
Gesellschaft beitragen. Dass die Akteure ihre Wahlmöglichkeiten variieren, wenn sie mit dem 
Zusammenbruch des autoritären Regimes konfrontiert sind, passiert nicht zufällig, da diverse 
„legacies“ zumindest anfangs die Ressourcen und Erwartungen formen, die den Akteuren 
helfen, ihre Interessen zu definieren und die Wege und Mittel zu wählen, um politische Macht 
zu erlangen. Die operativen Taktiken, Verhalten und Strategien, die von den oppositionellen 
Kräften in jedem der ausgewählten Länder angewandt werden, weisen viele Ähnlichkeiten auf 
und bieten eine interessante Basis für einen globalen Ansatz, um Demokratisierungsprozesse 
und Gesellschaften zu vergleichen. Die vorliegenden Ergebnisse wurden hauptsächlich durch 
qualitative Interviews gewonnen, welche mit Akteuren, die für die Transitionsprozesse zentral 
sind, während Forschungsaufenthalten in allen drei genannten Ländern durchgeführt wurden. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Aim of the Study 
This PhD thesis1 examines the role of oppositional forces in selected countries in the 
democratization period and explores how oppositional behavior, i.e. choices and strategies of 
the opposition to enhance its competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent, increase the likelihood 
of electoral autocracies becoming electoral democracies. An investigation of the role of 
oppositional forces in different settings (over a longer period of time) includes a detailed 
analysis of their aim, meaning and composition, which are components that vary not only 
with respect to issues at stake or place but also with respect to time. While in-depth study of 
these aspects would not be manageable from a time perspective this PhD thesis focuses on 
three specific electoral periods. This, of course, does not mean that the general context and 
historical background are left out of analysis as they need to be considered in order to be able 
to understand the current behavior, tactics, resources and allies of the oppositional forces. 
(Baumgartner et al. 2009) In Ghana the focus is laid on the 2000 elections in which the main 
opposition party, the NPP (New Patriotic Party), managed to remove the NDC (National 
Democratic Congress) – the party of Jerry J. Rawlings, former military and from 1992 on a 
transformed civilian leader of the country – from its incumbent seat. In Slovakia the efforts of 
oppositional forces culminated in 1998 when the opposition coalition SDK (Slovenská 
Demokratická Koalícia) succeeded the non-democratic government of Prime Minister 
Vladimír Mečiar, who had been accused of authoritarian tendencies. As the level playing field 
of the incumbent and of the opposition2 in democratizing societies is uneven and strongly 
biased to advantages of the former it is of special importance to explore the “how” of 
oppositional victory; the strategies and tactics employed, choices selected and allies and 
resources found. In my analysis I focus on the specific period of democratization when the 
political space has de jure been opened and political contestation declared as “free and fair”; 
however, at the same time the rules of the political game between various political actors have 
de facto not yet been fully established (see e.g. Lindberg 2006) and conditions for operation 
of permanent oppositional forces (most commonly political parties) and conditions for the 
operation of the ruling party have not been (or still are not) equal. In this transitional setting, 
                                                 
1This PhD thesis was conducted within the framework of a three-year structural doctoral program, the Initiative 
Group Vienna School of Governance (ViGo), at the University of Vienna. Within this time period was the 
researcher employed at the University of Vienna as a PhD fellow and lecturer at the Department of African 
Studies.  
2
 Democracy in this study is defined by peaceful alternation of power; that is why opposition groups who fight 
for their cause with violent means, such as guerilla groups, or military groups with separatist aims are excluded 
from the analysis.   
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political parties are not fully, if at all, functional and their power resources are not sufficient 
to challenge the incumbent, as the rules of the game between the actors are not yet fully 
established or applied to. In this specific time and space setting, permanent oppositional 
forces need the assistance of other political and societal actors (which I name “transient” or 
“situational oppositional forces”) who will temporally supplement or assist them in their 
functions and their performance, or even overtake their role in order to help them to counter-
balance the uneven dominating conditions.  
The Ugandan case, on the other hand, serves as the “negative” case study of this PhD project 
as the oppositional forces, despite several strategic tries including e.g. creation of a coalition 
of all opposition parties, or cooperation with civil society have so far not managed to remove 
Yoweri K. Museveni, President of Uganda since 1986, from his position. This study focuses 
on the efforts of Ugandan oppositional forces during the 2006 elections as it was the first 
election after a twenty-year ban on political party activities and hence, in which political 
parties were (re)allowed to operate under a multi-party political dispensation.  
The challenging part of this project was to highlight the structural and individual differences 
and similarities between the strategies and tactics of the respective oppositional forces in three 
selected case studies. 
The aim of my dissertation project is thus to research the meaning-making of the oppositional 
forces in three specific democratizing settings (Ghana, Slovakia, and Uganda)3, explore their 
role, form, performance and function, and analyze their operational dynamics, conditions for 
their existence and possible contribution to increased democratization4. This was done by 
conducting qualitative field research in all three countries of interest: two research stays in 
Uganda were accomplished in July-October 2007 and February 2008 subsequently, followed 
by a research stay in Slovakia in July – October 2008 and completing the research period in 
Ghana from March to July to 20095. The operational tactics, behavior, and strategies applied 
by the oppositional forces in all selected case studies show many similarities and offer an 
interesting ground for a global type of comparison of democratization processes and societies. 
While it may be difficult to make universalistic claims about democratic principles and 
                                                 
3
 For detailed outline for selection of these case studies see Chapter 3 on methodology.  
4
 The performance of oppositional forces depends on the one hand on the contextual factors like type of the 
authoritarian regime and the mode of transition, historical context, statehood, nation-building, socio-economical 
factors, cultural factors, political behavior, and international context, on the other hand on the type of the 
oppositional space, in which the forces are situated. Crucial for possible success are issues involved (some issues 
are perceived more popular and/or relevant as others) and composition of actors (having more high-profile 
groups increases the chances of success; having more committed - as opposed to self-serving groups - increases 
the chances for more enduring achievements). The issues and the composition influence the meaning making of 
oppositional forces and the space they are situated in. These thoughts will be explored in detail in Chapter 7.  
5
 Details of the conducted field research are provided for in Chapter 3 on methodology.  
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values, democracy can be defended through learning from comparative experiences from 
elsewhere in the world.  
This study is done in awareness that democracy implies by its very nature the right to self-
determination, democratic citizenship, and independent choice. (Abrahamsen 1997) If 
democracy is seen to be forced upon a country or delivered mainly from the outside in 
exchange for financial assistance, its essential properties are somehow reduced. Reversely, by 
emphasizing the indigenous, popular roots of recent transitions, the process appears more 
democratic, more authentic. It is therefore important that democracy building approaches 
should be grounded in local ownership including agenda and standard setting.6  
This introductory chapter is subdivided into three main parts. Firstly, it answers the question 
of the need for conducting such a study and offers necessary background information to the 
importance of the role of opposition and democratization by elections phenomena; secondly, 
it presents the main research puzzle and some of the main findings from the three individual 
case studies as well as the main contributions intended by this study. The last part of this 
chapter portrays the outline of the thesis with a short overview of individual chapters.  
 
1.2. Why Democratization by Elections?  
After O’Donnell and Schmitter’s seminal work, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (1986), 
it was assumed that any country moving away from authoritarian rule could be considered as 
transitioning towards democracy. By the mid 1990s, however, discussions of “hybrid 
regimes”, “electoral authoritarianism”, and “virtual democracy” have attained prominence. 
(see e.g. Przeworski 1988; Archer 1995; Collier, Levitsky 1997) negating the transition 
paradigm. (Carothers 2002) It became clear that democratic transition is not a linear process 
that moves from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. Given the exclusive nature of 
authoritarian political systems it is bound to be “messy, fitful and frustrating” (Nasong’o, 
Murunga 2007:8), with many advances and setbacks along the way. Huntington emphasized 
and warned that the future status of democracy in the world might itself be in question and 
that “a new reverse wave may be gathering which could lead to the erosion of some third 
wave gains.” (Huntington 1991) Worldwide the transition from authoritarian rule received a 
new spark of life with the “third wave” of democratization. (Huntington 1991) The process 
started in the mid 1970s in Portugal, Spain and Greece and has subsequently transformed the 
geopolitical map and greatly expanded the universe of “electoral democracies.” (Norris 1999) 
                                                 
6
 Similar arguments have been made by Gitonga (1987); Wiseman (1990); Ake (1996); Linz, Stepan (1996); 
Abrahamsen (2000) et al.  
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Most political regimes today are neither clearly democratic nor fully authoritarian, but belong 
to the “ambiguous, foggy” zone. (Schledler 2002a) These regimes have been named with 
several intermediate categories such as "democratizing regime", "semidemocracy", or other 
more specific „diminished subtypes"7 such as "illiberal" or "delegative" democracy. Some 
authors (Diamond et al. 1997; Schedler 2002a; 2002b; Lindberg 2006: 125)8 instead propose 
to deploy the symmetrical categories of electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism in 
order to fill the space between closed authoritarian regimes on the one end of the continuum 
and liberal democracies on the other. How can the different categories be differentiated 
between each other? 
According to Schedler (2002b: 37), the distinction between liberal and electoral democracies 
derives from the common idea that elections are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
modern democracy. Such a regime cannot exist without elections, but elections alone are not 
enough. While liberal democracies go beyond the electoral minimum, electoral democracies 
do not. They manage to "get elections right but fail to institutionalize other vital dimensions 
of democratic constitutionalism, such as the rule of law, political accountability, bureaucratic 
integrity, and public deliberation”.  
It is “the contested center of the continuum”9, i.e. electoral democracies and electoral 
autocracies, that forms the most interesting part of the democratization process (both from a 
theoretical and a practical perspective), which also holds the greatest potential for change10 – 
whether for improvements or setbacks. Therefore, this study will concentrate on these two 
regime types. It is also worth mentioning that the “contested center” includes the majority 
(Schedler 2002b: 48) of political regimes in the world today. 
As Schedler (2002b: 38) argues “the exercise of differentiation between separate categories of 
democracy is made difficult by the fact that regime boundaries tend to be blurry and 
controversial to the extent that their constitutive norms are idealizations that admit varying 
degrees of realization in actual political practice.” Furthermore, democratic norms are not 
perfectly realized anywhere, even in advanced democracies.  
 
                                                 
7
 On "diminished subtypes" of democracy, see Collier, Levitsky (1997) 
8
 Schedler reserves the “middle” space for the broad category of "electoral authoritarianism," while Diamond 
divides it three ways—into ambiguous regimes, competitive authoritarianism, and uncompetitive 
authoritarianism. Diamond et al. (1997: xv); Schedler (2002b: 37); Lindberg (2006: 125) 
9
 Schedler (2002b: 38) 
10
 See e.g. Brownlee (2009); Roessler, Howard (2009). On the other hand, Geddes (1999); Lust-Okar (2009) 
among others showed in their studies that in hegemonic authoritarian systems elections do not appear to foster 
democratization. These studies provide evidence that authoritarian regimes which hold elections remain in power 
longer than those that fail to hold them. 
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The transitions from authoritarian to democratic systems begin with (more or less) 
competitive elections. (Elster, Offe, Preuss 1998: 131) Merkel (1999) adds that the transition 
form one-party to multi-party dispensation is one of the first important steps of what he calls 
“Systemwechsel.” Stoess and Segert (1997: 384) claim that the crucial importance of 
founding elections is among others manifested by the formation of political parties, which 
emerge for this purpose.  
 
Respective academic literature concludes that democratic performance appears to be quite 
sensitive to the electoral calendar (see Bunce 1994; Fish 1998; Schedler 2002a; Hadenius, 
Teorell 2007; Lindberg 2009; Roessler, Howard 2009); however, processes of 
democratization by elections are different. When the first electoral contest is announced, the 
“drama of democratization” (Whitehead 1999) only starts as the first elections are “not the 
final step of regime change but its mere point of departure”. (Schedler 2002a: 110) These 
transitional elections rarely allow for democracy at once. Rather, one can talk of “protracted 
transitions” (Eisenstadt 2000) in which oppositional forces engage in “a continuous series of 
battles” (Barkan 2000: 236) “to peel off layers of authoritarian control step by step”. 
(Schedler 2002a: 110)  
Schedler (2002a: 119) argues that in the “third wave” of global democratization, numerous 
countries have been going through a process of democratization by elections. On the other 
hand, he points out (Schedler 2002b: 36f) that by organizing periodic elections authoritarian 
rulers only secure their tight control over the process and gain electoral legitimacy; however, 
without running the risks of democratic uncertainty. The demarcation between legitimacy and 
control is thus very blurry and the incumbents manage to “situate themselves in a nebulous 
zone of structural ambivalence.” As Schedler (2002a: 110) states all over the globe, actors 
have been playing the ambivalent game of competing for votes and seats and simultaneously 
struggling to change the basic rules and conditions of electoral competition. The two-level 
game of elections in democratizing societies, as explained in detail in the following chapter, is 
thus used as an analytical tool in this study.  
 
1.3. Why Opposition? 
There is a common agreement in the academic literature on the role of opposition being a 
crucial element to the functioning of democracy, not only in terms of providing electoral 
choice and offering an alternative government but also in terms of subjecting the incumbent to 
constant critical examination. (see e.g. Wiseman 1990) Despite this shared acknowledgment 
there neither exist a consistent theory nor a unified definition of opposition which can be 
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applicable to other political systems then consolidated democracies. (Ionescu, Madariaga 
1971) Thus, there is no agreement on “who” or “what” actually constitutes opposition. As 
there is a significant lack of empirical studies about the role, function, and performance of 
opposition in non-Western settings, my research aims to contribute to a better understanding 
of the operational dynamics of oppositional forces in democratizing societies. I will distance 
myself from the narrow Eurocentric notion of opposition applicable solely to Western 
advanced democratic societies while broadening the definition through inclusion of a plurality 
of stakeholders and placing them into a spatial setting, as there are multiple oppositions 
within one political system. In democratizing societies, the provisions for the expressions of 
the oppositional political parties are in many cases very limited, and many opposition 
activities occur outside the framework of political parties, that is why I propose to use the 
term “oppositional forces”11.  
 
From the democracy theory point of view, the importance of a political opposition should thus 
be uncontroversial. Self-government – the sovereignty of the people to rule over itself – is 
democracy’s fundamental value. (Sartori 1987: 30)  Competitive and participatory elections 
are the institutionalized attempt to actualize the essence of democracy in its modern 
representative form. (Lindberg 2006) The fundamental value of self-government not only 
translates into equal opportunity of political participation, but also into political competition; 
according to Dahl, the two core dimensions of democracy.  In order for the people to be able 
to exercise their sovereignty in elections there has to be choice. Dahl (1971, 1989) claims that 
without political opposition there is no choice and without choice the people cannot exercise 
their right to rule via representation. Thus, the existence of opposition parties contesting 
elections is a prerequisite of political competition, which itself is instrumental to the 
realization of self-government. (Lindberg 2004: 8)  
 
Lindberg’s studies (2004, 2006) have shown that the behavior of opposition parties plays a 
crucial role in transforming electoral autocracies into democracies. By choosing to contest 
elections and accept the outcome of that contest, opposition groups greatly enhance the 
probability of the regime to become democratic. Lindberg (2006: 132) thus argues that the 
intrinsic dimensions of democracy – popular participation and political competitiveness (as 
adopted from Dahl) – are to some degree determined by opposition behavior. Whether 
opposition participates in elections or not has a strong and significant effect on alternations in 
power and acceptance by losers of the results. Even when the elections do not fulfill the 
                                                 
11
 The concept of oppositional forces will be explained in detail in the following chapter. 
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requirements of free and fair, it might further the long-term goal of democracy to rest the 
case, for another election shall come and things are likely to improve. Dahl (1971) and van de 
Walle (2002), specifically for Africa, suggested that the quality of competition and the power 
of the opposition could go a long way to explain the level of democracy that has developed in 
these countries. Lindberg (2004: 24) argues that the behavior of the opposition is particularly 
important to study in electoral autocracies where the attainment of democracy is still an open 
question.  
 
Dynamics of oppositional behavior – their tactics and strategies - and its role in protracted 
transitions is an important determinant of democratization by elections. The opposition’s 
ability to further contribute to democratization has been proven in several studies, among 
others by Dahl (1971); Schedler (2002a); Lindberg (2003, 2004, 2006) et al. Bunce and 
Wolchik (2009: 251) state that in post-authoritarian regimes the best predictor of democratic 
improvement is the election of the democratic opposition. The questions of importance thus 
are: When do electoral autocracies/democracies become liberal democracies? What is the role 
of the opposition behavior/involvement in facilitating such a development? How significant is 
the effect of opposition participation in elections on regime transitions? How does opposition 
manage to win if the ruling power has an extensive network of supporters (clients) at its 
disposal?  
As there are no precise measures of distinguishing between several regime types (although 
there have been several tries – see e.g. Diamond, Freedom House etc.) the degree of 
competitiveness and thus the role of the opposition highlights a crucial source of variation 
among regimes. (Schedler 2002b: 46) While democracy is "a system in which parties lose 
elections," (Przeworski 1991: 10) electoral authoritarianism is a system in which opposition 
parties lose elections. Naturally, we can find also considerable variations within the category 
of electoral democracies or autocracies. The relative strength of oppositional forces thus 
varies substantially among electoral autocracies. As Schedler (2002b: 47) argues “in some 
systems, the electoral arena is a genuine battleground in the struggle for power; in others, it is 
little more than a theatrical setting for the self-representation and self-reproduction of power.”  
The above stated background indicated that we can observe a strong discrepancy with respect 
to the study of democratization by elections and the role of opposition in democratizing 
societies. On the one hand the crucial importance of elections and opposition is confirmed in 
all workings on the processes of democratization and democracy; on the other, we lack 
sufficient data on the study of elections and opposition (above all in Africa – see Lindberg 
2006), we do not have any clear definition so far about what actually constitutes an opposition 
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which can be applicable to all societies worldwide nor can we draw upon any meaningful, 
non-ambiguous differentiation between various transition stages of democratization. (see here 
above all Schedler 2002a) Finally, we know only very little about the oppositional behavior in 
democratizing societies. As Lindberg (2004: 24) points out, we need to better understand the 
dynamics of the opposition group’s behavior and its role in protracted transitions where 
elections are not the end of the process but steps on the way to attain a minimal democracy. 
This study aims to fill this gap.  
 
1.4. What is my Puzzle? 
Given the undisputed prominence of the opposition in the global context of democratization 
by elections the main questions of interest for this study are: 
 
How can oppositional forces in a setting of adverse ruling conditions (when the “rules 
of the game” are not yet fully established) trigger political change? How do 
oppositional forces gain power and operational potential to peacefully replace the 
semi-authoritarian incumbent? 
 
As the “menu of manipulation” (Schedler 2002a) at the disposal of the incumbent is much 
bigger than the strategic opportunities of the opposition in democratizing societies, implying a 
greater asymmetry of resources at all levels, opposition needs to enhance its power positions 
and its competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent in order to have a chance of winning 
elections. The elections during transition may be flawed, irregular, orchestrated, or dominated 
by the incumbent party; electoral rules may be devised to disfavor the opposition’s chances of 
winning; or elections may even be more or less free and fair while periods between them are 
characterized by denial of political rights and civil liberties with autocratic behavior on the 
part of the incumbent regime. (Lindberg 2006: 124; Schedler 2002a, 2002b)  
The enhancement of the competitiveness of the opposition can be promoted through a variety 
of strategies. The main sub-question of interest generated from the above stated puzzle is thus: 
  
What are the different strategies that the respective oppositional forces are developing 
and applying in order to mobilize support and enhance their strategic position? 
 
The uncertainty and ambivalence of the democratization process (O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986) 
can be managed by a combination of different strategies where both sides - incumbent and 
opposition - have ample opportunities at their disposal. (Schedler 2002a: 117f) The major 
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strategy of the opposition lies in improving its competitiveness by electoral gains. Opposition 
tactics and behavior and the respective employed strategies have to be seen as an outcome of 
the state-society dynamics as they are embedded in the latter. Opposition feels that the 
authoritarian incumbent is losing credibility and legitimacy both at national and international 
level through economic decline, worsening living conditions, abuse and/or denial of human 
rights, deepening gap between the elite and the masses and it hence uses this opportunity. 
Strategic, rational acting thus suits the interests of the opposition and appeals to the majority 
of the voters as the gap between the development of the society and the development of 
politics is increasing. The transitioning societies modernize as people needs grow; they 
establish associations, create new opportunities, claim more rights and thus automatically get 
into conflict with the more and more repressive ruling regime trying to control its losing 
power position. Opposition uses the mood within the society and the uncertainty by which 
any transitional society is characterized. In such a situation, the incumbent does not act as a 
guarantor of the social order and stability anymore. (Bunce, Wolchik 2009) Opposition 
strategically exploits these changing state-society interactions caused by altering relations, 
and incorporates the rising questions of credibility and legitimacy into their rhetoric in order 
to gain access to power, as political power is the only asset (Ake 1996) left. The issues at the 
stake of the transition period, namely power and resources, are very high and the whole 
process too uncertain and unpredictable (O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986) for any of the involved 
actors to appeal to any fixed set of rules. Not one set of rules, practices, or processes remain 
unaltered by the dynamics of state action and social response. (Chazan et al. 1999: 221) The 
impetus for change as well as its direction, as the events of the 1990s demonstrated, is an 
outgrowth of the many interactions between governments and social groups, between rulers 
and citizens. Unfortunately, as Schedler (2002b: 46) claims the field of comparative politics 
today has little knowledge about the conditions under which authoritarian actors pursue, or 
stop pursuing, certain strategies or bundles of strategies.  
 
The manipulation strategies of the incumbent vary within electoral autocracies and electoral 
democracies; however, the repression is not continual as in closed authoritarian regimes, but 
“selective and intermittent as irregular episodes of harassment make fewer international 
headlines.” (Schedler 2002a: 106) To a large extent, it is the strategic interaction between 
authoritarian incumbents and the democratic opposition that determines how the structural 
ambiguity of electoral autocracies plays out. (Schedler 2002b: 49) 
My study concentrates on the game level (electoral competition/opposition choices) of 
Schedler’s analytical model and analyses the various types of strategic choices and decisions 
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of the opposition in order to enhance their bargaining position for the inter-active dialogue 
with the meta-game level (incumbent position). I claim that the right selection of strategic 
choices enables the opposition to improve its position and through the “self-reinforcing” 
dynamics contributes to democratization of the society. If an opposition fails to select a 
specific strategic choice of how to gain power, the incumbent will not be forced to open up 
the electoral space. This study takes into consideration the strategic interdependence between 
the game and the meta-game level. The choices and strategies of both the opposition and the 
incumbent are embedded in given conditions and context and they shape the nature of the 
state – society relation and thus produce a longer term legacy. (Villalon, VonDoepp 1997) 
However, the study does not cover a full scope of possible strategies that opposition may 
employ to appeal to voters and to build durable linkages to electoral constituencies as the 
theoretical options are too rich in quantity.  
 
The alternation of power, as the ultimate goal of democracy (Lindberg 2006), happens when 
opposition constitutes a credible and legitimate alternative. This presumption poses the 
question about the conditions under which the opposition constitutes a credible and legitimate 
alternative? Interestingly enough, the conducted research showed that the opposition parties in 
all three countries used the same reasoning in order to appear as a credible alternative to the 
electorate. They portrayed themselves as the “real” or “true” democratic party, following 
liberal democratic tradition on the one hand, on the other as the only party being able to bring 
along “change” from the prevailing undemocratic conditions. However, despite the fact that 
oppositional forces in all three settings used the same rhetoric and terminology (reasoning) 
they applied different argumentation strategies, which were/are specifically context bounded. 
These will be explored in detail in individual chapters and put into broader context in the 
analytical chapter.  
 
The study distinguishes between long-term (contextual) and short-term (immediate) causes 
for success or failure of the employed oppositional strategies. The conducted field research 
and subsequent analysis showed that in Ghana the long-term causes of party democratic 
legacy and tradition were decisive, whereas in Slovakia the short-term strategies (such as 
cooperation and inter-active governance with situational oppositional forces shortly before 
elections) were of prominent importance. As the premise of this study is that oppositional 
forces play a crucial role in democratizing societies, the performance in Ghana and Slovakia 
will be analyzed as opposed to the performance of oppositional forces in Uganda who failed 
to achieve their biggest objective, namely removing President Museveni from power and 
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replacing him in the driving seat. To be able to explain the “success” of the two former case 
studies, the so called “electoral model” by Bunce and Wolchik (2009) will be made use of, as 
it helps to explain the new approach to winning elections by the opposition without being too 
context-bound. 
 
The different background, explanatory factors and selected opposition strategies for 
enhancing competitiveness for each of the countries also explain how the chapters of the 
individual case studies in the thesis are structured. The historical development will be dealt 
extensively with in the Ghana chapter, whereas the chapter on Slovakia concentrates mostly 
on the 1998 elections and the immediate period before. The Uganda chapter will respectively 
focus on the factors that are contributing to Uganda’s protracted transition and hindering 
oppositional efforts to succeed.  
 
Drawing from these findings the following assumption is made: The less the opposition 
political parties can rely on their democratic legacy and traditions, the more they have to rely 
on other tactics/strategies e.g. cooperation (inter-active governance) with other actors in order 
to achieve their political aims. Therefore, when studying transitional societies it is crucial to 
not only include opposition political parties but also oppositional forces in the broader sense 
into the analysis. The findings also explain why Ghanaian opposition did not need such a 
strong network and support of other oppositional forces and how Slovakia managed to 
democratize with the help of a network of oppositional forces despite its long-lasting 
communist political legacy.  
 
1.5. Main Contributions of the Study 
The contributions of this study both to theoretical and empirical discussion on 
democratization are fourfold. Firstly, the study offers an analysis of “Africa beyond Africa”. 
It explores similarities between selected African and CEE countries both at the structural 
macro-level – being the global Zeitgeist of liberal democracy, modernization, and liberal 
market policies – as well as within the international context by exploring the implications of 
(neo-)colonization for the “argumentation/reasoning” of the oppositional forces at the micro 
level. The oppositional forces in all three settings, irrespective of their geographical location, 
adopted the global rhetoric of “liberal democracy” and “change” in order to enhance their 
internal as well as external legitimacy and credibility. The “liberal democracy” was presented 
in all three setting as the “real” or “true” democracy, with the main opposition parties in all 
three countries following (or at least claiming to follow) the ideology of a liberal democratic 
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party. This adaptation of the global democratization discourse at the micro-level is mirrored in 
the composition, strategies as well as application of the discourse by the oppositional forces in 
all three settings.  
Secondly, this study offers a qualitative enhancement of existing quantitative studies as it 
explores the “how” of oppositional forces question in three concrete settings. Opposition 
behavior in the form of participation in elections has significantly contributed to improving 
the democratic qualities of elections in electoral regimes in Africa leading to a decline of 
authoritarianism. (Lindberg 2006: 134) Opposition behavior is an important determinant of 
democratization by elections in “the foggy zone of electoral authoritarianism”. (Schedler 
2002b)  
However, we do not know which concrete strategies the oppositions employ from its disposal 
in order to counter-balance the menu of manipulation of the incumbent, as the vast majority of 
the existing studies concentrates on the strategies of the incumbent and analyzes opposition 
only as a dependent concept. As Lindberg (2004: 24) points out, we need to better understand 
the dynamics of opposition group’s behavior and its role in protracted transitions where 
elections are “not the end of the process but steps on the way to attain a minimal democracy”. 
Thirdly, the study applies the concept of the oppositional forces to societies in transition, 
which proved to be of greater importance to democratizing contexts than the narrow, Western 
oriented definition of opposition as being exclusive to political parties. As too many 
oppositional activities occur outside the framework of the political parties, and the “menu of 
manipulation” of the incumbent, and thus the structural disadvantages for the opposition are 
too extensive, a broadening and inclusion of the oppositional forces into the space of political 
contestation becomes necessary as it allows for more dynamism and fluidity of the concept 
with respect to time and issues at stake. 
Fourthly, this study hopes to be of practical use for countries in transition. Without wanting to 
be prescriptive in any manner, this study tries to identify strategies employed by the 
oppositional forces, which have the potential to be the most efficient – efficient in a sense of 
contributing to the victory of the opposition and minimizing the hegemonic position of the 
incumbent. The outcomes (offered in Chapter 7 and 8) could serve as “best practices” for the 
oppositional forces in Uganda and other countries struggling with similar challenges in 
protracted transitions globally.  
 
1.6. Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. This first chapter offered introductory insights into 
the importance and aimed contributions of this study. It outlined the meaning of oppositional 
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forces for democratizing societies and briefly presented the three case studies with respect to 
the selected strategies of oppositional forces in order to enhance their competitiveness vis-à-
vis the (semi-)authoritarian incumbent.  
The second chapter outlines the most important theoretical concepts used in this thesis. Firstly 
it offers a short overview of the discussion on definitions and meaning of democracy. The 
chapter further portrays the crucial importance of elections as common denominator of every 
representative democracy in the world. It introduces the analytical model by Schedler (2002a, 
2002b) which understands elections as a two-level game, as well as the “menu of 
manipulation” while analyzing the “survival strategies” (Brumberg 2000) of the incumbents 
in the try to prolong and legitimize their stay in power. In addition, the theoretical chapter 
explores the concept of oppositional forces in detail. It firstly provides an overview of the 
indispensable role, importance and contribution of the opposition to democratization 
processes as well as established democracies. (Dahl 1971; Ionescu, de Madariaga 1971; 
Wiseman 1990; Lindberg 2006) The necessity of applying a broader and more dynamic 
notion of the opposition is outlined in detail in democratizing settings, in which many 
opposition activities occur outside the framework of political parties. The oppositional forces 
are situated in the space of political contestation as the spatial understanding of opposition, 
combined with time-and-issue factors allows for more dynamic and accurate understanding of 
the opposition in democratizing societies. The behavior, cooperation and interactions of 
oppositional forces within the space of political contestation are analyzed by applying 
governance theories. For this purpose the inter-active governance theory of Jan Kooiman 
(2000, 2003) as well as Sorensen’s and Torfing’s concept of network governance (2007) 
proved to be especially useful.  
The third chapter outlines the methodological approach applied. This PhD project makes use 
of the comparative case study methodology which has an explorative character as this kind of 
methodological approach is best suited for the purpose of this dissertation project. The chapter 
outlines in detail the research design including accessing, generating and analyzing the data. 
Special attention is given to the conduct of qualitative interviews during the field research in 
all three countries of interests, as this method represents the essence of my methodology. 
Chapters four, five and six present in detail the three case studies, Ghana, Slovakia and 
Uganda. Chapter four on Ghana focuses on the victory of the opposition NPP (New Patriotic 
Party) in the 2000 elections. It identifies the main strategies of the Ghanaian oppositional 
forces in their quest for democratization. Long-term (contextual) as well as short-term 
(immediate) causes for the success of the opposition in 2000 elections are presented and 
analyzed in detail. Special attention is given firstly, to development and continuation of 
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political parties’ legacies and traditions; secondly, to the dynamic interplay between the state 
and various actors of civil society, which might include co-optation strategies and efforts to 
influence and/or create alternative civil society in addition to the pro-democracy oriented one 
from the side of government on the one hand, or formation of oppositional forces to 
hegemonic rule of the government, on the other. The short-term or immediate causes for 
NPP’s victory could have been identified mostly thanks to the conducted interviews with 
political party representatives and include the opposition’s campaign of positive change and 
cooperation with other actors of the concept of oppositional forces. Individual crucial actors – 
political parties, civil society, media, churches, trade unions, students, professional bodies, 
traditional authorities, private sector –are further portrayed in detail including their historical 
development in order to understand the long-established relationships, their legacy and impact 
on the current political situation and positioning within the space of governmental or 
oppositional forces. The chapter also looks at procedural and legislatives innovations that 
contributed to Ghana being considered a country with strong democratic credentials on the 
African continent. These included, among others, various confidence building measures, elite 
consensus mechanism and the creation of IPAC (Inter-Party Advisory Committee) as a 
consultative forum between political parties and the Electoral Commission, as well as revived 
and expanded media and civil society space.  
Chapter five on Slovak developments of oppositional tactics and strategies starts with an 
overview of the political history of independent Slovakia after 1993 and the role of Prime 
Minister Vladimír Mečiar throughout the developments of the newly created state. Particular 
attention is given to the period after 1994 when the struggle for the preservation of a 
democratic regime and its institutional framework became dominant and the regressive 
direction that weakened not only the parties but also the foundations of democracy started. 
(See e.g. Mesežnikov 1996, 1997a, 1998a; Malová 1998) The strategies employed by the 
Slovak oppositional forces to counter-act these hegemonic efforts of the government are 
analyzed in this chapter. The analysis is based on interviews conducted during my field 
research stay in Bratislava from July to October 2008 with various representatives of political 
parties, academia, civil society organizations and journalists, as well as from secondary 
literature. The creation of a coalition between opposition political parties including extensive 
activities and strong involvement of oppositional forces – above all, civil society bodies – into 
the political developments before the 1998 elections resulted into a victory of the opposition. 
It was this inter-active cooperation of oppositional forces that enabled the victory of 
opposition political parties despite the strong structural advantages on the side of Vladimír 
Mečiar and his ruling party. Within the framework of the civic campaign “OK’ 98” for free 
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and fair elections several parallel activities were taking place such as educational projects, 
cultural activities, get-out-the-vote concerts, brochures, TV video clips, films, and discussions 
forums. NGOs prepared almost 60 independent informational, educational and monitoring 
projects. Activities which gained widespread visibility were “Road for Slovakia”, a trek of 
young volunteers around the whole country, “Rock the vote” concerts, the project Civic EYE 
(Občianske Oko ‘98) for civic supervision over the elections organized by the Association for 
Free Elections, TV spots produced by the civic association “Head ‘98” in which popular 
personalities from cultural, music and sports life appealed to young voters to go to vote with 
the message “I vote, therefore I am”, democratic roundtables with representatives of political 
parties, civil society and many others.  
Chapter six on Uganda represents a “negative” case study in the comparison, as the activities 
of the oppositional forces were not successful such as the case of Ghana and Slovakia. This 
chapter analyzes five hampering elements on Uganda’s way to a multiparty political system 
and meaningful role of oppositional forces, being tight control over the transition process by 
the ruling party, poor mode of governance, shortcomings of anti-governmental political and 
societal actors, upwards accountability of local stakeholders towards the donor community, 
and absence of culture of political tolerance. It shows that the historical, cultural, social, and 
political legacy of “Movementocracy”, the mode of governance introduced by President 
Museveni, is very complex and influences not only the representatives of the ruling power 
gathered around the person of President Museveni, but also the performance of other societal 
and political actors with crucial importance for genuine transition, such as opposition political 
parties, civil society organizations or Western donor agencies represented in Uganda. The 
chapter offers a detailed profile of three main opposition political parties, their coalition 
building efforts as well as various activities and potential of the civil society to influence the 
course of democratic development in Uganda.  
Chapter seven is a reflective analysis combining the results of the three case studies and 
looking at the concrete findings in a comparative perspective. Firstly, a general look at why 
societies democratize at all is offered as it is important to place the concrete findings into a 
broader context of democratization studies. The two main reasons, namely internal and 
external causes for democratization, are further presented. As this study is conducted in the 
belief that structural and institutional factors cannot give us full answers, other explanatory 
causes must be searched for. That is why the second subchapter concentrates on the strategic 
choices of the oppositional actors and looks closely on the similarities and differences 
between the three case studies. The type of oppositional space, selection of strategic choices, 
main argumentation strategies, composition of oppositional forces, as well as their 
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expectations and rewards will be looked upon in a comparative manner. In the third part, the 
performance of the oppositional forces will be analyzed. As the premise of this study is that 
oppositional forces play a crucial role in democratizing societies, the performance in Ghana 
and Slovakia will be analyzed as opposed to the performance of oppositional forces in 
Uganda who failed to achieve their biggest objective, namely removing President Museveni 
from power and replacing him in the driving seat. To be able to explain the “success” of the 
two former case studies, the so called “electoral model” by Bunce and Wolchik (2009) will be 
made use of, as it helps to explain the new approach to winning elections by the opposition 
without being too context-bound. 
The final chapter is a short summary of the main findings. It confirms that the selected 
strategies of opposition to enhance their competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent proved to be 
of crucial importance for the success or failure of the respective transition. However, at the 
same time it takes into account the numerous contextual factors impacting on the performance 
of the opposition. The chapter is at the same time a call for a more prominent role of 
oppositional activities in academic literature due to the crucial importance of opposition for a 
“successful” outcome of democratization. The chapter lastly discusses the policy implications 
of this study.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Guidelines 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The theoretical chapter is divided into three main parts. The first introductory part is offering 
a short overview of the discussion on definitions and meaning of democracy. The second part 
is concerned with the phenomenon of democratization by elections and democratization 
transition processes. It portrays the difficulties with distinguishing between various phases of 
transition processes and applies useful categories of electoral democracies and electoral 
autocracies (as by Diamond et al. 1997; Schedler 2002b; Lindberg 2006) in order to serve as a 
measure of distinction. As it is “the contested center of the continuum” (Schedler 2002b: 38) 
– the electoral democracies and electoral authoritarianism – that constitute the most 
interesting part of democratization and build the majority of the political regimes in the world 
(Lindberg 2009), my study will concentrate primarily on these. The crucial importance of 
elections as common denominator of every representative democracy in the world will be 
outlined subsequently. This second part of the chapter also offers an analytical model as 
introduced by Schedler (2002a, 2002b) which understands elections as a two-level game. 
Schedler (2002a: 110) explains that “at the same time as incumbents and opponents measure 
their forces in the electoral arena, they battle over the basic rules that shape the electoral 
arena. Their struggle over institutional rules is not extraneous to but an integral part of their 
struggle within prevalent institutional rules, as the game of electoral competition is embedded 
within the meta-game of electoral reform.” 
During this transition period from authoritarian rule, which is according to O’Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986: 3, 5) marked by “extraordinary uncertainty” and “indeterminacy”, the 
incumbents as well as the opposition become part of a democratization game in which they 
apply different kinds of strategic choices from the “chain of democratic choice” while having 
certain “strategic dilemmas” at the same time. (Schedler 2002a) In order to gain national as 
well as international legitimacy authoritarian rulers, aiming to prolong their stay in power 
while opening the electoral space, employ different “survival strategies” (Brumberg 2000) 
from their what Schedler (2002a) calls “menu of manipulation.” The third and last part of the 
chapter introduces the concept of oppositional forces as used in this study. It firstly provides 
an overview of the indispensable role, importance and contribution of the opposition to 
democratization processes as well as established democracies. (Dahl 1971; Ionescu, de 
Madariaga 1971; Wiseman 1990; Lindberg 2006) The necessity of applying a “broader” and 
more dynamic notion of “the opposition” in democratizing settings is further outlined 
referring to many opposition activities, which occur outside the framework of political parties. 
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The oppositional forces are situated in the space of political contestation as the spatial 
understanding of opposition, combined with “time-and-issue” factors allows for more 
dynamic and accurate understanding of the opposition in democratizing societies. The 
behavior, cooperation and interactions of oppositional forces within the space of political 
contestation will be analyzed with the use of governance theories. Here, above all, the inter-
active governance of Jan Kooiman (2000, 2003) and Sorensen’s and Torfing’s concept of 
network governance (2007) proved to be particularly useful. The last part of the chapter pays 
special attention to the role of opposition political parties and civil society in the 
democratization context and distinguishes between a “pro-democracy” and “pro-government” 
type of civil society (Ninsin 1998; Gyimah-Boadi et al. 2004). Simultaneously it reminds us 
of the fact that civil society cannot be romanticized and is only as democratic as its 
practitioners of the ground. (Gaventa 2007) The chapter starts with providing a short 
overview into the discussion on numerous definitions of democracy.  
 
2.2. Defining Democracy 
The concept of democracy remains a contested one despite countless tries of academics and 
practitioners to find a common ground. Different definitions and theories emphasize different 
aspects of democracy. In order to be able to situate the various empirical meanings and forms 
that democracy can take into a broader theoretical discourse it is important to note that the 
term “democracy” refers to a set of ideas that no actual political system has ever 
approached.12 Lindberg (2006: 21f) recognizes that there is no necessary link among a 
particular term, like democracy, the conceptual construct in the mind, and the empirical 
phenomenon to which it refers. In recent decades the quest for democratic governance has 
become an almost universal phenomenon. Indeed, the honorific nature of the concept of 
democracy is such that all manner of political systems claim to be democracies.13 (Nasong’o, 
Murunga 2007: 4) Schmitter and Karl (1996: 49) state that some scholars conversely hesitate 
to use the term democracy – without adding qualifying adjectives - because of the ambiguity 
that surrounds it. Some of them, such as Robert Dahl, even tried to introduce a new term 
“polyarchy” in order to “maintain the distinction between democracy as an ideal system and 
the institutional arrangements that have come to be regarded as a kind of imperfect 
approximation of an ideal.” (Dahl 1971: 9) However, despite the “age of democratic 
confusion” (Sartori 1962), Schmitter and Karl (1996: 49) claim that “we are ‘stuck’ with 
democracy as a catchword of contemporary political discourse”.  
                                                 
12
  Eliot 1940; Sartori 1962; Gitonga 1987, et al. 
13
 Collier and Levitsky (1997) talk of “democracy with adjectives” including liberal, social, progressive, guided, 
non-party, illiberal, deliberative, participative and other democracies. 
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For this practical reason there is a consensus within academia to set minimal conditions that 
the polities must meet in order to be called “democratic.” Schaffer (1998: 1) states that to find 
out “whether democracy means anything, in meaning too many things” (Eliot 1940: 11f) is 
crucial if we intend to compare democracies, to identify factors that promote their 
consolidation, to examine the effects of democracy on economic development, or to ask any 
number of questions about the causes and consequences of democracy. Schmitter and Karl 
(1996: 50) state that “modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers 
are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through 
the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.” This definition does not 
identify democracy with some particular set of rules or institutions, nor does it restrict it to 
some specific culture or level of development and is thus suitable for a broader comparison as 
intended in this thesis. Lindberg (2006: 27) states that studies of elections, democratization 
and transition tend to avoid debating normative democratic theory. Sklar (1996: 26) argues 
that “political science is not moral philosophy; it does not prescribe the ends of political 
action; it is concerned with finding adequate means for achieving politically defined ends.”  
Most scholars thus talk of “liberal elitist democracy” (Lindberg 2006: 28) as the majority of 
democracies in the world are elitist, liberal and representative. This thesis thus leans on an 
empirically oriented definition of representative liberal democracy that is general enough to 
apply to a variety of contexts but specific enough to exclude clearly non-democratic political 
systems. 
 
The crucial concepts that distinguish democracy as a unique system for organizing relations 
between different sectors of the society, but also emphasizing the link between democracy 
and elections are: widespread participation, equal choice, fair competition/public contestation, 
accountability of those in power, cooperation/inclusiveness/incorporation and right to form 
relatively independent associations or organizations including independent political parties 
and interest groups. A democratic political system is thus inclusive, participatory, 
competitive, representative, accountable, transparent and responsive to citizens’ aspirations 
and expectations.14  
To deal with democracy’s many meanings, a significant number of empirical social 
scientists15 choose to consider this concept only in its institutional aspects, and define it in 
terms of some set of procedures or mechanisms. This minimalist view of democracy being 
equated with elections (Schmitter, Karl 1996: 52) gained many critical opponents and became 
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 These were generated from Dahl 1971; Coppedge, Reinecke 1990; Wiseman 1990; Ake 1996; Schmitter, Karl 
1996; Diamond et al. 1997; O’Donnell 2004; Lindberg 2006; IDEA 2008. 
15
 Schumpeter 1962; Lipset 1983; Lijphart 1984; Di Palma 1990; Przeworski 1991; Huntington 1991 et al. 
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known as “fallacy of electoralism”. (Karl 1986; Bratton, van de Walle 1997) Geisler (1993: 
633f) claims that “democratic processes have been reduced to the holding of internationally 
observed multi-party elections with no agreement on the definition and principles of 
democracy.”16 Marina Ottaway (1993: 3f) talks of “limits of electoralism” as it provides 
inadequate criteria for categorizing regimes as democratic and distinguishes between “the 
ritual of democracy” and its “substance”, given that “many African leaders are learning to 
play the election game-giving aid donors an election barely clean enough to receive a low-
passing grade, but dirty enough to make it difficult for the opposition to win.”   
Diamond et al. (1997) state that the scope of democratic progress in the world is partly 
illusory, for regular, free, and fair elections (what he calls electoral democracy) do not ensure 
the presence of other important dimensions of democracy such as extensive protections for 
individual and group freedoms, inclusive pluralism in civil society and party politics, civilian 
control over the military, institutions to hold officers accountable, strong rule of law, and 
independent, impartial judiciary (liberal democracy by Diamond) (1997: xv). A problem thus 
arises when participation and competition are legally permitted but not effectively enforced, 
and procedural legitimacy may exist in law but not in fact. (Lindberg 2006: 7f) Elections may 
co-exist with systematic abuse of human rights, and other undemocratic practices. 
Nevertheless, holding formally participatory and contested elections is a key necessity for 
those elections to be democratic and the political system to be a representative democracy. 
(Lindberg 2006: 8) 
 
2.3. Democratization by Elections 
This study is concerned with the phenomenon of democratization by elections. There is a 
common agreement that elections are a crucial concept to the functioning of representative 
democracy, an institutionalized attempt to actualize the essence of democracy; the mechanism 
of translating people’s power to governmental power and thus a common denominator of 
modern democracies. (Lindberg 2006: 1) Practical concerns of the necessity of elections are 
that larger democratic political systems require a representative government. (Selingson, 
Booth 1995: 6) Besides elections being a key defining characteristic in almost every theory of 
democracy, another practical advantage of the elections-democracy link is that most measures 
of democracy and political freedom rely heavily on electoral indicators as “an election is a 
phenomenon that can be conceptualized and measured in relatively unambiguous terms, with 
highly valid indicators and reliable data for comparative analysis.” (Lindberg 2006: 4) 
Furthermore, causal impact of elections is that it improves the quality of democracy. Elections 
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 Similar statements can be found in the works of Ake 1996; Ihonvbere 1996; Colomer 2000 et al.  
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are “a necessary component or indicator of democracy, but also a cause for democratization. 
In a nutshell, elections will, more often than not, be the way to democracy.” (Lindberg 2006: 
20) 
 
Elections give the citizenry the right and freedom to exercise their sovereignty. “The people 
may not really govern themselves, but they can stir up a deafening commotion if they dislike 
the way they are governed.” (Key 1964) Dahl (1971) states that broad citizenry must not only 
have the power to select its governors but also the ability and opportunity to choose between 
multiple alternative governors. Elections are placed at the core of the process of 
democratization everywhere. For Chazan (1987) elections are an indispensable index of state 
legitimacy. In liberal democracy elections serve as a source of public legitimation of power 
and make office holders accountable to the voter, as s/he gives the power. Elections provide 
the possibility for participation and contestation of the broad citizenship in recruiting and 
legitimating the authority of their rulers. (Dahl 1971; Remmer 1996; Throup, Hornsby 1998) 
 
A significant number of influential scholars17 thus agrees that the democratic procedures 
alone (e.g. elections) do not define democracy, but their presence is indispensable to its 
persistence. Conversely, the values of democracy are realized through political institutions 
and practices.  
Helpful here is O’Donnell’s notion of the quality of democracy (2004: 14) which presupposes 
that “in a democratic regime elections are competitive, free, egalitarian, decisive, and 
inclusive, and those who vote also have the right to be elected – they are political citizens.” 
Elections may be held even in authoritarian and/or communist countries, but only in a 
political democracy/democratic regime/polyarchy (terms used interchangeably by O’Donnell) 
they meet all the required conditions and can thus be called fair. However, in contrast to 
“minimalist” definitions of democracy, O’Donnell maintains that fair elections are not 
sufficient for characterizing a democratic regime. Additionally elections must be 
institutionalized, because only in such a scenario all relevant actors adjust their strategies to 
the expectations that fair elections will continue to be held. Otherwise, elections will not be 
“the only game in town” (Linz, Stepan 1996), and relevant agents will invest in resources 
other than elections in order to access the highest positions of the regime. He concludes 
(2004:15) that “fair and institutionalized elections are a central component of a democratic 
regime because they are the only means of access […] to the principal governmental 
positions.”  
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 Sartori 1962; Dahl 1971; Gitonga 1987; Schaffer 1998; Cullell 2004 et al.  
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Lindberg’s empirical study (2006) goes even further in providing evidence that elections in 
fact improve the quality of democracy. His analysis shows that a sequence of elections not 
only contributes to increasing the democratic quality of a political regime but also broadens 
and deepens civil liberties in the society as democratic behavior (elections) produce 
democratic values and culture. He thus concludes that repetitive elections (even if flawed) are 
important causal factors in democratization and improvement of quality of democracy. (see 
here also Barkan 2000; van de Walle 2002)  
 
As every political system combines democratic and non-democratic ideas, this study is guided 
by the notion that democracy is not an “all or nothing affair”, but a matter of degree. There is 
a controversy in the academic literature among those who define democracy in terms of kind 
or of degree: whether democracy and non-democracy are best conceptualized as a dichotomy 
or as two ends of a continuum. One has to make a decision as what kind of regime potentially 
can be a democracy and what cannot and should therefore be excluded from the analysis 
(Munck 2005). Scholars like Alvarez et al. (1996); Huntington (1991: 11f); Geddes (1999); 
Linz (1975) and Cheibub et al. (1996) argue in favor of a dichotomous approach. These 
authors defend a rigid demarcation of what democracy is, and is not, as democracy can then 
be easily misused by leaders of authoritarian systems of rule calling themselves democrats. 
(Sartori 1987)  
Other scholars like Dahl (1971), Coppedge and Reinicke (1990); Diamond (1999) and 
Lindberg (2006) understand democracy as a matter of degree and place the political regimes 
along a continuum. Democracy is thus understood not as an either-or concept but as one of 
extent18. For the purpose of this analysis, a dichotomous conceptualization can be considered 
as an unsuitable analytic tool as it does not take into account limitations, which would mean 
that no country in the world would be considered a democracy. This study respectively leans 
on a “graded approach” towards democracy as this provides for more information and is more 
sensitive to the various graduations of political systems that always exist in the real world.  
 
2.3.1. What is a Transition? 
After O’Donnell and Schmitter’s seminal work, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (1986), 
it was assumed that any country moving away from authoritarian rule could be considered as 
transitioning towards democracy. By the mid 1990s, however, discussions of “hybrid 
regimes”, “electoral authoritarianism”, and “virtual democracy” have attained prominence. 
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 Collier and Levitsky (1997) reportedly stopped counting at 550 subtypes while reviewing the democratization 
literature of the 1990s. These subtypes are a matter of degree and can be found somewhere along a continuum.  
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(e.g. Archer 1995; Collier, Levitsky 1997; Joseph 1997; Przeworski 1988) negating the 
transition paradigm. (Carothers 2002) It became clear that democratic transition is not a linear 
process that moves from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. Given the exclusivist nature 
of the political systems it is bound to be “messy, fitful and frustrating” (Nasong’o, Murunga 
2007:8), with many advances and setbacks along the way. Huntington (1991) emphasizes and 
warns that the future status of democracy in the world might itself be in question and that a 
new reverse wave may be gathering which could lead to the erosion of some third wave gains. 
With respect to elections and their role within the transition process, Huntington (1991: 174)19 
further noted that multiparty elections mean the demise of dictatorships. The early beginning 
of the 1990s was celebrated as the new political renewal worldwide (Ayittey 1992; Hyden, 
Bratton 1992; Joseph 1992); however, soon after, pessimistic statements (above all with 
respect to African countries) dominated the academic discussion. (Ake 1996; Carothers 1997; 
Akinrinade 1998; Bratton 1998; Joseph 1998; Villalon 1998; Chabal, Daloz 1999; Schicho 
2003) During this period various diminished subtypes of democracy appeared, which, in turn, 
have been criticized as misleading since they represent rather negations than descriptions of 
democracy.  
 
A political transition is thus not a democratic order in itself; it is rather a beginning of a long 
process. As Jeong (2005: 114) points out: “Holding elections is only the first step toward the 
establishment of a functioning political system and multiparty democracy. Political stability is 
not immediately brought about by elections without stable institutional relations and 
consensus on political values. Democratic development has to be based on social consensus 
regarding the system of rules that govern the expression of political differences and 
competition.” Rather than being the end of the transition period, elections can be part of the 
transitional period (Barkan 2000; Lindberg 2006).   
 
The term political transition is used here with reference “to a period in a country’s 
development when conscious efforts are made to overcome a political order characterized by 
institutional disarray and normative incongruence, recurring political instability, institutional 
breakdown as well as extreme civil disorders by substituting it with one that is institutionally 
coherent and stable, and above all, capable of responding to the demands emanating from an 
interplay of social interests and claims.” (Ninsin 1998a: 4)  
In the transition process, as Ninsin continues to argue, different social classes engaged in the 
process normally espouse different political agendas. In terms of objectives in the transition 
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 He claims that “elections are not only the life of democracy, they are also the death of dictatorship.” 
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politics, these different social forces pursue a democratic project that has different meanings. 
As the case of Ghana might illustrate, on the one hand, “for different opposition groups the 
movement for political reform was a fight against military dictatorship; it was either for 
constitutional rule, civilian rule, human rights; or a combination of a number of these. For the 
Rawlings regime […] the issue at stake in the transition politics from the early 1980s was 
simply a struggle for power.” (Ninsin 1998a: 9)  
 
2.3.2. Menu of Manipulation 
The idea of democracy has become so closely identified with elections that we are in danger 
of forgetting that the modern history of representative elections is “a tale of authoritarian 
manipulations as much as it is a saga of democratic triumphs”. (Schedler 2002b: 36) The 
transitions to democracy produced new forms of authoritarianism and regimes that hold 
elections and tolerate some pluralism and inter-party competition, but at the same time violate 
minimal democratic norms so severely and systematically that it makes no sense to classify 
them as democracies.20 Additionally, in a number of transitions authoritarian rulers, instead of 
quitting the political scene, opted for entering the electoral arena themselves. Schedler 
(2002a: 103) argues that their main aim was simultaneously not to lose power and to 
legitimize their continuity in office through elections. They thus tried to control the electoral 
process in order to minimize the risk of defeat21.  
 
Authoritarian rulers thus may agree to liberalize the rules of the game only as they hope to 
maintain everything under control. In later transitions, the authoritarian rulers have been 
innovative and have broadened their repertoire of “survival strategies.” (Brumberg, 2000) 
Skidmore (1989: 30) asks how do rulers manage to “retain power while cultivating some 
semblance of electoral legitimacy” and Schedler (2002a: 104) responds in claiming that they 
have “a broad array of safeguards at their disposal” and they use a combination of various 
strategies of electoral control. Zakaria (1997: 22, 25) argues that a growing number of leaders 
who came to power through “open and fair” elections, are “routinely ignoring constitutional 
limits on their power and depriving citizens of basic rights and freedoms.” 
The strategies might include electoral fraud (voter rigging, expelling voters from poling 
stations), legislative amendments favorable for the incumbent or political repression of the 
opponents. However, the repression is “not continual, but selective and intermittent as 
irregular episodes of harassment make fewer international headlines”. (Schedler 2002a: 106)  
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 For similar recent diagnoses, see Linz (2000); Carothers (2002); Schedler (2002a).  
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 Joseph (1998b: 56, 59) talks of “democracy as deception”.  
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Another strategy often used in transitional societies by the incumbent is manipulating the 
actor space: often the transitional elections are won by the incumbent not due to their own 
“cleverness but the ineptitude of [their] opponents.” (McFaul 2000: 23) As most transitional 
regimes lack a consolidated party system, (Segert 1994a; Segert, Machos 1995) authoritarian 
rulers can take advantage of the uncertain transitional environment and split or marginalize 
upcoming inexperienced oppositional forces. Some of the most widespread strategies used by 
the incumbent to manipulate the actor space and deal with the oppositional forces are 
exclusion and fragmentation. (Schedler 2002a: 106) Through exclusion, the adversaries can 
be kept out of the electoral arena. The means range from physical elimination, which is the 
most extreme form to “more common” and “milder techniques” (Monga 1997: 159) of 
banning parties and candidates. Schedler (2002a: 106) talks of “hand-tailoring” of legal 
instruments by the ruling parties to permit them to exclude opponents from electoral 
competition. The second strategy is fragmentation. Sithhole (1997: 136) claims that “once 
long-dominant ruling parties are forced to accept the inevitability of multi-partyism, they 
often try to ensure their control over the transition [by] encouraging the creation of ‘friendly’ 
opposition parties, and infiltrating others with a view to keeping them as weak and unstable as 
possible.” The parties can be banned entirely as was the case in Uganda, or informal practices 
may occur by “harassing or bribing the leaders of any new parties” until they split or they 
members defect. (Barkan, Ng’ethe 1998: 33) Schedler (2002b: 43) further claims that to 
prevent voters from acquiring fair knowledge about available choices, incumbents may strive 
to prevent oppositional forces from disseminating their campaign messages. Oppositional 
forces may find themselves closed out of the public space by denial of their rights to speak, 
peaceably assemble, or move about freely, or being deprived of reasonable access to media 
and campaign resources. 
Another manipulation tactics is manipulating rules of representation, when biased rules of 
representation are designed to prevent an eventual loss of votes from translating into a loss of 
power22. Manipulating of the issue space occurs when the incumbent constructs new social 
and ethnic cleavages or exploits the existing ones through the deployment of external or 
internal violence such as President Museveni is doing in the North of Uganda in the 
protracted conflict with the LRA (Lords’ Resistance Army). Snyder (2000) confirms that a 
substantial number of authoritarian elites in democratizing countries have been surviving by 
“persuading” citizens of the saliency of ethnic cleavages that have not been politicized before.  
Unfair competition, another crucial strategy from the menu of manipulation occurs when 
incumbents and opposition parties meet under explicitly unfair conditions, whereby the main 
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themes of unfairness are money, media and time. (Schedler 2002a: 108; Schedler 2002b: 44) 
The incumbents enjoy generous access to public financing and public exposure at the same 
time. Usually, electoral authoritarians enjoy ample access to public funds and favorable public 
exposure and they are backed by the whole apparatus of the state often including government-
run media. They further posses the means to harass or intimidate privately owned media 
organs into ignoring opposition candidates. Time is another crucial resource at incumbents’ 
disposal, as will be demonstrated in this study on the example of all three case studies. All 
three incumbents of the time, Jerry J. Rawlings of Ghana, Vladimír Mečiar of Slovakia and 
Yoweri K. Musevi of Uganda amended the respective electoral laws just a few months before 
the Election Day and disabled their opponents to organize in a respective manner. 23  
The campaigning in the pre-election period often includes unfair practices of competition, 
when authoritarian incumbents tend to treat their adversaries with contempt (Monga 1997: 
165); or they organize aggressive campaigns with the aim of destroying the public reputation 
of opposition candidates. (Wiseman 1998: 65)24 To Dahl (1971: 3) the problem lies in the fact 
that not only are the minimal standards of civility and truthfulness violated, even more 
importantly, the incumbent proceeds without brakes, “without the countervailing force of 
alternative source of information.” However, not only pre-election situations must be “free 
and fair” in order to ensure for a democratic outcome. Elections must be irreversible as they 
are a meaningful exercise of democratic governance only if voters are able to endow elected 
officials with real power. Yet even if elections are decisive ex ante, with elected 
representatives enjoying full constitutional authority, they may still fail to be decisive ex post. 
(Schedler 2002b: 44) 
 
2.3.3. Elections as Two-level Games 
When dealing with transitional societies and elections in electoral autocracies and electoral 
democracies, the question of interest is: When are authoritarian elections regime-sustaining 
and when are they regime-subverting? What makes elections in some cases instruments of 
power for the incumbent (as in the case of Uganda), in others for the opposition (as in the 
cases of Ghana and Slovakia)? This study is based on Schedlers (2002b: 49) findings that to a 
large extent, it is the strategic interaction between authoritarian incumbents and the 
democratic opposition that determines how the “structural ambiguity of electoral autocracies 
plays out”.  
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The ambivalent and thus (usually) contested nature of flawed elections implies that elections 
do not unfold as simple games but as two-level games, or what Tsebelis (1990) calls “nested 
games”, where “the game in the principle arena is nested inside a bigger game where the rules 
of the game themselves are variable.” (Tsebelis 1990: 8) Schedler (2002a: 110) explains that 
“at the same time as incumbents and opponents measure their forces in the electoral arena, 
they battle over the basic rules that shape the electoral arena. Their struggle over institutional 
rules is not extraneous to but an integral part of their struggle within prevalent institutional 
rules, as the game of electoral competition is embedded within the meta-game of electoral 
reform.” 
 
The links between these two levels are both causal and strategic. (Schedler 2002a: 110) The 
causal side is manifested in the following way: “the outcomes of the meta-game level – the 
conditions of electoral competition and electoral governance – delimit the probability 
distribution as well as the outer limits of outcomes at the game level. Inversely, the results of 
electoral competition constitute important power resources at the moment of renegotiating the 
basic rules of the game. On the strategic side, actors know about the causal interplay between 
the two levels and adapt their strategic behavior accordingly.” One has to be attentive to both 
levels of the democratizing game, if one wants to understand the rationale of the behavior of 
the oppositional forces and the incumbent and the strategies undertaken by them.  
The interaction between electoral competitiveness and electoral reform (between game and 
meta-game level) which defines “the power of elections” (Di Palma 1990: 85) is thus “self-
reinforcing” (Schedler 2002a: 111) towards democratization. At the same time, the 
simultaneous effect is that the self-reinforcing democratization dynamics triggers a “self-
subversive” spiral that undermines both the institutional and the electoral bases of the 
authoritarian incumbent. As Barkan (2000) and Lindberg (2006) claim that in a sense even 
flawed elections are contributing to democratization as they cultivate democratic behavior 
which triggers democratic values and culture. Barkan (2000: 235f) uses the metaphor of “the 
mouse nibbling at the proverbial piece of cheese. After a period of time, the piece, in this case 
the authoritarian state is no more.” Also van de Walle (2002) states that flawed elections 
generate important experiential lessons.  
However, one also has to bear in mind that democratization is only one possible outcome of 
this interplay, whereas abortion or stagnation of the process constitutes alternative 
possibilities. (Schedler 2002a: 111) That is how a “regressive spiral” of decreasing electoral 
integrity can start. To illustrate the stated more concretely, if the military is controlled by the 
incumbent, the later might use it at any point of the transition to shut down the electoral arena 
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as happened in Uganda after President Museveni came to power. A further possibility is that 
the citizens themselves, who are the ultimate decision-makers in the election process, comply 
with the practices of the ruling party and electoral authoritarianism may settle down as a 
stable solution. (Case 1996) This scenario is probably currently happening in Uganda after the 
opening up the space of political contestation in year 2005.  
 
2.3.4. Strategic Choices and Dilemmas  
There is a cycle of strategic choices, or conflictual interactions which revolve around electoral 
processes. (Schedler 2002a: 112) These choices (portrayed here in a very simplified manner) 
include on the side of the opposition (at the game level of electoral competition) the decision 
if to boycott or participate in the elections before the elections take place and if to protest or 
accept the outcome after the results have been announced. Lindberg (2006: 128) distinguishes 
between two variables of opposition behavior, namely opposition participation and loser’s 
acceptance. The decisive question with respect to opposition participation is whether to 
participate in or boycott the elections. The opposition parties may participate even in non-
legitimate and non-free and fair elections in order to press authoritarian rulers to democratize 
further, but on the other hand they can also boycott legitimate elections in hopes of 
discrediting a ruling regime when there is no chance of winning. (Lindberg 2006: 128) With 
respect to the second variable, opposition parties may decide to challenge the results in order 
to gain political advantages e.g. from the international community. Opposition groups rarely 
boycott the elections in order to discredit them; on the other hand the results of democratic 
elections are rejected or contested far too often. This means that opposition parties do play 
along the rules of the game but to some extent only when it suits their interests. (Lindberg 
2004: 20)  
Lindberg (2006: 128) claims that even when it comes to protesting against an incumbent (as 
opposed to uniting for a common platform in electoral alliance), opposition forces cannot 
unite as was the case in Uganda. Lindberg’s (2006: 129) study indicates that boycotts of 
various kinds are not that common in Africa; however, the strategy of disputing results to 
question the legitimacy of the process and the winning of the adversary is used too frequently. 
As efforts to discredit a legitimate and democratic process (free and fair elections) are seen as 
undemocratic behavior, opposition parties with such practices cannot be seen as apriori pro-
democratic actors. Lindberg (2006: 130) observes a difference with respect to transitional 
elections and associates them with a different pattern of oppositional behavior. He claims that 
oppositional parties participate in almost all these elections and the losing parties accept the 
outcome in more than 75 percent of the cases. He concludes that opposition participation and 
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acceptance of the outcome are part of the answer to how and why electoral democracies 
develop into democracies and the behavior of the opposition thus fosters democratization by 
elections.  
 
In case an opposition wins the election, it is the ruling party which has to decide if it is going 
to accept or reverse the outcome of the elections. Schedler (2002a: 112f) states that in case of 
acceptance, “the transition has come to an end and the two-level game of democratization by 
elections is over.” However, the incumbent may decide to perpetuate the two-level dynamic 
by introducing “corrective” measures. In the pre-election period, the incumbent might use any 
of the strategies from the “menu of manipulation”; in the post-election period (in case of 
opposition victory) he might introduce “post-electoral safeguards” such as adjusting official 
election results; jailing the newly elected president in case of presidential election or strip 
legislators of their mandates; intimidating and “persuading” of the opposition actors to cross 
floors and join their ranks etc. Naturally, the democratization game is also over when the 
incumbent responds to his defeat by closing the electoral arena and staging a military coup 
d’etat.  
 
Schedler (2002a: 113) points out that the strategic choices for opposition actors lie at the 
game level of electoral competition, while the major choices for the incumbents lie at the 
meta-game level of the electoral reform and institutional change. This asymmetry of choices 
raises from the asymmetry of resources these actors control. It is logical that the correlation of 
forces determine actor strategies on both levels of the game. The powers of the incumbent are 
much greater in scope as they have both the influence to decide whether they want to initiate 
any reforms in between the elections, or if they want to act within the existing framework and 
to respect or subvert it during the electoral periods.  
 
On the other hand, the crucial “joker” of the opposition is the question of electoral legitimacy. 
Whereas, the incumbents control the terms of electoral competition, opposition parties control 
the terms of electoral legitimacy. (Schedler 2002a: 113; Lindberg 2006) Schedler (2002a: 
113) calls the denial of legitimacy the “major bargaining chip” of the opposition, as every 
incumbent who wants to tighten the grips of the power needs for “at least a semblance of 
electoral legitimacy” the cooperation of its adversaries. As soon as the ruling power opens up 
an electoral competition with at least some measure of genuine plurality, a fundamental shift 
of power is at stake. Even if the incumbents continue to control the structural conditions of 
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the game, “they surrender control over its conditions of acceptability to opposition parties.” 
(ibid: 113) 
Each side controls valuable resources of the other, the opposition parties care about conditions 
of electoral competition, the incumbents care about electoral legitimacy, and they become 
strategically interdependent. In order to achieve any goal and to move forward, each side has 
to try to make cooperative moves across game levels. “Incumbents try to get what they want 
at the game level (opposition participation) by deploying the resources they command at the 
meta-level. Their opponents try to get what they want at the meta-level (democratizing 
reform) by using the leverage they have at the game level.” (Schedler 2002a: 113f)  
 
During this interaction and strategic interdependence, several dilemmas of actors on both 
sides arise. The dilemma of the incumbent is to bring opposition parties into the game but at 
the same time to keep them under control, as their main interest lies in legitimizing their 
continuity in power and not in institutionalizing democracy. (Schedler 2002a: 114) Monga 
(1997: 159) states that the whole process is a balancing act while “rational governments” will 
not try to distort the electoral process as much as possible but only as much as necessary to 
assure a win. Joseph (1998a: 9) talks about the search for democratic “legitimacy via 
controlled elections.” The dilemma of the opposition is that entering in the electoral arena, 
participating in it and thus democratizing the pre-democratic electoral game means 
legitimizing it at the same time. On the other hand, if they stay outside they miss the 
opportunity to participate and thus get into power. Schedler (2002a: 114) concludes that 
“contesting manipulated elections may perpetuate their ambivalent nature, but it may well be 
the only way of subverting them.”  
 
The dilemmas faced by both sides are heightened by the uncertainties about the outcome of 
democratization by the election processes. As O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 3, 5) claim, 
transitions from authoritarian rule are times of “extraordinary uncertainty” and 
“indeterminacy”. If opposition parties are weak, they have little to lose by boycotting the 
elections, if they are strong they have much to win by participating (as was the case in 
Ghana), but much to lose as well if robbed of their victory by electoral fraud. If they boycott 
they may or may not achieve democratic reform at the meta-level; if they participate they may 
or may not make progress at the game level. (Schedler 2002a: 117) 
 
Schedler (2002a: 115) argues that “during the whole process of democratization, ‘measuring’ 
actors’ relative competitiveness is very much a matter of informed guesses.” It can happen 
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that the authoritarian rulers miscalculate their power position and they open up the electoral 
process under the firm expectation of winning (as happened in Ghana in 2000, when Jerry 
Rawlings obeyed the constitution and stepped down, because NDC was sure of winning); or 
on the other hand it can happen that the opposition challengers overestimate their popularity 
and have to admit that the citizens decided to prolong the incumbents term in office by their 
own free will as happened in Uganda. 
This uncertainty and ambivalence of the democratization process can be managed by a 
combination of different strategies (Schedler 2002a: 117f) where both sides have ample 
opportunities of combining at their disposal.  
 
Schedler further claims that the major strategy of the opposition may be found in improving 
competitiveness by electoral gains or in improving structural conditions by electoral reform; 
however, the later is due to asymmetric resource distribution between opposition and 
incumbent less probable than the former. The strategies of improving competitiveness might 
of course differ or are combined and include appeal to legacy and tradition or interaction with 
other segments of the society. As a response to the strategies of the opposition, also 
incumbents might combine different strategies from their “menu of manipulation.” The 
selection and employment of strategic choices of the oppositional forces to improve their 
competitiveness with respect to the incumbent are the main interest of this thesis. There is a 
need for better understanding of the dynamics of opposition behavior and its role in protracted 
transitions where elections are not the end of the process but steps to attaining democracy. 
(Lindberg 2006) Before proceeding to individual case study chapters where the employed 
strategies of the opposition political parties will be explained in detail the concept of 
oppositional forces, as used and understood in this study, will be outlined.  
 
2.4. Concept of Oppositional Forces 
The third and final part of the theoretical chapter introduces the concept of oppositional 
forces. It firstly provides an overview of the role and contribution of the opposition in a 
democratic system and its crucial importance in democratizing societies. It further outlines the 
need for a broader definition of opposition in democratizing context including the spatial 
dimension to understanding of opposition and analyzes the behavior of oppositional forces in 
the space of political contestation with the use of governance theories.  
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2.4.1. Role and Contribution of the Opposition in a Democratic System 
There is a common agreement in the academic literature on opposition that its role is crucial 
to the functioning of democracy, not only in terms of providing electoral choice and offering 
an alternative government, but also in terms of subjecting the incumbent to constant critical 
examination. (Wiseman 1990) Ionescu and de Madariaga (1971) see political opposition as 
the most advanced and institutionalized form of political conflict. The essence of political 
opposition lies in its provision of a democratic basis for a competitive struggle for power. 
Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah (2008: 141) see the contribution of the opposition particularly to 
good governance and democracy in the fact that they tend to legitimize democratic politics 
and are responsible for the high voter turn-out in the elections. Furthermore, the activities of 
opposition parties through parliamentary motions and initiating debates help to expose the 
government to the citizens, and thus prevent abuse of power, breach of human rights and 
waste of public funds. Classical theories on the role of organized opposition generally ascribe 
three main benefits to its existence within a political system, namely: representation of 
minority interests and values; provision of rare or restricted information both to the 
government and the public, and exercise of surveillance and control over the policies and 
actions of the government.25 As accountability, rule of law and respect for human rights 
flourish only in systems where an alternative government is waiting, classical opposition is a 
sine non qua of democratic governance.  
 
Roth and Wilson (1976: 440) identify distinctive components of political stability as 
legitimacy, management of conflict and durability. A political system is stable when the 
public perceives its institutions and leaders as legitimate, which means when they enjoy 
general support. Max Weber (1947) identifies three kinds of legitimacy or authority: 
traditional, charismatic and rational-legal. The stability of the nation depends among others on 
how the ruling party approached the problems of nation building and especially the issue of 
political opposition. Also Ionescu and de Madariaga (1971) claim that effective political 
competition through legitimate channels such as the political system decreases the likelihood 
of violence and ensures stability. On the other hand, violence and confrontation become ready 
tools for the opposition in a situation where the ruling party or political system deprives those 
in opposition of the channels for effective political participation in the affairs of the state.  
Boafo-Arthur (1993: 228) shows on the example of Ghana, that when the political situation 
was unstable a military intervention in the country proceeded. During the First Republic the 
CPP (Convention Peoples Party) lost its constitutional legitimacy on account of the methods 
                                                 
25
 For detailed discussion of the functions of the opposition in democracies see Dahl (1966). 
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of governance it adopted and the environment of “chronic instability” created an opportunity 
for the military to intervene. (ibid: 229). The Progress Party (PP) leading the Second Republic 
was not able to cope with the difficult economic situation (Goldworthy 1973: 11) and its 
harsh economic measures adopted with accordance of WB and IMF policies were extremely 
unpopular among the public and destroyed the democratic government’s public support. This 
change in public perceptions and climate made the government vulnerable for the next 
military coup d’etat. (Ronald 1976: 67) When Dr. Hilla Limann came to power in 1972 and 
the Third Republic came into existence, the country was politically unstable after the brief 
intervention of the AFRC and economically devastated after the economic mismanagement of 
previous governments. The economic crisis and the poor performance of the government26 in 
this respect affected the support base of the regime and undermined its constitutional 
legitimacy. (Hanson 1987: 172) The involvement of opposition in the process and cooperation 
between opposition and ruling system can significantly enhance the stability of the country. 
By finding lasting solutions to national problems, the legitimacy of the democratic system is 
assured, its capabilities at conflict management enhanced and its durability guaranteed. 
 
2.4.2. Opposition and Its Importance 
Lindberg (2006: 131) analyzes if opposition participation in an election also advances the 
three major qualities of democracy, namely if opposition participation also increases voter 
turnout (participation), while decreasing the winning candidates’ and party’s share of votes 
and/or seats (competitiveness), and contributes to acceptance of the outcome by losers 
(legitimacy). In other words, does opposition participation also promote institutionalization of 
competitive elections? Another question of interest is: When do authoritarian regimes become 
electoral or liberal democracies, and what is the role of opposition behavior in facilitating 
such a development?  
Voter turnout is an important dimension of quality of democracy (Altman, Perez-Linan 2002) 
and an indirect measure of popular legitimacy. (Lijphart 1999) Lindberg (2006: 131) claims 
that participation of opposition parties has indirect effects on the quality of the regime via 
increasing popular participation. A second set of indicators is the level of competition. For 
people to have a choice there must be at least two alternatives. Legal provisions for equal 
political participation must exist. (Dahl 1971) However, it is not sufficient if the contestation 
and formation of alternatives is de jure allowed for and there is a provision for alternation of 
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 The pressures for good performance were increased by Rawlings warning that the PNP politicians were in 
power “only on probation”. Additional factor was the internal struggle within the party for positions. (Boafo-
Arthur 1993: 234)  
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power, but de facto electoral competition is likely to be low or non-existent27 and alternations 
in power virtually absent in non-democratic countries holding elections. (Dahl 1989; 
Diamond 2002; Schedler 2002a; van de Walle 2002) 
 
Przeworski (1986: 57-61), among others, states that alternation in the manifestation of power 
is an important indicator of democracy. To Schedler (1998: 99) the ultimate proof of any 
democratic electoral system is alternation in power. Stoess and Segert (1997: 386) highlight 
that consolidation of democratic institutions takes place with the emergence of a differentiated 
party system and subsequent accepted alternation in power from the incumbent towards the 
opposition. “If a de jure competitive electoral regime is truly competitive, it is likely at some 
point to result in alternations in power. Alternations in power are not a necessary condition for 
democracy or democratic qualities. Elections can be truly competitive without turnovers, and 
in some cases one party can rule for many electoral cycles. Yet, when a peaceful turnover of 
power occurs, we have unambiguous evidence that the election results have been accepted by 
the losing incumbent.” (Lindberg 2006: 42)  
 
However, despite this shared acknowledgment on the importance of the opposition there 
neither exist a consistent theory nor a unified definition of opposition which can be applicable 
to other political systems then consolidated democracies. (Ionescu, Madariaga 1971) There is 
no agreement who or what actually constitutes the opposition. As there is a significant lack of 
empirical studies about the role, function, and performance of opposition in non-Western 
settings, my research aims to contribute to a better understanding of the operational dynamics 
of oppositional forces in democratizing societies. I will distance myself from the narrow 
Eurocentric notion of opposition applicable solely to Western advanced democratic societies 
while broadening the definition through inclusion of a plurality of stakeholders and placing 
them into a spatial setting, as there are multiple oppositions within one political system. In 
democratizing societies, the provisions for the expressions of the oppositional political parties 
are in many cases very limited, many opposition activities occur outside the framework of 
political parties. That is why I propose to use the term oppositional forces instead of the term 
opposition. I consider the term oppositional forces (in relation to opposition) more appropriate 
to cover a broader spectrum of different actors, types, modes and forms of opposition active in 
a variety of political systems. The association of opposition with the notion of forces has been 
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 On the other hand, as Sartori (1968) argues too much competition can create problems. Too many parties in 
the legislature make a fragmented party system (Sartori 1968) that deters governability and thus effective 
representation and consequently leads, in certain aspects, towards too much democratic quality.  
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used in academic literature by several scholars. Walter Euchner states that opposition can be 
described as “forces that antagonize the ruling power within a given polity” (Euchner 1993: 
7). Ros Prizzia defines the concept of oppositional forces as “groups of people mobilized to 
oppose or change the government.” Bassam Tibi understands opposition as a political force 
contesting the political power or at least enforcing the incumbent rulers to incorporate 
oppositional interests in the decision-making process. (Tibi 1993: 160) 
Significant broadening of the traditional notion of the opposition has been acknowledged by 
many scholars in the academic literature on opposition. The main reason seems to be that 
many opposition activities occur outside the framework of political parties. Furthermore, in 
democratizing societies, it becomes very difficult to assess the real strength of the opposition 
parties, as it is a varying mix of underground activity and of recognized and tolerated activity 
and cooperation with other non-political actors.  
Such a broader definition of oppositional forces is of particular significance in post-
authoritarian democratizing societies, where political parties were a priori not legitimate and 
often not allowed to operate. The provisions for the expressions of constitutional opposition 
are in many cases very limited with little prospects for overcoming the crisis, so the 
emergence of other oppositional forces became necessary to contest power against 
authoritarian regimes.28 
 
The so-called “non-institutionalized” or “non-party”29 type of opposition (Dahl 1966; Dahl 
1973; Blondel 1997) have found their way into definition of opposition and thus enable us  to 
apply the concept of opposition to different types of political systems, as well as to different 
types of situations.  
 
However, in my opinion, demarcating precisely the spheres of influence of the so-called 
conventional (institutionalized) and non-conventional (non-institutionalized) forms of 
oppositional forces and drawing a sharp borderline between those two is almost impossible, as 
they are often intertwined and their activities are dependent from each other. The analysis of 
their actions and interactions shows that the boundaries between the system of decision 
making (which is associated with the political, institutionalized actors) and the system of 
exerting influence (connected to activities of non-political, non-institutionalized actors) 
                                                 
28
 “Some six or seven years after the great opening of the early 1990s, however, the inadequacies of oppositional 
party politics as a way of rescuing African states from deep-seated structural difficulties are clear.” (Clapham  
1997: 549)  
29
 However, majority of these distinctions have been made with respect to established Western democracies. 
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(Helms 2002) are fluid and blurred and it is therefore not possible to permanently attach one 
particular actor/force to one particular type of opposition. (Helms 2002) 
Further concern that needs to be taken into account when studying opposition is that it is a 
dependent concept and its profile changes with time even within a single political system 
depending on current power sharing relations, strategies of the actors undertaken or the 
structure of the party system in a given context to name just a few. A possible solution to the 
problem would be a spatial understanding of the oppositional forces and their unification 
within this space without allocating different actors to predetermined obsolete categories.  
 
My thesis advances the argument that all oppositional forces (parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary opposition, party and non-party opposition, opposition of political and non-
political groups) are situated within a dynamic interactive space30 of political contestation.  
The boundaries of this space31 are rather fluid, thus allowing and enabling the oppositional 
forces to enter, leave and re-enter the space, respectively, according to their current needs and 
thus contest political power. The oppositional forces consist of a plurality of relevant key 
actors such as individuals, groups, organizations, institutions who often become active only 
on specific issues and for particular periods of time. Grote and Gbikpi (2002: 21) argue that 
“[…] two crucial political choices have to be made with regard to who has the right to 
participate and what the decision-making rules will be. Regarding the right to participate, 
persons/organizations should be entitled to participate depending on their possession of some 
quality or resource relevant to the substance of the problem that has to be solved. Regarding 
the decision-making rules (consultation, vote, negotiation, consensus, unanimity), the most 
effective choice for governance arrangements seems to be consultation and negotiation (or in 
other words arguing and bargaining) aiming at reaching a consensus based on exchanges of 
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 While referring to spatial dimension of the opposition Dahl (1966) uses the term “site”. “Because it seeks to 
bring about a change in the behavior of the government, an opposition will employ some of its political resources 
to persuade, induce, or compel a government to alter its conduct. The situation or circumstances in which an 
opposition employs its resources to bring about a change might be called a site for encounters between 
opposition and government.” (Dahl 1966: 338)  
Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) and Stepan (1997) talk of an “arena”. “By political society in a democratizing 
setting I mean that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise 
control over public power and the state apparatus. By civil society I refer to that arena of the polity where self-
organizing groups, movements and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate 
values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests.” (Stepan 1997: 663) 
31
 I am using the “spatial understanding” of oppositional forces in order to express the flexibility and fluidity of 
the concept on the one hand, and to point to the interaction and cooperation of the actors on the other. The 
oppositional forces become active only on specific issues and for certain periods of time, and thus positioning 
them into “the space of political contestation” enables them to enter, leave and re-enter the space respective to 
their needs. This space setting can be also described by a metaphor of a stage in theatre, which is a different kind 
of space. The performers are coming on stage, or coming into the stage, playing their role, leaving and returning 
later on again. For academic literature on “politics as spectacle” see e.g. Goffman (1959).  
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differences in the intensity of preferences among participants, and efforts at convincing each 
other to change those preferences and some process of arriving at a compromise via mutual 
concessions. […] In short, all those possessing some quality or resource to solve a concrete 
problem or to resolve a specific conflict should have the entitlement to participate.” 
 
The “issue-and-time” argument is very important for the composition and shaping of the 
oppositional space and speaks for a further analytical and more structural differentiation 
between the oppositional forces. However, not on the basis of institutionalization, or on the 
basis of the structure of the power as this might change and a civil society organization, social 
movement or a trade union might become a political party over time (which is often the case 
in post-authoritarian democratizing societies) or a civil society organization might, at certain 
period of time, be much more powerful than an established political party (which in reality, 
would not be allowed to operate). To pro-democracy groups, the creation of District 
Assemblies in Ghana was a sign that the government was not willing to return to 
constitutional multi-party rule but rather tried to follow its “original populist program of 
establishing a kind of grassroots democracy” (Ninsin 1998b: 54) which would form the base 
of any future government at the national level. During this period the various pro-democracy 
civic associations joint their forces, build alliances in order to form a more united front and 
showed greater consistency in their demands for a return to constitutional multi-party rule vis-
à-vis the government. With respect to different stages of transition from non-democratic to 
democratic form of establishment – liberalization, democratization and consolidation32 of 
democratic institutions as proposed by O’Donnell and Schmitter – the liberalization phase in 
CEE countries began with formation of anti-communist forces represented in form of civic 
initiatives (such as Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia), groups of intellectual elites and artists, or 
trade unions. Their main aim was initially to create a public space for discussion and gain 
individual rights and freedoms and only later (with increasing repression) transferred to 
change of the regime as such. (Stoess, Segert 1997: 382)  
 
As the number and type of groups in oppositional space has an impact on the outcome of the 
opposition initiatives, I prefer to analyze oppositional forces with respect to time periods and 
consistency in pursuing their goals and positions and thus distinguish between “permanent” 
oppositional forces (being political parties) and more “circumstantial/situational, or transient” 
oppositional forces, whose opposition is (but must not be) issue-based. The later forces might 
                                                 
32
 For definition of consolidation see Merkel (1996). 
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decide to join their activities with the permanent forces in the context of democratization, 
when the political parties do not have sufficient power and capacity to be able to challenge the 
ruling (post-) authoritarian government on their own and thus become temporally even more 
prominent and important than the permanent ones.  In accordance, Kooiman (2003: 11) argues 
that “governance issues arise in interaction between ‘the’ political and ‘the’ social”. The 
interdependencies between these actors and entities (individuals, organizations, institutions) 
must be recognized, as no single actor [in this case political parties] has the knowledge and 
information required to solve complex, dynamic and diversified societal challenges; no single 
actor has sufficient potential to dominate unilaterally”  
 
Such a definition of oppositional forces would include important actors, other than political 
parties, central to the study of transition and democratization, such as civil society, media, 
private sector, pressure groups, social movements, communal groups, churches, 
environmental bodies, Diaspora, academicians, experts, scientists, professionals, intellectuals, 
and lawyers.33 However, determining a fixed set of stake holders is impossible, as each 
context requires a specific approach and a highly context bounded analysis with respect to 
time and place.34 This means that current Ugandan oppositional forces and thus the space they 
are situated in differ not only from Slovak and Ghanaian oppositional forces but also from 
Ugandan oppositional forces in another time periods e.g. during the struggle for independence 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  
This understanding of oppositional forces would allow us to take into consideration the 
specific spatial and temporal circumstances of each country, as opposition has to be set not 
only in its political, but also social, cultural and economic context to be understood in its 
wholeness.  
According to Folson (1993: 32) there may be other groups and associations (interest and 
pressure group, trade unions, employers associations, professional bodies, youth and regional 
associations) which may also participate in shaping the political will. Both formal and 
informal links must be maintained between political parties and these groups. “It is through 
these links that ‘the political will’ of the society is shaped in a democratic system. The formal 
links […] come into play at the stage when executive policy is being formulated or laws are 
being enacted. These links are thus vital to democratic stability. But perhaps even more vital 
                                                 
33
 The set of actors might grow even further. That is why I do aim to differentiate between the most crucial and 
less crucial oppositional forces and concentrate the main part of my analysis on the former group as this would 
make the amount of data and following analysis easier and more transparent.  
34
 “[…] the exact nature of governance and the contribution of various nodes to it are regarded as empirically 
open questions. It is assumed that the specific way in which governmental nodes relate to one another will vary 
across time and space.” (Shearing, Wood 2005: 100) 
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are the informal links, as these enable the groups to make inputs into the formulation of basic 
ideas and attitudes of political parties which underlie much official policy.” The importance 
of informal links, networks and relations35 in transition societies is outlined in Chapter 7 in 
more detail.  
As the opposition is not one coherent group, but includes many different actors and bodies36, 
it is not reasonable to talk of “THE” opposition (Blondel 1997) as the various oppositional 
actors/forces have a different nature and purpose of existence, various strategies and goals to 
be achieved and their position towards government might reach from slight disagreements up 
to absolute rejection of the ruling power.  
“It is therefore not realistic to state, for instance, that ‘the’ opposition is ‘anti-system’ or ‘pro-
system’, as only some parts of the opposition are likely to be anti-system, while other parts 
may clash with the government but be nonetheless pro-system, and yet others may merely 
criticize the government on minor points. Thus the ‘landscape’ of the opposition is 
determined by the differences which exist among the opposition bodies in the distance 
between the goals of each of these bodies and those of the government.” (Blondel 1997: 470) 
 
2.4.3. Behavior of Oppositional Forces within the Space of Political Contestation 
There is a variety of possibilities considering the behavior, tactics and strategies of the 
oppositional forces within the space of political contestation. To understand and be able to 
analyze the behavior of oppositional forces and their interactions within the space this study 
applies the inter-active governance concept of Jan Kooiman (2000, 2003) and the network 
governance concept of Sorensen and Torfing (2007) as these proved to be useful tools in 
explaining cooperation strategies of involved actors.  
The oppositional forces which entered the space of political contestation might act 
individually for their own benefit or they might decide to build up a network in order to 
produce innovative solutions and advance their competitiveness with respect to the incumbent 
regime. With respect to this, Blondel (1997: 486) states that “the strength of the opposition 
depends on its cohesiveness.” Bryson and Crosby (1993: 323) argue that “organizations and 
institutions must share objectives, resources, activities, power, or some of their authority in 
order to achieve collective gains or minimize losses.” The cooperation between different 
oppositional forces within the space must not be legally binding and long-lasting; on the 
contrary the partnership remains very often situational, as well as temporary and issue 
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 See here also the studies of Segert (1994a); Segert, Machos (1994) and Segert (2007b).  
36
 “Should opposition increasingly be sought, in the pluralist (even postmodernist) manner amongst the multiple 
oppositions to be found in civil society in lobbies and social movements?” (Parry 1997: 460)  
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oriented. (Sorensen, Torfing 2007) The space of political contestation thus becomes dynamic 
and fluctuant. The inter-active governance perspective advocates (Kooiman 2002: 75) that 
societies derive their strength from their diversity, complexity and dynamics which create new 
opportunities. These in turn produce new types of interdependencies and interactions between 
societal and political actors as “no single governing agency is able to realize legitimate and 
effective governing by itself”. (Kooiman 2003: 3) Some of the forms of cooperation and 
spaces are fleeting, one-off consultative events; others are regularized institutions with a more 
durable presence on the governance landscape. (Gaventa 2007) Following these 
developments, issue oriented ad-hoc opposition became the most popular form of joining 
forces recently. (Dahl 1966; Kirchheimer 1976; Steffani 1976) 
 
The communication and interaction within the space is based on crosscutting horizontal 
negotiations (Sorensen, Torfing 2007) between various affected actors. Interplays37, as 
Kooiman (2003: 21f) argues, are the interactions with a typical ‘horizontal’ character. There is 
no formal authority or domination or sub-ordination within them. “Interplays aim to reach 
goals by engaging actors in collective, rather than independent action, and on a generally 
equal basis.” The interplays seem to be the most common mode of interaction between 
opposition political parties and other oppositional forces mostly in the initial phases of their 
cooperation. At the beginning of the transition, the incumbent is controlling the space of 
contestation too extensively and possesses an exaggerated menu of manipulation strategies so 
that political parties alone could counter-balance the hegemonic power and increase their 
competitiveness. In this stage of transition they are almost entirely dependent on the 
assistance of other oppositional forces mostly civil society and media. It is also these actors 
who overtook the role of the political parties in case they have been banned and/or forced to 
operate underground and thus possess the necessary structures, organization and resources to 
act as the opposition. Naturally, with variety of actors representing different interests and 
following numerous goals, interaction conflicts within the space are frequent. As Kooiman 
(2003: 22) stresses: “For governance, individuals interacting in interplays are interesting, but 
horizontal interactions between groups, organizations and other entities are more important. In 
these interplays, tensions between striving for individual and collective interests, always 
present in interactions, relate mainly to differences in organizational goals.” We have to 
constantly bear in mind that the period of transition is characterized by high degrees of 
uncertainty. (O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986) The transition from authoritarian to democratizing 
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 Kooiman (2003: 20-22) differentiates between three forms of societal interactions – interferences, interplays, 
and interventions.  
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society is an extreme kind of situation, in which individual actors are bound together by 
following an overarching aim – entering the space of the incumbent and removing, or at least 
decreasing his hegemonic position. It is highly improbable that these actors would cooperate 
and interact also under normal circumstances in, for example, established democracies. This 
has been proven in both cases of Ghana and Slovakia, when the cooperation of oppositional 
forces ceased after the aim has been reached, the former incumbent removed and replaced 
with opposition. It is thus the common cause – removal of the incumbent – that joins the 
various oppositional forces in democratizing contexts in their efforts.  
The actors within the space can be operationally autonomous, but at the same time 
interdependent. (Sorensen, Torfing 2007) Kooiman (2003: 18) explains that closed systems 
are very dangerous for the dynamics of the interactions, as the energy of the co-governing is 
getting lost. “The more space an interaction creates, the more freedom there is for actors to 
select the values, goals and interests they want to strive after. Conversely, the more inhibiting 
and controlled an interaction, the more it will influence action contrary to the values, goals 
and interests of actors and the degree with which they can aspire to, are influenced by 
structural components of the interactions rather than the actors exerting influence on these 
interactions.”  
 
The collaboration of actors/oppositional forces, their positioning and repositioning within the 
space depends mainly on the benefits, rewards and expectations for self profits that can be 
gained from the cooperation. When talking about interaction, “a mutually influencing relation 
between two or more actors or entities”, Kooiman (2003: 14) differentiates between 
intentional and structural/contextual level in governing interactions. “At the intentional level 
of governing interactions issues such as goals, interests and purpose of individual or corporate 
actors are at stake.” These intentional interactions are always situated in material, social and 
cultural contexts. (ibid: 15) In short-term this structural component is constant and 
predictable, in long term it is perceived as changeable. The structures are produced and 
reproduced by actors in interaction. These two aspects are mutually influencing. “The 
activities of governing actors co-influence the structural conditions within which they govern 
by changing or conserving them, while these structural conditions co-determine these 
governing activities by enabling or controlling them.” (Kooiman 2003: 19) If there are 
tensions between the action level and the structural level the consequence is a system of 
preserving forces and a system of changing forces that are at work in every interaction at the 
same time. (Kooiman 2003: 16) The relationship between social action and social structures – 
“the structure-agency problem” – is one of the central problems in social sciences and 
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initiated with the debates of Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim on one side, and Max Weber on 
the other. Over the years attempts have been made to overcome this dualism (Laclau, Mouffe 
1985; Giddens 1984) with currently maintaining the mainstream position that both actors and 
structures have significance, with shifting weight, depending on the level of interaction and 
what we are studying. (Sztompka 1993) Number of scholars claim that institutions both 
constrain actors’ capabilities and scope of choice (Bates 1989; North 1990) and expand 
individual choice (Ostrom, Schroeder, Wynne 1993) as actors have room to maneuver. Their 
subjective goals and interests matter for outcomes, however, within limits not of their own 
choosing.  
However, I do not aim to draw a clear demarcation line between a structural approach and 
individual actors’ choices as both historical legacies and actors’ strategic choices matter in the 
path-dependent process of creating new polities and economies. Kitschelt et al. (1999: 19) 
claim that “legacies at least initially shape the resources and expectations that help actors to 
define their interests and to select the ways and means to acquire political power.” 
Democratization, as O’Donnell, Schmitter (1986); Segert, Machos (1995); Przeworski, 
Limongi (1997) among others, claim is not only an outcome of deterministic conditions, but 
also of actors and strategies they employ. The variation of actors’ choices and strategies, 
when faced with the collapse of existing authoritarian regimes, is thus not random. (Karl, 
Schmitter 1991) The assumption here is that rational actors prefer to choose political 
institutions that lock in permanent gains and impose lasting losses on their adversaries. 
(Knight 1992; Przeworski 1991) This study thus advances an argument based both, on 
structural path dependency and rationality of the individual actors, whereby the state-society 
relationship is central to understand the political dynamics of the analyzed settings. Weiner 
(1987: xxviii) claims that changing conditions define available options at any given historical 
moment. The decisions, both by internal and external actors can be made only within this 
range38. Structure and process are a precondition for understanding outcomes and politics 
becomes a manifestation of the exercise of choice by multiple actors within existing 
parameters. (Chazan et al. 1999: 24) Political factors account for many social and economic 
realities but are themselves informed by historical, demographic, cultural, ecological, 
ideological, and international factors. These form together the constraints on choices that can 
be made by individual actors. The selection of strategic choices and options available to 
governments, social groups, regional organizations and international agencies must be 
understood, examined and their implications assessed within this context.  
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 See here e.g. the thesis of Segert (2007b) on the positive legacy of socialism. 
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As self-profit and intentional level in governing interactions are very dominant, we have to 
bear in mind that various representatives of the same actor group, for instance, civil society 
organizations can thus belong at the same time to the space of the oppositional forces as well 
as to the space of the ruling power and thus constitute part of different networks. Ninsin 
(1998b: 42) thus argues that for example in Ghana during the authoritarian period 1982-1992, 
a section of civil society acted to expand the realm of political society to ensure enjoyment of 
political freedoms by all citizens whereas simultaneously other civil society actors aimed at 
maintaining the status-quo based on exclusive political society with restricted enjoyment of 
political freedoms.39 These actions of pro-democracy civic associations were led and 
sustained until the ban on political party activities was lifted and political parties were 
allowed to engage in open political activities. Similarly, all other oppositional forces, be it 
media, churches, trade unions and others tend to be separated along pro-opposition versus 
pro-government lines with some of the actors belonging to the space of the opposition, others 
advocating for the cause of the incumbent.  
 
Including various actors into my broader definition of oppositional forces does not 
automatically mean that they all contest political power and aim for government positions in 
an equal way and thus represent “government in waiting”. The contribution of 
transient/situational oppositional forces to political parties in this sense is more or less 
supplementary. Rather than acting as competitors for political rule40 they act as government 
and/or regime opposing forces. Their main contribution is often to enhance voter 
participation, mobilization, provision of civic education, as well as increasing credibility and 
transparency to the whole electoral process. The circumstantial/situational actors are relevant 
to the study of opposition as they constitute a kind of counterforce (active or passive) to the 
incumbent rulers and act as supplementary organs to political parties (However, as stated 
earlier, even if they represent supplementary organs they might, at certain periods of time, be 
even more prominent and important than political parties themselves.)41 Their primary aim is 
replacing the government in power, restructuring of the ruling system while helping the 
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 This study concentrates on civil society organizations active in the political sphere, whose actions either 
enhance or obstruct the course of democracy. Civil society organizations less active in the political realm dealing 
mostly with service delivery activities, which did not engage in the transition politics as a vocation will not be 
subject of further analysis here. It is neither the liberalization of political power, nor consolidation of the existing 
power which is their primary concern, they are mostly apolitical and development oriented.  
40
 Helms (2002) differentiates here between the actors within “Entscheidungssystem” (decision-making system 
including parliamentary or so called institutionalized opposition) and “Einflusssystem” (influence-exerting 
system including extra-parliamentary or non-institutionalized actors). For further analysis see Helms (2002). 
41
 The several military dictatorship attempts have not persisted also because of the involvement and resistance of 
civil society bodies, and no dictatorship has succeeded in ruling them completely out of their existence. Some 
segments of the civil society, above all the professional bodies and religious organizations, have thus evolved a 
liberal culture of resistance to state interference in their affairs.  
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oppositional political parties to gain power in order to contribute to increased opening of the 
political system and/or else, ”waiting”, which in return rewards in financial form, in terms of 
advanced service delivery, or in terms of securing their livelihoods. Gyimah-Boadi and 
Oquaye (2000: 24) argue that the main reasons for pro-democracy civil society organizations 
to join the democratic, liberal front are “constitutional rule, privatization, and general 
economic recovery as well as the growing awareness of civil society organizations […] 
helping to effect important changes in the overall policy environment within which civil 
society organizations and NGOs operate.” Every political activity involves the clash and 
reconciliation of interests. (Wiseman 1990) Such differences will always exist, as competitive 
demands are endemic in any political system. To override or to ignore them will lead to 
differing forms of authoritarianism. The party system is one well tried mechanism to 
accommodate such differences (Anderson 1993: 150) as party systems mirror the conflicting 
structure of every society and the political parties are able to translate the social conflicts into 
political ones. (Stoess, Segert 1997: 393f) It is thus the political parties who become one of 
the bearing agents of the transition period as they are best equipped to accommodate the 
conflicting positions within a transforming society. (Segert, Machos 1995: 26) 
This study acknowledges the fact that multi-party system42 of government is the best means to 
accommodate conflicting interests by peaceful means and by offering meaningful 
participation to the people and legitimacy to the government. Political parties are crucial 
actors of the transition process (Karl, Schmitter 1991) as they serve as agents of political 
modernization and constitute the basic structure of modern political systems. (Segert, Machos 
1995) 
The parties serve as a bridge uniting various sections of the society and the state, and the party 
is therefore influenced by both the state and the society. Political parties serve as guarantees 
of the accomplishment of the “Systemwechsel43” (Merkel 1999) and can be seen as one of the 
actors contributing to political stability of democratic systems. (Segert 1994a: 13) 
The aim of political parties is to win political power through mobilization of people, 
aggregation of diverse interests into national party programs and participation in periodic 
elections. The parties engage in a political contest in which they campaign to influence the 
electorate to accept their programs by voting them into power. The rise and development of 
modern democracies thus go hand in hand with development and proliferation of political 
parties. (Stoess, Segert 1997: 380) Their main objective is to attain or retain political power, 
normally through elections, in order to form the government of the country or, if failing to 
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 “Nearly universally the single party system has degenerated into a form of oligarchic patrimonialism that was 
even unknown in pre-colonial Africa.”(Uwayuzurike 1990: 67) 
43
 For a definition of „Systemwechsel“see Merkel (1999).  
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constitute the opposition. (Ball 1983: 75) Other subunits, like trade unions, professional 
bodies etc. may support candidates, or lobby the government and its agencies in order to 
influence them on certain issues and policy decisions. Drah (1993: 75) further states that 
political parties are the “vehicle” whereas the other subunits of civil society constitute 
building blocks of the political parties, and political parties aggregate their interests, concerns 
and claims into their “policy packages.”  
If the political parties expect to operate in a national democratic environment, then the parties 
themselves must be democratic in conducting their internal affairs in a democratic manner. 
Essuman-Johnson (1993: 197) argues that if the party itself is used to an undemocratic 
internal structure it will find ways and means to subvert national democratic ways of 
operating.  
I therefore acknowledge political parties as the appropriate oppositional bodies, as if 
successful, they become the new incumbents and thus the holders of political power. 
However, in (post)-authoritarian regimes, where the political environment is not so favorable 
to their operations or, in the worse case, proscribe their existence and activities at all, some 
other actors/forces are allowed to enter the space and temporally overtake their function or 
help them to balance the uneven dominating conditions. As Stepan states “[…] oppositional 
forces in civil society can alter the parameters of the political game and thereby create a new 
incentive structure.” (Stepan 1997: 671)  
 
2.5. Importance of Civil Society in Democratizing Societies 
The success of a transition process in democratizing societies depends among others on the 
extent to which the principle political actors agree on the rules of the game and negotiate 
them. According to Ninsin (1998a: 4), one of their main responsibilities in a transition process 
is to systematically redefine the boundaries between state and society, institutionalize rules, 
norms and procedures that will ensure responsible government and safeguard the rights and 
interests of society. This function is in the literature on democratization and transition 
processes most commonly attributed to civil society. As Diamond (1994: 7) argues: “The first 
and most basic democratic function of civil society is to provide the basis for the limitation of 
state power; hence, for the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political 
institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control. This function has two main 
dimensions: to monitor and restrain the exercise of power by democratic states; and to 
democratize authoritarian states.”  
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However, as opposed to civil society optimists, Bangura and Gibbon (1992), among others, 
warn that civil society is only a product of the existing social structure, and that the 
authoritarian tendencies within particular social structures are reflected and reproduced in the 
civic associations that constitute civil society. Civil society is thus only as democratic as its 
associations and bodies which it is made of. (Gaventa 2007) Scholars remind us (see e.g. 
Ninsin 1998a: 5) that it is especially dangerous, particularly in developing countries, to 
attribute to civil society intrinsic democratic tendencies as the emerging social forces lack 
sufficient autonomy from the state and can easily become instruments for enforcing the 
political domination of the incumbent power. Another reason is that in many cases the norms 
and attitudes are significantly regulated by traditional authority structures and ideologies44. 
Civil society in such social formations thus cannot function as free agents capable of 
transforming the authoritarian political structures of society to democratic ones45. Ninsin 
(1998b) argues that in liberal democracies, civil societies are autonomous political realms, 
because the social forces which constitute such arenas are themselves autonomous and 
powerful; however, he denies these attributes for the social forces in democratizing societies. 
According to him, they are economically and politically impoverished and too weak to be 
independent of the state. In Ghana, for instance, the rise of these less autonomous social 
forces, often active in the informal sector like market women, street hawkers, provided the 
Rawlings regime46 with the material for constituting an alternative civil society to the pro-
democracy civil society. (Ninsin 1998a: 12) The weak social forces thus provide ground for 
an authoritarian state as they can be manipulated and mobilized easily. Civil society, 
constituted of these less autonomous social forces, is not able to function as agents of 
democratization (they are rather aborting the process of democratization) and so it is separated 
with two tendencies – pro- and anti-democracy each spearheaded by their own civil society 
organizations.  
The weaknesses in the social structure are reproduced at the level of political action. 
However, the traditional and modern sectors have a symbiotic existence and cannot be 
separated. The point is that in societies with weak social agents, civil societies are very easily 
created by the regimes, or the existing ones are co-opted into state-centered patronage 
networks, and thus cannot be seen with certainty as agents of democratization. (Ninsin 1998a: 
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 On this argumentation, see also the famous study by Mahmood Mamdani on “bifurcated state” consisting of 
the traditional sector of African societies which is seen as an obstacle to democratization and the modern sector 
which is committed to the democratization of state power. E.g. in Mamdani (1995)  
45
 These state-society relations are captured by Bayart’s (1993) “politics of the belly.”  
46
 Ninsin (1998a: 17) reminds us that this strategy was employed already by Nkrumah who mobilized less 
autonomous social forces to propel his party to power in the elections of 1951, 1954 and 1956, and later 
mobilized them once again to consolidate his power.  
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6) To understand the concept as well as the ambiguities of the civil society, a closer look will 
be given to its role within democratizing societies.  
 
2.5.1. Meaning of Civil Society  
Ninsin (1998b: 42) argues that civil society is the realm of social life where organized groups 
intercede between the rest of society and the state with the objective of defining or redefining 
the basis and scope of the rights and obligations of the members of the political community, 
or citizens. To Anheier (2004: 22f) civil society is “the sphere of institutions, organizations 
and individuals located between the family, the state and the market in which people associate 
voluntarily.” Civil society organizations are “self-organized groups that have voluntary 
participation, relative autonomy from family, market, and state, and capacity for collective 
action to advance common interests.” 
Drah (1993: 73) claims in accordance, that civil society47 denotes the presence of a cluster of 
intermediary organizations/associations48 that operate between the primary units of society 
(individuals, family, ethnic groups) and the state. These intermediary groupings include labor 
unions and associations of professionals, farmers, women, youth, and students, religious and 
business organizations, cultural and recreational clubs. Pressure and interest groups are also 
part of the process of political participation. The underlying principle of these organizations 
may be seen in terms of effectiveness in promoting any interest or agenda through collective 
action. They postulate various viewpoints and positions and apply pressures – overt and 
covert – to attain their objectives. These goals can be, according to Ninsin (1998b: 43), 
multiple, including political ones. The relevance of civil society lies in the employment of 
communication, in influencing government policy formulation and implementation. (Oquaye 
2004: 297) Their activities are the center of political and social activity and the whole 
democratic political system can be explained in terms of a gigantic network of various 
interconnected groups.  
 
Gyimah-Boadi et al. (2004: 4ff) differentiate between two49 competing broad types50 of civil 
society namely, the “corporatist51” (or alternative by Ninsin), which are organizations 
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 On the expectations posed on civil society to facilitate economic renewal and help to construct a democratic 
political development, see among others Chazan (1992); Landell-Mills (1992); Diamond (1994).  
48
 Ninsin (1998b: 43) identifies civic associations as “any organizations, which are formed by certain social 
groups for the pursuit of a set of goals and objectives that are determined by the general interests of its 
members.” 
49
 Ninsin (1998b: 42f) talks of pro-democracy civil society and alternative civil society.  
50
 On selection criteria allowing us to distinguish between civil society bodies belonging to a corporatist or 
pluralist group, such as autonomy, internal democracy, accountability and open recruitment, see Hyden (1997: 
32).  
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sponsored and sustained by, and dependent on the state or the ruling party, using state 
resources, and “voluntary-pluralist52” (conflictual or “pro-democracy” in Ninsin’s 
terminology) which are formed voluntarily to compete with one another to pursue their socio-
economic interests, which are both of private and public nature53. The corporatist (alternative) 
type is necessary for the state as the later seeks the advice and co-operation of certain strategic 
groups like labor and business to improve its management of national economy. According to 
Ninsin (1998b: 43) these are associations whose actions “obstruct” the attainment of 
democracy and the course of freedom. The state gains greater social control in return for 
giving functional representations to such groups.54 (Drah 1993: 73) The civil society 
organizations, in reciprocity, have tended to align themselves with the government as a way to 
secure public approval and respectability. (Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye 2000: 3) For example the 
PNDC adopted the Ghana Private Road and Transport Union (GPRTU) of which its leaders 
played a principal role in the PNDC’s political mobilization activities. For this support they 
were rewarded with state subsidies and its leaders given positions on important national 
committees. (Gyimah-Boadi 1994a) The pluralist (pro-democracy) type of civil society is not 
a monolith speaking with a single voice. “It is an arena of dynamism, conservatism, 
competition, collaboration and conflict,” (Fowler 1996: 29) with the responsibility to expand 
the boundaries of political society through sustained political action. (Ninsin 1998b: 43) This 
separation clearly shows that civil society cannot be romanticized (Gaventa 2007), as en 
entity perceived as opposing the state, as it can also legitimize and support the ongoing 
political processes, according to its private interests.  
 
2.6. Conclusions 
This chapter aimed to describe most relevant theoretical concepts for this study. Firstly, it 
discussed the question of democracy and democratization, the relevance of elections in 
democratizing society and the importance and necessity of viable opposition as an alternative 
for a functioning democracy. With respect to the study of democratization by elections, 
Schedler’s (2002a, 2002b) theories on elections as two-level game and Lindberg’s (2004, 
2006, 2009) theoretical thoughts on distinction between electoral autocracies and democracies 
as well as on the importance and crucial role of elections for democratization, proved to be 
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 Here they include 31st DWM – December Women’s Movement, GPRTU - Ghana Private Road Transport 
Union, TUC – Trade Union Congress, CIBA – Council of Indigenous Business Association, ACDR – 
Association for the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. (ibid: 4f) 
52
 On typology of different kinds of pluralist civil society see Diamond (1994: 6) 
53
 On this division see also Drah (1993: 72-76) 
54
 According to Ball (1983: 102f), if the corporatist model is not carefully applied it can lead to totalitarian 
dictatorship.  
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very useful. In the second part, the framework of oppositional forces, with special attention to 
the role of political parties and civil society has been introduced, which from now on will be 
used as the main analytical concept in the thesis. Governance theories of Kooiman (2000, 
2003) and Sorensen and Torfing (2007) have been applied to analyze the behavior and 
interactions of oppositional forces in the space of political contestation. An important notional 
aspect of this thesis is the distinction between the realms of actors belonging theoretically to 
one actor group, such as civil society, churches, trade unions and others, practically, however, 
being part of two distinctive spaces, the pro-opposition and the pro-government space of 
political contestation depending on ideological orientation, interests and aims to be followed. 
The spatial understanding of oppositional forces helps to capture the situation on the ground 
with respective actors moving from the side of the opposition to the side of the government 
and vice versa as convenient to their needs. The application of these theoretical findings in 
practice will be presented on the example of three concrete case studies of Ghana, Slovakia 
and Uganda analyzed in the following chapters. Before we proceed to this analysis, the 
following chapter will outline the methodological approach applied for this study.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
3.1. Introduction  
The aim of my dissertation project is to research the meaning-making of the oppositional 
forces in three specific democratizing settings (Ghana, Slovakia, and Uganda), explore their 
role, form, performance and function, and analyze their operational dynamics, conditions for 
their existence and possible contribution to increased democratization55. The operational 
tactics, behavior, and strategies (inter-active governance; legacy) applied by the oppositional 
forces in all selected case studies show many similarities and offer an interesting ground for a 
global kind of comparison. While it may be difficult to make universalistic claims about 
democratic principles and values, democracy can be defended through learning from 
comparative experiences from elsewhere in the world56.  
This research project makes use of the case study methodology as it is an ideal tool when a 
holistic, in-depth investigation is needed (Feagin, Orum, Sjoberg, 1991). Case studies, on the 
other hand, are designed to bring out the details from the viewpoint of the participants by 
using multiple sources of data. This research strategy, known as data source triangulation, 
increases confidence in the generated data, their interpretation and confirms the validity of the 
processes arising from the ethical need. (Denzin 1984; Yin 1984; Feagin, Orum, Sjoberg, 
1991; Stake 1995) Leaning on the seminal works of Yin (1984) and Feagin, Orum, and 
Sjoberg (1991) this research uses multiple sources of evidence for data collection, such as 
survey instruments, documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation and 
participant observation in order to ensure validity of the data. As Wittgenstein already pointed 
out (Buckler 2002: 176-178) we cannot understand, describe or determine the unique. It is 
only in comparison with an expected regularity in action – a pattern – that we can see and 
articulate the unique. That is why a comparative case study methodology will be applied as it 
is preferable if we want to study a process (Yin 1994; Gerring 2004; Munck 2004; Ragin 
2004) and investigate causal mechanisms rather than estimating effects. (Norgaard 2008: 15) 
Further, Gingrich (2002) lends an approach to self-reflexive, controlled macro comparison, 
which departs from the identification of similarities between cases and which constitutes a 
qualitative, open research process that sheds additional light on individual local or national 
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 The performance of oppositional forces depends on the one hand on the contextual factors like type of the 
authoritarian regime and the mode of transition, historical context, statehood, nation-building, socio-economical 
factors, cultural factors, political behavior, and international context, on the other hand on the type of the 
oppositional space, in which the forces are situated. Crucial for possible success are issues involved (some issues 
are perceived more popular and/or relevant as others) and composition of actors (having more high-profile 
groups increases the chances of success; having more committed - as opposed to self-serving groups - increases 
the chances for more enduring achievements). 
56
 See Int. IDEA 2008.  
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settings and at the same time has the potential to enrich theories. Gingrich also emphasizes 
that the conditions of current globalization do require such a comparative approach. It is by 
comparison that one can understand how various local societies around the globe deal and 
interact with globalizing processes. (ibid.) 
The comparative case study methodology applied here will have an explorative character 
which is crucial as it can help us to produce new theses if the existing theories are weak 
(Gerring 2004: 349-50; Yin 1994) or if the level of knowledge is not sufficient. (King 2006) 
In some research areas like e.g. voting and party behavior the causal theories are well 
documented and developed, so that it hardly seems productive to start a new exploratory 
study. In other fields of research, like the impact of choices and strategies employed by the 
oppositional forces on democracy, the level of knowledge is far lower and it is thus crucial to 
carry out explorative case studies aimed at describing and understanding the ongoing causes 
and effects. The applied methodology followed the recommendation of Yin (1994) and was 
separated into three main stages: 1) designing the case studies; 2) conducting the case studies 
and 3) analyzing the case studies evidence and developing the conclusions, recommendations 
and implications.  
 
3.2. Selection of Case Studies 
Within the framework of the explorative comparative case study research I am looking at one 
phenomenon – choices and strategies selected by oppositional forces in order to increase their 
competitiveness – in three specific settings in order to better understand the process of 
democratization and the role and contribution of the oppositional forces towards it. As the 
selection of the specific case studies – Ghana, Slovakia and Uganda might appear rather 
unusual; the reasons for such a choice need to be made explicit in more detail here. In 
accordance with Schedler’s (2002a: 119) argumentation, this study is conducted in the belief 
that that there is such a phenomenon as democratization by elections57. In the “third wave” 
(Huntington 1991) of global democratization, numerous countries have been going through a 
process of democratization by elections.  
This study thus takes into consideration the global perspective, as the discourse of 
democratization and democracy is a global one. It further rejects the, in literature commonly 
represented position, that Africa needs to be treated as a “special case” as it is not comparable 
with any other conditions. Both African and Central- and Eastern European countries were 
going through a process of democratization by elections which started in the early 1990s and 
both regions have suffered under authoritarian rule.  
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 On further elaboration see Chapter 2.  
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There is a number of structural similarities between Africa and Central- and Eastern Europe at 
the macro level as mentioned in the academic literature including homogenous transition, 
external pressures and globalization, simultaneous transitions58, including political, economic, 
nation- and state-building processes, political vacuum shortly after the transition, the absence 
of civil society, bureaucratic, ineffective and swollen state apparatus, the fragmentation of the 
central authoritarian system and the arising questions of nationalism and ethnic pluralism. (see 
e.g. Segert, Machos 1995; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Chazan et al. 1999) However, these structural 
similarities at the macro level are not the main concern of this study. The focus is rather put 
on a selected category, role and behavior of oppositional forces in three specific settings. The 
national level is bound to the global level by situating my three specific case studies into the 
global discourse of democratization by elections.  
However, a comparison of post-authoritarian regimes in Africa and the CEE region requires 
further explanation for a specific selection of these case studies, namely Ghana and Uganda 
from Africa and Slovakia from the CEE59.  
 
I claim that the Slovak case study helps me in accordance with the ethnographic approach 
applied here to understand the processes going on in different, not so familiar settings. As 
Ortner (1996: 281) explains: “ethnography is the attempt to understand another life world 
using the self – as much of it as possible – as the instrument of knowing. In such a study, the 
whole self physically and in every other way enters the space of the world the researcher 
seeks to understand.” The familiarity with the context, the language skills, the easy access to 
the field, my background and experience gained from the country while growing up there are 
all relevant factors of consideration. However, no matter how practical these reasons are, they 
remain of secondary importance. The primary motives for selecting Slovakia as a case study 
representing the CEE region are twofold. Firstly, while the other member countries of the 
Visegrad Four Group, including Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, have maintained a 
vigorous democratic system, Slovakia has experienced periodic reversals to semi-
authoritarian governance. (see e.g. Szomolanyi 1997; Bútora 1999 et al.; Mesežnikov 1999) 
Between 1994 and 1998 Slovakia was rated as “partly free” by Freedom House, and its 
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 For difficulties and challenges of the multiple transitions see above all Offe (1991).  
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 During the course of my research and while presenting my dissertation concept at various seminars and 
conferences, I have often been given the question why the number of case studies in my thesis is uneven, 
meaning why are not there two European case studies as a balancing counter-effect to the two African ones. The 
explanation is very simple as due to restricted time resources of the PhD program (3 years), it would not have 
been feasible to conduct such a detailed, concrete and intense study in four different settings. To limit the thesis 
to two case studies, one from Africa and one from CEE, would miss one of the aims of this study which was to 
show that some African countries can show more similarities to countries in different regions of the world than 
to other African countries.  
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political troubles led to the exclusion from the first round of OECD and NATO expansion, as 
the only country from the region. Also Stoess and Segert (1997: 386) treat Slovakia as a 
rather “special” case where the power relations between political parties had not yet been 
consolidated, the economic transformation had not proceeded and the ethnic cleavages had 
not yet been solved. They (ibid: 427) describe the government as unstable and labile (claiming 
that the ideologically heterogeneous coalition was held together only by the populist 
personality of Vladimír Mečiar) and the opposition as too weak. Slovakia thus did not 
experience a linear process of democratization; it represented a case of an electoral democracy 
thus ideally fitting into the framework study. The second reason for selection is the success of 
the involvement of all relevant segments of the society (oppositional forces) before the 1998 
elections, highlighting above all the prominent role played by the civil society. This inclusive, 
inter-active model of governance was later applied in the transitional processes in the Balkans 
as well as during the Ukrainian Orange revolution. The process in Slovakia is claimed to be 
exceptionally successful in an extremely short period of time and deserves therefore our 
attention.  
 
As with respect to the two African case studies Ghana and Uganda, the emphasis was placed 
on former British colonies, mainly because of my previous work and research experience in 
the Anglophone part of Africa. My reasoning was not to select two neighboring countries as 
the developments might have been too similar due to regional conditions. That is why one 
country from Eastern and one from Western part of Africa have been chosen. However, again 
here these practical considerations are rather of secondary importance. The main argument for 
selection is the paradox of partly similar and partly completely divergent political and social 
developments of both countries. The main differences include the political history and 
developments in post-independence period. Uganda was the only country in post-
independence Africa, in which political parties were banned under a civilian regime of 
President Museveni, and this for a period extending twenty years. Despite the wave of 
electoral democracies spreading across sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, Uganda was 
the only post-independence civilian regime to suspend elections altogether. (Lindberg 2006: 
10) This development presents a unique opportunity for the study of oppositional forces 
expanding the narrow definition of political parties, as the fact that the opposition political 
party activities have been banned not automatically implies that opposition activities were 
non-existent. As Mugaju (2000: 23) argues genuine competitive multiparty politics has never 
been practiced in Uganda before or after independence, despite the existence of multiple 
political parties.  
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In Ghana, on the other hand, as Ninsin (1998a: 2) claims, multi-party politics and spirited 
public debate were key features of the country’s politics before and immediately after 
independence. This vibrant pluralistic democratic life was reflected in the diversity of political 
parties that existed prior to 1964 when a one-party socialist system replaced them in 
existence. Ghana is, politically seen, currently the “shining star” of Africa with respect to its 
democratic development and the only African country where the alternation of opposition 
power happened already twice (in 2000 and 2008 respectively) in a peaceful manner since the 
third wave of democratization began in the 1990s. As Morrison (2004) argues Ghana is an 
excellent case for analysis of party stability and consolidation, as the country was endowed 
with physical resources, prosperous and sizable traditional and educated classes, tradition of 
anti-colonial activism and two well-organized factions (populist and liberal) with two able 
leaders. (Austin 1970: 3) On the other hand, both countries shared a similar development 
trajectory for around two decades. This was mostly dictated by foreign powers as in the 1980s 
both countries have been selected as the “paradigms” of development and democracy in 
Africa by Western international donor community. Both were the pioneers of the introduction 
and implementation of the structural adjustment programs of the WB and the IMF in Africa. 
Both their leaders Jerry J. Rawlings and Yoweri K. Museveni have been praised for a very 
long time for their achievements in the field of foreign, social and economic policies by the 
Western community. However, since the end of the 1990s the countries went rather divergent 
ways: While a regime change in Ghana forced Jerry Rawlings to step down from the 
presidential struggle, obeying the constitution, President Museveni decided to amend the 
constitution, thus prolonging his 26 years in power with at least five additional ones. 
Consequently, these countries build the ideal case studies due to their different backgrounds 
and the question of what role did the oppositional forces play in this context, how did they 
behave and how the environment influenced the selection of their choices and strategies.  
 
3.3. Research Design 
After having described the choice of methodology being an exploratory comparative case 
study approach as well as the reasons for selection of the three different case studies, the 
research design will be outlined in the following section. This part of the chapter includes 
sections on accessing and generating data, and their subsequent analysis. Specific attention is 
given to the conducted qualitative open-end in-depth interviews, which construct the major 
part of my field research in all three settings.  
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3.3.1. Accessing and Generating Data 
To be able to find out the meaning-making of oppositional forces in concrete settings (time 
and space dimension) and specific contexts, the positions/views/perceptions of the respective 
involved actors/oppositional forces on the concrete transition process and their role within 
needs to be identified. These findings gained in the interviews with representatives of 
oppositional forces represent the individual level of the research. Further, the gained positions 
and perceptions have to be compared with available secondary literature to test their 
credibility as well as to place them into the broader context. This proceeding represents the 
structural level of my research.  
As stated above, leaning on the seminal works of Yin (1984) and Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg 
(1991), this research uses multiple sources of evidence for data collection, such as 
documentation, archival records, direct observation and participant observation in order to 
ensure validity of the data. Expert interviews with various stakeholders of the democratization 
process conducted at the national level supplement the information gathered from relevant 
organizations, research centres and secondary literature. The following details of my research, 
as generated mainly from the works of Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006) and Geertz (1973), 
should provide for trustworthiness and credibility of the course, conduct and findings of my 
field research. The main categories looked at are the issues of space, time, timing, exposure, 
and access to the field.  
 
a) Space – research settings: The setting of my research is varying as my conversational 
partners varied significantly as well. They included representatives of political parties, both 
opposition and the ruling party, representatives of civil society organizations including NGOs, 
think-tanks, research centers, trade unions, churches, religious organizations, domestic 
election observation bodies, further journalists and representatives of academia as well as 
international donor community active in the respective countries. The majority of the 
interviews took place at the working places of the interviewed partners, be it parliament, 
university, state house, political parties headquarters or offices of the NGOs or civil society 
organizations, research centers, media houses, churches or offices of international donor 
foundations. A significant number of them also took place in restaurants or pubs in the city 
centre of Accra, Bratislava, Kampala60 or in the homes of my interview partners. In general 
the first interviews were conducted after two or three weeks stay in the country, which was 
the necessary time needed for establishing contacts with the relevant interview partners. 
                                                 
60
 In all three countries my research was confined to the capital cities as my target groups were the political, 
social and cultural elites situated almost exclusively in the capitals.  
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Besides conducting interviews, documentary and text analysis was done in the libraries of 
Universities in all three capitals, in relevant research centers as well as parliaments where the 
political bills and party manifestos were made available to me. Extensive newspaper research 
was conducted both in the respective archives, libraries as well as online.  
 
b) Time – Date, Day, Time: The various groups of actors required different conditions of 
approaching and conversation. Some of the politicians were willing to meet me even during 
the weekends, as they were very busy during the week. Professors and academic staff from 
the universities preferred early morning or late evening hours while not having lectures. Some 
members of the Ugandan ruling party (who wished to stay anonymous) would meet me only 
very late in the evening in a remote restaurant in the suburbs of the capital. The majority of 
actors in all three countries preferred to use their lunch break for a conversation. The date, day 
and time of the interviews were always adjusted to wishes of my interview partners. 
Logistical problems arose when I conducted up to five interviews a day. This was naturally 
not my preference, but in many cases I was given only one possible date for a meeting 
without my interview partner taking into consideration my availability. This was mainly the 
case of high-ranked politicians, such as ministers, party-presidents or the prime-ministers. The 
time pressure forced me to occasionally keep some crucial interviews shorter as would have 
been wished, as I had to hurry to the next one. While moving from one interview location to 
another I used public transport means which, in African capitals, may become a very time 
consuming adventure.  
 
c) Timing – Duration:  I conducted my field research in Uganda during a three-months 
research stay during the summer of 2007 (July – September) and a follow-up research in 
February 2008 as the network of contacts during my first stay was too broad and I did not 
have sufficient time resources available. The research in Slovakia was conducted in the 
summer of 2008 (July – September). Last, but not least the research in Ghana followed in the 
period from February to July 2009. While in Uganda, I was based at the regional office of the 
Austrian NGO Horizont 3000, and during my stay in Ghana I worked as a research fellow for 
the Delegation of the European Commission in Accra. In Slovakia, I established the contacts 
through the Commenius University where I was given a research grant by the University of 
Vienna.  
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d) Exposure – Time and Space: Crucial for success and the outcome of the research was 
firstly, to establish contact with the “right” contact person61, which provided me with contact 
details, mostly mobile telephone numbers, of other relevant interview partners of interest to 
me. The method of snowballing exposure proved to be very efficient here. The last question 
of every conversation was “to whom else should I talk to?” A vast majority of the interview 
partners was willing to provide me with further contact details of other persons of interests. It 
further occurred that politicians or civil society representatives recommended me to talk to 
their “adversaries” to gain the opposing view of the stories. They reminded me of not telling 
the respective person that they were the ones providing me with the contact details, because 
the new contact might not wish to talk to me in that case. I continued asking this question 
until a certain level of saturation was reached and after some time the same names started 
repeating.  
Having access to mobile phone numbers of the interviewed experts proved to be the most 
efficient method of organizing interviews. To have a personal mobile phone number and not 
an office line was of crucial importance for the research as I never managed to get to the 
desired person through the secretary, especially in case of high-ranked politicians, such as 
ministers. However, as soon as I reached the person on the personal mobile phone, and 
explained my concern, the meeting was organized successfully in the vast majority of the 
cases without any difficulties.   
Only in Slovakia, the majority of the interviewed politicians as well as journalists was 
contacted via their official parliamentarian or party headquarters e-mail addresses to which 
their assistants replied and organized a meeting. In Uganda and Ghana, the email contact was 
used in less than 5% of the cases as my African interview partners did not tend to check their 
e-mail inboxes frequently, very often due to bad internet connection. Attending workshops 
organized by political parties or civil society organizations was another significant way of 
gaining information and identifying contacts. 
 
e) Access  
Gaining access to the field was unexpectedly smooth and the openness of my resource 
persons, their willingness to talk and allowance to record our conversation were surprisingly 
pleasant. In this kind of research, there are two principal threats to reliability (Lindberg 2004): 
biases in the sources consulted and subjectivity in the coder’s scoring. One has to question the 
general character and reliability of the source, its reputation and known liabilities, if any. 
                                                 
61
 Special thank in this respect goes here to Walter Ehmeir, Simon Osborn, Henry Kasacca and Professors Yasin 
Olum and Simba Sallie Kayunga  in Uganda, Professor Darina Malová and journalist Robert Kotian in Slovakia 
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Here, academic sources and independent institutes are, generally speaking, of “higher value” 
than information from other more biased sources such as politicians or representatives of the 
international community. My assumption here is that these two groups, academics and 
research analysts, still remain the most credible sources of my field research as they have 
considerably less to loose and to gain while delivering an unbiased picture of the political 
situation with its strengths and weaknesses. They are in the position to act – at least 
temporarily and under certain circumstances – as unprejudiced observers. The representatives 
of opposition political parties constitute the core part of my research; however, paradoxically 
I was forced to use their first-hand information with great caution. After having considered all 
relevant aspects, accessible sources, publications and documentations, and having placed “the 
said” in its “lived” context, I had to question the reliability of provided information and 
consequently admit that these actors were too often handling in their own interest, thus letting 
the gap between the “objective reality” and their “subjective truth” grow further apart. 
However, the use of multiple sources and cross-checking of information might minimize the 
effect of biased sources. 
 
However, I soon found out that I myself, in my role as researcher, was influenced and shaped 
by my prior knowledge and my Western academic background and I had created my own 
categories before commencing the ethnographic research (much more than I actually thought). 
This was made clear to me by one professor at the University of Makerere who after 50 
minutes of our conversation finally said: “[…] because you have come with a map, which 
says from dictatorship or from a single party there is transition in this post-transition and that 
is where you want to fit, under all circumstances. You are not the first and not the last. You 
come with this packet and you want to fit in, Uganda at one, two, three, and four [...] and 
therefore whenever you have a problem, you want the answers to fit in a matchbox [...] you 
have been carrying a baggage along with you.” 
With respect to this observation Lindberg (2006: 22) claims that the way we choose to frame 
and define our study object in a sense shapes the data collection and processing. The more 
encounters we have had with a particular type of phenomena – election-related phenomena, 
for example – the more are our percepts influenced by expectations based on our earlier 
encounters (e.g. Garfinkel 1984; Giddens 1982) 
 
3.3.2. Interviews 
A total of 163 qualitative open-end interviews with various representatives of the political and 
social life in all three selected countries have been conducted. The majority of these 
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interviews (96) were conducted in Uganda as compared to 32 in Ghana and 35 in Slovakia. 
The main reasons for this huge difference between Ghana and Slovakia on the one hand, and 
Uganda on the other are twofold. Firstly, as stated in the introduction chapter, Uganda finds 
itself in another stage of transition process towards democratization. My field research took 
place during the time in which most of the developments the framework of this thesis is 
concentrating on where currently happening. The discussed issues of the opposition choices, 
strategies and opportunities as well as the “menu of manipulation” employed by the 
incumbent were thus “hot” issues and consequently very controversial. Due to the recentness 
of the happenings (the elections in Uganda took place 2006; my research was conducted in 
2007 and 2008 respectively), not many publications were accessible. That is why it was 
important to interview as many different sources as possible. In the case of Uganda, the 
conducted expert interviews are thus used in this study not solely as illustrations of respective 
experts’ positions but at the same time serve as the main source of information for analysis of 
the hampering elements on the way to multiparty democracy. 
In Ghana and Slovakia it was sufficient to interview around 30 interview partners for each 
country, as the research relevant period happened a decade ago. The crucial elections of 
interest in Ghana were in the year 2000, in Slovakia in the year 1998. Consequently, enough 
secondary literature was available and furthermore, the positions and reflections of the 
interview partners were not that controversial, as with ten years passing, the discussed issues 
lost on their “actuality” and did not produce such high emotions as was the case in Uganda. 
As one of my interview partners in Slovakia, Prof. Vladimír Krivý pointed out with respect to 
the problematic:  
 
“The stories you are listening to are being polished every day with every other 
narration both in negative and positive sense. Some of the moments will be pushed 
into background, some others will be highlighted, and some will be simply forgotten.” 
(Krivý Vladimír, SAV, 18th September 2008) 
 
The second reason for the high difference in the number of conducted interviews is a practical 
one. As Uganda was the first country out of the three case studies, where I conducted my field 
research I did not assume from the very beginning that I would be able to gain access to high-
profile politicians, including a prime-minister, various current and former cabinet ministers, 
party chairmen and others. That is why I started my interviews with “low-profile” experts 
including various NGO and civil society representatives, journalists etc. Subsequently, in 
Ghana and Slovakia I concentrated solely on the highest level of influence which made in 
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both countries around 30 representatives. One has to also take into account that Uganda’s 
population (approx. 30 million inhabitants) is much larger than that of Ghana (18.5 millions) 
or Slovakia (5.5 millions).  
 
The interviewees were selected purposefully based on their position during the “critical 
election” time, experience, and knowledge on the research subject, as well as availability and 
willingness to share information. For simplification reasons and in order to enable a better 
overview for the reader, the numerous interview partners could be allocated into following 
main groups of key actors:  
a) incumbent politicians including ministers, members of parliaments and other 
representatives and members of the ruling political parties;  
b) representatives of the political opposition including presidents of the biggest opposition 
parties;  
c) academics from Legon University in Accra, Commenius University in Bratislava and 
Makerere University in Kampala as well as various other academic institutions and 
research centers;  
d) leading representatives of the most prominent civil society organizations dealing with 
democratization and human rights issues;  
e) journalists working for the most widespread newspapers in the country as well as FM 
stations in Accra, Bratislava and Kampala.  
 
To get a complex picture of the current political development and be aware of the position of 
the forces working from “outside”, I included representatives of the international community 
as well various donor agencies (SIDA, DANIDA, DfID, USAID, UNDP, UNCDF, European 
Commission and World Bank) into the spectrum of my field research. 
This diversity of interview partners made it possible to gain different perspectives on the same 
issues to be obtained and compared as these were often controversial. Cross-checking of 
perspectives within and between the different categories of respondents enhanced data 
reliability. (Rubin, Rubin 1995: 65) In the course of data gathering, the process of carrying 
out more interviews was quite loose. The interviews proceeded based on my judgment about 
(a) which issues needed further elaboration and (b) which interviewees were deemed best 
suited to give this information. The interviews were of a semi-structured nature. Interviewees 
were asked open-ended questions that gave them space to tell their version of the story. Such 
open-ended questions were suitable for obtaining rich descriptions, analyses, controversies, 
and explanations (Blee, Taylor 2002: 94) that the study required. The interviews were 
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conducted with much flexibility, although there was a list of topics that served as an interview 
guide. In other words, in the course of the interview, the respondent was probed to elaborate 
on more issues when it was considered necessary. The interviews were therefore “more like 
structured conversations” (Taylor 1998: 366). Before the start of every interview, 
interviewees were given a brief description of the general purpose of the study. However, the 
exact purpose and aim of the study were left out, so as not to bias the respondent. All 
interviews were conducted face-to-face. All but three interviews (the sources wished to stay 
anonymous) have been recorded with digital voice recorder. The duration of each interview 
ranged from 20 minutes to 4 hours. All interviews, apart from two have been conducted only 
with one person at time. The group interviews were rather confusing, as all interview partners 
were talking at the same time, and the flow of the conversation was thus very difficult to 
follow.  
 
3.3.3. Analyzing Data 
The interviews have been analyzed with qualitative interpretive methods/tools and offer 
reflections of various stakeholders on the democratization and the transition process and the 
role of oppositional forces in the respective countries.  
Each of the stakeholders’ stories conveys a very different view of reality and represents a 
special way of seeing. The actors “select for attention a few salient features and relations from 
what would otherwise be an overwhelmingly complex reality” (Rein, Schoen 1994: 26) to 
offer a comprehensible and for them convenient picture of their subjective reality. In order to 
better understand how and why people in official public functions perform, it is useful to draw 
on the difference between the front and the back stage made by Goffman, who uses a 
metaphor of a theater stage. He states “[…] on the stage one player presents himself in the 
guise of a character to characters projected by other players; the audience constitutes a third 
party to the interaction – one that is essential and yet, if the stage performance were real, one 
that would not be there. In real life, the three parties are comprised into two; the part one 
individual plays is tailored to the parts played by the others present, and yet these others also 
constitute the audience.” (Goffman 1959: preface) 
The Rubin and Rubin (1995: 64-67) principle of similarity and dissimilarity of informants 
guided the selection of informants. That is, the interviewee sample was made of informants 
with like and unlike profiles as far as relationship to the research subject was concerned. The 
stake-holder groups interviewed by me hold conflicting interests (incumbent forces versus 
non-incumbent forces including not solely oppositional political parties, but also a variety of 
journalists, civil society organizations, and academia representatives) and “their problem 
 70
formulations and preferred solutions are grounded in different problem-setting stories rooted 
in different frames.” (Rein, Schoen 1994: 29) The reliance on interview data poses specific 
problems to my study, as the interview setting was certainly affected by my positioning 
within the field. The answers might have reflected what my interview partners assumed I 
wanted to know or what they thought it was in their interest for me to know. The process of 
interpretation is rather difficult to follow as it encompasses four interpretive moments. 
(Yanow, Schwartz-Shea 2006) To make sense of complex and information-rich situations 
requires selectivity and organization. The first interpretation62 is one that the person attaches 
to his/her understanding of the transition process, the second is the way the researcher, (as 
his/her counterpart in the conversation) interprets the provided information in a given 
situation at particular time, the third is the meaning the researcher forwards and interprets in 
the text while analyzing the results of the study and finally, the fourth one is the meaning 
attached by the reader to the written outcome. Rein and Schoen (1994: 41) underline this by 
claiming that “all interpretations are necessarily conditioned by particular society, historical 
period, and social status from which they originate. In other words, what you see and know 
depends on who you are, when you are, and where you sit.” However, through thick 
description (Geertz 1973), snowballing exposure, triangulation of evidentiary resources, 
reflexivity about researchers’ positioning in the field and use of member checking (Yanow, 
Schwartz-Shea 2006) the results of this study aim to be testable and trustworthy.  
 
3.4. Conclusions 
This research project makes use of the comparative case study methodology which has an 
explorative character as this kind of methodological approach is best suited for the purpose of 
this dissertation project. The chapter has outlined the research design including accessing, 
generating and analyzing the data. Special attention was given to the conduct of qualitative 
interviews, as this method represents the essence of my methodology. At the core of the 
agent-centered approach applied in this study is the consideration of agents themselves, their 
                                                 
62
 Other very important consideration while analyzing the data is, according to Yanow, Schwartz-Shea (2006), 
the reflexivity about the role of the researcher, including on the one hand, the “positional” reflexivity in the field, 
as well as “textual” reflexivity on the page. The positional reflexivity in the field was above all in the African 
context in many cases formative for the outcome of the conducted interviews. The questions of main interest 
included those of physical positioning in the field: which role/identity do I take and what consequences does it 
have to be a young European woman interviewing the most prominent politicians in given countries. Many of 
the political representatives had, at the beginning of our conversation, the feeling that I am completely unfamiliar 
with the context and history of their countries and felt the necessity to explain all the details. Their attitude was 
of great advantage to me as while explaining the context, they often gave me information that they actually did 
not intend to. Above that, the long introduction in the conversation made them feel confident and easygoing and 
later they were ready to answer even the more “tricky” questions. It was very useful to treat my conversational 
partners as experts (definitely being ones); our relationship was often a “teacher – student” one, which I realized 
was very flattering for them.  
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diversity, connectedness and levels of interactions. (Axelrod 1997) The actors of my research 
belong mostly to the concept of oppositional forces; however, representatives of the space of 
the incumbent forces have been interviewed as well. I have found my interview partners 
through secondary literature, but primarily through my own ethnographical research and the 
use of the method of snowballing exposure. I have tried to define their identity, their reasons 
and motivation for entering the space of political contestation, their assumption of their roles, 
and the aims they want to achieve. The interviews are supplemented by the analysis of 
secondary literature, including party manifestos of the incumbent and main opposition party, 
parliament bills relevant to the operational space of the opposition, biographies of 
personalities from political and social life, unpublished notes of interviewed representatives, 
influential newspapers, national and international journals, and secondary literature. The 
following chapters outline the concrete findings in the three relevant case studies starting in 
alphabetical order with Ghana, Slovakia and finishing with Uganda.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 72
Chapter 4: Ghana - Revival of the Past 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In accordance with the phenomenon of democratization by elections (Schedler 2002a; 
Lindberg 2009) outlined in the theoretical chapter, this chapter’s aim is to explore the 
importance of the 2000 elections for further development of democracy in Ghana. The 2000 
elections are specifically significant for the main research area of this thesis, as it was the 
year, in which the oppositional forces in the country managed to remove the former military 
leader Jerry J. Rawlings after his twenty-year long stay in power. As Gyimah-Boadi (2001b: 
59) claims the alternation in power was so significant to further democratic development of 
the country, as “the coming to power of the NPP [New Patriotic Party] provides an 
opportunity to prevent the consolidation of the ‘party-state’ system that was evolving under 
the NDC [National Democratic Congress].”  
This chapter will explore a variety of strategies employed by the oppositional forces in order 
to enhance their credibility and legitimacy through increasing their competitiveness vis-à-vis 
the incumbent government. As Jerry J. Rawlings had subsequent structural advantages, an 
individual network of followers as well as decentralized organs from former revolutionary 
days on his side, the opposition, being deprived of the incumbency advantages and access to 
resources, was forced to apply other strategies of survival to counterbalance the uneven level 
playing field. I agree with Anderson (1984: 38) who points out that some elections are 
“critical”: these are those who produce major realignments in voter coalitions; elections, in 
which citizens through the electoral process help to produce fundamental changes in public 
policy. (see also Bunce, Wolchik 2009) 
 
To many scholars (see e.g. Ahiawordor 2001: 105; Bratton et al. 2001; Gyimah-Boadi 2001a; 
Nugent 2001; Ayee 2002: 149; Smith 2002: 621) the Ghanaian 2000 election63 was the most 
important since independence in 1957, and constitutes a significant landmark in Ghanaian 
political history and democratic development. Ayee (2002: 172f) claims that it was the fairest 
and most transparent election since the independence and that it contributed to the process of 
democratic consolidation, by institutionalizing the electoral process in Ghana and enhancing 
its legitimacy. To Smith (2002: 621) the 2000 elections initiated a new era of democracy; 
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 Ghanaian 2000 elections can be called “critical” above all when one compares it with the previous elections. A 
significant number of scholars conclude that the 2000 elections outshone the well-regarded 1996 polls (Ayee 
1997; Green 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 1999; Lyons 1999; Nugent 1999), and were a marked improvement over the 
flawed 1992 presidential election and subsequent boycotted parliamentary elections (Jeffries, Thomas 1993; 
Gyimah-Boadi 1994; Oquaye 1995; Rotchild 1995; Saaka 1997; Bawumia 1998).  
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Bratton et al. (2001) talk of the benchmark for Ghana’s consolidation of democratic 
governance under its Fourth Republic. Nugent (2001: 405) mentions a “historic moment as it 
was the first time when the power changed by means of ballot box” and points out the 
“impressive measure of political pluralism.” To Gyimah-Boadi (2001a: 103) the elections 
“presented the first step of workability of the constitutional limits on presidential tenure as 
well as the first real opportunity to achieve a peaceful change of power through the ballot 
box.” To Smith and Temin (2001: 160) the 2000 elections were “another monumental step in 
the consolidation of Ghana’s democracy,” whose importance “extends beyond Ghana’s own 
democratic development and serves as a model and source of hope for other countries in sub-
Saharan Africa.” (Gyimah-Boadi 2001a: 110) The democratic achievement was 
acknowledged also by the then secretary general of UN who stated that “with these elections, 
Ghana has demonstrated that democracy and its institution are taking roots in Africa. The 
international community should rejoice at this orderly and democratic transfer of power.” 
(Kofi Annan: quoted in Anebo 2001: 69)  
 
4.2. How did the Oppositional Forces Manage to Succeed? 
The following analysis differentiates between the contextual or long-term causes and 
immediate or short-term causes for the victory of the main opposition party, the NPP (New 
Patriotic Party), in the Ghanaian 2000 elections. The latter have to be understood at the same 
time as the outcome of the long-term developments at the Ghanaian political scene. The long-
term factors have been generated mostly from the secondary literature (though contain views 
of the interviewed representatives as well) and include: firstly, the continuing democratic 
party traditions and experience with democratic behavior64, which resulted in the popular 
desire for change; secondly, organization, cooperation and level of involvement of 
oppositional forces throughout pre-independence days up to the 2000 elections; and thirdly, 
the elite consensus and other institutional, dialogue-promoting mechanisms. The short-term 
causes have been generated mostly from the conducted interviews with representatives of 
major political parties, New Patriotic Party (NPP), National Democratic Congress (NDC) and 
Convention Peoples Party (CPP), civil society organizations and journalists, and academia 
and research institutes’ representatives during my field research in Accra, the capital of Ghana 
from March to July 200965. The primary and secondary sources have shown that the most 
important immediate causes for NPP’s victory encompass: firstly, a very good party 
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 As Ninsin (1998a: 2) argues, multi-party politics and spirited public debate were key features of the country’s 
politics before and immediately after independence. This vibrant pluralistic democratic life was reflected in the 
diversity of political parties that existed prior to 1964 when a one-party socialist system replaced their existence. 
65
 For more details on the conduct of the field research see Chapter 3 on methodology.  
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organization of the NPP for the 2000 elections; secondly, the inability of the ruling NDC to 
appeal to the voters; and thirdly, some significant structural changes in voting patterns and 
behavior as a result of the previous two factors. All of the short-term causes are naturally 
building upon the continuing legacy of the long-term causes mentioned above and could have 
developed only thanks to the existing contextual situation. However, to measure the extent of 
the contribution of individual factors is not possible, as it was the combination of all of them 
that enabled the victory of the oppositional forces. The main aim of this chapter is to explore 
how did the oppositional forces, through employment of different strategies, and despite the 
structural as well as individual disadvantages, manage to replace the semi-authoritarian 
incumbent from power.  
 
4.3. Analysis of the Long-Term Causes for Victory of Oppositional Forces 
4.3.1. Continuing Democratic Party Traditions 
After having analyzed accessible primary and secondary sources, I consider the survival of 
party tradition and continuity of democratic behavior as the most important cause for the 
opposition victory in the 2000 elections. This line of argumentation goes along with many 
scholars, among others Jonah (1998: 72), who argues that to understand the role and capacity 
of parties in the transition process and their contribution to the democratic system, one needs 
to study them from two analytical angels. He thus differentiates between the party as a distinct 
political organization and the party as an institution that embodies a specific political 
tradition. Jonah states that political parties in Ghana, even after a long military rule or any 
other authoritarian rule can effectively meet the challenges of multi-party politics as the rich 
political party tradition survives and reinforces the capacity of the parties to stand up to the 
tasks of multi-party politics.   
What is crucial in this differentiation is that a party tradition66 cannot be legislated out of 
existence: as Jonah (1998: 75) and my personal interviewees stated unanimously “if 
legislation declares a party tradition illegal the latter continues a vibrant existence in 
conditions of splendid semi-clandestinity or open defiance.” B.J. da Rocha, chairman of the 
NPP in 199267, made in the conducted interview reference to both. He pointed towards a clear 
distinction between party tradition and party organization; and at the same time appealed to 
the tradition of the PP (Progress Party)68, being the forerunner of the NPP.   
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 Jonah (1998: 76) further states that a party tradition is kept together with a living hero who controls the 
situation through a combination of his charisma and the power of patronage. If he is not present anymore, there 
is a danger of serious fragmentation of the party tradition.  
67
 1992 was the year of lifting of the ban on political party activities and return to multi-party form of 
governance.  
68
 The NPP is seen as a continuation of the PP. For details see below.  
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“You see it is one thing to ban a political party, and it is a totally different thing to kill 
it! That is a mistake the military is doing all the time, you can ban a party, but if the 
party does not want to be killed, it will not be killed. And we in the Progress Party 
tradition decided that we are not going to allow ourselves to be killed. We were quietly 
meeting and planning for the future, because we knew that in due time the people of 
this country would want their parties back, which is in fact what happened.” (B.J. da 
Rocha, chairman of NPP, 11th June 2009)69  
 
The tradition gives the party two principal types of legitimation (Jonah 1998: 76), a normative 
or philosophical one, like inclination towards liberal democracy, socialism, or anti-
colonialism, and an empirical one, which refers to the concrete achievements associated with 
the founding members of the party. Crucial is, as Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah (2008: 139) 
argue that this continuity in political party tradition has lent stability and has been helpful to 
the survival of multi-party politics. In Ghana, generally two party-traditions can be 
distinguished, the so called Danquah-Busia and the Kwame Nkrumah tradition, named after 
their respective founders. Several scholars (see among others Chazan 1983; Boahen 1989; 
Jonah 1998; Manu Yaw 1998; Nugent 1999) as well as interviewed political party 
representatives believe that the continuity of political party traditions in Ghana is unbroken 
and one can trace the current NPP back to its mother organizations PFP (Popular Front Party), 
PP (Progress Party), NPP (Northern People Party), UP (United Party), NLM (National 
Liberation Movement) and UGCC (United Gold Coast Convention). The parties of the 
Ghana’s Third and Fourth Republics retained the organizational structures of those of the 
First and Second Republics. Also the membership was a carry-over from the erstwhile 
political parties, the only changes that occurred were those with respect to the names of the 
party. (Manu 1993: 125) Aubynn (2002) states that the transition to independence was 
powered by these two main political forces and Ghana’s party politics have been 
‘traditionalized’, ‘iconised’ and organized around the main ideologies of these two parties – 
as the Danquah-Busia and the Nkrumah tradition. With the June 4 1979 and December 31 
1981 Revolutions of Rawlings, a third tradition or force constituted by the PNDC (Provisional 
National Defense Council) and its organs has developed. (Gyimah-Boadi; Essuman-Johnson 
1993: 200; Boafo-Arthur 1998; Aubynn 2002: 77; Gyimah-Boadi, Debrah 2008: 139)  P/NDC 
as the third force effectively “combines the populism of the Nkrumahist tradition, and equally 
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 Almost identical statements have been made in nearly all interviews with NPP representatives.  
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exposes the liberal70 democratic ideals of the Danquah-Busia tradition.” (Boafo-Arthur 1998: 
85) 
 
Crucial is that for Ghanaian politicians the party political tradition is real, good and should be 
maintained. It also signifies that there is a strong respect for multi-partyism in Ghana’s 
politics. (personal interviews; Jonah 1998: 77) To understand the argument of legacy of party 
traditions properly as well as its importance for the victory of the oppositional forces in the 
2000 elections one needs to be familiar with the historical background of Ghana’s political 
development. This will be outlined by going back to the country’s independence struggle71 , 
as the two main traditions developed around this time.  
 
4.3.1.1. Historical Background to Development of Party Traditions 
The Nkrumah Years 
The modern Ghanaian nationalism originated in the 1920s and 1930s when individual 
personalities72 started agitations against anti-colonial rule. The motivation and advocacy of 
the prominent group of lawyers, journalists, publishers and businessmen was initially self-
serving, but translated from the 1940s onwards into a widespread agenda for freedom and de-
colonization. (Agyeman-Duah 2008: 7) Formal party politics in Ghana thus began in the 
1940s with the emergence of UGCC (United Gold Coast Convention) on 4th August 1947 in 
order to legitimize the authority of local intelligentsia, give outlet to indigenous grievances 
and to be a mouthpiece of the chiefs and the people. (Apter 1955; Austin 1964) The first party 
tradition emerged around the UGCC, which was dominated by prominent merchants, 
businessmen and intellectuals and had a long anti-colonial history73. The original leader of the 
UGCC party, J.B. Danquah, was later succeeded by Kofi Busia who led the Second Republic 
from 1969 to 1972. This cleavage is persistent up to date on the Ghanaian political scene and 
became commonly termed as the Danquah-Busia tradition dominated by intellectual, 
business, and professional elite and representing moderate, liberal and western-oriented 
lifestyle and market economy. (Morrison 2004: 423) The rather elitist and conservative 
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UGCC group engaged in the 1950s Kwame Nkrumah as the General Secretary to bring more 
dynamic element into the new movement, communicate with the masses and to mobilize the 
youth with grassroots appeal, as well as ordinary members of the society. (Apter 1955; Austin 
1964; Chazan 1988; Jonah 1998) Nkrumah showed growing dissatisfaction with UGCC’s 
elitist composition and accommodating attitude towards the colonizers, demanding 
independence, but only through measured constitutional reforms. Nkrumah utilized his 
position and party resources, inherited political infrastructure of the established party, which 
enabled him to found his own mass based party with the populist slogan “independence now”. 
As his subsequent success showed, the choice of the agenda was the right momentum to win 
elections and the widest support. (Schicho 2003: 215; Agyeman-Duah 2008: 7) The anti-
colonial uprisings in 1948 ended in sharp ideological and political contradictions between the 
conservative leadership of UGCC and Nkrumah (Austin 1964) and subsequently in a break-
away of Nkrumah with the support of the Committee of Youth Organizations and formation 
of the first massive political organization, the CPP (Convention Peoples Party). (Austin 1976) 
The second tradition was thus born out of the cleavage, which concentrated around CPP and 
its populist leader Kwame Nkrumah. It was a left-wing party74 and its strategy was the 
mobilization of workers, market women, servicemen, clerks, teachers, and storekeepers, 
(Austin 1970: 195-197), as well as veterans, farmers and unemployed “verandah boys”75. The 
polarization between “intelligentsia and educated elite” and the “mass of the people,” which is 
still persistent in Ghana’s internal political life until nowadays, thus commenced in those 
days. (Jonah 1998: 74) 
 
Nkrumah started introducing several repressive legislations76 and became more authoritarian 
immediately after coming to power in order to consolidate his position. (Schicho 2003: 215; 
Agyeman-Duah 2008) An important stage in the transition towards authoritarianism was the 
replacement of the 1957 Westminster Constitution with the 1960 Presidential Constitution 
giving Nkrumah vast powers as executive president. These repressive developments ended 
with Nkrumah declaring himself president-for-life, absolute monopoly of the CPP77, and were 
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restrictions posed on all freedoms and liberties. (Agyeman-Duah 2008: 13; Schicho 2003: 
215)  
The hostile legislative climate circumscribed the ability of the opposition parties to organize 
and progressively play their normal democratic roles. (Bluwey 1998; Schicho 2003; Gyimah-
Boadi, Debrah 2008: 130) At this time party political activities were reduced to praise 
Nkrumah as an African hero78 and these developments led to the creation of de-facto and de-
jure one party state in 1961 and 1964 respectively. By 1962, opposition parties disappeared as 
an organized force and Nkrumah’s hegemony was completely established. (Chazan 1988; 
Sandbrook, Oelbaum 1999) This climate of political repression and exclusion, as well as the 
economic decay caused by decreasing prices of cocoa served as a fruitful ground and 
justification for the February 24th 1966 Coup d’Etat, which brought the National Liberation 
Council (NLC) to power. (Gyimah-Boadi, Debrah 2008: 131)  
 
The Period of Military Domination 
Agyeman-Duah (2008: 14) calls the period following Nkrumah’s regime as the period of 
“military domination and instability in the political cycle as the result of multiple coups 
d’etat”. The five military regimes79 were interrupted only twice with a constitutional rule, 
both time for a short period of time. These are termed the Second and the Third Republic and 
were led by Kofi Busia’s Progress Party between 1969 and 1972 and Hilla Limann’s People’s 
National Party between 1979 and 1981. (Ayee 2002: 148) After each of the military coups, 
the old political traditions were reinvented, even if under new names. (Chazan 1983; Gyimah-
Boadi, Debrah 2008: 134)   
Political activities were kept frozen until 1969; though, the anti-CPP opposition was still 
asking for a return to constitutional rule and multi-party democracy once the military had 
accomplished its “remedial task.” (Austin, Luckham 1975: 4-7) Subsequently, a new 
constitution was adopted, official opposition re-acknowledged and the ban on party activities 
lifted on May 1st 1969. (Gyimah-Boadi, Debrah 2008: 132) Before the formation of the 
Second Republic through 1969 elections, several parties were formed, of which the most 
viable seemed to be the Progress Party (PP) led by Dr. K.A. Busia. Prime Minister Busia, who 
was the inheritor of the “Danquah political tradition” and during whose term civil liberties 
and rule of law, was respected and an economic liberal agenda supporting free enterprise 
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followed. (Agyeman-Duah 2008: 14f) Manu (1993: 124) examined the manifestos of the 
parties and concluded that they have similar contents and that the vital factor in determining 
the voter’s choice is then the differences in the personalities of the leaders. He claims that “the 
advantage of Dr. Busia was his identification with the Opposition that constantly advocated 
liberal democracy.”  The 1969 political contest thus became a continuation of the established 
party traditions. The newly established PP (Progress Party) and NAL (National Alliance of 
Liberals) resembled and replicated the UGCC and CPP traditions. (Chazan 1988: 102; 
Awonoor 1990: 219; Aubynn 2002: 79; Gyimah-Boadi, Debrah 2008: 153) The PP’s 
inclinations were towards liberal democratic ideals, which were manifested in support of the 
rule of law, human rights and freedoms and a free enterprise program; whereas, NAL guarded 
socialism. However, also the three military intervals and its leaders reflected the main 
cleavages. Both Nkrumah and Rawlings80 recruited from the same social stratum. The 
Rawlings revolution of 1982 with “peoples” and “workers defense” committees that 
dispensed justice and redistribution, replicated the Nkrumahist populist model and statist 
conceptions. (Gyimah-Boadi 1993: 6) The PNDC regime was, according to Agyeman-Duah 
(2008: 17), unique because of its longevity and its try to establish a popular democratic 
regime through civilian-military partnership. The regime was nurtured by establishing popular 
committees at all levels of national structures and workplaces. (Agyeman-Duah 1987) As 
Rawlings rule during 1982-1992 is crucial for further understanding of the role of the 
oppositional forces, it will be now analyzed in more detail. 
 
Rawlings Revolution and Multi-Party Politics 
The PNDC government had constructed an authoritarian regime established around the 
personality of J.J. Rawlings (Hansen 1991; Yeebo 1991). Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC), headed by Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings overthrew on June 4th 1979 the ruling body 
of SMC (Supreme Military Council) and started an era of unprecedented violence in Ghana’s 
post-independence history, which found its climax in its continuation as reformed PNDC. 
(Drah 1993; Oquaye 2004; Agyeman-Duah 2008:22 et al.) This was shortly interrupted by Dr. 
Hilla Limann’s PNP (People’s National Party) government, inaugurated on 24 September 
1979 and terminated on 31 December 1981 during the revolution led by J.J. Rawlings. 
Rawlings’ intention while in power was to develop the revolutionary political structures, such 
as PDCs (Peoples Defense Committees) and WDCs (Workers Defense Committees) into a 
future political system not based on political parties. (Hansen 1987; Shillington 1992) 
Democracy was thus understood by Rawlings not in terms of political parties, but in terms of 
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a communalist decision-making process, in which every individual should be involved from 
the local level on. Political parties were seen as the major obstacles to the liberty of an 
individual to freely participate in local government and their work was overtaken by the local 
CDRs (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution). (Oquaye 1993: 154; 157) The PNDC 
support in the early days came from urban workers, students, leftist intellectuals, the youth, 
soldiers and other radical groups,81 and the urban unemployed who were mostly affected by 
the economic conditions of the previous regimes. (Shillington 1992: 86; Morrison 2004: 426) 
These forces were joined by other state-sponsored or co-opted associations such as 31 DWM 
(December Women Movement)82, or Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU), 
(Gyimah-Boadi 1994b: 133-135)  From 1988 on, the local government system brought into 
the camp traditional leaders, district chief executives, and servicemen in the district 
assemblies. (Ayee 1999: 31) The creation of DAs (District Assemblies) and decentralization 
policy in 198883 was, to its critics, only another attempt by the PNDC to buy time and avoid 
the inevitable, meaning party politics. With the establishment of District Assemblies in 1988, 
Rawlings was able to constitute a significant shift in the support base of the PNDC from 
urban to rural areas. (Jonah 1998: 80) Ninsin (1998a: 7) states, “by giving these small 
politicians access to political office, regular income and political patronage, the government 
could count on their support in the impending political contest between it and the opposition 
pro-democracy forces during the transition.” With the establishment of District Assemblies, 
the direction of democracy at the local level seemed clear, at the national level, its nature 
remained unknown (Ayee 1999; personal interviews)  
In July 1990, the NCD (National Commission for Democracy)84, a body established by 
PNDC, was entrusted with the responsibility of collecting views of Ghanaians and the kind of 
democracy they prefer. (Aubynn 2002: 80) The final outcome of the report was that a 
majority of Ghanaians were in favor of a multi-party establishment. On the one hand, the 
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factual realization of these desires was rooted in internal political dynamics and pressures 
from movements like MFJ (Movement for Freedom and Justice), on the other, in external 
sources and conditionalities imposed by Western governments, the IMF and the WB. 
(Aubynn 2002: 81) Decisive precondition for return to multi-partysim was also the 
government’s own desire to legitimize, to some extent, the military government by 
committing itself to the idea of multi-party democracy. (Ninsin 1991; Oquaye 1995) The next 
step on the way to constitutional dispensation was the establishment of a Consultative 
Assembly. It was relatively broad-based and represented a departure from its previous elitist 
character, as its representation included groups of hairdressers, farmers, fishermen, butchers, 
drivers, market women etc. (Aubynn 2002: 81). Additional problems were caused by the fact 
that these groups lacked the necessary legal knowledge required for constitution writing and 
“effective opposition views were virtually absent, the balance of representation uneven and 
the whole process largely controlled by the government”. (ibid: 81) The established bodies, 
like Electoral Commission, were not non-partisan; their independence and effectiveness were 
highly circumscribed, especially given the processes of appointment of its members and 
resource limitations. (Agyeman-Duah 2005: 9) After it became clear that the no-party system 
was not sustainable at the national level, combined with the pressure from internal and 
external forces, PNDC announced on 10 May 1991 that political parties will form part of the 
new constitutional arrangement of Ghana. On 18 May 1992, the ban on political parties was 
lifted and political parties began immediately to register with the INEC (Interim National 
Electoral Commission.) (Jonah 1998: 80) 
 
4.3.1.2. Employment of the Traditions as Response to the Lifting of the Ban 
Radical rhetoric and one sided propaganda against political parties during the PNDC rule 
almost let the political parties disappear. (Gyimah-Boadi, Debrah 2008: 136; Boahen 1977; 
Chazan 1985; Chazan 1988) In this context, the strongest evidence for the surviving party 
traditions despite the long military rule is the fact that the members of existing political party 
traditions had begun to re-organize long before the ban on political parties was officially 
lifted85, most commonly under the guise of social clubs. (Gyimah-Boadi 1994b; Jonah 1998: 
80; Ninsin 1998a; et al.; personal interviews) Thanks to surviving democratic tradition but 
also a variety of “clandestine” activities and maintaining relationships with other oppositional 
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forces, the political party tradition, on which NPP was later based, survived throughout the 
authoritarian periods: 
 
“We were ready when the ban was lifted, my office [private law practice] served as 
the first national secretariat of the party, where we filled the forms for registering the 
party. We did not have to start from the beginning in 1992, as we were already 
organized.” (B.J. da Rocha, NPP Party President, 11th June 2009)  
 
4.3.2. Cooperation and Level of Involvement of Oppositional Forces 
A strong political party tradition is thus crucial as it gives hope and assurance before election 
time that multiparty culture exists within the country and can come up at the proper time. 
(Personal interviews with NPP representatives) As Jonah (1998: 77) puts it, “once the ban on 
political parties is lifted, parties very quickly spring back into action and establish backward 
linkages with their respective traditions.” However, I claim that political parties would not 
have managed to survive the long-lasting rule of numerous military regimes if not for the 
extensive cooperation with oppositional forces, mainly various civil society bodies. This 
inter-active cooperation and involvement of oppositional forces in the space of political 
contestation reaches back to the pre-independence time. A historical overview of development 
of situational oppositional forces, civil society, media, churches, trade unions, students, 
professional bodies, and traditional authorities will be offered. This enables us to compare 
their changing role and performance as well as to follow the shifting meaning of opposition 
over time in one specific setting. The overview will show that the issues at stake, as well as 
the positioning within the oppositional or governmental space of political contestation, varied 
depending on personal motivation and nature of the incumbent regime. As Ninsin (1998b: 
47f) argues the struggle for Ghanaian transition and democracy is a contest between the pro-
democracy and the “corporatist” or pro-government civil society86. The pro-democracy civil 
society actors used in general non-violent forms of political agitation while pursuing their 
demands. These included sending memoranda to the government, holding press conferences, 
sending pastoral letters, issuing communiqué, using private media, demanding return to 
constitutional rule and other activities. On the other hand, the corporatist civil society engaged 
in violent acts and open confrontations with the opposing associations. They denounced 
middle class groups and destroyed or seized property belonging to members of this class. 
(Ninsin 1998b: 49) “Pro-government and governmental-aligned organizations fared better and 
even prospered, whereas those deemed politically threatening to the regime or not sufficiently 
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compliant were repressed and/or sidelined.” (Gyimah-Boadi 1994b: 139) The following 
historical overview will explore both, the strategies and practices of oppositional forces in 
order to survive as well as co-optation and absorption tactics employed by the authoritarian 
government.  
 
4.3.2.1. Historical Development of Civil Society in Ghana87 
Civil society formation in Ghana goes as far back as 1871, when one of the first society-based 
organizations, The Fanti Confederacy, was formed by the Fanti educated elite, followed by 
the Aborigines Rights Protections Society (ARPS) in the 1890s to protest against the 
annexation of native lands by the British. (Howard 1978) Independent Ghana had a nascent 
civil society, which was “fragile” (Chazan 1983); though, “potentially vibrant” while 
undertaking social and political actions. (Drah 1993: 76) However, soon after the suppression 
of civil society by Nkrumah started.88 His strategies of retaining absolute control included 
legal89 as well as political measures. The latter were taken to strengthen CPP’s position 
through re-structuring of the party and appointments of party adherents to positions. Common 
practice was absorption of trade unions90, labor movements, co-operative movements (like 
farmer co-operatives, cocoa marketing co-operatives etc.)91, youth organizations and other 
civil society bodies as “integral wings” (Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye 2000: 4) or “composite 
parts” of the party. (Drah 1993: 80) Several movements and organizations have been 
penetrated, captured or suppressed, which led to proliferation of patron-client networks, 
effective elimination of political pluralism and exclusion of the majority of Ghanaians from 
the political landscape. (Drah 1993: 89; Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye 2000: 5) It is this time of 
development of state-society relations that they became antagonistic and highly politicized. 
The pattern of co-optation continued in this manner up to the PNDC rule of Jerry J. Rawlings, 
during which it reached its peak.  
PNDC’s means and structures to intimidate and suppress pro-democracy civil society and 
oppositional forces encompassed a broad range of strategies that varied significantly with 
respect to the set objectives. (Oquaye 1993; Ninsin 1998a: 6f) Some of the strategies 
employed by the state in order to penetrate and suppress  pro-democracy  oppositional forces 
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and to monopolize power were, besides the above mentioned attempts, to control or take over 
business, labor, farmers’, women’s and religions organizations (Drah 1993: 104); practices of 
intimidation, and confrontation of middle class and professional bodies; weakening, dividing 
and suppressing the political groupings (Graham 1989; Ninsin 1989; Yeebo 1991; Gyimah-
Boadi, Essuman-Johnson 1993); subverting the elitist base of civil society through 
establishment of certain popular organs such as People’s and Workers’ Defense Committees, 
public tribunals, The Citizens’ Vetting Committee (CVC), the National Investigation 
Committees (NIC), the Mobilization Squads (Mobisquads). (Drah 1993: 97) As a result of 
these measures, by the end of 1984 the middle class organizations, with the exception of the 
Ghana Bar Association, were frustrated and silenced, thus leaving them with “the only vocal 
middle class organization to agitate for constitutional rule.” (Ninsin 1998b: 51) 
 
Scholars as Gyimah-Boadi and Oquaye (2000: 9), Ninsin (1998a: 6-13), Gyimah-Boadi and 
Markovits (2008: 212) argue that it was during the late PNDC era and in the process of return 
to constitutional rule, when the pattern of marginalization of some civil society groups and co-
optation of others by government as well as its monopolization of the political space has 
reached its heights. The middle class representative bodies were denied broad participation in 
the membership of Consultative Assembly that drew up the 1992 Constitution in favor of 
others, largely apolitical or pro-government bodies such as the associations of hairdressers, 
fishermen and farmers, 31st DWM, and Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.92 The 
co-optation and perpetration continued under constitutional rule when the CDRs transformed 
into the Association of Committees for Defense and Revolution (ACDRs) and registered as an 
NGO, together with other associations such as 31 DWM, June 4th Movement, Reformed 
Nkrumahist Brigades, Verandah Boys and Girls Clubs, which all constituted pro-NDC 
GONGOs93 and served as foot soldiers of the ruling party.94  
Additionally new bodies such as Confederation of Indigenous Business Association, Tertiary 
Educational Network and many others were formed. (Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye 2000: 9)  
 
The oppositional forces responded to this state of art by employment of various survival 
strategies to increase their political potential vis-à-vis the government. During the ban on 
political parties a number of clandestine activities crucial for the survival of the opposition 
were ongoing. As the most important survival strategy of political parties and a means to 
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challenge the existing hegemonic rule was maintaining contacts and cooperation with 
oppositional forces, this will now be outlined in more detail. What strategies did the 
opposition political parties employ in order to survive the authoritarian rules? With whom did 
they cooperate? How did they conduct their oppositional activities despite the ban posed by 
the numerous military regimes? 
 
4.3.2.2. Survival Strategies of the Oppositional Forces during Authoritarian Rule 
The Danquah-Busia tradition operated during all the military rules as an opposition. It 
recruited its leaders from long-standing autonomous professional organizations, such as GBA 
(Ghana Bar Association), or ARPB (Association of Recognized Professional Bodies) and the 
established universities. Professor Adu Boahen, a very well known scholar and later leader of 
NPP “used his university platform as a springboard to NPP leadership”. (Morrison 2004: 427) 
The other source of recruitment and support came from the Catholic and traditional Protestant 
churches who opposed military interventions and thus became allies of the Danquah-Busia 
tradition. (Gyimah-Boadi 1994b: 129) The party also maintained its alliances with traditional 
leaders and highly educated technocrats. (Morrison 2004: 427) George Hagan, former 
chairman of the of the CPP party explains the crucial importance of the oppositional forces, 
such as civil society groups, students’ organizations, or professional bodies as they provided 
cover for the activities of the political parties:  
 
“The political parties were not allowed to operate openly, but they operated behind 
the facade of the civil society organizations. They had strong voice in the student’s 
organizations, strong representation in the professional bodies, they were very 
active.” (George Hagan, CPP, 27th April 2009) 
 
Another survival strategy of political parties (Jonah 1998; Ninsin 1998b: 63) during the ban 
on their activities was the creation of their own underground social and welfare clubs, quasi-
political associations and movements95 such as Danquah-Busia Club96, Club 10, Friday Club97 
where individuals used to meet “to discuss issues and prepare strategies.” Football clubs 
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became also a hidden opportunity to meet people and spread the political message. These 
were operating clandestinely as harassment and disruption of their activities by PNDC as well 
as infiltration and co-optation of various organizations into the space of government activities 
occurred on a daily basis. (Jonah 1998; Bluwey 1998b; personal interviews)  
The hegemonic position of Rawlings began to change with 1985 when the previous 
supporters of the regime like the labor organizations98 and some of the radical groups began to 
develop an antagonistic relationship with the still more authoritarian government. (Hansen 
1991: 79-80; Ninsin 1989, 1991; Yeebo 1991: 218-240) The involvement of the TUC (Trade 
Union Congress) and the NUGS (National Union of Ghana Students) was a very welcomed 
move for the pro-democracy oppositional forces as it provided them with the mass support 
they were lacking as elite organizations throughout their struggle. Also other smaller political 
radical groups such as NDM (National Democratic Movement), or KNRG (Kwame Nkrumah 
Revolutionary Guards), which originally appeared on the political scene in the 1970s99, re-
entered the political arena on the side of the pro-democracy movement. (Ninsin 1998b: 53)100  
Kwesi Pratt, one of the leaders of the KNRG explains that the push for democracy and 
restoration of multi-partyism came from their own experience with undemocratic practices of 
the PNDC regime: 
 
“By 1985 I had to go to prison five times, by 1981 I have gone to prison 14 times, 
there was no freedom for expression. I joined the KNRG in 1985 [as general 
secretary] for the purpose of breaking away from PNDC. For most of the activists, 
many of our friends were shot or killed; we lost many of those who were involved in 
the agitation against the government. After the assessment of the situation we came to 
the conclusion that it was important to have some democracy, which enables people to 
organize, to talk freely. That was our decision.” (Kwesi Pratt, Journalist, 25th June 
2009) 
 
The most important development of this time became the formation of MFJ (Movement for 
Freedom and Justice), inaugurated on 1st August 1990. The demand of MFJ was the fight 
against intimidation, intolerance, exclusion, and abuse of human rights, repeal of all 
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actors in the campaign for constitutional rule as the middle class professional associations leading the movement 
in so far have been forced by the repressive measures of the government to cease. Secondly, the activities of 
these organizations with mass appeal shook the government’s self-confidence and thirdly, the defense 
committees have been depoliticized and lost political influence as well as public support. 
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repressive laws, and return to constitutional multi-party rule. The main contribution of this 
newly formed force was that it united political elites from the most diverse political 
orientations and thus gave the movement the substantial strength needed for a struggle against 
authoritarian rule. (Karikari 1998: 172f; Jonah 1998) The MFJ put maximum pressure on the 
government to liberalize and “stepped up the political agitation through rallies, 
demonstrations, public lectures and public statements.” (Ninsin 1998b: 59) Other oppositional 
activities during the time on the ban of political parties, involved giving lectures101, taking 
PNDC to court to challenge its status as legitimate ruling organ or occasional open protest 
actions. These encompassed street protests102 and demonstrations103; designing of posters; 
using spray cans during the night curfew and writing slogans on the walls; issuing various 
statements and using leafleting for distribution. Efficient was also the using of the illegal 
radio station “Eye”, which was broadcasting without license and moving from place to place 
until it was ceased down by the government. According to the interviewed first-hand 
representatives, another crucial tactic was the organization of secret meetings of individuals 
and small civic groups in houses, private places, bars and clubs. Their main role was informal 
mobilization of supporters, keeping alive the idea of opposition, issuing party manifestos and 
working on the new constitution.  
 
“When there was this tight ban on political parties, of course we did not work 
publicly; we talked secretly. We quietly knew how to reach people. This is a society, in 
which we have communities, we go into a town and you can meet people, you can talk 
with them, you do not have to have big meetings, you go to the houses, or village. You 
meet the head of the village, if you talk to him and his elders; you are talking to all the 
people.” (B.J. da Rocha, 11th June 2009) 
 
This culture of informal mobilization persisted even after the ban on political parties was 
lifted and the informal structures continue to exist parallel to the formal ones up to now. 
Jonah (1998: 76) adds: „apart from party political activity, what has kept the party political 
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 Lecture by Adu Boahen (later leader of NPP) in 1988 called the “Ghanaian Sphinx” is perceived to have 
broken the “culture of silence” imposed by J.J. Rawlings for the first time publicly. The lecture detailed the 
nature of the PNDC authoritarian government. For details see Boahen (1988). 
102
 These were very difficult to organize: “initially there were not more then 6 people; we would be stopped, we 
have done only few meters before we were arrested, but we did it. One day we organized a demonstration from 
Accra to Tema and back, about 40 km, the police did not stop us.  We were only about 7 people carrying 
placates.” (Kwesi Pratt, Journalist, 25th June 2009) 
103
 In the demonstration against introduction of VAT in 1985 more than 500.000 people were protesting in the 
streets of Kumasi. The “Alliance for Change” by Nana Akuffo Addo was formed specific for this issue. 
However, the motivation of the people was concerning more the economic than the political conditions in the 
country.  
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tradition going in Ghana is a complex network of personal friendships and mutual support in 
the form of funerals, birthday parties, weddings and other social activities. ‘Funeral politics’ 
or ‘political funerals’ is now a popular political strategy employed by the various political 
traditions, especially during periods of military rule, to maintain their existence.”  
 
With the (re-)emergence of political parties on the political landscape and (at least partial) 
removal of the political hegemony, the nature of the cooperation between permanent and 
situational oppositional forces automatically changed. The previously strongly involved civil 
society organizations, journalists, churches and professional bodies tried to regain their 
neutrality and credibility and distance themselves from all partisan political activities. The 
contribution of oppositional forces does automatically diminished with the renewed activities 
of the political parties as the situation of crisis and survival threat was overcome and the 
common aim reached. (Papa Kwesi Nduom, CPP, 23rd June 2009; Kwesi Pratt, Journalist, 25th 
June 2009) 
 
“In the absence of political parties, these oppositional forces held up the society. As 
soon as political parties were formed, many of these forces cracked, because their 
membership belonged to political parties. However, these professional groups did not 
disappear. They have to protect their professional interests and they also have to be 
guardians of the national interests, but they are no longer that vociferous, and they 
are not becoming overly politicized.” (George Hagan, CPP, 27th April 2009)  
 
To Ninsin (1998b: 65) the period of transition of 1992 and the subsequent lifting of the ban on 
political parties exposed “the volatility and fragility of Ghana’s existing civil societies.” He 
claims that before active civil society organizations disappeared from the political scene they 
had been either co-opted into either one or another political party, which had come up, or they 
had metamorphosed as political parties. (see also Jonah 1998) They thus dramatically shrank 
in both size and vigor and had been superseded and overshadowed by political parties and 
party politics. The result of this transformation from civil society associations and political 
clubs to political parties signified also a substantial shift in the cause of struggle. From April 
1992, “politics was no longer a struggle for political freedoms; political parties actively 
campaigned for the mandate of the electorate to rule rather than contend over the nature and 
direction of the democratization process.” (Ninsin 1998b: 66) The struggle for political power 
was at the center of the stage and the role of the civic associations – like the GBA, TUC, 
NUGS, CCB, CBC, which once led the pro-democracy movement – was only to “complement 
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the efforts of the new exponents of democratic politics – the political parties.” (Ninsin 1998b: 
67)  Subsequently, their activities became “mediatory” instead of “confrontational”. Gyimah-
Boadi and Markovits (2008: 228) explain that despite the numerous activities of pro-
democracy civil society organizations “there are constraints of exposure and history as well as 
deeply embedded cultural norms of subordination and dependency on ‘big men’, in which 
people are less accustomed and less comfortable to challenging authority, the system of 
neopatrimonialism, or the status quo.” This is due to the fact that Ghana’s political culture is 
encompassing both experiences – the traditional and the modern one, which are mixed. 
 
The main issues for involvement of actors, like professional bodies, churches, civil society 
organizations, social clubs and others, into the oppositional space of political contestation 
were the hegemonic nature of the authoritarian rule restricting individual rights and freedoms. 
Their cooperation with opposition (or at times underground political parties) was thus mostly 
united by the common cause – repression by the authoritarian regime, and common aim – its 
removal. As soon as the cause was removed and the aim reached, the intense cooperation 
decreased. However, with time and formation of political parties many of the representatives 
of the professional bodies and journalists found their way to politics via the channels of 
cooperation and the leading personalities of the Social Clubs and Movements became the 
leading personalities of the later established political parties.  
 
“You may call it emergent opposition political formation; because the key people who 
were engaged in those things turned out to be the core members of various opposition 
political groups, but until the ban on politics was lifted in 1992 there was nothing like 
political opposition in terms of political opposition parties. They were all different 
groups calling on PNDC government to lift the ban on political party activities and 
condemning the excesses of the then military regime.” (Professor Kwame Boafo-
Arthur, Legon University; 15th April 2009)  
 
Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah (2008: 140) thus conclude that towards the end of the PNDC era 
the “opposition party politicians proved extremely skilful in employing a combination of 
resistance and cooperation to secure democratic concessions in delicate periods of the 
transition.” In 1992, after the ban on political parties was lifted, the NPP was formed out of 
the Danquah-Busia Club. Debrah (2005: 124) claims that “the list of the leading NPP 
functionaries […] reads like a roster of Danquah-Busia political students.”  
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The second pattern of Kwame Nkrumah followers started as a collection of clubs including, 
among others, “Our Heritage”, “Kwame Nkrumah Welfare Society”, “National Co-
Coordinating Committee of Nkrumahists”, “Kwame Nkrumah Youngsters Club” et al. (Jonah 
1998: 81) However, these fractions did not manage to overcome their differences and unite in 
the process of the transition towards a political party.104 The potential field organizers, the 
young militants have left the party tradition while they got attracted by Rawlings revolution 
and joined in as members of defense committees, JFM, 31 DWM etc. These forces constituted 
the core of what has later developed as the Rawlings tradition. (Jonah 1998: 81)  
 
The third tradition of Rawlings was an initiation of eight groups105 in 1991-1992, which acted 
in order to ensure that Rawlings would be elected president in the 1992 multi-party elections. 
(Jonah 1998: 83; Ninsin 1998b: 64) NDC party, as immediate follower of the PNDC days, 
was formed by some key members of the incumbent PNDC government, but included both 
former Nkrumahist and Danquah-Busiahists. (Jeffries, Thomas 1993: 347) “The party’s 
initials, NDC, were probably well-crafted to resemble the P(NDC), ostensibly to remind the 
electorate of its associations with the PNDC […] which had been associated with certain 
developments such as the construction of roads and electricity, particularly in the rural areas.” 
(Aubynn 2002: 84).  
 
4.3.2.3. Political Development of Oppositional Forces under the Fourth Republic 
Ghana thus held its first multi-party transitional elections106 against both internal and external 
pressures for good-governance and multi-party elections after eleven years of military rule. 
The results of the presidential elections, which were won by Jerry J. Rawlings were contested 
by four opposition parties, which accused NDC and Rawlings of massive rigging, misuse of 
incumbency, strategic timing of the polls and other institutional manipulations. (Gyimah-
Boadi 1991a; Jeffries, Thomas 1993; Oquaye 1995; Aubynn 2002; Agyeman-Duah 2005) 
PNDC was desperate for legitimacy through the election process (Rothchild 1995); however, 
the line between state and party activities was crossed, and long before the parties were 
legalized the PNDC used its “general power of incumbency to get a head-start on other 
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 Jonah (1998: 81f) explains that this could be due to missing outstanding personality that has not emerged out 
of Nkrumah’s followers as well as out of misplaced and non-actual ideologies of anti-colonialism, Pan-
Africanism and Socialism at the beginning of the 1990s. The outcome of the ongoing fragmentation of the CPP 
tradition included four registered political parties for the 1992 elections: the NCP (National Convention Party); 
the PNC (Peoples National Convention); the PHP (Peoples Heritage Party); and the NIP (National Independence 
Party).  
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 These were the Eagle Club; Friends of the Progressive Decade; Rawlings Fan Club; Development Club; 
Development Union; Development Front; New Nation Club; and the Front Club. (Ninsin 1998b: 64) 
106
 On oppressive legal framework of the 1992 elections and severe technical challenges see Agyeman-Duah 
(2005: 8f). 
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political groups”. (Saaka 1997: 147) The playing field was uneven and the chances of the 
opposition were “worsened by an unrestrained incumbent who had built an entrenched 
network of clients and patronage over the years.” (Baffour Agyeman-Duah 2005: 9) Another 
limiting factor was the non-operability of governance institutions to assist the conduct of good 
and credible elections. The new Constitution provided for creation of such institutions such as 
the NCCE (National Commission for Civic Education); NMC (National Media Commission); 
however, at the time of the elections they were not constituted yet, as it first needed the new 
government to be installed.  
The level playing field of the opposition was further narrowed by the fact that the role of the 
civil society was not very significant. The professional bodies such as Ghana Bar Association, 
National Union of Ghana Students, Association of Recognized Professional Bodies, whose 
involvement was crucial during the PNDC rule, were not as active once the opportunity to 
support the transition elections arrived. The 1992 elections were thus also marked by the 
absence of strong independent institutionalized democracy-promoting civil society 
organizations that would focus on elections support activities.107 (Gyimah-Boadi 1994a) 
 
Altogether, the 1992 elections did not provide for civic education activities, civil society 
support and media access, which were important variables enabling to level the playing field 
in favor of the opposition. There were no independent local monitoring and observation 
groups present, neither advocacy activities for transparent, free and fair election by the civil 
society bodies. “Considering that the PNDC had controlled the management of the process 
and had subsequently distorted and skewed the pre-election environment to favor its 
sponsored party, the NDC, the outcomes were predictable.” (Agyeman-Duah 2005: 11) 
The restored democracy was thus not operating fully, “at best it was a semi-authoritarian or 
nonmilitary, one party system” (Agyeman-Duah 2005: 12). Scholars’ summary of Ghanaian 
1992 elections was rather ambiguous naming it a “major step forward in democratic 
reconstruction108” on the one hand; on the other, the prospects for future democratic 
developments remained “uncertain”109.  
 
The reaction of the opposition to the rigged outcome of the elections was firstly, to accept the 
results for keeping peace in the country110; secondly, to appeal to the public opinion through 
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 This situation changed partly with the emergence of IEA – Institute of Economic Affairs in 1996, and 
subsequently CDD – Center for Democratic Development in 1998. 
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 Lyons (1999)  
109
 Gyimah-Boadi  (1994a) 
110
 Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah (2008: 140) argue that the decision to publish “The Stolen Verdict” may have 
spared the fragile democratization process the protracted violent conflict and even civil war. 
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the publication of “The Stolen Verdict111” with detailed descriptions112 of all electoral 
malpractices and; thirdly, to boycott the following parliamentary elections. Following the 
decision of the majority113 within NPP, during the period between 1992 and 1996, the 
opposition activities took place outside of the parliament “with press conferences, 
appearances on radio and TV programs, sometimes with demonstrations [or] just any 
opportunity that came to express a contrary view to what was happening in the government.” 
(Papa Kwesi Nduom, CPP, 23rd June 2009) Interestingly enough, all of the interviewed 
political representatives (including the then incumbent NDC) agreed that as “opposition 
outside the parliament”, the NPP was much more effective, vocal and articulated than during 
the period of 1996-2000 when it was represented as opposition in the parliament. The NPP 
effort to strengthen its position in this time had both internal and external dimensions. 
Externally, they entered into a dialogue with the NDC government and managed to extend the 
political arena to the judiciary, which “consequently became a theatre of political struggle”, 
when NPP won several cases and obtained a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court. (Jonah 
1998: 88) Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah (2008: 140), thus conclude that in the period between 
1992 and 1996, the opposition played a prominent role through its extra-parliamentary 
activities notwithstanding their absence from the parliament. 
 
The 1996 election was thus conducted under significantly improved circumstances as 
compared to 1992. This time a crucial part was played by the civil society organizations that 
mobilized in support of the elections and expanded the democratic space. “A more extensive 
and all-inclusive civil society coalition” was formed under the aegis of the then newly 
established private IEA114 – Institute of Economic Affairs (with the support of the 
Washington National Democratic Institute). The so-called NEDEO (The Network of 
Domestic Election Observers) coalition comprised of 22 civil society and religious bodies 
organization. (Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye 2000: 22-24; Agyeman-Duah 2005: 14) The 
monitoring activities provided by them together with the initiated electoral reforms bestowed 
the elections with credibility and legitimacy (personal interviews).  
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 See also Oqyaye (2004); Agyeman-Duah Baffour (2005: 11f); Agyeman-Duah Ivor (2006)  
112
 “We did not mount barricades; we did not start rebellion, we have just written a book, and said to the 
government, if it is not true, you write a book as well. They were of course unable to write a book to refute the 
accusations.” (B.J. da Rocha, NPP, 11th June 2009)  
113
 The party was internally strongly divided on the issue of boycotting the elections.  
114
 “These ‘political’ NGOs are focused on the promotion of respect for human rights and protection of 
democratic freedoms in particular and the facilitation of democratic consolidation in general.” (Gyimah-Boadi, 
Oquaye 2000: 9)  
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However, despite these improvements, significant challenges hindering the establishment of 
democracy were still present. The main ones included the uneven level playing field for the 
opposition and incumbent party, abuse of incumbency115 and access to resources116, technical 
shortages with voter’s register117, restrained access of the opposition to the public media118 
and lacking contribution of the created government institutions.  
After the 1996 elections119 the civil society bodies, which monitored the elections “grew in 
strength, capacity and stature due to the expanded democratic space and growth in the level of 
political tolerance that empowered groups and organizations to be confident and assertive in 
promoting democratic values.” (Agyeman-Duah 2005: 17)  
 
The developments during this period also revealed that political party tradition, until then 
perceived as a definitively positive element, can as well become counter-productive (Jonah 
1998: 78). This becomes apparent especially in situations when rigid adherence to party 
tradition blocks formation of political alliances, which could become essential for more 
competitive political coalitions among traditional opponents for ensuring electoral victory. 
Even though, the two main political traditions, Danquah-Busia and Nkrumah, were both 
against military rule, they were not able to overcome their traditional antagonism120 and form 
a united front against Rawlings. (Personal interviews with representatives of both parties) It 
was only before the 1996 elections that the need became stronger with time and the two 
traditions understood that the only way to remove Rawlings from power was to join forces: 
“The idea was that once Rawlings was defeated, the ‘order’ of the traditional Danquah-Busia 
– Nkrumahist political competition would be returned since the NDC party itself would have 
collapsed.” (Aubynn 2002: 84) 1996 elections thus produced an alliance between the political 
adversaries – the two traditions – which formed the so called “Great Alliance” 121.  
 
4.3.2.4. Contribution of Individual Oppositional Forces to Democratization 
The following section offers an overview of individual oppositional forces that played a 
prominent role for the course of democratization in Ghana. The aim is to stress the fluidity of 
the spatial understanding of the concept of the oppositional forces and show their entering, 
                                                 
115
 Agyeman-Duah (2005: 16f) 
116
 Ayee (1996: 50)  
117
 Gyimah-Boadi (1999) 
118
 The opposition had to rely on private newspapers with limited circulation. Attempts to operate private radio 
stations e.g. “Radio Eye” were ceased down by the security agents of the government. (Agyeman-Duah 2005: 
16; personal interviews) 
119
 Rawlings won the 1996 presidential elections with 57% compared to 39% of John A. Kufuor.  
120
 This goes back to the 1966 coup on Nkrumahs government. For further details see Jonah (1998: 78f).  
121
 To avoid the splitting of votes, the alliance presented joint presidential (NPP) as well as parliamentary 
candidates in the constituencies in the ration of 112 to 86 for the NPP and PCP respectively. (Aubynn 2002: 85) 
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leaving and subsequent re-entering into the space of political contestation, depending on their 
personal motivation, issues-at-stake and general environment. It will show how Ghana’s civil 
society has alternated between contraction and expansion, depending on the nature of the 
regime in power. (Drah 1993: 107) The historical background of each of the actors is outlined 
in order to understand their current involvement, role, performance and cooperation, either 
with political opposition or government. The respective actors have been generated from the 
secondary literature as well as primary field research through the method of snowballing 
exposure. The following list does not encompass a full scope of all involved oppositional 
forces, but, due to space and time constraints, concentrates on the most active and influential 
ones as identified in the conducted interviews.  
 
4.3.2.4.1. Media 
Many scholars (Ayee 1997; Clawson 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 1999a; Karikari 1998; Oquaye 
1998) agree that the print and electronic media, both state- and private-owned, played a major 
role in the electoral process and in cultivating democracy in Ghana. Despite the co-optation 
efforts and pressures undertaken by the government, the private press remained the “single 
most important force in the enormous task of keeping open and wider the frontiers of political 
freedom.” (Karikari 1998: 183) All the interviewed partners agreed that the media were, 
besides the political parties, the main actor of the democratization process. The vast majority 
of the private media supported the opposition throughout the development of the Fourth 
Republic. Various statements about the indispensable role and contribution of the media in the 
2000 elections gained, according to my interview partners, support the academic position: 
“independent media virtually was hostile to the NDC government” (Ben Ephson, Journalist, 
Editor of “Daily Dispatch”, Executive Director of Election Monitoring Body “Ghana Alert”, 
26th March 2009). “NPP had a natural ally in the private media, as P/NDC government was 
repressive of their rights, jailed journalists […]. It thus became a natural marriage and nice 
coincidence.” (Kojo Pampuni Asante, CDD, 1st April 2009) However, Karikari (1998), 
Gadzekpo (2005)122 et al. point out that the Ghanaian press, similarly as the civil society, was 
divided between the pro-democracy and pro-government forces and its contribution to the 
democratization process was thus contradictory123. In order to better understand the role and 
alliances of the media with respective political forces, a historical background to their 
development will be further explored.  
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 See also Pratt (1995); Gadzekpo (1998); Ninsin (1998a); Smith, Temin (2001) 
123
 Ninsin (1998b) argues similarly that the tradition of fragmentation within the media is structured by deep-
seated normative, ideological and political divisions in Ghanaian society. 
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Historical Development of the Media  
The media history of Ghana provides evidence of vibrant political culture (Gadzekpo 2008: 
196), as the press was central to the anti-colonial movement and always played a critical role 
in the struggles for a pluralist political dispensation.124 However, soon after independence the 
media were used by all the regimes125 as a key instrument for gaining public support and 
mobilizing legitimacy; (Karikari 1998: 167) as well as “for propagating political and 
ideological objectives of imposed regimes, and for consolidating power and quelling dissent.” 
(Gadzekpo 2008: 199) This pattern of media repression repeated itself throughout the whole 
rule of the PNDC between 1981 and 1992. This legacy of political victimization and co-
optation126 of the media has resulted into positioning of journalists as being opposed 
adversaries to particular governments. (Gadzekpo 2008: 212) The press started re-awaking in 
1990-91 as a direct outcome of the global and local movement for political liberalization and 
pluralism. The repressive Newspaper Licensing Law 1985 was repealed only six months 
before the 1992 elections, which was immediately used by around 30 private newspapers to 
re-open their business. (Smith, Temin 2001: 162) The transition of the repressive and media-
unfriendly military regime of the PNDC into a civilian regime, operating under a liberal 
constitution, suddenly guaranteeing freedom of speech and media rights, made the 
relationship between the media and the new NDC government very difficult. (Gadzekpo 
2008: 212; personal interviews with NDC representatives and journalists) The media took an 
explicit political-watchdog role (Karikari 1998: 176) after the boycott of the 1992 
parliamentary elections by the opposition parties, when there was no opposition in the 
parliament, and the private media became known as “the opposition press.” (Gadzekpo 2008: 
212) “To most NDC supporters, the main source of their defeat [in the 2000 elections] had 
been the one-sided anti-NDC reportage. The private media’s role in exposing a number of 
alleged acts of corruption did a great harm to the credibility of the NDC.” (Ahiawordor 2001: 
110) On the other hand, the state-owned newspapers (Daily Graphic and The Ghanaian 
Times) showed considerable bias to NDC in their coverage of the election campaign127. 
(Gyimah-Boadi 1994a: 79)  
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 For an historical overview and development of press under Ghana’s First, Second and Third Republics see 
Ainslie (1966); Ekwelieh (1985); Karikari (1998); Gadzekpo (2008).  
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 There was certain kind of liberalization during the civilian rules of Kofi Busia (1969-1972) and Hilla Limann 
(1979-1981). (Gadzekpo 2008: 199) 
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 From the very beginning PNDC undertook some measures against independent media, which included 
confiscations, closing down of media houses, dismissal, arrest, detention, imprisonment and forced exile of the 
editors and journalists. (Karikari 1998: 169) 
127
 In 1993, NPP successfully sued the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation for violating Article 55 (Sections 11 and 
12) of the 1992 Constitution when the Supreme Court agreed that the opposition should have had equal access to 
state-owned media during the campaign. (Oquaye 1998
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The media’s collective performance in the 2000 elections was an improvement over their role 
in the previous elections of 1992 and 1996. (Ayee 1997: 420; Clawson 1998: 193, Oquaye 
1998: 105)128 In 2000 they played a critical role in informing the electorate about the political 
parties and their candidates. Gyimah-Boadi (1999b: 174) explains that the independent media 
were responsible for keeping the “elections somewhat competitive and saving opposition 
candidates from total despair about their chances against the incumbents.” The private media 
enabled the opposition NPP129 “to convey its message of ‘positive change’ to the public”. 
(Smith, Temin 2001: 164; Morrison 2004: 437) Nugent (2001: 419) argues that “the 
opposition press performed an invaluable service to the NPP in keeping the issue of 
corruption at the center of the public consciousness.” The main contribution of the private 
media with respect to their role in the 2000 election was according to the interviewed experts 
in “exposing government violations of constitutional dispensation” (Ziblim Barry Iddi, Legon 
University, 17th April 2009) Many of the private media are owned or edited by politicians or 
people closely allied with political parties and have thus always been a fruitful soul for 
opposition arguments and a platform for conducting their political campaigns. (Gadzekpo 
2008: 212; Papa Kwesi Nduom, CPP, 23rd June 2009) Another significant contribution with 
respect to enforcing democracy included conducting of opinion polls and seminars, serving as 
monitoring bodies, commenting on actual happenings, pointing at governments’ wrongdoings 
and issuing statements as well as commentaries.  
Media freedoms were further deepened when the NPP government fulfilled in 2001 its 
campaign promise by repealing the criminal libel law. (Gadzekpo 2008: 199) The removal of 
the “Criminal Libel Law”, which constrained the liberties and freedom of expression of the 
media under the P/NDC rule, became, according to interviewed journalists and media houses 
representatives, the main issue of their involvement in the oppositional space of political 
contestation ahead of the 2000 elections. As NPP promised to abolish the law when becoming 
the ruling party, independent media decided to support it for these personal and pragmatic 
reasons. Another sign of a well-established relationship between the media and the NPP 
government was (Gadzekpo 2008: 205; personal interviews) that it became quite common that 
government ministers became guests on radio stations responding to policy questions or 
allegations. The established phone-in programs provided the common people with an 
opportunity for direct interactive access to public officials. However, the negative side of this 
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 Nugent (1999: 310) criticized the NPP’s strategy to depend almost exclusively on the private print media in 
order to spread their message around the country, as this did not unable them to reach the majority of the 
population in rural areas; however, one has to consider the fact that with the state-owned media being clearly 
biased in favor of the incumbent there were only few options left. (Smith, Temin 2001: 164) 
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phenomenon was that “there [were] allegations that much of the media (particularly the 
private media), who saw themselves as in opposition to the NDC government, [were] muted 
in their criticisms of the NPP government.” (Gadzekpo 2008: 206) 
 
4.3.2.4.2. The Church 
“In every situation, where the formal opposition structures do not exist, you always get 
non-formal oppositional structures. They depend on the country context, but 
invariably the clergy, always becomes a source of the opposition.” (Kofi Totobi-
Kwakye, NDC, 24th June 2009) 
 
According to Oquaye (2004: 347) the Church in Ghana has generally been apolitical but did 
not hesitate to take a stand against authoritarian political practices in both pre- and post-
colonial Ghana. It was about all the CCG130 (Christian Council of Ghana) and CBC (Catholic 
Bishop’s Conference) who have spoken out in times of national crises – political, social or 
economic. (Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah 2000: 17) Churches’ involvement in 
democratization quest is, according to academic literature (see e.g. Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, 
Drah 2000: 19f; Gyimah-Boadi, Markovits 2008: 219) and personal interviews, especially 
valuable as they have a long history of resistance to co-optation and political activism, a large 
membership base, extensive contacts to other international bodies and access to resources and 
moral support from them. To Crook (2005a) they are most vibrant, the largest, most deeply 
rooted, and most widely distributed of civil society organizations in Ghana.131 
 
The individual representatives132 who persistently protested against the PNDC133 regime faced 
harassment and persecution. (Ninsin 1998b: 51) The church has taken a strong position as part 
of oppositional forces’ fight against revolutionary rule in several areas134, the most significant 
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 Rawlings had open conflicts on a personal level with several Ghanaian Bishops, among others, the Bishop of 
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 On issue-based opposition of the churches against previous Nkrumah and Achaempong regimes, see among 
others (Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah 2000: 18) 
134
 The interviewed NDC representatives agree with these statements and were aware of the antagonism of 
certain powerful clerical individuals as they perceive NDC as an off-shoot of PNDC. “A certain section of the 
media continued to act as opposition, the Catholic Standard at that time was the principle mouth piece of the 
opposition, it was a must read. It reflected to a large extent the views of the catholic hierarchy in Ghana but also 
by extension it reflected the feelings of the established Christian clergy in a way that you could feel they were in 
opposition.” (Kofi Totobi-Kwakye, NDC, 24th June 2009) 
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being (Oquaye 2004: 347, personal interviews) human rights abuses and condemning the 
extra-judicial killings, issues concerning participatory democracy and guaranteeing freedom 
of association, the free operation of political parties as well as economic hardships caused by 
the SAPs. Activities of churches while taking “counter-hegemony stance” (Gyimah-Boadi, 
Oquaye, Drah 2000: 19, personal interviews) included issuing pastoral letters, circulating and 
presenting memoranda, joining forces with other professional bodies and calling on PNDC 
government to return to civilian rule. As their contribution towards democratic movement, 
both CCG and CBC produced a document entitled “The Church and Ghana’s Search for a 
New Democratic System – A Study Material for Christians”. (Ninsin 1998b: 55f) The 
churches got involved in the Constituent Assembly after government’s decision to return to 
civilian rule and cooperated with other religious bodies, and published the generated opinions 
of the people parallel to the government. According to Ninsin (1998a: 10), the CCG and the 
CBC “had departed from their traditional role to engage in direct and partisan political 
activity.” 
“They were the mouthpiece of the people during the revolutionary days in the early 
1980s, as everybody else was afraid to talk. The individual was not allowed to talk, so 
the role was taken by the only institution that could have come out – the church.” 
(Bern Guri, KAS, 17th April 2009) 
  
The PNDC further withdrew the licenses for publishing of all oppositional newspapers, 
including the Catholic Standard, under the Newspaper Licensing Law and tried to restrain the 
independence of the religious bodies through the so-called religious Bodies Registration 
Act.135 (PNDC Law 221) The issue-based oppositional reaction of the churches was very 
strong as they felt threatened in their independent existence. To protest they issued a joint 
pastoral letter condemning the law as an infringement on the fundamental rights of worship 
and as a “precedent which might be used to proscribe all forms of religious expression in the 
future.”136 (Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah 2000: 19) According to the interviewed executive 
directors of the GCC, Fred Deegbe and David Dartey, the church, as an entity, has never 
perceived itself as being in opposition to the government of the day. Its opposition was rather 
individual and based, so the representatives, solely on selected, thought general issues such as 
human dignity and human rights, or “if [the government] were approaching too closely the 
democratic space of the people”. (Reverend Fred Deegbe, Christian Council of Ghana, 22nd 
                                                 
135
 For details see Gyimah-Boadi (1995). 
136
 The churches were particularly unsatisfied with the requirement to provide full information about property 
and financial assets and with the provision that the governing council of the religious organization was 
personally liable for any violations. (personal interviews; see also Oquaye (1996). 
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April 2009) Churches generally accepted and cooperated with the government of the day on 
service delivery activities; “however, this cooperation did not diminish our opposition in 
areas, which we did not consider appropriate.” (Reverend David Asante Dartey, Christian 
Council of Ghana, 26th June 2009) 
In the period from 1993 up to 2000 the churches and other religious bodies also used the 
newly available political space to promote the good governance agenda. Their activities 
included restoring peace, promoting dialogue between politicians, coordinating election 
observation activities, promoting conflict resolution and engaging in health and civic 
education programs. (Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah 2000: 17; Gyimah-Boadi, Markovits 
2008: 219) To assure free, transparent and credible elections, CCG cooperated with other 
institutions, above all, the National Catholic Secretariat, National Bishops Conference, and 
Ghana Pentecostal Council and formed the Forum of Religious Bodies137 being crucial in 
1996138 and 2000 elections. With respect to the 2000 elections, the churches were very vocal; 
though, did not come up openly in a partisan way. However, their political inclinations 
became clear as they preached “change”, which made evident that their support was not meant 
for the government in power. The speeches and prayers of concrete prominent 
individuals/personalities, such as Archbishop of Accra Palma Bukle were perceived as very 
influential and always included criticism of the government’s record of abuse of human 
rights. (Kojo Pampuni Asante, CDD, 1st April 2009) On the other hand, the congregations of 
the member-churches of the Ghana Pentecostal Council were potential supporters of the 
Rawlings regime, as according to Ninsin (1998b: 60), these churches fraternized regularly 
with the leading members of the government, including Rawlings. One can thus clearly see 
the dividing line between the pro-oppositional and pro-government forces, also with respect to 
the role of the churches. That is why the spatial understanding of oppositional forces becomes 
indispensable, as different representatives of one civil society body can, at the same time, 
belong to both spaces. The strategies of the church and the various activities undertaken 
varied with changing time and issues at stake. Whereas during the repressive PNDC era, 
church perceived itself as a crucial oppositional force against the abuse of human rights and 
agitated for a return to constitutional rule. After the ban on political parties was lifted it 
concentrated on other issues, such as worsening economic situation and living standards of 
the population and played a rather complementary role to political parties.  
 
                                                 
137
 Also the cooperation with other professional bodies like GBA, NUGS, TUC, FIDA and Ghana Association of 
Teachers was very active through forming small consulting groups, participation in seminars, sharing 
information, organizing consultations, and issuing joint statements.  
138
 For the 1996 elections Christian Council of Ghana invited over 500 ecumenical partners from abroad to 
observe the election exercise. (Rev. David Asante Dartey, Christian Council of Ghana, 26th June 2009)  
 100
4.3.2.4.3. Trade Unions 
As the above overview of history of state-society relations in Ghana has shown, strategies of 
the government to deal with mounting pressures from the oppositional bodies is often to 
employ divide-and-rule tactics and start forming rival organizations.139 This was also the trade 
unions’ case. (Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah 2000: 21) Analysis of academic literature (e.g. 
Hansen 1991: 29-40; Yeebo 1991) further revealed other tactics and practices, including the 
mixture of intimidation, infiltration, manipulation and repression to contain labor and prevent 
strikes.140  
The official body representing the trade unions’ interests, the TUC (Trade Union Congress), 
subsequently decided in 1984 not to consider the PNDC government as workers government 
anymore141 and started a series of opposition activities against it. (Oquaye 2000: 341-347) 
Afterwards TUC joined other Professional Bodies Organizations in issuing statements 
condemning the extra-judicial killings and claiming return to civilian rule. However, most 
prominent issues for their oppositional status were the harsh effects of the Economic 
Recovery Program introduced by government as part of the SAPs in the early 1980s. They 
also condemned the attempts by Rawlings regime to link all the genuine struggles by workers 
with coup plots, the massive infiltration of the ranks of workers by spies and informants of the 
regime as well as intimidation of workers. (Oquaye 2000: 346) As the government became 
increasingly repressive in response to growing labor agitations, state-labor agitations became 
more and more antagonistic. (Graham 1989; Ninsin 1989, 1991; Yeebo 1991)  Similar to the 
case of students, Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye and Drah (2000: 29) point out that most strikes have 
been staged not in defense of any larger national purpose but for trade union reasons. The 
authors continue to claim that TUC always tended to take rather an “opportunistic stance in 
Ghanaian political struggles142 and has not been consistent in the counter hegemonic activities 
of civil society.” Despite this rather pragmatic stance, TUC’s entering into the oppositional 
space of political contestation helped to counter-balance the uneven structural conditions and 
                                                 
139
 During PNDC rule several pro-government bodies, such as WDCs (Workers Defense Committees) and ALU 
(Association of Local Unions) were formed to serve as counterforce against the independent and official TUC 
(Trade Union Congress) (Ninsin 1998b). Another example is the Ghana National Students’ Organization 
(GHANASO) as counterpart formed by Nkrumahs’ government in 1964 to NUGS. (Amoa  1979) 
140
 On relations between Ghanaian governments and TUC see also Artiabah, Mbiah (1995); Kraus (1979); 
Gyimah-Boadi, Johnson-Essuman (1993). 
141
 The main issues for TUC were labor retrenchment and wage freeze, inflation and the rising cost of living, the 
removal of subsidies on social services and rising unemployment, which all had a devastating effect on the 
quality of life of workers. (Yeebo 1991: 202-217; Gyimah-Boadi, Essuman-Johnson 1993: 200; Ninsin 1998b: 
50) 
142
 TUC collaborated with all Ghanaian regimes including Nkrumah’s in the 1960s when it was practically 
incorporated into CPP as a party wing, as well as with Acheampong Supreme Military Council in the 1970s. In 
exchange for its service and loyalty it was rewarded with patronage in form of favorable legislation, diplomatic 
postings for leaders or a government provided national office. For further details on an overview of TUC 
activities in the post-independence Ghana see Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah (2000: 25-30). 
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support the base of the opposition and government, their status as mass organization brought 
along almost its entire support base. After transition to multi-party constitutional rule, TUC 
joined other bodies in providing civic education and monitoring elections activities. In the 
course of the 2000 pre-election campaign, trade unions were, in cooperation with other civil 
society bodies, calling for “change” and thus indirectly in favor of the opposition NPP.  
 
4.3.2.4.4. Students 
The students of Ghana represented through the leadership institution NUGS143 (National 
Union of Ghana Students), played a very complex and varied role in Ghanaian politics with 
respect to resistance to authoritarianism. Their position varied from vehement protests, 
demonstrations, and claims for return to civilian rule up to co-optation by the repressive 
regime. Their contribution to democratic development is thus for many ambiguous.144 
Students were initially generally supportive of the PNDC regime and its revolutionary ideals. 
The reasons for this enthusiasm were their belief that a developing country needs a form of 
socialist revolution to bring about social change and development145. (Oquaye 2004: 326f) 
The University of Legon became one of the main venues for revolutionaries who prepared the 
31 December 1981 revolution. Many of the student leaders – including P.V.Obeng, Nana 
Konadu Agyemang Rawlings, Kofi Totobi-Kwakye – took prominent positions in the later 
PNDC government and became the ideological leaders of the regime (Gyimah-Boadi, 
Oquaye, Drah 2000: 23; personal interviews) 
However, students’ support did not last long and by 1983 they turned away from the 
government of the day; the turning point being the budget of 1983, which posed the 
population even under greater economic hardship and led to students condemning PNDC’s 
economic policies (Oquaye 2004: 328). Anti-PNDC moods began to mount and street protests 
were organized in major cities of Accra, Cape Coast and Kumasi. The students questioned the 
legitimacy of the PNDC rule and called for a return to multi-party democracy. (ibid: 329). The 
response of the government was closing down of all three universities and growing 
antagonism. Kofi Totobi-Kwakye explains how PNDC missed the opportunity of involving 
students for their cause: 
 
                                                 
143
 For the historical origins and development of NUGS and a more detailed list of their oppositional activities 
under Nkrumah and Acheampong regimes see also Oquaye (2004: 325-333); Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah 
(2000: 20-24). 
144
 For history of government-student relations up to 1972 see e.g. Amoa (1979); Oquaye (1996: 63-65). 
145
 Students helped organizing voluntary self-help activities like bringing cocoa from the hinterlands to the 
harbors because of non-existing infrastructure. (Oquaye 2000: 327; personal interviews)  
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“By 1984, the so called pro-democracy forces have got into the leadership of the 
NUGS for agitation and unfortunately we [PNDC] did not engage them in dialogue. 
Our response was more of pushing, they feared. Increasingly they became hostile and 
defiant, and from that period on, the only way you could emerge as a student leader on 
the campus, was if they were said to be vehemently opposed to the PNDC.” (Kofi 
Totobi-Kwakye, NDC, 24th June 2009) 
 
Despite their heroic efforts, organizations of street protests, and demonstrations146, many 
scholars (see e.g. Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah 2000: 20-24, personal interviews) claim that 
the modus operandi of the students was largely ad hoc and oriented towards crisis 
management. Their position was issue-based and changed according to their private interests. 
Much of the opposition against PNDC by students was driven by austerity measures, which 
directly affected them in forms of reduction of subsidies on boarding facilities, deteriorating 
conditions on campuses including lack of accommodation and lack of textbooks or decrease 
in value of allowances and frustration because of unemployment. (Oquaye 2004: 330; 
Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah 2000: 24) The students were thus constantly moving between 
the spaces of opposition and government147 as convenient to their objectives. After the lifting 
of the ban on the political parties in 1992, students assisted in voter education campaigns and 
formed a part of the coalition of civil society bodies to monitor 1996 and 2000 elections. 
(Personal interviews, Agyeman-Duah 2005)  
 
4.3.2.4.5. ARPB - Association of Recognized Professional Bodies  
GBA (Ghana Bar Association)148 is one of the most prominent members of the ARPB active 
in national, political, social and civic affairs since CPP era. GBA maintained its role as 
guardian of liberal democracy and took a consistently opposed opposition to Rawlings 
PNDC149 from the very beginning. The main issues for GBA’s involvement in oppositional 
space were the murder of three judges by the PNDC regime, the worsening economic 
situation and shortage of food items, as well as almost non-existing provision of social 
services, and non profitable environment for functioning of private businesses. As Ziblim 
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 Student movements had very well established contacts to other pro-democracy forces within the country, 
many of the pro-democracy activists started their career at the Campus of the University of Legon. 
147
 E.g. NUGS supported Acheampong military regime in the early days because of the reinstatement of free 
student allowances by that regime. (Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah 2000: 24) 
148
 GBA initiated in the early part of the 19th century when few lawyers in the Gold Coast associated informally 
under the leadership of John Mensah Sarbah, the first Ghanaian lawyer. It became a formal organization in 1958 
when it adopted a formal constitution and Code of Ethics. On further details of emergence and establishment as 
well as objectives see Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah (2000: 9-16) 
149
 See Luckham (1981); Adjetey (1996: 63-65);   
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Barry Iddi from the Legon University expressed in an interview, “during the revolutionary 
days, the Bar could actually have been a political party.” (Ziblim Barry Iddi, Legon 
University, 17th April 2009) Actions and concrete activities undertaken by GBA to respond to 
governments proceedings over the years included organizing strike actions and demanding 
return to civilian government, issuing statements, calling on the government to allow access 
to information and remove the curfew, sending memoranda to PNDC, holding public lectures, 
hosting conferences, setting up committees responsible for gathering information on human 
rights abuses, monitoring all decisions and activities of the Government with a view to 
ensuring their constitutionality, launching a “legal literacy program” to educate public on 
civic and human rights, publishing small booklets summarizing the rights of Ghanaians under 
the Constitution in English and main local languages.150  
During the transition time, the association experienced also serious internal problems when 
some of the more radical members of the GBA accepted senior level positions in the new 
government. Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah (2000: 13) state that the division line and 
fluctuation between the space of government and opposition went also within the rank of 
lawyers; “the PNDC proved extremely successful in attracting many lawyers to serve as 
chairmen of the extra-legal tribunals, or to appear before them as counsel in spite of the 
GBA’s boycott […] in the conditions of severe economic hardships […] many lawyers […] 
found such opportunities too good to resist.” After the 1992 elections and return to multi-
party dispensation, crucial figures of various professional bodies became founding members 
of the NPP.  
 
“The Bar president [Sam Okudzeto] was a huge responsibility, because there was the 
expectation he is going to lead. Most of the leadership of the Bar basically became the 
funding members of the opposition NPP in 1992. After 1992 the civil and media space 
were still not established, so the relevant bodies continued in their activities alongside 
political parties, but the proliferation of purely political parties became evident. They 
were all lawyers; they used their platforms and their professional background to 
launch constitutional cases, so they basically were the actors going into the 2000 
elections.” (Kojo Pampuni Asante, CDD, 1st April 2009)  
 
 
 
                                                 
150
 Generated from Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah (2000: 11-13); Oquaye (2004: 333-341) and personal 
interviews.   
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4.3.2.4.6. Traditional Authorities 
Traditional authorities play a significant role in civil society and political developments in 
Ghana and thus cannot be left out of this analysis. Chieftaincy has greatly impacted 
governance in Ghana151 and contributed to peace and development progress of the 
community. (Crook 2005b; Gyimah-Boadi, Markovits 2008: 220) Nevertheless, also this 
group of actors did not escape the model of fluctuation between the space of opposition and 
government.  
Crook (1984: 81, 83) claims that the birth of the CPP party in 1949 put the colonial 
government and its perceived collaborators, the chiefs, under pressure. Nkrumah divided 
between the praised chiefs “who were with us” and the chiefs who were “in the league with 
imperialists who obstruct our path.”(Rathbone 2000: 101) The Constitution was written in a 
“fierce struggle” (Yankah 2008: 68) between traditional rulers and Nkrumah’s CPP. Bluwey 
(1993: 213) claims that “Nkrumah had never been on good terms with the chiefs”, which was 
followed by their destoolment in the first year of CPP rule. Their role became respectively 
diminished through various legal provisions and orders. However, with proceeding time they 
were re-guaranteed some of their powers and the Fourth Republic Constitution of 1992 gave 
chiefs high visibility in key national institutions. (Addo-Fening 2008: 51) Even if the Article 
276 of the Constitution152 banned chiefs from participation in active party politics, it allowed 
them to be appointed for any public office for which they are otherwise qualified. 
 
The perceptions of the interviewed partners about the role and contribution of the traditional 
authorities towards the democratization process in Ghana are very divergent, as “they tend to 
take both-sides” and continue to act actively within the political arena despite the 
constitutional restriction. With respect to the 2000 elections, many of the opposition NPP 
political representatives thought that the traditional authorities did not play any significant 
role in the oppositional space of political contestation. Their active involvement was bounded 
predominantly to the northern, rural parts of the country where their influence is still very 
strong153. On the other hand, others (together with many academic scholars154) are convinced 
that traditional authorities are crucial for further democratic development as people listen to 
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 For an historical overview and development of chieftaincy institution since pre-colonial times up to present 
see Addo-Fening (2008: 33-49). 
152
 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), Chapter 22, Articles 90, 272; p. 165. 
153
 Oquaye (1993: 164f) states that the PNDC, which had been against chiefs in the past, began to court chiefs in 
a new policy of reconciliation. “This policy worked more effectively in the rural areas for two reasons – the rural 
chiefs were more gullible whereas the urban chiefs were more wary of the PNDC […] the influence of chiefs in 
mobilizing their people for the purpose of voting in any election has always been more effective in the rural than 
in the urban areas.” 
154
 See also Addo-Fening (2008: 53); Yankah (2008: 69) 
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them and follow their advices at the district level. (Bluwey 1993) Ayee (2003: 3) argues that 
“the whole institution of chieftaincy is so closely bound up with the life of our communities 
that its disappearance would spell disaster.” To Boafo-Arthur (2000:9)155, chieftaincy is “the 
nucleus, around which micro-administration of Ghanaian society is effectively carried out.” 
Despite the ban on their involvement in active party politics, the institution of chieftaincy was 
regularly exploited by the political leaders to legitimize their stay in power. (Yankah 2008: 
66) 
According to Peter MacManu, National Chairman of the NPP (Interview on 23rd June 2009), 
when political party representatives arrive to a new area (constituency or village) they firstly 
pay a courtesy call to the chief. As such, the news about the political parties’ manifestos, 
campaign strategies and ideas are spreading without the necessity of visiting each potential 
voter individually.  
 
“If you do not get their [chiefs] support, they will go against you. Kufour went 
between 1996 and 2000 to every funeral in this country, every single, because that was 
culturally significant, showing that you care but also a very interesting ground for 
strategizing, meeting new people.” (Kojo Pampuni Asante, CDD, 1st April 2009) 
 
The importance of chiefs in politics, also for the government side, is demonstrated in Gyimah-
Boadi’s (2001b: 60) statement considering the political campaign ahead of the 2000 elections. 
“Traditional rulers were prevailed upon to organize grand durbars to showcase the ruling 
party and its candidates in the elections […] some funerals were taken over by the NDC 
political leadership. The party displayed largesse and demonstrated great patronage 
capabilities at these cultural events.” An efficient side-effect was the wide and favorable 
coverage in the state-owned media. Also Emmanuel Akwetey from IDEG stresses that “in a 
situation of patronage politics the party cannot be able to do everything by itself. It is these 
informal alliances that decide.” (Emmanuel Akwetey, IDEG, 29th June 2009)  
Scholars and interviewed experts thus agreed that also traditional authorities fluctuate 
between the space of pro-government and pro-oppositional forces. The alliance of chiefs with 
one or another camp is very strongly based on their regional origin156 and benefits they expect 
for their communities. (Ninsin 1998a) There was a common agreement that the main role of 
traditional authorities in current Ghanaian politics is advancing peace, stability and 
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 Quoted in Addo-Fening (2008: 54) 
156
 See sub-chapter on voting patterns.  
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development157 and they thus continue to play a stabilizing role in a situation of crisis.158 
(Yankah 2008: 71) 
 
After having profoundly analyzed the first two long-term causes and employed strategies for 
the success of oppositional forces - which culminated in the 2000 election - we can now 
proceed to the third one, being elite consensus.  
 
4.3.3. Elite Consensus 
In the previous sections elaborating the development of party politics and civil society in 
Ghana, it has been mentioned, that the 1990s led to more liberalization and open space both 
for political parties and civil society. One significant cause of this development was the elite 
consensus achieved between the major political and societal actors after the 1992 rigged 
elections. How was this consensus building reached and which mechanisms enabled and 
enhanced the dialogue between originally antagonistic forces? 
In Ghana, the government finally responded to the concerns of the opposition after 1992 
elections, even if it was initially “cold and dismissive, refusing even to talk to the opposition.” 
(Agyeman-Duah 2005: 13) The opposition appealed to the government with strong and 
persuasive claims of fraud and serious infractions in the elections, and breach of principles of 
fairness and transparency. It demanded immediate reforms and the reconstitution of the 
electoral body with representatives from the political parties. (Ayee 1998)  
 
Many scholars (see e.g. Ayee 1998:157; Agyeman-Duah 2005: 13; personal interviews 
among others with the first secretary of IPAC John Larvie) determine the government’s 
decision to dialogue with the oppositional forces and the subsequent try to achieve an elite 
consensus among the various factions as the most constructive contribution and the major 
turning point in the development of progressive electoral and democratic system in Ghana. 
The flawed 1992 election created an atmosphere of tension, suspicion and mistrust between 
the government and opposition. (Jeffries, Thomas 1993; Ayee 1996) Government failed to 
meet the demands of the oppositional forces for more transparent and leveled playing field 
and a communication gap was created. Ayee (1998: 161) talks more of “politics as war” than 
“politics as bargaining” as NDC was not willing to entertain in any dialogue; whereby, 
dialogue and consultation are seen as the building blocks towards democratic consolidation. 
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 On role of prominent traditional authorities in the transition process of 1992 and their contribution to stability 
and development of the country see (Yankah 2008: 70f)  
158
 A proof of this statement is also the fact that many party leaders, including Rawlings and Kufour, sought 
counseling from traditional rulers immediately after they have assumed their offices as heads of states. (Yankah 
2008: 71) 
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Following a model from Zimbabwe (implemented in the 1980 elections), and profound 
internal and external pressure, Ghanaian political parties together with the Electoral 
Commission (EC) agreed to form the so called IPAC (Inter-Party Advisory Committee) in 
March 1994. IPAC was constructed with the intention to function as a forum “to build a 
consensus on electoral issues” (Ayee 1998: 157) as an institutionalized form of dialogue. 
IPAC became the key element in transforming the Ghanaian electoral system in that it sought 
commonly shared mechanisms and mutually acceptable solutions and thus enhanced dialogue 
and confidence building measures. To B.J. da Rocha, leader of the NPP at that time it was a 
“crucial mechanism, which helped to evict the polarization in the country” (B.J. da Rocha, 
NPP, 11th June 2009) 
The meetings, which were sponsored by donor community, took place at the premises of the 
Electoral Commission; however, the Commission acted as a neutral body and provided the 
parties with guidelines on legal provisions. The negotiated agreements produced within the 
IPAC forum enabled the EC to introduce reforms, which helped to raise the confidence of the 
opposition political parties into the electoral system. Some of the reform measures proposed 
by the opposition included the use of voter picture ID cards, use of transparent ballot boxes, 
or same-day elections for both presidential and parliamentary elections. (Ayee 1998: 159-161; 
Agyeman-Duah 2005: 13ff; Larvie John, IPAC first secretary, 20th March 2009)  
The main importance of IPAC lies according to Ayee (1998: 161) in the fact that it helped to 
promote elite consensus; it constituted a two-way opportunity as a channel of information for 
both the EC and the parties. The EC was thus able to discuss all aspects of its programs and 
activities with the parties and they were able to freely and openly express their views about 
the programs and activities and to bring their concerns to the attention of the EC.159  
 
4.4. Analysis of the Short-Term Causes for Victory of Oppositional Forces 
The short-term or immediate causes for the victory of oppositional forces in the 2000 
elections analyzed below have been generated both from the primary sources as well as 
secondary literature. They have to be understood as an outcome of the above analyzed long-
term causes as the latter shaped the performance and selection of strategies of oppositional 
forces to enhance competitiveness vis-à-vis the opposition shortly before the 2000 elections. 
The main causes include institutional measures to enhance the credibility of the 2000 
elections; NPP preparedness for the elections; and NDC’s inability to appeal to the voters 
which transferred into dynamic underlying voter patters.  
                                                 
159
 As will become evident in the following chapters, above all Chapter 6 on Uganda and Chapter 7, the IPAC 
institutional mechanism constitutes one of the crucial differences between Ghana’s and Uganda’s way towards 
democracy.  
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4.4.1. Institutional Measures to Enhance the Credibility of the 2000 Elections 
Despite some familiar features160 of the 2000 elections with multi-party elections in previous 
years, a significant number of improvements with respect to electoral procedures occurred. 
(Ayee 2002: 152-158; Agyeman-Duah 2005: 18-21) Firstly, the political parties produced a 
code of conduct by May 2000 and restrained themselves from committing any excesses. 
Secondly, the IPAC161 was expanded from national to the regional and district level, which 
facilitated the dialogue among party leaders at the local levels. This extension led to the fact 
that during the 2000 elections the Electoral Commission was by virtually all stakeholders 
viewed as a “credible independent agency that operated autonomously from the NDC-
controlled government.” (Smith 2002: 643; see also Gyimah-Boadi 1999b: 110) It further 
enjoyed a high level of credibility from both internal and external observers.  
Debrah (2001: 75) argues that the centrality of impartial and trustworthy electoral process is 
critical to integrity and the capacity to increase confidence of the voters into the elected 
government and thus its legitimacy. Confidence building measures that enhanced the 
credibility of the EC included compiling a new voters register, involving agents of the 
political parties and candidates into the process, introducing some innovations such as 
transparent ballot boxes, and “lottery” method for determining the placement of presidential 
candidates and parties on the ballot paper, inviting both domestic and foreign observers to 
monitor the polls. (Gyimah-Boadi 2001b: 58; Ayee 2002) Trust in the quality of the electoral 
process and confidence building measures were promoted through consensus among elites. 
(Ayee 2002: 159) Important was also the previous experience of the voters with voting and 
election procedure as the ground rules and sophistication of the voters increased with every 
election and made rigging very difficult162.  
Further, the parties bound themselves to work towards peace163, tranquility and clean 
elections. (Debrah 2001: 78) The voter education provided by EC and other bodies was of 
tremendous importance for the process and went beyond164 familiarizing the voter with the 
mechanics of voting to providing basic information about the election process. (Gyimah-
Boadi 1999b: 111) EC collaborated with both domestic and foreign monitoring bodies, and 
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 Gyimah-Boadi (2001b: 59-64)  
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 On operational details and working procedures of IPAC at that times as well as details of polling procedures 
in general see Debrah (2001: 79; 82-84). 
162
 As Hayward (1987: 273) and Hyden (1992: 12) claim in this respect trust is sustained by socialization into the 
rules. See also Lindberg (2009).  
163
 To ensure peaceful elections, the EC even initiated partnership with security forces, which resulted into the 
formation of Electoral Security Taskforce; however, excluding military. Debrah (2001: 78) explains, that 
“popular fears in Ghana […] revolve around the involvement of the armed forces in election activities because of 
the exercise of coercion and intimidation in the past.” 
164
 The EC reached out to the voters through radio, TV broadcasts, theatre, comic shows, posters and hired 
community public educators who targeted voters in churches, market centers and other social gatherings. 
(Debrah 2001: 82) 
 109
granted access to all stages of the electoral cycle also to accredited party agents. Their 
effective role in monitoring appeared to have reached the international standards for free and 
fair elections. (Debrah 2001: 80, Gyimah-Boadi 2001b: 58f; Ahiawordar 2001: 107f)  
 
With respect to revived and expanded media and civil society space significant changes 
occurred as well. Despite the constitutional provision165, opposition parties complained about 
the unfair treatment and inadequate coverage received from the state-owned media 
(Agyemun-Duah 2005: 20) as these have nationwide coverage and enjoy a high degree of 
credibility among Ghanaian population.166  In order to help level the conditions of opposition 
and incumbent party and improve access of the former to the media, various civil society 
organizations introduced important initiatives such as organizing workshops and seminars for 
journalists and politicians as well as conducting monitoring projects on media coverage of the 
electoral process167. CDD (Center for Democratic Development) together with IEA (Institute 
for Economic Assistance) joined the voter education program and sponsored radio discussions 
and newspaper advertisements about appropriate voter behavior. Other initiatives by civil 
society groups such as the GBA (Ghana Bar Association), the NUGS (National Union of 
Ghana’s Students), the GJA (Ghana Journalists Associations), the CCG (Christian Council of 
Ghana), and traditional authorities with respect to electoral process were massive 
interventions from their side to ensure successful and peaceful elections in order to promote 
confidence in elections and their outcome. (Gyimah-Boadi, Oqyaye 2000: 22-24; Ayee 2002: 
163) Special prayers for peace have been organized and musical artists (MUSIGA – 
Musicians Association of Ghana) produced songs of peace and organized concerts and peace 
marches. (Agyeman-Duah 2005: 22f, personal interviews) The 2000 election was monitored 
by broad-based Coalition for Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), which was formed 
under CDD-Ghana and comprised of twenty-six168 civil society and religious organizations. 
                                                 
165
 According to the Article 55 (11, 12) of the 1992 Constitution “All state-owned media shall afford fair 
opportunities and facilities for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions” and “the state shall 
provide fair opportunity to all political parties to present their programs to the public by ensuring equal access to 
the state-owned media”. Article 163 adds that “all presidential candidates shall be given the same amount of time 
and space on the state-owned media to present their programs to the people.”  
166
 A survey conducted by CDD in 1999 shows that the Ghanaian population has the highest trust in the state-
owned Ghana Broadcasting Corporation with 83%. CDD (1999) 
167
 Monitoring Media Coverage of the 2000 elections (2001), Accra: CDD 
168
 CODEO membership included the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission, Center for the Development of People, Civil 
Servants Association, Council of Independent Churches, Federation of Muslim Councils in Ghana, Ghana Bar 
Association, Ghana Committee on Human and Peoples Rights, Ghana Journalist Association, Ghana National 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Ghana National Association of Teachers, Ghana Registered Midwives 
Association, Ghana Registered Nurses Association, Ghana Legal Literacy and Resource Foundation, Health 
Watch International, International Federation of Women Lawyers, International Poets, Editors and Novelists, 
International Prison Watch, Mankind’s Advancement, Upliftment and Development, National Union of Ghana 
Students, Non-violence International, the Trade Union Congress (www.codeogh.org)  
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The CODEO report169 revealed that state resources such as vehicles have been misused 
regularly throughout most constituencies and it also highlighted the problem of chiefs 
campaigning on behalf of the ruling NDC and confirmed that despite the constitutional 
constraints, chiefs did not play a neutral role in the politics. Additional monitoring bodies 
were the Forum of Religious Bodies and Ghana Alert. The innovative role of the electronic 
media and technology helped keeping the process transparent; the private FM stations 
provided ongoing live reporting from all polling stations and later the collating centers. They 
announced provisional results from each constituency collating center parallel to the official 
results provided by the EC. Some radio stations, like Joy-FM of Accra created a website 
posting all the coming results continuously, and so the public knew the outcome of the 
elections (at least unofficially) before the announcement by the EC, which made rigging 
impossible.170 Significant innovations to electoral processes were brought by public debates 
of presidential candidates, which were for the first time in Ghanaian history broadcasted live 
on television and radio171. According to Agyeman-Duah (2005: 24) these debates brought a 
new dimension of giving voters the opportunity to judge candidates on the basis of their 
position on specific issues, introducing “content” in a structured fashion for the first time in 
the Ghanaian presidential campaign, an innovation, which was of crucial importance.  
 
Nevertheless, content analysis of party programs and manifestos has shown that all the parties 
used the cults of past personalities and promised to continue with their work (Aubynn 2002: 
87; Ayee 2002: 162; Morrison 2004: 435; Agyeman-Duah 2008: 23; Gyimah-Boadi, Debrah 
2008: 147) These scholars thus argue that despite the two persistent traditions – Danquah-
Busia and Nkrumahist – “the two parties share the common interest of safeguarding 
democracy, promoting good-governance and sustaining the liberal economic environment.” 
There is a consensus among the dominant political parties on the national development 
agenda. “This ‘elite consensus’ is an essential prerequisite for national stability and 
predictability in politics.” There are no significant distinctions between the aims and policies, 
with the main objective being development. For NDC it was “development and progress”; 
whereas, NPP campaigned for “development in freedom” and all the parties offered free 
market policies. Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah (2008: 150) argue that the NPP presents itself as 
liberal democratic and capitalist party, and the NDC as a social democratic party; however, 
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 CODEO Report for the period September-November 2000, Accra: CDD-Ghana.  
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 The contribution of these activities and efforts was even more important in specific Ghanaian context where 
the military and police force did not enjoy credibility of the population. For historical background and detailed 
information see Ahiawordor (2001: 113); Gyimah-Boadi (2001b: 64); Agyeman-Duah (2005: 22) 
171
 Six out of seven presidential candidates, except pro NDC candidate Prof. J.E. Atta-Mills participated in these 
debates.  
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they “follow largely the same ideological line both in terms of manifestoes and policies – neo-
liberal economics and liberal democracy with a huge dose of populism. A vague 
developmental ideology aiming at improving the lot of the people” 
The NDC emphasized the stable economic and political achievements of the P/NDC 
(provision of roads, electricity and drinking water to the rural areas); while, the NPP stressed 
the negative impact of the economic policies (emphasizing poverty and unemployment) and 
promised better economic prospects. (Aubynn 2002: 86)  
The stakes in the 2000 elections were very high, as according to Ayee (2002: 163); Lindberg 
(2003) et al. the political parties in Ghana regard the service in government as a means of 
building a network of patronage to further their political ambitions. The control of the 
government is translated into the control over economic flows and resources. To Gyimah-
Boadi (2001b: 57) it was the hottest172 election in Ghana’s history with six opposition parties 
against the “Progressive Alliance” of NDC, and two other smaller parties. The race was; 
however, between the presidential candidates of the two strongest parties, J.E. Atta Mills from 
NDC and John A. Kufour from NPP. All Ghanaian presidential and parliamentary elections 
from 1992 up to 2008 confirmed that despite the freedom of political association and no 
restriction on the number of political parties to be formed, registered and compete for political 
power; the real range of political alternatives is narrow. The political scene is dominated by 
two parties, the NPP and the NDC (Morrison 2004: 433; Baffour Agyeman-Duah 2005: 6). 
The emerging party system was thus undergoing a process of polarization of the political 
arena and a reduction into a de facto two party system.  
 
Despite the above-mentioned significant institutional improvements, the pre-election 
environment was characterized by “deep mistrust and intense acrimony” (Gyimah-Boadi 
2001b: 57) Even though the previous elections have been partly successful they failed to 
remove the incumbent from power, so that Ghana “appeared to be evolving a ‘party-state’ 
political system, in which the ruling NDC was permanently entrenched in power and 
opposition parties, civil society, independent media and other key institutions of democratic 
governance established under the 1992 Constitution were constrained by severe handicaps.” 
(ibid: 57) It is thus of special theoretical and empirical interest in the context of the prevailing 
dominant ruling conditions being in favor of the incumbent, to explore the victory of the 
oppositional forces. The next point explains strategies employed by the opposition NPP to 
enhance its competitiveness and win the so called “swing voters” on its side.  
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 See also Ahiawordor (2001: 118f)  
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4.4.2. NPP Strategies for Winning the 2000 Elections 
The interviewed representatives from all political parties and civil society agreed that one of 
the most important features of the 2000 pre-election period was the campaign of “positive 
change” conducted by the opposition NPP. The opposition was for this election far better 
organized then ever before with early primaries, coherent campaign strategy and sharper and 
catchier campaign advertisements.173 The following overview will offer a list of most 
important opposition strategies, as generated from the protagonists themselves, employed in 
the course of the 2000 elections in order to increase oppositions’ competitiveness through the 
enhancement of its credibility and legitimacy.  
NPP articulated its campaign around the message of “positive change” in a way that “it 
invited the electorate to focus on all the things they disliked about the NDC regime and then 
to imagine the opposite.” (Nugent 2001: 418; Dan Botwe, NPP, 11th June 2009) The NPP 
highlighted the inability of NDC to manage the national crisis. “The NPP presented itself as a 
party positively overflowing with the relevant ideas and expertise, whereas the NDC was cast 
as a party of nobodies.” (Nugent 2001: 418) Interviewed NDC representatives agree as well 
that some credit must be given to the opposition NPP, which was constantly growing stronger 
and developed very strong propaganda and communication strategies on how to push the 
government on the defense side: “They put such an effort in the 2000 [elections] as I had 
never seen the NPP do before. It was almost like, with Jerry [J.J. Rawlings] now out, we can 
win.” (Kwamena Ahwoi, NDC, 23rd April 2009) The analysis of NPP’s success is divided 
into three major points: internal party provisions and re-organization of the party; 
employment of political rhetoric of the only credible alternative and mechanisms of gaining 
funds.  
 
4.4.2.1. Internal Party Provisions and Re-organization of the Party  
Interviews with NPP representatives revealed that the amendment of the party constitution 
and selection of presidential candidate two years ahead of the elections, proved to be of 
crucial importance as it gave the party sufficient time to campaign. It also enabled to settle the 
numerous internal differences within the party long before the pre-election campaign started. 
The selection of John A. Kufour as the NPP national chairman and presidential candidate is 
another positive attribute. He was perceived as a non-radical candidate, from whom a smooth 
transition of government could have been expected. Besides that Kufour promised a policy of 
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 The NPP had also a very strong presence as it was able to recruit, train and deploy agents to all the polling 
stations in the country for both the 7 December Elections and the 28 December run-off. (Gyimah-Boadi 2001b: 
62; personal interviews) 
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reconciliation in case of his victory, a move which allegedly encouraged Rawlings to hand 
over power peacefully as he did not have to fear prosecution for his past crimes.  
 
Another element often mentioned in the interviews as contributing to NPP’s victory was the 
profound re-structuring and re-organization of the party, which provided for better 
organization and operational structures at the local level. The party organizational lines were 
broken into smaller units – the polling stations – to counterbalance the NDC’s hegemony in 
the rural areas.  
 
“In 1992 you only had one person managing the polling station in some cases wearing 
the NDC T-shirt. So, you have the NDC man as a presiding officer, as an electoral 
officer, as a polling agent.  In 2000 there were actually polling stations that had NPP 
polling agents without NDC agents. So, NPP had mobilized and every report on radio 
was indicating that NPP was all over the place. So, the ruling party could not rig the 
elections and use the advantage of incumbency in terms of managing elections.”  
(Ziblim Barry Iddi, Legon University, 17th April 2009)174 
 
The NDC’s control over the rural voters decreased due to NPP’s decision to cut down its 
elitist, urban character and carry its campaign message to remote rural areas. (personal 
interviews; Gyimah-Boadi 2001b: 71) Gaining rural votes was especially difficult for the 
opposition, as the areas were strongly under control of the incumbent. (see e.g. Aubynn 2002)  
However, NPP had enough capacity to repackage itself as a national party, which offered a 
well-designed and implemented campaign. As Ayee (2002: 171) confirms, “the NPP in fact 
transformed itself from a party associated with the educated middle class and urban dwellers 
to one which appealed to rural dwellers, while still capitalizing on its claim to have the 
support of business and self-made entrepreneurs.” The party also managed to balance the 
presidential ticket ethnically and regionally, which found response among the voters175. 
 
The NPP concentrated on the votes of the youth as they constitute the decisive part of the 
voters, given the demography of the country. Additionally, as Nugent (2001: 419) claims, 
these young voters do not have memories of Rawlings revolution and achievements, but the 
high unemployment rate was very real to them. The NPP’ message of positive change thus 
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 Ayee (2002: 164) claims that the expediency and fairness of election dispute resolution was secured by 
counting of votes in the presence of the candidates and their agents; the countersigning of the results by the party 
agents and parallel tabulations of the parties of the EC’s declared results.  
175
 For details see below 
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found strong support with the urban unemployed youth and working people suffering under 
the bad economic conditions. NPP took very skillfully advantage of the NDC’s economic 
failures to win more voters. (Ahiawordor 2001: 109; Gyimah-Boadi 2001a; personal 
interviews) NPP organized jogging sessions and sustained “keep-fit clubs” in order to connect 
closer to the young and take new identity. (Dan Botwe, NPP, 11th June 2009) The 
establishment of an efficient youth-wing of the party was another factor of importance. The 
NPP party was supported by two main groupings active at that time. The first one, the official 
youth wing of the party – the “Young Elephants” – were in their own words “the foot soldiers 
of the party”, present in all regions and mobilizing for support locally. The second 
organization – the “Young Executive Forum176” – headed by Alan Kyerematang177, associated 
the prominent young businessmen of Accra who were doing fundraising activities within and 
outside Ghana and provided the mobilizing youth with needed funds.  
 
4.4.2.2. Employment of Political Rhetoric as the Only Credible Alternative 
There was a common agreement among my interview partners that NPP had better human 
resources at its disposal, who were able to sell the message of change and credible alternative. 
“In 2000 elections NPP had all the brains” (Zimblim Barry Iddi, Legon University, 17th April 
2009; Kwame Pianim, NPP, 17th June 2009). According to Dr. Emmanuel from Legon 
University, the NPP was able to package the message of tradition, history and ancestors 
standing for “real democracy”. (Debrah, Emmanuel, Legon University, 3rd April 2009) 
Rawlings legacy of abuse of human rights was strategically used against him at every 
occasion. Dan Botwe, the general secretary of the party at that time explains:  
 
“However, it was not too difficult to destroy NDC. We were talking about people who 
killed people. It is easier to let them look bad and let the people believe that they are 
bad. So we have explained plain democracy to people, and said, look this person 
[Rawlings] is not truly democratic, he is not a natural democrat, the events were 
imposed on him.” (Dan Botwe, NPP, 11th June 2009)178  
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 The YEF has been described in Ghanaian newspapers as “a group of young upwardly mobile cellular-phone-
clutching business executives and professionals who provided substantial financial backing for Prof. Adu 
Boahen’s 1992 Presidential bid.” (cited in Jonah 1998: 89) Boafo-Arthur (1998: 91) states: “This is an 
association of young party members in business and various professions who through contributions financed the 
party in several ways. For instance, before the 1992 general elections, the Young Executive Forum furnished the 
party head office.”  
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 Better known as “Alan Cash”  
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 Nugent (1999: 294) pointed in accordance that “the NPP had no shortage of electoral ammunition at its 
disposal”.  
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Nugent (2001: 419) argues that the PNDC days were a moral issue for NPP who constantly 
and strategically reminded of the human rights abuse record. The continuation of the human 
rights tradition advocated already by the NPP forefathers in the early 1950s provided the NPP 
with a good reference point towards own democratic credentials. This strategy of employing 
political rhetoric in order to enhance the structural disadvantageous position (see here Bunce, 
Wolchik 2009) gained the highest prominence among Ghanaian opposition. As explored in 
detail in the first part of this chapter, even under the Fourth Republic, both NPP and NDC 
continue to follow their political party legacy and try to persuade their voters as being keen 
followers of the respective traditions. (Morrison 2004: 431) The parties have constructed an 
image of the self and the other party, which could heighten the political tensions and ruin 
mutual trust as portraying oneself as the angel and the opponents as the devil. (Jonah 1998: 
86; personal interviews) NPP representatives thus portrayed themselves as the bearers of these 
democratic aspirations, the followers of Danquah-Busia tradition, and as the only and real 
alternative to the ruling (undemocratic power) with respect to human rights and rule of law.  
 
“NPP was strong enough as a competing body, ideologically and ethnically 
counterforce to NDC. It was a real alternative and it appealed to different groups of 
people.” (Kojo Pampuni Asante, CDD, 1st April 2009)  
 
NPP not only associated perfectly with the notion of “real” democracy – being to them the 
liberal one – but also connected their political rhetoric very efficiently with the idea of 
“change179”. Change became a buzzword automatically associated with the NPP politics; 
change in improving the economic conditions, raising the employment rates; change in fight 
against corruption, change towards a more democratic form of governance. As Nugent (2001: 
418) claims the lofty promises “enabled the NPP to be somewhat imprecise about how it 
proposed to better the lives of the Ghanaian people in the midst of a severe economic crisis.” 
 
The party optimized the bad economic situation to their own advantage and projected itself, 
besides being the “real” democratic party, also as the “right liberal economic party”. The 
phrase “look into your pocket and count your vote” found strong appeal among voters. NPP 
presented itself as a party having long-term strategies for economic recovery and a party 
encouraging actively private enterprise. For the first time in Ghanaian history, incumbency 
appeared to have also some disadvantages. The opposition attacked the performance of the 
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 “We have associated our campaign like that, if you don’t like Rawlings and NDC then vote for NPP.” (Dan 
Botwe, NPP, 11th June 2009) 
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ruling party constantly on issues such as the economic downturn caused by the decline in 
value of the local currency by about 70%, high unemployment, growing perception of official 
corruption and mismanagement. Corruption became an issue (with support of the opposition 
press) and “the NPP also made great play of the contrast on lifestyles between the NDC 
nouveaux riches and ordinary Ghanaians.” (Nugent 2001: 419) Gyimah-Boadi (2001b: 62) 
thus argues, that “the opposition gleefully and opportunistically blamed all the woes of the 
economy, including the ones caused by external factors such as sharp rise in the price of crude 
oil and the steep decline in the prices of gold and cocoa on the world market, on the 
incumbent government.” NPP thus skillfully promised to offer a credible alternative, not only 
with respect to political but also to economic terms.  
 
“The government was saying they are supporting private sector led development. But 
we explained the people that they [the government] are not doing it out of conviction, 
but out of compulsion. We are the ones who do it out of conviction, so you need us. We 
are the people who believe in it, you need us. We are the people who make sure that 
your living standards will improve, and they believed that!” (Kwame Pianim, NPP, 
17th June 2009) 
 
A further important strategy in order to enhance its competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent 
and counter-balance the incumbent advantages was to connect with several segments of the 
society, oppositional forces, which have been natural allies of the party tradition since early 
independence days. This strategy has been explored in detail in the previous point; however, 
one important actor, the private sector, has been left out of the analysis so far. As its 
involvement proved to be crucial for NPP’s success, the issues of funding, party financing and 
motivation for involvement of the private sector will be discussed now.  
 
4.4.2.3. Gaining Fund Mechanisms 
One of the most crucial challenges for opposition parties in Africa generally, contributing to 
their structural disadvantage vis-à-vis the incumbent (see e.g. Boafo-Arthur 1998; van de 
Walle 2007) is the lack of public funding and resources. The results of the poor financing in 
Ghana are lacking presence in all regions and constituencies of the country180, notably in rural 
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 “The Political Parties Law, 1992 (PNDCL 281), Section 9 (1)(c) requires the parties to have branches in all 
the regions of Ghana in addition to their being organized in not less than two-thirds of the districts in each 
region” – this is one of the conditions for registration and recognition as a functional political party. In reality; 
however, only few parties are able to maintain their offices throughout the country. Most party offices are 
virtually closed down soon after elections only to be re-opened in an election year. (Boafo-Arthur 1998) 
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areas181. Campaigning, as Nugent (2001: 408) states, is a very expensive business, while 
“chiefs have to be presented with their customary drinks; and communities need to be 
saturated with poster, flyers and T-shirts […] and provided with certain amount of 
largesse.182” In this kind of situation, the incumbent regime enjoys a substantial advantage 
over its rivals (Ahiawordor 2001: 110; Gyimah-Boadi 2001b: 60; Nugent 2001: 408) 
manifested in privileged access to state resources, presence on the state-owned media, private 
contributions from businessmen in the expectation of winning favorable tenders and contracts, 
and creation of atmosphere of fear and linking opposition success with possible threats to 
peace and stability in the country. Opposition parties on the other hand, (Nugent 2001: 409) 
are dependent on the good will of sympathetic “big men” in a situation where “NDC was 
prepared to make life difficult for anyone who fraternized openly with the opposition.” There 
is the commonly shared perception that voters would “only put their trust in candidates who 
manifested generosity” in one or another way. (see e.g. Lindberg 2003)  
 
Little or no attention has been paid to the subject of finances in the Ghanaian politics. As 
Ayee explains (1993: 246) “this dearth of literature on party financing may be attributed 
largely to the fact that the extent of contributions and the identity of the donors have remained 
a closely guarded secret.” Determining the sources of financial resources of political parties is 
difficult (Morrison 2004: 436) as the reports provided by the parties do not record all 
supporters. (Boafo-Arthur 1998) However, NPP as an opposition party managed to obtain 
sufficient finances for the pre-election campaign, mobilize enough resources, establish a wide 
circle of party-contributors and ensure cost-effectiveness of the campaign. To achieve this 
structural advantage, a combination of several factors became necessary.  
 
As the conducted interviews revealed, it was crucial that NPP members were contributing 
their own funds, selling own properties to gain resources for party financing, or donating own 
houses for the purpose of being used as party headquarters. In their own words, they were 
committed to and sacrificed for the cause of the party’s survival because of its ideology and 
traditional meaning.  
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 This is a specific problem for NPP, as NDC is maintained firstly, through the appointments of district 
assembly executives (Ayee 1999); and secondly, through maintaining the PNDC network from the revolutionary 
days, including 31 DWM, Council of Independent Business Associations, the Ghana Private Road Transport 
Workers Union, market women’s associations a.o. (Boafo-Arthur 1998: 81; Sandbrook, Oelbaum 1999: 21)  
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 Nugent (2001: 409f) argues that “on the NDC side, the provision of roads and electric poles at election times 
was calculated to persuade the voters that the NDC was genuinely committed to ‘development’ and had their 
best interest at heart. The distribution of small money was equally intended to tap into the image of the 
benevolent ‘big man’ caring for his clients.”  
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“My own office served as the first national secretariat of NPP and all of us 
contributed. We had people who believed in what we were doing and who would 
contribute without being known publicly.” (B.J. da Rocha, NPP, 11th June 2009) 
 
Decisive for success of an opposition party with no public financing was also the fact that 
almost everything was done on a voluntary basis.   
 
“A lot of the young traders provided money; all of us put the hands in our pockets to 
finance the party, but most importantly was that party people tended to give their time. 
If there is a rally, you don’t have to pay for it. People organized, all polling agents, 
assistants, people would drive them, and some of the women would cook so you don’t 
have to provide food.” (Kwame Pianim, NPP, 17th June 2009) 
 
Costs were reduced significantly by operating in small areas. The General Secretary of the 
party, Dan Botwe, explained to me how NPP would motivate and appeal to the voters: 
 
“We had 10 activists as party agents on the polling station, we had average of 500 
people at the polling station, so one person took 50 people, in a house, community, 
you have average of 5 voters, so it means, I am working in 10 houses, around this 
area, I don’t need vehicle, I don’t need fuel. Each person was working in specifically 
pre-determined zones or areas.” (Dan Botwe, NPP, 11th June 2009) 
 
Thanks to the traditional orientation of the party towards businessmen183 and close alliance to 
the private sector, there is a natural alliance of NPP with private business entities.  
 
“NPP is a party committed to the private sector; many of our friends in the private 
sector could not bear the raising rates, the raising inflation during the NDC time, so 
they donated; if not cash, then bicycle, vehicle etc. That enabled the good organization 
of the party.” (Peter MacManu, NPP, 23rd April 2009)  
 
However, significant difficulties arose with contributions from the private sector as the 
majority of the businessmen donated under the condition of staying anonymous because of 
fear the association of their business with an opposition party might bring their activities to a 
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 As Kwame Pianim put it in an interview, “all of us were businessmen, we did not need any money” (Kwame 
Pianim, NPP, 17th June 2009) 
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standstill. To better understand the motivation of the private sector for “clandestinely” 
entering the oppositional space of political contestation, a short historical overview of the 
state-private sector relationships becomes necessary at this point.  
 
The negative state – private sector relation goes back to early post-independence period when 
Nkrumah’s approach to Ghanaian private enterprises was not favorable and he did not provide 
the needed framework for local business people to expand. Instead, a great number of state 
enterprises was established and the links between private sector and foreign private interests 
broken. (Killick 1978: 37; Drah 1993: 88f; Hart, Gyimah-Boadi 2001b) The Ghanaian 
business people and their representative associations saw their position eroded even further 
with the economic decline under Acheampong’s regime as well as with the first coming of 
Rawlings under AFRC (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) in 1979. The ferocity of the 
AFRC’s exercises184 left the Ghanaian private sector “implacably opposed to Rawlings” and 
resulted in a growing conviction that the less a businessperson had to do with government, the 
better off he or she would be. (Hart, Gyimah-Boadi 2000: 2; 4)  
Despite the economic and political liberalization that followed in the 1990s, the methods of 
consultation and communication between business associations and the government remained 
poorly developed during the NDC rule, as the government wanted to “have it both ways”, on 
the one hand calling on private enterprises to take over the responsibility; on the other, 
questioning business people’s moral character and commitment to public good. Hart and 
Gyimah-Boadi (2000: 21) argue that “[…] it looks as if the democratically elected 
Rawlings/NDC regime continues to harbor hegemonic designs on business associations and 
other elements of civil society.” In Ghanaian political history, the state has thus become the 
main de facto source of funding185. (Ayee 1993: 248; Gyimah-Boadi, Debrah 2008: 137) 
 
It was therefore not surprising that the business community saw its new chances in a political 
party, which promised a “golden age of business” (Emmanuel Akwetey, IDEG, 29th June 
2009) and which would enable them to institutionalize the mechanisms of private sector 
participation. As NPP is historically associated with the businessmen and private enterprises 
following the liberal Danquah-Busia policies and stressing the importance of the private 
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 For more details on the AFRC activities and exercises with respect to the private sector as well as lists of 
confiscated companies see also Chazan (1983: 282); Pellow, Chazan (1986: 60-62); Gyimah-Boadi (1991b: 
195); Folson (1993: 4); Herbst (1993: 25f).  
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 For mechanisms of state resources being channeled to fund the incumbent parties during the Nkrumah time 
see e.g. Chazan (1988); Ayee (1993); Debrah (2005). For continuation of similar practices under subsequent 
civilian regime see e.g. Werlin (1972); Le Vine (1974); Price (1975). 
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market, the alliance of interests appeared only natural.186 Despite the strong natural 
connection of interests, the business associations and private sector enterprises never took a 
clear stand in order not to get compromised (Gyimah-Boadi, Debrah 2008: 152), as the state 
participation in economy in Ghana was still very strong ahead of the 2000 elections (Boafo-
Arthur 1998: 91) “People were afraid to get associated with the party [NPP]. They would not 
even stop to greet me on the street because they were afraid their business could be affected.” 
(Dan Botwe, NPP, 11th June 2009)  
In this clandestine form of cooperation significant support was also received from the 
Ghanaian Diaspora in the form of direct financing of NPP activities as well as moral 
encouragement. The Ghanaian Diaspora consists mostly out of capitalists drawn out of the 
country during PNDC187 time, who became dissidents after their private properties have been 
confiscated by Rawlings.  
 
 “Many of the people in Diaspora have left in escaping the PNDC atrocities so 
automatically they will be sympathetic to our party, because they have been driven out 
of here. So when a party has come up to fight against those people, then you know that 
automatically they come by your side.”  (Peter MacManu, NPP, 23rd June 2009) 
 
Another significant source of funding for the opposition NPP kept flowing from the party’s 
overseas branches especially in UK and USA. (Boafo-Arthur 1998) 
 
As the funding of political parties happens secretly, all information about the direct 
involvement of the private sector and business enterprises are thus rather speculations (Ayee 
1993: 246; Morrison 2004: 436). One could trace their involvement backwards only from the 
rewards in form of appointments. Daniel Batidam from Ghana Integrated Initiative, an anti-
corruption body and local chapter of Transparency International states: 
 
“…the only thing we could tell is from the appointments when they came into office, 
like some people appeared from nowhere. We thought they were coming from 
nowhere, but they were known as individuals who have financed the party.” (Daniel 
Batidam, Ghana Integrated Initiative, 21st April 2009) 
 
                                                 
186
 “All these donations, t-shirts, vehicles, fuel, paper, radio, TV adverts, we kept organizing fund-raising bets, 
and they [private sector enterprises] supported us.” (Dan Botwe, NPP, 11th June 2009) 
187
 Prominent individuals whose enterprises have been ceased or confiscated under the PNDC era, and who later 
became members or financial supporters of NPP include J.A. Adison from Ghana Association of Industries; or 
Appiah Menka and B.A. Mensag owing a tobacco company and a brewery.  
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The financial contributions are made with “an eye on securing access to power holders and 
influence over contract awards and decision-making.” (Gyimah-Boadi, Debrah 2008: 152; 
Lindberg 2003) Businessmen maneuver their favorite candidates; get lucrative positions in 
politics and the state bureaucracy. These donations are; however, based on reciprocal benefits 
(Sandbrook, Oelbaum 1999: 42-44). The contributors (private firms, civil contractors etc.) 
expect some tangible favors188, namely in the case of a win, that the party would help secure 
their company’s contracts. (Debrah 2005: 154) For politicians, it is an occasion to represent 
their largesse – in donating clothes, cars, attending clients’ birthday, and wedding ceremonies 
– all being a part of a plan to buy political clients and thus guarantee their election victories. 
(Lindberg 2003) However, as Ayee (1993: 254) pointed out, “the role of contributors in 
influencing policies and actions of government must be regarded in a larger context than that 
of a contributor always buying a specific action or wanting something in return. Businessmen, 
for instance, may contribute to a party on the assumption that its general policy orientation 
will turn out to be sympathetic to them.”  
 
All of the efforts mentioned above affected the NPP’s message of positive change positioned 
the party very strategically as opposed to other opposition parties, and NPP managed to 
persuade the voters that if they really wanted a change of government they should not waste 
their votes for smaller parties. (Nugent 2001: 420) 
 
4.4.3. Inability of NDC to Appeal to the Voters 
As the activities, performance and selected strategies of the opposition cannot be analyzed 
without a reference towards the ruling force (Prempeh 2008b), the following section will 
explore the shortcomings of the ruling NDC and its inability to appeal to voters despite 
significant structural incumbent advantages on its side. Similar as in the previous section, a 
set of various factors as generated from the conducted interviews with NDC representatives 
and other actors will be analyzed in detail. The statements gained in the interviews are 
supplemented with the existing secondary literature. 
 
4.4.3.1. Arrogance as Cause of a Failure? 
The first and foremost factor cited both in the literature and mentioned among my interview 
partners is the complacency and arrogance of NDC after almost twenty years in power. 
                                                 
188
 On mechanisms of party financing and scheme of individual financial contributions affecting policy-making 
of the political party see also Key (1964); La Palombara, Weiner (1966); Shannon (1959).  
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NDC189 did not recognize serious challenges the environment brought along (Ayee 2002: 170) 
and its functionaries turned down invitations from the media to explain their policies and 
programs. Anebo (2001: 73) argues that the electoral outcome of the 2000 elections was due 
to the so called “protest” or “negative voting190”, as the NDC representatives were too 
arrogant and lost contact with the electorate. Nugent (2001: 407) stresses that NDC has 
“become so used to winning that it became blasé and lost touch with its popular base.” 
 
As some of my interview partners expressed during our conversations (including NDC 
representatives): “the party was digging its own grave” (Nicolas Awortwi, Legon University, 
28th February 2008) with a “destructive, negative internal process” going on (Zimblim Barry 
Iddi, Legon University, 17th April 2009). The “2000 elections was a manifestation of inherent 
weaknesses and failures of NDC” (Kofi Totobi-Kwakye, NDC, 24th June 2009) as “we did not 
think we could ever loose and so we did not put as much effort as we ought to have” 
(Kwamena Ahwoi, NDC, Minister of LG, General Secretary, 23rd April 2009). This opinion 
that the elections was rather lost by NDC than won by NPP also has a substantial support 
among academic scholars. Many argue191 that the outcome was rather an NDC failure as the 
party had “at its disposal the military and was backed by revolutionary grass-roots 
mobilization with the Civil Defense Organizations in every village. The structures remained 
intact even during the NDC time.” (John Larvie, CDD, 20th March 2009) With the network at 
its disposal, and with the support of military and security institutions, the party felt invincible, 
“by virtue of the fact that Rawlings was a product of these security institutions, therefore 
knew how to manage the security establishment in favor of us.” (Kofi Totobi-Kwakye, NDC, 
Head of National Security, 24th June 2009)  
The question thus arises if we can talk of a “failed misuse of incumbency” (Nugent 2001: 
406) in case of NDC as it was extensively using the advantages of incumbency but failed to 
capitalize on them. The advantages included, among others, revolutionary structures from the 
PNDC days at Rawlings disposal (Nugent 2001: 414); use of the DCEs and other government 
functionaries in between elections who carried out propaganda and organizational activities 
on behalf of the NDC (Boafo-Arthur 1998: 81); and use of official vehicles for party 
campaigning, which enabled it to reach remote rural areas not accessible for the opposition. 
(Aubynn 2002: 97; Ayee 2002: 162) 
                                                 
189
 Similarly as the Slovak HZDS (Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko); see following chapter 5 on Slovakia.  
190
 A so called “protest vote” is an extension of “rejection vote”, where “voters displeased with a certain policy 
or personality within their party defect to another party.” (Anebo 2001: 74). He further states that “the exit of the 
Rawlings candidacy, transformed certain individuals, from likely voters to non-voters.”  
191
 Also Atta-Mills, the NDC presidential candidate stated afterwards: “I am convinced that the NPP did not win 
the 2000 elections; rather the NDC lost it.” (cited in Nugent 2001: 407) 
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4.4.3.2. Lack of Internal Democracy within NDC 
The prevailing general perception among all interview partners is that the ruling party was 
controlled by Rawlings and his wife. The cadres of NDC disregarded with the 
recommendations of its foot soldiers on how to revitalize the party (Ahiawordor 2001: 117; 
Ayee 2002: 171; personal interviews with NDC representatives) as well as the call of the 
constituencies for primaries. These were rejected by the National Executive Council of NDC 
and the sitting parliamentary candidates (above all in Volta Region) were confirmed (Nugent 
2001: 46) and imposed from the party headquarters192. (Ahiawordor 2001: 117). These 
undemocratic proceedings mounted into grass-roots revolt in the Volta Region against the 
party headquarters. (Nugent 2001: 416) 
 
“At that stage, the state and the party were totally fused. There was no distinction […] 
people were just asking for the choice of parliamentary candidates, to have an input, a 
role, but then they [the HQ] announced the parliamentary candidates from the 
Castle.” (Sam Garbah, NDC, 12th June 2009)  
 
Another sign of lacking internal democracy was that the party did not have an established 
leadership succession arrangement193. The internal struggle for power and leading positions 
was too strong, as there was no proper arrangement allowing people to express their emerging 
interests and their leadership ambitions have not been fulfilled. Immediately after it became 
clear that Rawlings is leaving the party presidents’ seat, internal struggle for his succession 
begun and led to, what academic literature calls the “Factor Atta-Mills.”  
 
4.4.3.3. Factor Atta-Mills and Formation of National Reform Party 
The selection of the presidential candidate following Rawlings became the main issue within 
the NDC. Instead of going through transparent selection procedures, as proscribed by the 
party’s constitution, incumbent Jerry Rawlings hand-picked his follower. His choice fell on 
                                                 
192
 The then General Secretary of NDC and Minister of Local Governmnet, Kwamena Ahwoi, told me in an 
interview that they were forced by their own party members to select the candidates: “In 2000 our MPs told us, 
if you want us to go and campaign in the primaries before we get elected by our party to contest, then we are 
going to leave the parliament and how government work is done is your problem. We were the government and 
we had to do the work - our budget, bills, and policies - all needed to be passed. So, they wanted to retain their 
seats without going back to compete, people from my own party! So, we gave in finally, because we needed them 
to work for parliament.” (Kwamena Ahwoi, NDC, 23rd April 2009) 
193
 “Rawlings virtually prevented a congress within party when he picked up Mills for his successor”(Ben 
Ephson, Journalist, Editor of “Daily Dispatch”, Executive Director of Election Monitoring Body “Ghana Alert”, 
26th March 2009). 
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Prof. J.E. Atta-Mills.194 The prevailing perceptions within the party (according to conducted 
interviews) were that if Atta-Mills would be elected, the country would be further controlled 
by Rawlings, which was confirmed by the domineering presence of Rawlings as founder and 
leader of NDC in Atta-Mills’ pre-election campaign. A decisive tactical failure from Mills 
came at Ho (Volta Region) on 29 April 2000, where he declared, if elected he would consult 
Rawlings twenty-four hours a day. (Ahiawordor 2001: 109) This became a “juicy piece” for 
the opposition who managed to persuade the electorate that Rawlings was still acting behind 
the scene. (see personal interviews) Mills had, according to Nugent (2001: 415), a weak 
power base in the party. The party did not have confidence in him and he was thus not 
provided with a sufficient financial backing. Opposition members naturally used the situation 
and accused NDC of not being an internally democratic party. (Ahiawordor 2001: 115)195 
Despite the discrepancies in the party, Prof. Mills was endorsed as a candidate in Ho at a party 
congress for semblance of unity. (Sam Garbah, NDC, 12th June 2009) 
Mills was embraced as the new flag-bearer during the so-called Swedru Declaration196 in June 
1998. (Ayee 2002: 172) As a result to Rawling’s statement197 the National Reform Party 
(NRP) was formed in July 2000198 out of the NDC personalities who were not comfortable 
with the chairman’s decision. The NRP, although weak in terms of percentages, had a massive 
psychological effect and “devastating message” on the voters, “because they were coming 
from inside us, and anything they said,[whether it was] true or false, was believed.” 
(Kwamena Ahwoi, NDC, 23rd April 2009). The dumping of spirit was large after the leave of 
the NRP under the leadership of Goosie Tanoh, which was additionally the “research, 
strategic wing”, “the young intellectuals” of the party.  (Nugent 2001: 414) NRP strategically 
fielded candidates in NDC strongholds, which cost NDC at least eighteen seats. Ahiawordor 
                                                 
194
 Jeffries (1998)  argues that Atta-Mills was selected as the new flag-bearer, partly to help win votes from the 
Nkrumahist tradition in the Western and Central regions. Besides that he had a “clean” image. For ethnic 
background details of the selection of the running-mate of all political parties in 2000 elections see Ahiawordor 
(2001: 111); Frempong (2001:153f); Gyimah-Boadi, Debrah (2008: 147) The authors recognize in the selection 
of the running-mates from the North rather a geographical balance of North-South equation than solely ethnic 
voting. 
195
 NPP took every opportunity to point to the misuse of advantages of incumbency by NDC. (Nugent 1999: 294)  
196
 The Swedru Declaration was decisive as it provided the spark of all the conflicts. Without Swedru the 
situation could have been clarified internally within the party and it would have been possible to let it appear as 
an internally democratic party; however, after the public declaration of Rawlings at Swedru on June 8 1998, the 
party could not remain the most solid and unified at the political scene, as it appeared to be before. (Ahiawordor 
2001: 115)  
197
 However, the Swedru Declaration was only an immediate cause for a break-away, and the division within the 
party was much deeper going back in time. The selection of running mate was not a new issue within the party 
and went back to 1992 elections, when Rawlings picked a person from CPP tradition, Ekow Nkersen Arkaah, to 
show a broad-based tendency of his movement. Issue of succession came onto surface again in 1996, when 
Rawlings did not pick his favorite candidate Goosie Tanoh, but decided for Atta-Mills. (for details see Nugent 
2001: 413)  
198
 The cadres who broke away firstly launched a reform movement on February 4 1999 which was later 
translated into a political party. (Ahiawordor 2001: 115)  
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(2001: 115f) summarizes the implications of the breakaway as follows: leaders of the NRP 
carried away not only the expertise, as they were electoral strategists of the NDC, but also the 
“very dedicated, active and committed cadres who served as foot soldiers of the party”. This 
meant that the strategies and electoral tricks of the NDC in previous elections became 
exposed to the opposition and consequently blocked. Crucial was in further development the 
decision of the NRP to support the opposition NPP in the run-off of the presidential elections.  
 
4.4.3.4. Process of Internal Stagnation and Missing of Rawlings Charisma 
According to interviewed NDC representatives, the party did not take any new faces on the 
board but rather preferred to remain with the old guards and thus overstayed in power as it 
was in fact the continuation of PNDC. (personal interviews with NDC representatives) There 
was no new message to sell, as the slogan “continuity in change” was not catchy enough to 
appeal to the voters. (Kwamena Ahwoi, NDC, 23rd April 2009). NDC as a party did not 
exploit the liberalized civil and media space and was not able to develop a communication 
strategy responsive to the times. Instead, they rather antagonized these crucial forces:199 
 
“When we left that era [PNDC], we did not bring them [media, civil society] on to 
play. Yes, we changed, we recognized the new media, the new environment of free 
expression, but at the same time we did not develop a strategy for dealing with them in 
long term. The NPP took advantage and boxed us into the corner.” (Kofi Totobi-
Kwakye, NDC, 24th June 2009) 
 
Ahiawordor (2001: 109) and interviewed NDC representatives argue that the NDC slogan of 
continuity was selected rather unfortunate, as many people interpreted continuity to mean an 
attempt by Rawlings to continue in ruling the country from the back-stage.  
 
4.4.3.5. Economic Circumstances 
The economic circumstances had both internal and external character. The external character 
could be ascribed to the worsening economic situation with cocoa prices falling down on the 
global market, increase of fuel prices and an inconvenient foreign exchange situation200.  
The internal ones include according to Nugent (2001: 413, 417) that the resource base of 
NDC was substantially eroded; the party neither showed capacity to channel strategically state  
                                                 
199
 They did not exploit them even in the eight years while in the opposition (2000-2008); the same phenomenon 
can be observed in Slovakia, where the HZDS, SNS never gained the pro-democracy forces on their side during 
their stay in opposition from 1998-2006.  
200
 The Cedi depreciated almost from 3.500 to 7.000 cedi to dollar.  
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resources for the 2000 elections; nor could it appeal to the electorate with new development 
projects or other achievements. The party was further weakened by a loss of internal funds 
due to two main reasons. Firstly, Mrs. Rawlings retired from politics taking 31 DWM funds 
with her. (Nugent 2001: 415) Secondly, the funds of the party got lost through internal 
clashes. After Mills selected Martin Amidu201 as his running-mate for the 2000 elections, Dr. 
Obed Asamoah (the then Attorney General of the country) who was a strong candidate for this 
position, stepped back from the campaign and as chairman of the NDC finance committee 
“made sure that the moneys received for the purpose of party campaigning were not 
forwarded to the party account.”  
 
“He decided to make a plot to teach Mills a lesson for not selecting him. After the 
elections, other party members discovered in his garage a whole stock of Atta-Mills 
campaign posters, which have not been distributed throughout the country. We re-
used the respective posters again in 2004 elections.” (Kofi Totobi-Kwakye, NDC, 24th 
June 2009) 
 
The opposition NPP capitalized very effectively on the situation and on the fact that NDC was 
not able to meet its promises. As Ayee (2002: 171) claims the weakening economy started to 
weaken the whole system with budget difficulties, strikes, donors not releasing funds and the 
economic hardship was blamed on the government’s inaction and mismanagement. It was 
thus “all too easy for opposition candidates to allude to a long trail of broken promises” 
(Nugent 2001: 413). Even interviewed NPP representatives admit that their victory could not 
have been contributed solely to their performance but is mainly caused by external 
circumstances, which played into their hands: 
 
“The economy has conspired against them [NDC], external factors were very hard 
against them, they have lost their foot-soldiers.” (Kwame Pianim, NPP, 17th June 
2009)  
 
As the above discussed, two factors contributing to the outcome of the elections can be 
ascribed to a “strong showing of the main opposition party” as well as a “dismal performance 
of the incumbent ruling NDC”. (Anebo 2001: 72).  
 
                                                 
201
 Nugent (2001: 415) further assumes that Amidu was picked up because of his Northern origin. 
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All the above mentioned developments translated into a loss of voters, as NDC disconnected 
from the grass-root voters and the floating swing voters decided to vote for NPP. NDC is 
traditionally supported by a grass-root base, whereas, NPP, (see Morrison 2004; Jonah 1998; 
et al.) is traditionally perceived to be an elitists middle-class party. However, in the 2000 
elections, the grass-roots support base of the NDC shifted towards the NPP.  The next point 
explains the voting pattern behavior, which has to be understood as an outcome of the shift in 
the public mood and decision to vote for the opposition.  
 
4.4.4. Underlying Voting Patterns  
Scholars distinguish several underlying patterns of Ghanaian elections and voting behavior of 
the population. Analysis of literature revealed that Ghanaians tend to vote along 
regional/ethnic (Gyimah-Boadi 2001a: 115; Frempong 2001; Nugent 2001: 410-412; 
Morrison 2004: 429-431); urban-rural (Nugent 1999: 305; Aubynn 2002: 93) and socio-
economic lines. (Fridy 2007: 281) Others claim additionally that, whereas in established 
democracies voters generally tend to vote issue-oriented, voting behavior in Ghana is 
influenced predominantly by local factors such as local collectivity202, personal obligation to 
candidates, traditional loyalty, ethnicity and other primordial considerations203. However, 
Lentz and Nugent (2000); Frempong (2001: 141); Morrison (2004: 43); Fridy (2007: 302) et 
al. argue that even thought ethnicity is a very important factor in Ghanaian elections it did not 
become the sole central issue of political campaigns204. Further, they claim that the ethnic 
patterns around Ghanaian elections cannot be reduced to the simplistic Ashanti-Ewe 
dichotomy205. The Ghanaian elections are always “unpredictable and discourage politicians 
from turning national votes into a zero-sum ethnic censes”206. (Fridy 2007: 281) Although the 
ethnic sentiments were misused and the ethnic card was played by the political parties207, it is 
                                                 
202
 Chazan (1987) 
203
 Dunn (1975); Austin (1975: 10) 
204
 Stronger position is supported by Debrah who claims that “The reality is that Ghanaian electorate are cleaved 
along ethnic lines represented by the informal description of the NDC as Ewe and NPP as Akan parties.” 
(Debrah 2005: 142)  
205
 This Ashanti-Ewe rivalry goes back to the military regime of National Liberation Council. See Hutchful 
(1973), and remained persistent in Ghanaian politics throughout all Four Republics and military regimes. 
Awoonor (1984: 57) states that “the fact that Ewes the second largest ethnic group in the country, see themselves 
in opposition to all governments in Ghana, which inevitably became Akan (Ashanti) dominated […] as it were, 
the contest for power is reduced in simple terms to a fierce contest between the Akan (Ashanti) and the Ewes. 
The large Ewe presence in the civil service, military and institutions of learning is seen as an effective check on 
Ashanti efforts at hegemony.”   
206
 However, on the other hand, parties appear to lean on ethnicity for support as some form of insurance in an 
electoral context, in which they deem the electorate unpredictable. (Frempong 2001; Debrah  2004) 
207
 In the run-off NDC’s campaign strategy rested heavily on ethnic mobilization (Gyimah-Boadi 2001b: 62) 
when it called against “the Ashanti invasion” portraying all Ashantis as “wicked and vindictive.” (Frempong 
2001: 156) Besides, the misuse of the ethnic card for polling, and personal attacks on the opponents became the 
leading campaign tactic in the second round elections. 
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difficult to explain the election results solely in ethnic terms. They thus conclude that the 
identities, even those based on ethnicity, are flexible and that whatever role ethnicity plays, it 
is mediated by other factors. 
 
4.4.4.1. Voting along Regional Lines 
Ghanaians tend to vote along regional lines with the NPP being dominant in the Ashanti 
Region and the NDC having its stronghold in the Volta Region208 and some prominent 
support in the three Northern Regions: Upper East, Upper West, and Northern209. The five 
remaining regions, Eastern, Greater Accra, Central, Western and Brong Ahafo, are the so 
called “Swing regions.” However, Fridy (2007: 282) claims that these patterns can be 
explained by other than ethnic variables. Namely, the socio-economic cleavages, with the 
NPP being a center-right party and NDC a center-left, including also rural-urban divide210, 
level of education, occupation status and sector, and income levels. (Lindberg, Morrison 
2005) NPP is generally portrayed as an Asante, Southern and city party; whereas, NDC is an 
Ewe, Northern and rural party211. (Nugent212 1999: 305; Fridy 2007: 299) With respect to the 
outcome of the elections, even more important than voting along regional lines appears to be 
the urban-rural voting pattern.  
 
4.4.4.2. Urban-Rural Voting Pattern 
From the very beginning, NDC was aware of its unpopularity in the cities and that the 
elections would be decided on the countryside. (Nugent 2001: 410) Several analysts 
(Bawumia 1998; Green 1998; Nugent 1999; Aubynn 2002) point to the fact that the SAPs 
created a rural-urban bifurcation in Ghana as they had a differential impact on Ghanaian 
implemented economic policies. They claim that rural areas have benefited more from SAP 
                                                 
208
 The dominance of the NDC in the Volta region can be explained with the fact that it is Rawlings home region. 
Interesting were the strategies of the NDC to create a new “world bank” of NDC in the Central region where the 
presidential candidate Atta Mills comes from. NDC billboard and campaign posters sought to present Mills as a 
Fanti for whom all Fantis should vote; however, as one left Central region (Frempong 2001: 149), the NDC 
billboards changed to “Vote Prof. Mills for President” leaving his ethnical background completely out of 
campaign and presenting him as a candidate of the whole nation. The efforts for creating en bloc Central region 
vote a la Volta region vote were diminished by the fact that later three other political parties CPP, GCPP, and 
NRP chose Fantis as their flag-bearers.  
209
 For statistical results see among others Frempong (2001: 157f); Gyimah-Boadi (2001b: 63) 
210
 “In addition to the urban and rural distinction, there is a perceived and actual gap between the country’s North 
and South dating back to the colonial period when the British purposively kept the northern population 
uneducated so that they would remain a cheap source of labor in the South.” (Thomas 1975) 
211
 These partisan cleavages are, however unrealistically sharp and in actuality much more nuanced. See Fridy’s 
mapping of the votes (2007: 285-290). 
212
 Nugent points also to center-periphery voting pattern rather than one in terms of North-South divide. Nugent 
(1999: 305f) means with center the metropolitan core of the nineteenth century Greater Asante, with these 
regions leaning to NPP tradition, and the “outer provinces” of Volta, Western, Brong-Ahafo, Upper East and 
Upper West leaning towards NDC.  
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policies and the increase of prices of cocoa and other cash crops. Secondly, there was a 
significant improvement in the provision of service delivery such as health centers, roads, and 
electricity in marginalized parts of the country during the PNDC rule. (Ewusi 1987; Herbst 
1993; Nugent 2001) 
The biggest winners – the nouveaux riches – were located in the cities; however, at the same 
time the costs of SAPs were carried more heavily by the urban than the rural population as the 
retrenchment from the public sector as well as the system of urban taxation had a greater 
impact on cities than on the countryside. (Nugent 1999: 309) The urban dwellers thus suffered 
through high prices followed by the removal of subsidies and the devaluation of the currency, 
reduction of state employment, and low rates of income. (Ninsin 1991; Herbst 1993) 
Therefore, the explanation for a shift in voter’s preferences can be found in the economic 
circumstances, as urban wage earners as well as the unemployed youth were mostly affected 
by the economic situation. The implementation of SAPs since 1983 meant a “U-turn in 
economic policy of Ghana as it alienated the urban working class and students, on whom 
Rawlings initially drew from for his support”. (Aubynn 2002: 93) With their vote rural voters 
wanted to protect and enhance their economic fortune, the urban voters wanted to protest 
against it. (Aubynn 2002: 93) Nugent (1999: 309) claims that all these measures were done as 
“the NDC understood that the election would be won in the rural areas, and made sure that it 
was seen to be delivering on its earlier election pledges.”213 Even though, the media in Ghana 
are “vibrant”, free to operate214 and flourishing in the urbanized areas of the country, they 
remain largely inaccessible to people living in rural and remote areas215. (Smith, Temin 2001: 
176) The rural voters thus tend to vote rather traditionally for reasons of economic and 
political stability, fear of violence and lack of confidence that any substantial change would 
occur if the opposition came to power. (Aubynn 2002: 98) The urban-rural divide in the 2000 
elections was even more pronounced than in 1996 (Nugent 2001: 423), while the only 
regional capitals where NDC gained majority were Ho and Wa in Volta and Upper West 
regions. As many interview representatives further stressed that the rural population does not 
live in complete isolation, as their relatives in urban areas regularly send remittances as well 
as advice for whom to vote. The changing voting patterns have shown how the adopted 
                                                 
213
 Jonah (2001) identifies three types of constituencies in Ghana; namely, “urban-industrial”, “urban non-
industrial”, and “rural” constituencies. His research shows that while NPP is strong in the first two types, NDC is 
prevailing in the rural ones.   
214
 For details of occasional incidents occurring despite the generally free environment and constitutional 
guarantees such as closing of the private Chris FM station or arresting the publisher of the private newspaper 
Ghanaian Chronicle see Smith, Temin (2001: 164f) 
215
 Four out of ten Ghana’s regions do not have a single private FM station.  
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economic policies might influence the state-society relations in general and consequently the 
outcome of the elections in particular over time.  
 
4.5. Conclusions 
This chapter identified the main strategies of the Ghanaian oppositional forces and their quest 
for democratization. Long-term as well as short-term causes for the success of the opposition 
in 2000 elections were presented and analyzed in detail. Specific attention was given firstly, 
to development and continuation of political parties’ legacies and traditions; secondly, to the 
dynamic interplay between state and various actors of civil society, including cooptation and 
cooperation or opposition depending on the nature and the objectives of the respective regime. 
Individual crucial actors, as generated from secondary literature and personal interviews, were 
portrayed in detail, in order to understand the long-established relationships, their legacy and 
impact on the current political situation and positioning within the space of governmental or 
oppositional forces. The chapter has also shown that the issues of the opposition varied with 
time and the nature of the respective regime. The second part explored the short-term causes 
and strategies employed immediately ahead of the 2000 elections. These included a campaign 
of positive change by the main opposition party NPP and the inability of the incumbent NDC 
to exploit its advantageous incumbency position, which manifested themselves in the 
underlying voting patterns. As the crucial factor of importance for the success of oppositional 
forces proved to be the continuation of party traditions, the chapter has been named “revival 
of the past”. The main strategy was the employment of political rhetoric and appeal to 
continuing tradition of human rights record and liberal democracy. This strategy appeared to 
be especially useful when pointing to the negative record of abuse of human rights and misuse 
of rule of law by the incumbent. Through appealing to own democratic credentials and past 
records, the opposition was able to enhance its credibility among voters and portray itself in 
entirely positive light. Of significant importance was also the natural connection of the NPP 
(and its forerunners) to the private sector and business association, which provided for 
sufficient funds in the pre-elections period. Through constant appeal to own democratic 
history, the party managed to create an aura of stability, trust, and prosperity. The electorate 
was thus given the impression that only this opposition party can create a real alternative to 
the incumbent; and thus bring along the highly anticipated “change”, both in political and 
economic terms. We can conclude that the employment of this strategy was possible on the 
one hand, thanks to the long-term democratic legacy and existing party traditions; and on the 
other, thanks to the extensive network of cooperation and interaction with various 
oppositional forces reaching back to the days of early independence.  
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Chapter 5: Slovakia - The New Beginning  
 
5.1. Introduction  
In the history of independent Slovakia, Mečiars’ political style in the post-communist period, 
especially in the period between 1994 and 1998 became highly confrontational and Bútorová 
and Bútora (1995: 121) talk of a “liquidation syndrome vis-à-vis the opposition.” The 
opposition and all critics of the government were constantly labeled as “Anti-Slovaks”, 
“enemies of the state” (Szomolanyi 1999: 28; Bútorová 1998b: 33) damaging the new state 
and acting in the interests of hostile foreign forces. Elster, Offe and Preuss (1998: 144) argue 
that this period was marked not by political conflict over policies but it shifted towards 
political conflict over “the rules of the game” and the democratic or non-democratic nature of 
the Slovak state. In Slovakia, “the evaluation of almost any political proposal for 
‘constitutionality’ or ‘unconstitutionality’ has become part and parcel of everyday public 
discourse.” Abrahám (1995) and Mihaliková (1995) assessed the situation as such, that every 
time a political change occurred, whether elections or change of government, the entire 
existence of democratic structure became threatened. Beside that, in Slovakia, the tolerance 
for former communist elites in top positions in the post-communist situation remained high216. 
Bútorová and Bútora (1995: 124)217 argued that “ex-communists, now members of Mečiar’s 
ruling movement for the most part, came to hold all the key posts in the newly independent 
state […]; moreover, these were not reform communities who had broken with communism 
and became dissidents, but mostly people who had remained mentally rooted in communist 
collectivism.” The Slovak path to transition was thus close to a model from an early post-
authoritarian regime to “a successor regime that is likely to be authoritarian or controlled by 
leaders who have emerged from the previous regime.” (Linz, Stepan 1996: 60)  
 
This chapter explores the strategies employed by the Slovak oppositional forces to enhance 
their competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent regime of Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar and 
his ruling coalition. The efforts of the oppositional forces culminated in the 1998 elections, in 
which the coalition of diverse opposition parties managed to replace Mečiar from the driving 
seat. The chapter will thus focus on the activities of the oppositional forces, their performance 
                                                 
216
 The high level of continuity was reflected among others in the fact that 99 out of 150 parliamentary deputies 
in the Slovak post-communist parliament were former members of the Communist Party. (Szomolanyi 1994a) In 
fact, the pattern continues up to nowadays, as Peter Weiss, former leader of the pre-1998 opposition left-wing 
Party of Democratic Left (SDĽ) argued: Slovakia has never been able to present government without the 
involvement of the former communists. The coalition of right-wing opposition parties only managed to get to 
power in 1998 and 2002 respectively through help and channels of the former communists. (Weiss Peter, SDĽ, 
3rd September 2009) 
217
 For similar argumentation see also Abrahám (1995: 95).  
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leading to the October 1998 elections and strategies applied to counterbalance the hegemonic 
position of the incumbent. With respect to 1998 Slovak elections, Szomolanyi (1999: 25) 
talks of “an event that involved decisions about the basic character of the country’s political 
regime and its foreign policy orientation.” To Vladimír Krivý, the year 1998 was a critical 
moment in Slovakia’s development “when one could not afford the luxury of not getting 
involved, as the stakes were too high.” (Krivý Vladimír, SAV, 18th September 2008) Bútora et 
al. (1999: 11) describe the 1998 elections as the “delayed velvet revolution”, as the elections 
were not about the tip of the political scale moving more to the left or to the right as in other 
CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) countries, but represented a choice between an 
authoritarian versus democratic path returning to the ideals of November 1989,218 the date 
which marked the end of communist rule in Czechoslovakia.  
 
The analysis of the employed oppositional strategies is based on the interviews conducted 
from July to October 2008 during my field research stay in Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, 
with various representatives of main political parties, academia, research think-tanks, civil 
society organizations and journalists; as well as on the widely available secondary literature.  
 
This chapter will firstly outline the background information leading to the 1998 elections in 
order to understand Mečiar’s style of ruling, and the repressive means his government has 
taken to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the oppositional forces. Paradoxically, 
these legal, political, economic, cultural and social measures had an opposed effect and 
alienated all important segments of the society against him. A crucial network of actors, who 
joined the oppositional space of political contestation in order to help the opposition political 
parties balance the uneven level playing field, will further be introduced. Their developing 
relationship to the state, motivation for involvement as well as kind and extent of their 
contribution towards democratization will be explored in more detail. Special attention will be 
given to the first-time voters and the shifting public opinion – the so called “popular desire for 
change” caused by Mečiar’s authoritarian practices219. As Bútorová (1999: 195) among others 
argues, public opinion developed to a significant factor in political change in the 1998 
elections. The word “change” became one of the buzzwords (Bútora et al. 1999: 9) of the 
1998 pre-election campaign and many scholars220 argue that the need for change dominated in 
motivating the Slovak population to vote. 
                                                 
218
 See also Krivý (1999c) 
219
 Majority of the citizens (84%) supported “change” as a reaction against Mečiar’s autocratic rule. (Bútorová 
1999) 
220
 See e.g. Gyarfášová, Kúska (1999: 229) 
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To Krivý (1998a), the enormous success of Mečiar could be explained by the adherence of the 
Slovak population to the same traditional values as only a macro-change of the political 
regime and system took place with end of communism; whereas, micro-continuity in people’s 
minds remained persistent. In his sociological study, Krivý (1998b) demonstrates that the 
value orientation of Slovakia’s population in the period after the 1994 elections was primarily 
oriented towards clientelism (68.3%); paternalism (65,4%); ruralism (63.4%); and 
helplessness (56.3%). However, the value orientation changes significantly if disaggregated to 
several socio-demographic groups. The results show, that age and education are factors of 
great impact on value orientation. The poorly educated and older age respondents are 
characterized by higher scores of most value orientations; mainly, paternalism, egalitarianism, 
ruralism, authoritarianism, Anti-westernism, and provincial isolationism. (Krivý 1998b: 45) 
Bútora and Bútorová (1998: 208) remind us that Slovakia is not the only country in the region 
suffering from a split and schism in the society. “The cultural conflict between ‘urbanists’ and 
‘ruralists’, ‘modernists’ and ‘conservatives’, ‘Westernizers’ and “Easternizers’ has been 
present in the modern history of several Central and Eastern European countries. However, in 
some of these countries, for the sake of national interests, the quarreling members of the elites 
have been able to find common ground.” 
The democratic tendency is thus more favorable among highly educated, younger age 
generation, students, professional, senior managers and entrepreneurs. (Krivý 1998b: 49) That 
is why the Slovak opposition sought support primarily among these strata of the society. The 
Leitmotiv of the 1998 opposition campaign became the mobilization of population, 
overcoming the apathy of voters and increasing the voters’ turn-out. In the Slovak case this 
was achieved only thanks to the strong involvement of oppositional forces, mostly, civil 
society bodies. The main strategy of Slovak opposition to counter-balance the hegemonic 
position of the incumbent was thus inter-active cooperation with other pro-democracy 
oriented actors. As Slovak opposition political parties could not appeal to their democratic 
legacies and party traditions (as was the case in Ghana), they had to look for other means and 
strategies of enhancing their competitiveness. These will be explored later in the chapter. The 
international and regional context, enlargement of the EU and NATO taking place during this 
period and Slovakia’s geopolitical position played in the hands of pro-democracy oriented 
opposition and will thus be analyzed as another important factor contributing to the victory of 
oppositional forces.  
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5.2. Political Developments Leading to the 1998 Elections  
Four general elections were held in Slovakia between the November 1989 collapse of the 
communist regime and the crucial 1998 elections. In 1990, 1992 and 1994 a majority of the 
Slovak population has repeatedly chosen a corrupt and authoritarian government, led by the 
Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and its charismatic populist leader Vladimír 
Mečiar221.  
 
The 1990-1992 broad democratization movement led to the establishment of the standard 
foundation of a democratic regime in Czechoslovakia with a balanced division of powers and 
proportional system of representation. In Czechoslovakia, at the beginning of the 1990s, an 
increasing number of political parties emerged; however, these were constrained by the 5% 
threshold filter while gaining representation in the Federal Assembly. (Elster, Offe, Preuss 
1998: 125) The first broad coalition was formed by the Czech based Civic Forum (OF), 
Slovak based Public Against Violence (VPN) and the Slovak Christian Democratic 
Movement. This was Mečiars’s first term in the position of Prime Minister, and he was ousted 
in April 1994 when the leaders of his own party, the VPN, “refused to tolerate his 
increasingly destructive activities both within the movement and the cabinet.” (Szomolanyi 
1999: 26) 
 
The 1992 elections brought along changes on the political map. The rump of the VPN did not 
even manage to win enough voters to reach the 5% threshold for entering parliament. 
(Szomolanyi 1999: 27) The split of VPN222 (mostly for the constitutional cleavages) led to the 
creation of the strongest party in Slovakia (HZDS) under the leadership of Vladimír Mečiar. 
In the Slovak National Council, the HZDS gained 74 out of 150223 seats and was thus short of 
an absolute majority. It decided to form a coalition with the far-right Slovak National Party 
(SNS), which brought additional 15 seats. The political allies of HZDS were ex-communists 
and the spiritual heirs of the wartime state’s Slovak People’s Party on the “platform of 
national emancipation”. (Szomolanyi 1999: 27) “Headed by V. Mečiar already before the 
‘velvet divorce’, it promoted the claim to self-determination for the Slovaks within a 
sovereign Slovakian state, a slower process of privatization, a more cautious approach to 
marketization in order to mitigate the social hardships of economic transformation, and state’s 
involvement in the crucial economic sector.” (Elster, Offe, Preuss 1998: 137) The HZDS thus 
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 For details and characteristic features of those elections see e.g. Szomolanyi (1999: 25-38).   
222
 For further details on the split and break-up of the early oppositional movements see Segert (1994a); Segert, 
Machos (1995).  
223
 Slovakia is thus classified as a multi-party system with one relative dominant party. (Stoess, Segert 1997: 
414).  
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succeeded in finding the right political expression for the Slovak population’s widespread 
inclination to paternalism and convinced voters that there was a “less painful road of 
economic transformation than the radical one dictated from the federal center in Prague.” 
(Bútorová, Bútora 1998b: 8; Krivý 1998, 1999b)  
 
František Mikloško, leading KDH politician and the chairman of the Slovak parliament 
during Mečiar’s rule told in an interview that Mečiar was: 
 
“A phenomenon that perfectly fitted into the post-communist era […] we had the 
problem who would become the Minister of Interior as nobody wanted to overtake the 
function as we did not know how to do it. He found appeal, he was strong, found 
resonance, understood the problems of common Slovaks, and presented himself as the 
savior from communism. The fascination with his person was culminating in the late 
1990s”. (Mikloško František, KDH, 20th August 2008) 
 
The vast majority of my interview partners agreed that Mečiar understood and personified the 
patriarchal problems of the Slovak society with his attitude “your problems at my shoulders.” 
According to Mikuláš Dzurinda, leader of the opposition and later Prime Minister (1998-
2006), Mečiar was disseminating the image that he needed to be given credit for the existence 
of the Slovak Republic. (Dzurinda Mikuláš, SDK Party President, 22nd October 2008) 
Bútorová and Bútora (1995) claim that Slovakia was not able to produce a political force, 
which could have formulated a coherent program for the politics of the 1993 post-
independence period.  However, this is also due to the fact that it was the Czech Republic and 
not Slovakia who was the successor state of Czechoslovakia incorporating the vast majority 
of the historically important ingredients, whilst Slovakia, as a typical secession case, had to 
begin with the complicated process of nation-state building. (Elster, Offe, Preuss 1998: 138; 
Offe 1991) Kitschelt et al. (1999: 453) mentioned, when trying to categorize the transitions of 
CEE countries, that “Slovakia is a hard case. Its regime and transition were dominated by the 
Czech pattern, but behind the veneer of bureaucratic-authoritarian communism and the 
implosion of 1989/1990 one can easily discover distinct elements of patrimonial communism 
and a ‘pre-emptive’ mode of transition which is highlighted by the rapid disintegration of the 
Anti-Communist civic movement and the assertion of the former communists in the 
nationalist successor parties.”  
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Elster, Offe and Preuss (1998: 72) argue that the main mechanisms for separation of 
Czechoslovakia were rooted firstly in the Czech-Slovak relation, secondly in the intra-Slovak 
relations. On the federation level, Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithar made the threats that 
Mečiar had made in their private negotiations public. Within Slovakia, Mečiar needed to 
demarcate himself from the others for electoral purposes. The separatist position was already 
occupied by the SNS, the federalist by Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), so the only 
position left to Mečiar was the confederative one. “He found that a strategy with great appeal 
was to pay lip service to the idea of keeping the country together while at the same time 
demanding Slovak independence in more and more domains”, (Elster, Offe, Preuss 1998: 72) 
like adoption of the Slovak constitution before the federal one, the election of a Slovak 
president, the creation of a Slovak central bank, and even an independent foreign service.  
The peaceful divorce of republics that followed may have been due to the fact that it was 
engineered in private talks between Václav Klaus and Mečiar, the Czech and Slovak Prime 
Ministers.224 The main protagonists were aware that to put the question of division of 
Czechoslovakia to a referendum would probably end in a deadlock. The repeated public 
opinion polls showed that the majority of the population would probably have refused the 
break-up.225 
 
The political will for keeping the two nations together was absent and the secession of 
Slovakia seemed to be the only possible solution. On November 25 1992, the Federal 
Assembly passed a law dividing Czechoslovakia into two separate and sovereign states to 
take effect from 1st January 1993. Mečiar’s authoritarian style of ruling in this period caused 
many defections of party members as well as the creation of new factions or parties. A state of 
the nation speech by President Michal Kováč in parliament criticizing the government of 
Mečiar as well as the style of his politics became very well known and was understood as one 
of the first oppositional steps against Mečiar’s rule. Mečiar was then deposed with a vote of 
no confidence by the opposition parties in parliament in March 1994. (Elster, Offe, Preuss 
1998: 127; 143; Szomolanyi 1999: 27) The country was led for the period of six months, until 
the new elections would take place by Prime Minister Jozef Moravčík who was supported by 
the whole Anti-Mečiar political spectrum, demonstrating an unexpected degree of cooperation 
throughout the whole period. (Bútorová, Bútora 1998b: 8) However, in October 1994, Mečiar 
returned on the political scene as the winner of the “deviating elections” (Szomolanyi 1999: 
29) and regained the Prime Minister seat. HZDS and SNS, the former allies took together 
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 For agreements between Mečiar and Klaus see Obrman (1992: 27f); Pehe (1992b: 26) 
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 For the separation of Czechoslovakia see Bútora, Bútorová (1993); Kipke, Vodička (1993); Bútora, Bútorová, 
Gyarfášová (1994); Bútorová, Bútora (1995); Musil (1997).  
 137
only 70 out of 150 parliamentary seats and thus needed additional support, which they found 
in the form of the far leftist party, the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS). Mečiar took 
revenge on all of those, who he blamed for having ousted him out of office in March, which 
included almost the whole political spectrum – the previous government, all oppositional 
parties and President Kováč in person, as well as a section of the media. Malová (1998: 55) 
states that the absence of formally defined representation of opposition in running the 
parliament in this period, clearly displayed “a tendency toward unchecked majority rule.” The 
opposition and all critics were constantly labeled as “Anti-Slovaks”, “enemies of the state” 
damaging the new state and acting in the interests of hostile foreign forces. (Szomolanyi 
1999: 28; Bútorová 1998b: 33; personal interviews)  
 
The 1994 elections resulted in political regression and in Slovakia’s departure from the 
Central European variant of transition (Szomolanyi 1999: 29) identified in the structural 
characteristics of the system of political parties, elite configuration and political culture. 
(Szomolanyi 1994c) Gati (1996) talks of a position of Slovakia within the CEE context as one 
of a “laggard”; Fischer (1997) sees the year 1996 as a year of continued political polarization 
and international disappointments leading Slovakia towards international isolation. 
Mesežnikov (1999: 49) claims that it was primarily after 1994 that the struggle for the 
preservation of a democratic regime and its institutional framework became dominant. 
Regressive direction that weakened not only the parties but also the foundations of democracy 
started in this period. (Mesežnikov 1996, 1997a, 1998a; Malová 1998) HZDS wanted to 
replace the parliamentary system with a presidential one and it tried to alter the “rules of the 
game” that were put in place by the Post-Communist democratic regime through the 
parliament during the historic all-night session of the National Council on 3-4 November 
1994. (Szomolanyi 1999: 30) 
 
Despite some economic progress Slovakia was experiencing, the European Commission 
decided in 1997, that Slovakia was the only one of ten associated countries that failed to meet 
the political criteria for the EU membership. Bútorová and Bútora (1998b: 10) state that it was 
the rejection of the Slovak Republic and the admission of the Czech Republic into the first 
round of accession, that demonstrated the geopolitical and socio-cultural differences between 
the transitions followed by each of the countries. Slovakia was respectively classified as a 
“transitional government” (Karatnycky, Motyl, Shor 1997) and “partly free” by Freedom 
House for the period 1996-1997. Zakaria (1997) placed Slovakia among “illiberal 
democracies”, where the elections might be free and fair, but they bring to power politicians 
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who do not sufficiently respect the rule of law, separation of powers and the protection of 
basic civil rights and political freedoms. Kaldor and Vejvoda (1997)  even speak of a special, 
sui generis post-communist model, where democratic political culture, legal culture and 
administrative structures are rather weak and where there is a strong tendency for 
confrontational rather than co-operative politics with widespread clientelism, lacking 
democratic consolidation226 and undermined civil society.  
 
5.3. Characteristic Features of Mečiarism in the 1994-1998 Period 
It is claimed that the coalition around Mečiar's HZDS is an ideologically heterogeneous 
movement (Stoess, Segert 1997: 427) of clientelistic, nationalistic and radical left parties.  
(Bútora et al. 1999: 9) Bútorová and Bútora (1995: 123) state that Mečiar’s HZDS included in 
itself diverse and contradictory tendencies such as communism and anti-communism, 
nationalism and the idea of participation in European integration, free market ideas and 
interventionism, pro-Western liberalism and Slavophilism. The coalition around Mečiar 
traditionally includes the Slovak National Party (SNS), a nationalist center-right heir to the 
oldest political formation in Slovakia, and a government partner from 1992 to 1998. Between 
1994 and 1998, the HZDS coalition also included the far left Association of Workers (ZRS). 
Parties that compose the HZDS coalition are all characterized by a confrontational style of 
politics, authoritarian methods, populist mobilization strategies, emotional voter appeal, and 
tendency towards personification of political power.227 The coalition was trying to build and 
maintain its power base even at the cost of violating and altering the “rules of the game.” 
(Mesežnikov 1999: 50) Galanda, Foeldešová and Benedik (1999: 93) state that the legislation 
in this period was marked by paternalism and etatism as well as by the predominant tendency 
of the executive branch, especially, the government and the Prime Minister to accumulate 
power.  
 
Marián Leško, a known Slovak journalist ascribed to the leading style of Vladimír Mečiar – 
“Mečiarism”228 – some typical features229: a long-lasting conflict between the president 
Michal Kováč and the Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar, and the continued efforts of the latter 
to remove the legitimately elected president out of office. Further, antagonistic confrontations 
between the ruling coalition of HZDS, SNS, ZRS and the opposition and the tries to weaken 
the opposition through mechanisms of legislative and executive power and implementation of 
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 These have been summarized from Martinsen (1996); Szomolanyi (1997); Mesežnikov (1998a) 
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discriminatory measures. These included among others the HZDS monopolistic position in 
the executive branch of government including security services, public broadcaster STV, 
economically powerful lobby groups directly sponsoring the party, direct presence of party 
officials on the supervisory boards of various enterprises, as well as the support of a network 
of numerous organizations and societies (cultural, professional, trade unions etc.) influencing 
public life for the benefit of the ruling coalition. It also has to be taken into account that the 
strong presence of the private sector and business enterprises, as the hard core of Mečiars’ 
supporters, was built around people who were rewarded by the dubious privatization process. 
(Leško Marián, journalist, 28th August 2008) Legislative measures in the period leading to the 
1998 elections were drafted and enacted as to convenience of strengthening political power in 
the hands of HZDS. Local and public administration reforms were designed to enhance the 
power of the HZDS representatives at the district and regional levels, and the parliament was 
loosing its control function vis-à-vis the growing position of the executive. (Nižnanský, 
Kling, Petráš 1999: 108f) Mečiarism can thus be characterized according to Szomolanyi 
(1999: 33) by “pervasive clientelism particularly in the privatization process, delegative rule, 
weak accountability and arrangements disadvantaging the opposition”. The absence of the 
form and legal definition of the role of the opposition made it possible to install the ‘tyranny 
of majority’ in the parliament. This situation allowed those in power to bring to their defense 
arguments that they were acting in the framework of the constitution. (Szomolanyi 1997)  
 
With respect to the state of economy, the year 1998 was the worst since the country’s 
independence in 1993. Jurzyca et al. (1999: 197) argue that the state budget deficit as well as 
the deficit in public finance reached its height. They argue, that an alarmingly high 
unemployment rate (15.6% in 1998), deteriorating internal and external trade imbalances, 
sharp criticism from abroad and non-transparent governing practices were the underlying 
factors that brought about a change of government following the 1998 parliamentary 
elections. With respect to social policy, Bodnárová (1999: 233) claims that by the end of 
Mečiar’s term, the national standard of living was still well below what it had been in 1989. 
The health care system (Demeš, Gintner, Kováč 1999: 249) as well as education and science 
(Rosa 1999: 259) were similarly beset by problems.  
Additionally, the tensions between the government and all ethnic groups and national 
minorities within Slovakia were growing thanks to the government’s confrontational national 
policy. The strongest divide of the Slovak political spectrum existed between the HZDS and 
the pre-1998 opposition Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), and it had a systemic rather 
than ideological character. Mesežnikov (1999: 54f) talks of two types of political entities, the 
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first group, the then opposition parties following the model of liberal democracy230 with a 
strong pro-European and pro-Western orientation, and the second entity of the ruling coalition 
characterized by authoritarianism, populism, nationalism and isolationism231. In accordance 
with the above stated Stoess and Segert (1997: 384) argue that the most pronounced divide in 
CEE countries became visible in the early stage of post-socialism and was based on the one 
hand on the conflict between communists and anti-communists, on the other, between 
traditionalists/nationalists or “structure-conservatives” and Westernizers or “modernizers.” 
Stoess and Segert (ibid:  400) talk in this respect of conflicts of the “first rank”, which were 
complemented by various layers of conflicts of the “second rank” such as socio-economic or 
ethnic ones. Segert and Machos (1995: 304) even described the underlying conflicts as a form 
a “Kulturkampf”.  
With respect to ethnic minorities, Kusý (1999: 96) claims that the HZDS-SNS-ZRS coalition 
put greater emphasis on “the protection of Slovak interests”, which were interpreted on anti-
minority grounds. These interests were allegedly threatened by the Hungarian minority and its 
political representation in particular, as well as by the Roma minority.232 “The ruling coalition 
thus a priori rejected all demands and complaints related to minority rights as ‘Anti-Slovak’”. 
Mečiar’s government heightened minority tensions by refusing to adopt a law on minority 
languages, in defiance of its constitutional obligation and a binding promise to European 
institutions. (For further details see Krivý 1999b: 96-100)  
 
Besides the always weakening position of the parliament, there was a growing lack of respect 
for the judiciary. The decisions made by the Constitutional Court233 were ignored or not 
properly implemented. The two cases gaining most publicity were the unconstitutional 
expulsion of MP František Gaulider from the parliament and the obstructed referendum of 
1997 on direct presidential elections234 by the Minister of Interior Gustav Krajči.235 Further, 
there was no investigation of several major criminal offences such as the abduction of 
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President Kováč’s son to Austria and the related murder of Robert Remiáš236, or the fictitious 
purchase of a painting owned by the Catholic Church in an attempt to portray the clergy in a 
bad light.  
 
At the same time, political, financial, public media and moral support were provided to pro-
governmental civil society organizations, including attempts to set up alternative institutions 
such as the Union of Civic Associations with the effect to counterbalance the Gremium of the 
Third Sector serving as a coordination board grouping together a majority of the most active 
NGOs. (Bútora, Bútorová 1998; personal interviews) The government was also putting 
pressure on creating an alternative tripartite mechanism, through a parallel establishment of 
alternative trade union organizations in addition to the existing ones that operated under the 
umbrella of the Confederation of Trade Unions, which deepened the conflict between the 
government and the employees. Bútora et al. (1999: 14) claim that the “idea was to undermine 
civil society from within and to establish a ‘parallel polis’ that would be guaranteed, funded 
and legitimized by the state.” HZDS also had a significant support from the nationalist 
cultural organization Matica Slovenská. Additionally, government exercised both direct and 
indirect pressure on the independent media and applied a selective approach to the journalists 
according to their perceived “oppositionness”. (Bútora et al. 1999: 14) 
 
The ruling party built its image and ideology on protectionist nationalism, isolationalism, 
Slavophilism, rejection to the West, and opposition to the EU and NATO membership and 
spread this message through the pro-government oriented public television. (Krivý 1998b, 
1999c; Stoess, Segert 1997) Chmel (1997), among others, states that the question of 
protectionism has been the Leitmotiv of the Slovak question in the twentieth century. In the 
first years of the century, when Slovakia was a part of Austria-Hungary, its essence was a 
struggle of Slovaks against Magyarization. This transformed into a struggle for equal 
partnership between the Slovaks and the Czechs since 1918 and the creation of the 
Czechoslovak Republic. Zajac (1997) argues that the Slovak protectionist question has, since 
the separation of Czechoslovakia, become a Slovak-Slovak question with fragmented elite 
factions and no readiness of the elites to act in accordance with democratic standards and 
principles.  
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 Robert Remiáš was an ex-policeman working for the Slovak Secret Service who possessed relevant 
information about the direct involvement of the Slovak secret service agency and thus state organs in the 
kidnapping case.  
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The consequences of Mečiar’s rule were a collapsing health care system, widespread 
insolvency of firms, general lack of liquidity and a still growing unemployment rate, despite 
the fact that by late 1998 Slovakia already had the highest unemployment rate in Central 
Europe, at about 16%. (Szomolanyi 1999: 34) All the above mentioned developments resulted 
into Slovakia not meeting the requirements for joining the EU and NATO237.  
 
5.4. Reaction of the Oppositional Forces to Growing Authoritarian Tendencies 
It is thus interesting to analyze how the Slovak oppositional forces developed measures and 
instruments to enhance its competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent in order to effectively 
oppose the authoritarian environment. The enhancement of competitiveness is a crucial step 
for the opposition in order to appear as a credible and legitimate alternative to the electorate. 
Bunce and Wolchik (2009: 258) state that Mečiar as an authoritarian leader went too far in the 
abuse of his powers not just harassing the opposition and journalists but also murdering them. 
Such acts can encourage a chain of popular protests and a strong involvement of numerous 
segments of the society in the space of the oppositional forces fighting against the political 
hegemony of one-man rule.  
 
Slovak opposition political parties centered its strategic choices on the cooperation with and 
support of oppositional forces, mostly segments of the civil society and independent media, as 
they could not rely on such a strong democratic legacy of political parties as was the case in 
Ghana. The CEE countries have been unique in this respect, as they could not start the process 
of democratization with either pre-existing or re-democratized political parties. Elster, Offe 
and Preuss (1998: 131) argue that “during short-lived authoritarian political regimes some 
parties may continue to exist or manage to retain a continuing membership or long-term loyal 
voter alignments; by contrast, the situation in the CEE countries was in the main a tabula 
rasa. […] With the exception of the former communist parties, the main parties and the party 
systems emerged throughout the turmoil of 1989 and beyond.” Wightman (1995: 243) argues 
that the oppositional parties in Slovak and Czech Republics underwent the necessary process 
of diversification only after the 1990 elections. Körösényi (1991: 121) states that these new 
political parties are more characterized by their different political styles, dominant 
personalities and images than by political programs or issues. Segert and Machos (1995: 15) 
add that the CEE political parties do not have the party character of their Western 
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 See above all Bútora, Šebej (1998) 
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counterparts238. They are too elite oriented, narrow based, with no sufficient financial 
resources and lack of ability to mobilize voters and recruit followers. (Segert 1994a: 13) Their 
weak performance might be interpreted as a legacy of socialism when one did not talk of 
political parties but rather “state parties”. (Segert, Stoess, Niedermayer 1997: 5) The theories 
applied in Western democracies are thus only of limited use here as the historical, social, 
political, economic, and cultural developments of the CEE countries are too context-bounded.  
(Segert, Machos 1995: 233f) 
Körösényi (1991) further claims, which is of decisive importance for this study, that for the 
party system in Slovakia it was essentially a new beginning and not a kind of re-
democratization through a revival of the past, such as in Ghana. Mair (1991: 134) agrees with 
Körösényi and states that the democratization process in CEE countries provided an almost 
entirely new electorate and open electoral market as only very few voters entered with pre-
existing partisan loyalties, identities or preferences. In addition to the almost non-existing 
party traditions and legacies, the situation was made more difficult by the non-existence of a 
differentiated civil society and of a corresponding set of organizations, which would create 
and sustain collective identities based on interests. (Evans, Whitefield 1993: 543-547)  
A somehow different position is argued by Segert (2007b) who claims that the old and the 
new regime are well connected by several linkages or “bridges”. Segert (2007b: 5) stresses the 
positive legacy of state-socialism and reminds us that the present situation can be properly 
understood only thanks to the legacies of socialism, most importantly its latest phase, which is 
the “key” to understand post-socialism. (ibid: 11) He disagrees with the notion of CEE 
countries being a tabula rasa at the point of break-down of state socialism, as state socialism 
must be understood not only as a political and economic but also a social order. In order to be 
able to comprehend the basis of legitimacy for current democracies, we need to recognize the 
successful developments and identify the impacts of state-socialism. However, he admits that 
the legacies of socialism are heterogeneous and the developments have taken different paths 
and models over time. (Segert 2007b: 9) As state-socialism can be interpreted as a social 
order, the socialization processes that took place within this period continue to shape the 
behavioural patterns, values, expectations and daily routines of the people. (Segert, Machos 
1995: 241) In other words it is the informal institutions and interpersonal networks and 
linkages that survived the “Systemwechsel” (Merkel 1999) and became the formal institutions 
of the new era. (Segert 2007b: 15f; Segert, Machos 1995: 51, 245) Similarly, the political 
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 Among the main differences are the different social situations of the citizens, non-existence of a 
“functioning” state and other intermediary institutions, non established cleavages influencing the emergence of a 
stable party system, weak organizational structures and mobilization capacities a.o. The consequence of these 
general structural weaknesses is that political parties become so called “super actors” who overtake duties and 
functions of the state as well as other institutions. (Segert, Machos 1995: 237f) 
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parties have been shaped by these informal legacies and show a certain degree of prehistory 
and continuity from the socialist system. Segert and Machos (1995: 240ff) identify three 
historical layers in which the “new” political parties were rooted at the beginning of the 
transition period. One of them is the existence of intelligence239, which took a strong political 
role already in the pre-socialist period. The covered activities of the intelligence240 led 
(especially after 1968) to a certain opening and acceptance of oppositional behaviour and 
activities. (Segert, Machos 1995: 253) 
 
Nevertheless, in Slovakia the state socialism was firmly rooted, and the regime was very 
orthodox, rigid and inflexible within the region. Slovakia is by Kitschelt et al. (1999: 29) 
described as the mix of national-accommodative and patrimonial communism241. The latter is 
characterized by extensive patronage and clientelistic networks and concentration of political 
power around a small clique or an individual. Its pre-communist past is characterized by a 
typical agricultural pre-capitalist economy, traditional or absolutist rule and demobilized 
urban middle strata. For this mode of communist rule are further characteristic low levels of 
formal professional bureaucratization and intense repression and co-optation. (Kitschelt et al. 
1999: 36f) The national-accommodative type produced regimes with more developed formal-
rational bureaucratic governance structures that partially separated party rule and technical 
state administration. It is characterized by a partially industrialized market economy, semi-
authoritarian rule and highly mobilized urban middle strata in the pre-communist time and 
intermediate levels of formal professional bureaucratization in the communist period (ibid). 
This impacts firstly on the mode of transition (in the patrimonial and national-accommodative 
case), mostly in the form of pre-emptive strikes242 and negotiation243; secondly, on the choice 
of democratic institutions and the expected popular strength of former communist 
incumbents. These factors tend to predominate in patrimonial communist regimes, followed 
by national-accommodative and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 32), 
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 For role, importance and development of intelligence since the 19th century see Segert, Machos (1995: 250-
256) 
240
 Segert and Machos (1995:254) point to the fact that even within intelligence active during the socialism there 
were two opposed groups present. On the one hand, the one that resisted (actively or passively) the authoritarian 
system, the so called “marginal system-critical”; on the other hand the “reform communists” who cooperated 
with the establishment of the day in order to enhance their social status and/or improve the economic position.  
241
 For detailed characteristic of all types see Kitschelt et al. (1999: 36f) 
242
 The pre-emptive strategies of incumbent elites have been also referred to as imposition (Karl 1990); 
transformation (Huntington 1991: 124-142); transaction (Share, Mainwaring 1986); or agreed reform within the 
ruling bloc (Colomer 1991).  
243
 The literature on negotiated transitions also talks of democratization through pacts (Karl 1990), 
transplacement (Huntington 1991: 151-153); extrication (Share, Mainwaring 1986); or controlled opening to the 
opposition (Colomer 1991).  
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which explains why Slovakia lagged behind the Czech Republic in belonging to the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian type.  
Thus, dissent and oppositional forces in Slovakia244 were very weak and arose later than in the 
other CEE countries. “Apart from narrow and rather ineffectual circles of dissidents that could 
never effectively break out of their marginal habitat of academic, artistic, or religious 
institutions (if not prisons), oppositional movements were largely […] a by-product of the 
regime’s decay rather than its antecedent cause.” (Elster, Offe, Preuss 1998: 11) As Slovakia 
did not have much democratic experience in its history, most of the democratic parties were 
relating to the experience of the “velvet revolution” in November 1989, which marked the end 
of the communist period in the country. The three types of political parties that emerged in the 
region were according to Segert and Machos (1995: 242) the so called “successor”245 parties; 
the oppositional movements and the “historical”246 parties. Bútora et al. (1999: 10f) see many 
similarities between the years 1989 and 1998, including intense civic mobilization, and filled 
towns squares with citizens. However, they further note three major differences. Firstly, in 
November 1989 the desired change meant different things for different people. In 1998, 
opposition voters were more united, despite certain disagreements, on the need for greater 
democracy, which was perceived as the best way to deal with the economic and social 
problems. Secondly, in November 1989 the leaders of the revolution were relatively 
unknown, whereas in the almost decade to 1998 they gained certain profile and credential 
among the population. Thirdly, the direct involvement, fight and popular desire for change 
were much stronger in 1998, as the events of 1989 were seen more as a result of the domino 
effect caused by the fall of the Berlin wall. 
 
The conducted public opinion polls (see e.g. Bútorová 1998b, 1998c, 1998d; Krivý 1998b) 
revealed that the majority of the population was convinced that during 1994-1998 period the 
society was heading the wrong political direction. Bútora et al. (1999: 15) argue that the 
authoritarian tendencies of Mečiar had unintended positive effects as Slovaks started to 
comprehend the importance of political rights and freedoms and to demand democratic rule 
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 Segert (1994a, 2007b). Segert and Machos (1995) point to several important activities of dissent oppositional 
forces, such as “Charta 77”, or the August 1968 events in Czechoslovakia; however, these are by the majority of 
Slovak academic scholars (see here e.g. Butora, Butorova, Krivy, Meseznikov) interpreted mostly as of being of 
Czech origin.  
245
 Only two out of ten analyzed parties present in the first Slovak Parliament belonged to the group of the so 
called “successor” parties (Stoess, Segert 1997: 406), whereas, the remaining eight were newly established. The 
analysis has further shown that the parliament is dominated by political parties following liberal and social 
democratic ideologies.  
246
 For further analysis of the success of “historical” parties see Segert (1994a: 16).  
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with greater emphasis247. According to the motto “the easiest way how to remove Mečiar, is 
to let him rule”, the consequences of Mečiar’s actions were counterproductive for him and 
favorable for the democratic players. (Mesežnikov, Bútora 1997; Szomolanyi 1999: 31) The 
opinion polls showed that more and more prominence was given to the issues of pluralism, 
compliance with the rule of law, consensus building and respect for minority rights from the 
side of the electorate.  
 
5.4.1. Public Opinion and Popular Desire for Change 
The polarization of the political scene was reflected in the polarization of the whole society 
and brought up the socio-cultural differences within the population on surface. (Krivý 1999a) 
The perceptions of all the interviewed partners were that the division of the society went 
down to the families and created two antagonistic groups: the Anti- and the Pro-Mečiar 
forces. It was the younger, better educated people in urban areas who were more critical of 
authoritarian politicians and thus more prepared to support the opposition. (Krivý 1998a; 
Krivý 1999a, 1999b, 1999c) Bútora et al. (1999: 10) claim that the opposition’s electoral 
victory was predominant thanks to the mobilization of urban population. Krivý (1999a: 67)248 
shows that in the 1994 elections, the gap in turnout between large towns and small 
communities was widely open (66% and 88% respectively); in 1998 elections, the election 
turnout in small communities continued to be high (89,2%) but it increased substantially in 
large towns to 82.7%. Krivý (1999a: 75) thus states that the winner in the 1998 elections was 
the urban setting; however, the opposition parties also strengthened their positions in the rural 
environment. This higher turnout of urban dwellers can be explained by constant undermining 
of the rule of law, political culture and political democracy by Mečiar. According to Krivý, 
another explanation is that the Slovak opposition parties, which rooted mainly in the urban 
environment, became more efficient in mobilizing the population. The analysis further 
showed that the two largest political adversaries, HZDS and SDK had the most pronounced 
socio-demographic deviation from the average profile of the population. (see Bútorová 1999b: 
147; Gyarfášová, Kúska 1999; Krivý 1999) The differences in value orientation and electoral 
behavior among the Slovak population were most obvious in terms of education and age. 
(Bútorová 1999a, Bútorová et al. 1999b; Krivý 1998a, 1998b; Gyarfášová et al. 1999) The 
polls have shown that the higher educated, young and middle-aged urban population had 
stronger democratic inclinations and formed the adherents of SDK; whereas, the HZDS had 
the rural, oldest electorate with only 4% of university educated voters. (Bútorová 1999a: 204; 
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 See also Bunce, Wolchik (2009). 
248
 For complete data on electoral behavior and voting patterns see Krivý (1999a: 63-78) 
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Bútorová et al. 1999b: 147; Gyarfášová, Kúska 1999: 225) In terms of economic beliefs, SDK 
adherents were the strongest advocates of a free market economy and a fundamental 
economic transformation; whereas, HZDS followers supported a socialist economy. 
(Bútorová et al. 1999b: 147) According to foreign policy orientations, SDK voters were the 
strongest supporters of Slovakia’s EU and NATO accession, while HZDS followers were its 
strongest opponents.  
 
The value shift among the Slovak population was one of the key factors in the electoral 
victory of the Anti-Mečiar opposition. (Bútorová et al. 1999b: 149) The discontent among the 
population began to grow shortly after the 1994 elections when 70% of respondents of 
opinion polls (Bútorová 1998b: 23) were convinced that Slovakia is heading in the wrong 
direction. (Gyarfášová, Kúska 1998) The ruling coalition was assessed very negatively and 
the majority of respondents expressed extreme discomfort over the growing level of 
racketeering; the murder of Robert Remiáš; the decision of Interior Minister Gustav Krajči to 
change the ballot papers and exclude the question on the direct election of the President from 
the 1997 referendum; the kidnapping of President’s son Michal Kováč; privatization of the 
company Nafta Gbely and the unconstitutional expulsion of František Gaulider from the 
parliament.249 (Bútorová 1998b: 27-30; Bútorová 1998c: 120-125; Bútorová 1999a: 198) The 
mood within the society was that of powerlessness, fear of spontaneously expressing political 
opinions, strong influence of clientelism, widespread non-compliance with the law and 
political corruption, fear that Slovakia is distancing itself from the West and fear of 
manipulation of the elections after the referendum. (Bútorová 1999; Bútorová, Gyarfášová, 
Kúska 1996; Bútorová 1997a) On the list of most frequently stated problems, the Slovaks 
placed (for a detailed analysis see e.g. Bútorová et al. 1999b:138-139) falling standards of 
living in the first place, followed by unemployment, crime and personal safety, 
malfunctioning of the health care system and problems concerning economic development 
and privatization. The increased authoritarian tendencies caused that people started to regard 
the issues of democracy with greater care putting emphasis on consensus seeking politics, 
respect for minority rights, and compliance to the rule of law. Citizens further demanded that 
the government coalition implement democratization changes aimed at enabling greater 
opposition participation in the control of power. (Bútorová 1997a; Bútorová 1998c)  
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 The kidnapping of President Kováč’s son in August 1995, the murder of Robert Remiáš in April 1996, the 
privatization of the company Nafta Gbely in August 1996 and the expulsion of Gaulider from the parliament in 
December 1996 are analyzed in detail in Bútora, Skladony (1997). The obstructed May 1997 referendum is 
described in Mesežnikov, Bútora (1997)  
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In accordance with the changing mood among the population and the growing need for 
change a shift in the development of voting preferences250 could have been observed. The 
HZDS constituency was eroding gradually reduced by the beginning of 1998 to a hard core of 
followers251. (Gyarfášová, Kúska 1999: 221) The process already started in spring of 1996 
when HZDS preferences sank below 30%. (Bútorová, Gyarfášová, Krivý 1998: 69) However, 
until mid-1997 the opposition had failed to strengthen its electorate despite the growing 
discontent of the general public with the government’s policies. The situation was thus a 
paradox; on the one hand the support for the opposition was significantly higher than for the 
ruling coalition, on the other the fragmented political opposition could not take advantage of 
this favorable position. (Bútorová, Gyarfášová, Krivý 1998: 69) The major turning point came 
with the emergence of the SDK in summer 1997. By the end of 1997, another dramatic 
change influencing the political scene occurred. A new political entity, SOP (Party of Civic 
Understanding) emerged under the leadership of Rudolf Schuster252, the mayor of Košice. 
SOP had an unclear value profile with inclination to the left (Bútorová, Gyarfášová, Krivý 
1998: 73) and declared the intention to cooperate with all political entities that respect the rule 
of law, and consensus-seeking policies. It decided to cooperate with the opposition with the 
ambition to attract disappointed former HZDS supporters.  
As Bútora and Bútorová (1998: 206) claim, the shifts in people’s attitudes do not 
automatically guarantee a political change. “Increased public discontent becomes an impetus 
for a political change only when corresponding publics are formed around the issues under 
criticism. It means that groupings of people are formed who take a particular issue in their 
hands, articulate its various aspects, communicate and publicize the issue in the media, create 
forums where the issue is dealt with, organize themselves and formulate their program and 
requirements, engage in pressure and lobbying activities, search for allies, and establish 
alliances.” This is what Bunce and Wolchnik (2009) call the “new electoral model”, which 
will be analyzed in detail in the chapter dealing with comparative reflections.  
 
The Slovak civil society and the opposition political parties took advantage of the mood 
within the society and undertook a number of activities of crucial importance for the outcome 
of the process: they created discussion fora, formulated positions, engaged in pressure and 
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 For detailed analysis of shifting voting preferences see Bútorová et al. (1999b: 144-146) 
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 Bunce and Wolchik (2009: 261) claim in this respect that even quiet poorly performing rulers have a solid 
group of supporters who depend upon the incumbent for protection and money.  
252
 Schuster’s political career started under communism. After 1989 he became chairman of Slovak National 
Council. After the communal elections of 1994 he became Mayor of Košice and strengthened his position as 
successful, charismatic and active local politician. Schuster decided to create his own party after his failed 
negotiations with SDK and SDĽ, and after it had become clear that he would not have any chance to be elected 
President by the MPs of the parliament. (Bútorová, Gyarfášová, Krivý 1999: 109) 
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lobbying activities, organized protest meetings, issued petitions and open letters and 
established alliances. This however, constituted a substantial challenge as the Slovak society 
“lacked a developed tradition of an activist political culture.” (Bútora et al. 1999: 15) The 
various protest activities and changing mood of the population only began to emerge under 
the negative pressure of political developments and were thus, in substantial manner, 
reactions to growing authoritarian practices of Mečiar. Mesežnikov (1999: 49) talks of a 
notable decline in the role of political party as a form of political organization and means of 
communication within the existing political system. At the same time, there was a shift 
towards strengthening other forms of political participation (civil associations and 
movements) as well as towards the proliferation of alternative forms of communication 
(satellite and cable TV, Internet and mobile communication).  
The close interconnection between the political and non-political sectors was given by the 
specific period and context-bounded developments. These caused that it was the same people 
being active at the same time in both, political and non-political sectors with a very high 
fluctuation rate. For instance, the initiator of the civic campaign OK’98 Pavol Demeš was 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the period 1991-1992. The leading figures of some civil 
society organizations and research analytical centers such as MESA 10, The Standing 
Conference of the Civic Institute, or the Slovak Society for Foreign Policy later became the 
founding members of the political parties253. The fluidity between the sectors was also 
provided by the fact that the majority of the involved actors in the 1998 election were former 
activists from early post-communist period and VPN.  
 
5.4.2. Issues at Stake 
What were the issues of critical importance that made the opposition parties to stick together 
and influenced the shift in population mood? According to secondary literature (Bútora et al. 
1999: 16), conducted opinion polls (Bútorová 1999a: 204) and personal interviews the turning 
point of the developments seemed to be the obstructed referendum on NATO membership and 
direct presidential elections in May 1997. The issue of direct presidential election emerged in 
December 1996 when opposition representatives proposed to amend the constitution to 
provide for direct presidential elections. The argument was that after the end of the term of 
President Kováč in March 1998, the parliament would not be able to elect a new president 
since a three-fifth majority was required. After the chairman of the parliament refused to 
schedule debates on this proposal, the opposition parties launched a referendum and 
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 Interviews with Zajac Peter, VPN, DS, 30th July 2008; Šebej František, SKOI, DS, 18th July 2008; Vášaryová 
Magdaléna, SDKU, SSFP, 25th September 2008.  
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eventually gained over 500.000 signatures. All main opposition parties created a broad, inter-
party initiative known as the “Joint Initiative for Referendum” that was aimed at mobilizing 
the population and organizing a pre-referendum campaign. (Mesežnikov, Bútora 1997; 
Mesežnikov 1999: 52) Additionaly, the parliament passed a resolution directing President 
Kováč to call a referendum on Slovakia’s integration into NATO, even though there was no 
invitation for the country to join. To Bútora et al. (1999: 16) this referendum was “an obvious 
attempt to shift the responsibility for the looming failure of the government’s integration 
efforts to the citizens themselves.” Kováč’s decision to combine the two referenda on a single 
ballot was opposed by the government, which instructed the Minister of Interior Gustav 
Krajči to remove the question on presidential elections and reprint the ballots.  
Following the appeal of the chairmen of the opposition parties to boycott the referendum, less 
than 10% of registered voters went to the polls and the referendum was consequently declared 
invalid by the Central Referendum Commission. After the obstructed referendum, fear arose 
among the opposition political parties and within the society as well, whether the forthcoming 
1998 September parliamentary elections would be conducted in a free and fair manner and 
without interference from the government side254.  
 
5.4.3. Profile and Strategies of the Oppositional Forces to Enhance Competitiveness  
5.4.3.1. Political Parties 
Even thought, the overall popular support for the opposition was higher than for the ruling 
coalition, the opposition was too fragmented and heterogeneous so that it could make use out 
of the situation. Mesežnikov (1999: 50) points out that the possibility of change was indicated 
in the opinion polls as early as the first half of 1996. Already during this time the strategy of 
the opposition shifted towards creating a unified front and consequently in autumn of 1996 a 
“Blue Coalition” emerged out of the three opposition parties Christian Democratic Movement 
(KDH), Democratic Union (DU) and Democratic Party (DS). The “Blue Coalition” was 
characterized by the proximity of its political program and despite the center-right block it 
created; it was ready to cooperate with other democratic parties, including leftist ones and the 
Hungarian Coalition. Mesežnikov (1999: 51) sees in the creation of this coalition the first step 
towards “the gradual formation of a new configuration within the Slovak party system.”  
However, as my interviews with representatives of all three involved parties revealed, the 
creation of the “Blue Coalition” was very complicated as two options were available. Firstly, 
a twin (more conservative) coalition, combining the KDH and DS, including ideologically 
most similar parties or secondly, a three-coalition including DU and thus encompassing 
                                                 
254
 See e.g. Bútorová (1998a); personal interviews.  
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former HZDS allies and the center of the political spectrum. Despite the vehement protests of 
DS representatives (who saw in DU party members collaborators of Mečiar), the three-
member coalition had greater potential in creating an entity that in terms of size would be 
competitive enough against the dominant HZDS. Later on, another significant enlargement 
followed out of the need to gain strength and resist the authoritarian tendencies of the ruling 
government. In July 1997 KHD, DU, DS, already part of the “Blue Coalition”, decided to take 
on board the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS) and Slovak Green Party (SZS)255 
and form a unified block, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), with the spokes person 
Mikuláš Dzurinda.256 (See e.g. Bútorová, Gyarfášová, Krivý 1998: 70f) This move was of 
substantial importance as it should have prevented the wasted votes257 of small opposition 
parties who did not reach the required 5% threshold for entering the parliament. (Krivý 1999a: 
64)258 The purpose of the coalition was thus twofold, firstly to eliminate the possibility of 
wasted votes, and secondly, to create the biggest possible group and thus have a better starting 
position against HZDS in the upcoming 1998 elections. However, the interviewed DS 
representatives were convinced that the coalition became too heterogeneous and diverse so 
that it could have functioned as an efficient and productive body. The internal struggles were 
about the basic principles of functioning but also included issues of minor importance such as 
the logo of the coalition. (Zajac Peter, DS, 30th July 2008) 
 
As the ruling HZDS perceived the growing opposition force as a threat to its hegemonic 
position, it decided to amend the electoral law259 only four months260 before the elections and 
used it as a tool of strengthening its position in power (Lebovič 1999: 40; Mesežnikov 1999: 
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 The two later parties were at that time united in a leftist coalition called “Common Choice”, which was 
dominated by the Party of Democratic Left (SDĽ).  
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 Mesežnikov (1999: 52) claims that this move was possible thanks to the level of cooperation the parties 
experienced during the cooperation within the framework of Joint Initiative for Referendum.  
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 Lebovič (1999: 39) and Krivý (1999: 63) state that in 1992 elections almost 24% of all votes were “wasted” 
on small opposition parties as they failed to meet the 5% threshold. This translated into more than 700.000 voters 
in absolute terms.  
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 Krivý (1999: 64) explains that virtually every Anti-Mečiar or opposition Non-Mečiar vote went towards 
gaining parliamentary seats.  
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 The amendments of the electoral law placed also restrictions on the private media, while not allowing them to 
broadcast any activities related to the political campaigns of the various parties. (Školkay 1999: 112) The state-
owned media were, however, strongly biased in favor of the government. Lebovič (1999: 42) sees in the 
amendments both “a tool for exerting political pressure against the opposition […] and the introduction of 
legislative ‘loopholes’, enabling unlawful manipulation of the elections.” Some of the amendments included e.g., 
creation of Slovakia as a single constituency with the intention to use the high popularity of Mečiar. (Lebovič 
1999: 44) For similar arguments see Mesežnikov (1999: 50). 
260
 Lebovič (1999: 40) and Mesežnikov (1999: 50) continue to state that the origins of the amendment date back 
to the adoption of the law on the new territorial and administrative organization of the country in 1996, in which 
the boundaries of the country were defined to reflect the voting preferences for the HZDS and its allies. For 
further details see Lebovič (1999). Ruling coalition partners SNS and ZRS refused such “gerrymandering” 
attempts and the replacement of the proportional with the majority system as they perceived it as a real threat to 
their existence. (Mesežnikov 1999: 51) 
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50). The idea of HZDS was a modification of the law prescribing a separate 5% threshold for 
each party within the coalition, which, in the case of SDK, would have transformed into a 
threshold of 25%. Some authors (Barany 1998; Dostal 1998; Kresak 1998) thus talk of clear 
“anti-coalition spirit” of the amendment.261 The single parties represented in the loose 
coalition of SDK were thus forced to transform into a single political party.  The newly 
created party was intended as a temporary election party, and it continued to use the name of 
the previous coalition – SDK262. The ruling party HZDS attempted to prevent this 
transformation from a coalition towards a political party and on 10 August 1998 raised a 
protest with the Supreme Court questioning the organizational status and registration of SDK.   
HZDS claimed that the SDK’s application included a number of wrong data (OSCE 1998: 15) 
and argued that the party’s name conflicts with the law, since there is the word ‘coalition’ in it 
and it is thus not clear whether it is a coalition or a party263. Despite strong pressures, the 
Supreme Court decided in favor of SDK. (Lebovič 1999: 43) The five parties maintained their 
independence and did neither merge, nor extinct but planned to return to their institutional 
bases after the elections. (Personal interviews) Mesežnikov (1999: 57) claims that the need for 
joint action against authoritarian power in Slovakia led the parties of democratic orientation to 
devise a form of mutual cooperation that would alleviate the two cleavages in the party 
system, namely the ideological divide (right versus left) and the ethnic divide (Slovaks versus 
Hungarians). Consequently, the main strategy of the leader of the opposition was to unite all 
oppositional forces within the society. Mikuláš Dzurinda, the speaker and later leader of SDK 
told me in an interview:  
 
“That is why it was clear to me that it cannot work without the unity of all 
democratizing forces, so I did not mind if left or right-wing, if former dissidents or 
communists, if Slovaks or Hungarians, I just tried to unite this establishment on the 
ideas of democracy, freedom and pro-western ideological orientation […] we needed 
everybody on board. A democracy and society in transition needs this kind of all-
encompassing approach.” (Dzurinda Mikuláš, SDK Party President, 22nd October 
2008) 
 
                                                 
261
 The amendment did not effect only the SDK coalition, but also the three Hungarian parties, which decided to 
form SMK (the Party of the Hungarian Coalition) to better their position.  
262
 For analysis of internal relations among individual SDK parties see Bútorová, Gyarfášová, Krivý (1998: 79). 
263
 Soon after the elections, the forced transformation of SDK from a coalition into a party under the election law 
amendments began to become problematic. (Bútorová 1999a: 215)  
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As the winning coalition was composed of four parties ranging from the left to the right of the 
traditional political spectrum – the SDK, SDĽ, SOP and SMK264 – the negotiations of forming 
the cabinet were very complicated. (see personal interviews; e.g. Szomolanyi 1999: 34) 
Interviewed politicians from all of the political parties of the post-1998 ruling coalition 
stressed the difficulties connected to creating a big coalition composed of ideologically 
diverse entities. As Peter Weiss, former leader of SDĽ stated: 
 
“SDĽ265 and KDH would, under normal circumstances, be opposition parties, but we 
were forced to become co-players in order to overcome the authoritarian tendencies.” 
(Weiss Peter, SDĽ, 3rd September 2009) 
 
Nevertheless, what united the opposition political parties was a commitment to democratic 
principles and the rule of law. Furthermore, all of them supported Slovakia’s integration into 
the EU and NATO. (Mesežnikov 1998c; Bútora et al. 1999: 10; personal interviews)  
 
5.4.3.2. Media 
All the interviewed partners agreed that the independent anti-government media have been the 
most important oppositional force, which entered the oppositional space of political 
contestation before the 1998 elections. The most influential media proved to be the private TV 
station Markíza, the FM station Radio TWIST, and the print daily SME. Their main 
contributions were, as interviewed journalists stated, to expose the malpractices of the 
government, increase the credibility of the opposition and highlight it as the possible 
alternative and thus create the atmosphere of change. This should have been reached through 
the provision of balanced and unbiased information and coverage as opposed to the biased, 
non-objective, pro-government stance of Slovak Television (STV) and Slovak Radio 
(SRO)266. To broaden the sphere of influence as much as possible, Mečiar started creating 
own radio stations (such as Radio Koliba, and later Radio Okey) in order to counterbalance 
the successful activities of the independent media (Fuele Jan, journalist, 16th September 2008) 
However, the involvement of the independent media in the oppositional space came with no 
surprise taking into account the unfavorable conditions under which they had to operate since 
                                                 
264
 Party of Democratic Left (SDĽ); Slovak Hungarian Coalition (SMK); Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) 
265
 SDĽ had according to its members specifically disadvantageous position as it was a former communist party 
within the block of right-wing parties and always being labeled by the coalition partners as a party with a strong 
anti-reform character. Peter Weiss thinks that the ruling coalition used SDĽ as an excuse for not progressing 
with the reforms as promised during the pre-election time.  
266
 This was confirmed by all domestic as well as international media monitoring activities. (see e.g. MEMO ‘ 98 
report; OSCE report 1998; Norris 1998) 
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1994. As Miroslav Kollár, analyst from the research think-tank Institute for Public Affairs 
(IVO) and media expert stated:  
 
“The media needed a secure environment, in which they don’t have to be afraid to 
loose their license, to loose investments, to face government involvement into their 
work. Regular economic conditions and rule of law were crucial for their working.” 
(Kollár Miroslav, IVO, 30th July 2008)  
 
The relationship between independent media and opposition political parties was reciprocal 
and profitable for both involved sides. On the one hand, the independent media enabled the 
opposition politicians to disseminate their message and information to the electorate267; on the 
other hand, the journalists were not left alone in their struggle for increased democratization, 
as the opposition political party representatives criticized the same issues. They were thus 
united by one common cause: change from an authoritarian to a more democratic form of 
government. (Leško Marián, journalist, 28th August 2008) Furthermore, the independent 
journalists were given immediate and first hand information from the politicians as the 
relationships were very friendly and the representatives of the two groups were meeting 
regularly. (Fuele Jan, journalist, chairman of the Syndicate of Journalists, 16th September 
2008)  
“The intellectual media background was working for them [opposition politicians]. 
We were strategizing about the election plan. If we had a certain idea, we met with 
Dzurinda, Čarnogurský, Hrušovký, and gave them the idea […], they on the other 
hand were providing information for the paper [Daily Sme]. Some of them were 
meeting on a daily basis. When politicians needed to communicate something they 
always came to us.” (Fulmek Alexej, journalist, 28th August 2008) 
 
However, as all interviewed journalists and politicians agreed, the relationship did not have an 
institutionalized character. It was rather given by prevailing conditions in the country and the 
unifying struggle against political hegemony. For the journalists, trying to preserve their 
independence and credibility, it was more of a necessity, as the threat to the media and 
individual journalists was enormous, including physical attacks, economic pressure, and other 
practices such as tracing of phone calls and putting constraints on advertising activities. 
(Kotian Robert, journalist, 11th July 2008)  
                                                 
267
 The independent media were airing discussions with guests or printing commentaries from politicians, which 
would otherwise not have been invited to any other media channel. 
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Fuele (1999: 386) claims that a number of journalists and even entire editorial departments of 
newspapers as well as the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists and the Association of Slovak 
Periodical Publishers were put under surveillance and their telephone conversations 
monitored. Školkay (1999: 111f) points out various strategies employed by the government to 
undermine the independent media including the efforts to reduce the number of newspapers 
by making their economic situation more difficult through raising taxes on only selected 
newspapers, as well as attempts to reduce the transmission range or even to stop the 
broadcasting of some radio stations. Mečiar’s practices to marginalize independent media and 
journalists further involved refusal to give press conferences, restrictions on providing 
information solely to state and public media, and intimidation of journalists by physical 
assaults. (Fuele 1999: 385) Due to the amendment of the election law, which proscribed the 
private media from broadcasting pre-electoral campaigns of the political parties268 (and thus 
significantly violated the constitutions and the freedom of speech), there was a great danger 
for the private media to lose their licenses if they did so. (Školkay 1999: 113, Fuele 1999: 
385)  
 
The public TV channel STV served as a “propaganda tool” of the government with all the 
news stories about the opposition having almost exclusively negative character. (Školkay 
1999: 111; Fuele 1999: 375) The monopoly of STV and SRO was strengthened by the fact 
that only these two broadcasters (both “public”) had a transmission range covering the entire 
country. The ruling coalition and particularly the Prime Minister received the greatest amount 
of air-time of all politicians, which was almost entirely positive. (Fuele 1999: 389, Školkay 
1999: 114) Conducted analysis have further shown that the less educated people are much 
more influenced by TV than by newspapers or magazines and that it is HZDS supporters who 
most often turn on the TV. (Bútorová, Gyarfášová et al. 1998: 160) The lack of coverage by 
private TV Markíza in some areas meant that people were exposed to information only from 
one pro-government channel, STV.269 (Krivý 1999b: 104) Mikuláš Dzurinda, the leader of the 
opposition confirmed in an interview: 
 
                                                 
268
 The solution to the tricky situation was cooperation with NGOs in their effort to increase voter turnout. The 
media then broadcasted informative and motivating materials prepared by the civic associations like Head ’98, 
OK’98, the Standing Conference of the Civic Institute, Rock the Vote, and the Institute for Public Affairs. The 
private media thus contributed to increased voter mobilization, not by calling on citizens to vote for a particular 
party but rather appealing to them to take part in the elections. The NGO campaign “I vote therefore I am”, in 
which personalities of cultural, sports and entertainment life participated, persuaded many first time voters of the 
importance to go and cast their votes. The numerous activities of various civil society organizations are outlined 
in detail below.  
269
 For selection of specific practices of the government to manipulate STV and create a negative image of the 
opposition see Školkay (1999: 116). 
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“My 1998 campaign was on bicycle because the TV left me completely out. The 
conditions were extreme; it appears almost unreal from the current point of view, even 
if it is only ten years back.” (Dzurinda Mikuláš, SDK Party President, 22nd October 
2008)  
 
Babitzová (1998: 13) and Krivý (1999b: 104-107) analyzed the covering of the TV stations 
with respective voter turnout and found out that in areas with exclusive STV coverage HZDS 
and SNS270 performed much better than in areas with mixed coverage. The MEMO ’98271 
monitoring of the media showed that within the immediate period before the elections (26th 
August - 26th September 1998) the time devoted to HZDS on STV news was 62% as 
compared to 15% received by the opposition parties. On TV Markíza the opposition received 
more airtime and was depicted positively or neutrally. As Bútorová (1998a) documented the 
target audience and TV viewers of two main TV stations differentiated with respect to their 
value orientations. Opinion polls have shown that supporters of political opposition and 
younger and more educated people had a greater tendency to trust TV Markíza and distrust 
STV. (Školkay 1999: 115) However, during the pre-election period also TV Markíza became 
strongly biased und supported the newly created party by the Mayor of Košice Rudolf 
Schuster, SOP, who later became President of the Slovak Republic. (See also Bútorová, 
Gyarfášová et al. 1998: 174) The radio stations, as compared to the TV stations, managed to 
maintain greater independence and provide less propagandistic news. (Školkay 1999: 120) 
The Slovak press272 was differentiated and belonged both, to the oppositional as well as 
governmental space. Of significant importance for this study is the daily SME defining itself 
as right-of-center liberal daily, thus closest to the center-right opposition parties. SME 
journalists were very critical of HZDS, and many opposition politicians in the years leading to 
the elections (later united in SDK) were regular columnists in SME. On the other hand, the 
daily Slovenská Republika, which was owned by individuals related to the HZDS, belonged 
to the government space of political contestation and was therefore the most supportive of the 
regime. (Bútorová, Gyarfášová et al. 1998: 160-162) Alexej Fulmek, leading journalist of 
SME and director of the Press House Petit Press (also publishing daily SME) saw the close 
                                                 
270
 STV did not conduct a direct propaganda for SNS but the outcome can be explained by the inclination to the 
same value orientation as HZDS. (Krivý 1999: 108) 
271
 Quoted in Školkay (1999: 117) 
272
 For the importance of Internet in the 1998 elections see Vystavil (1999: 135-146) and Bobovsky and Vystavil 
(1999: 417-429) This medium is not given space in this thesis as Vystavil’s study shows that the use of internet 
by political parties was in the beginning state and non of the political parties bothered to present in detail all their 
candidates running for parliament. Their sites lacked a lively two-way communication environment and all web-
sites failed to inform visitors about what the respective parties were trying to achieve.  
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connection and cooperation between the then opposition parties, above all SDK, and daily 
SME clearly: 
 
“Definitely, yes 100%! If you had asked me at that time why are we doing newspapers, 
my answer would have been to let Mečiar loose power. Of course we wanted to be a 
critical newspaper, controlling state power, but in the background this was our aim. 
We were celebrating when Mečiar lost the elections in the courtyard of the daily SME 
and oppositional leaders came along with Dzurinda.” (Fulmek Alexej, SME, 28th 
August 2008)  
 
Nevertheless, the interviewed journalists stressed that their involvement within the 
oppositional space was not about preferences for a specific political party, but rather about 
opposing the authoritarian tendencies. The close connection between the independent media 
and the opposition political parties and the opposition of the former actor towards the 
government was caused by the threatened principles of democracy in the society in this 
specific period of “Mečiarism” and thus issue-and-time dependent. The majority of journalists 
stated that as soon as the incumbent regime was removed, all the synergy effects, and friendly 
connections disappeared and a regular political and social scene became re-established. 
 
5.4.3.2.1. Strategies of the Political Parties in the Media Pre-Election Campaign  
This section explores what form and content did the electoral campaign of the various 
political parties take in the media and which of the employed strategies proved to be the most 
successful ones with respect to winning of the votes.  
As the ruling HZDS invested the largest amount of resources into its campaign, their TV ads 
as well as billboards were the most innovative and professional. (Školkay 1999: 125) The 
party concentrated on feel-good images of ordinary Slovak life, the achievements of the 
government, and the country’s promising future. (Serdelová 1998) To be able to finance its 
party activities, HZDS received financial assistance from the big entrepreneurs, which the 
government created through its privatization policies. The most prominent was Alexander 
Rezeš, HZDS campaign manager and one of the major owners of the Košice based East 
Slovak Steelworks (VSZ). Mečiar used a variety of strategies from the “menu of 
manipulation” at his disposal to strengthen his position in power. He built the campaign on 
portraying himself as a protector against enemies273 (both internal and external) and fighter 
for ordinary citizens. With creating potential crisis he managed to divert the attention of the 
                                                 
273
 For strategy of creating external and internal enemies by the incumbent in power see Hyden (2006).  
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public from the real problems and/or made the opposition responsible for misachievements 
and failures. (Školkay 1999) The central theme of the HZDS campaign was “heart”, 
symbolizing love and emotional relationship to the country274. The connection to Slovakia’s 
nationalist heroes and struggles was another important tactic, which found special resonance 
among the HZDS traditional supports base. On billboards, HZDS appealed to its voters 
through a “four-series” campaign of historical personalities, including Ľudovít Štúr (national 
awakener), Milan Rastislav Štefánik (co-founder of the Czechoslovak Republic), Andrej 
Hlinka (politician of the inter-war period)275 and, the fourth Mečiar himself. Školkay (1999: 
126) states that “the goal of this series was to evoke a historical connection between these 
four personalities and to elevate Mečiar and the HZDS to the level of important personalities 
in Slovak history.” Mečiar managed to attract a number of personalities from abroad to 
support his rallies and meetings – the German top-model Claudia Schiffer, Italian actress 
Claudia Cardinale, and French actors Gerard Depardieu, Jean Paul Belmondo were only some 
of the prominents visiting Slovakia shortly before elections. However, the campaign had a 
weaker appeal among the population as it was hoped for. With the increase of authoritarian 
practices and constant tries to negatively portray the whole spectrum of oppositional forces, 
Mečiar began to loose his credibility and legitimacy. The situation, when compared to 1992, 
changed significantly. In 1992 elections HZDS enjoyed an unrivalled positive image. (Bútora, 
Bútorová 1998: 205) It was considered to be the best advocate of Slovak national interests, 
with a strong potential of capable politicians and experts, and the citizens had the impression 
that HZDS cared most about them. In 1998, HZDS was raising less hopes but, despite its 
questionable instrumentalization of public TV, corruption and arrogance of the state 
administration as well as party clientelism (for details see Ivantyšyn, Sičaková 1999), 
remained at a share of 20% among the adult population representing its core supporters. 
(Bútora, Bútorová 1998: 205) In a transitional, setting which is characterized by high levels of 
uncertainty and unpredictability (Schmitter, O’Donnell 1986), the loss of the incumbent’s 
credibility does not automatically imply a gain for the opposition, as the population remains 
characterized by deep mistrust towards the image and role of the opposition. (Bunce, Wolchik 
2009) SDK, as the leader of the opposition therefore had to select specific, time-and-issue 
bounded strategies to appeal to the voters and increase their levels of trust.  
 
                                                 
274
 HZDS billboards were depicting Mečiar situated in a country side with slogan, “The country of my heart”. 
The media later found out that the picture was taken in the Swiss mountains instead of in Slovakia. Opposition 
skillfully used this strategic mistake and as a reaction printed own billboards with the Slovak mountains and 
countryside and slogan “The REAL country of my heart.” 
275
 Opinion polls by Bútorová and Bútora (1998c: 198) showed that the adherents of HZDS and SNS feel closer 
to Hlinka and wartime Slovak state than followers of other parties.  
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The main slogan of the party became “SDK: A Real Chance for Change” and the electorate 
was constantly reminded that SDK is the only real force being able to bring along change in 
getting more votes than the HZDS. The message altered slightly with time closer to elections 
to “Only the winner can bring CHANGE” to highlight even stronger the potential victory of 
oppositional forces. The main figure of the campaign became the SDK leader Mikuláš 
Dzurinda doing a bicycle campaign-tour around the country and doing populist promises such 
as doubling real wages in four years. SDK managed to project itself as the only guarantor of 
bringing Slovakia to the EU and NATO and used a high number of personalities from cultural 
and sports life who appealed to the voters. Another very interesting strategy to counterbalance 
the hegemonic stance of the incumbent was the application of political rhetoric to appeal to 
democratic history of Slovakia, or at least to some of its most crucial moments. The intention 
was to connect the short democratic periods with the image of the party and thus to portray it 
as credible trustworthy alternative and despite its very short existence as having a tradition of 
democratic experience.  
The SDK pre-election campaign spot on TV was named “The Magic Eight”. The 
argumentation line of the spot was that the majority of the decisive events in modern Slovak 
history happened in years including the magic digit 8 in it276. These include 1848, 1918, 1938, 
1948, 1968, 1989 and at last 1998, which should thus have become another key event in 
Slovak modern history. The TV spots were very emotionally appealing, showing montage of 
black-and-white photographs of Alexander Dubček and Prague Spring of 1968, 
demonstrations from November 1989 and other positive associations Slovaks tend to feel 
proud of. The opinion polls (e.g. Bútorová, Bútora 1998: 191-197) have shown that people in 
Slovakia view the periods with predominantly democratic character as the brightest times in 
Slovakia’s history including the Slovak National Uprising in 1944-45, the Velvet Revolution 
in November 1989 and the first Czechoslovak Republic277. The slogan connected to this series 
was: “The Magic Eight: it always comes when we can take our fate into our own hands.” The 
SDK thus managed, despite the limited and restricted operational space of the opposition to 
project itself as the only party being able to bring change, democratic form of governance, and 
consequently integration to the EU and NATO structures. At the same time it skillfully 
appealed to the citizens that it is them having the power to decide in their hands. This free will 
and possibility to influence the flow and outcome of political events have in post-communist 
context crucial importance, as the voters tend to be rather passive and do not believe their vote 
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 The impression was strengthened by the fact that SDK randomly selected election number 8. 
277
 Here again a look through party viewpoints reveals the existence of various interpretations of history, which 
becomes most evident when comparing the standpoints of SDK and HZDS adherents regarding the post-1989 
era. (Bútorová, Bútora 1998c: 194) Whereas, SDK supporters clearly define as the brightest times the three 
above mentioned, HZDS adherents appreciate also the wartime Slovak State very strongly.  
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could in one or another way influence the political happenings. (see e.g. Segert, Machos 1995: 
303) As Bútora and Bútorová (1998: 207) claim this time “people have not fallen in 
traditional lethargy as they used to under the communist regime when they usually retreated 
into privacy and grumbled in resignation.” Also other opposition parties wanted to make use 
of the changing mood within society and appealed to the leading theme of the 1998 elections: 
change. For instance, the SOP (political party of Rudolf Schuster, the Mayor of Košice) 
campaigned with the slogan “Citizens! It is five to midnight. Change is your hope. The SOP is 
change.” 
 
5.4.3.3. Civil Society  
Macháček (2000: 243) claims that the development of civil society in Slovakia can be divided 
into four stages. The first stage falls under the period of communism when the civil society 
was crushed and only individual actions by dissents were taking place. On the other hand, Les 
(1994: 76; 257-270) argues that the foundations of civil society associations in Central and 
Eastern Europe go back to the communist regime and are not only a product of 1989. The 
moral crisis of communism during the 1970s and 1980s in Czechoslovakia led to the creation 
of the “alternative”, “parallel” or “second” society represented in Slovakia, among others 
through the ecological movement “Bratislava – nahlas” (Bratislava – Say it aloud). 
The second phase during the early post-communist period 1989-1994 brought along a gradual 
re-establishment of civil society often enabled through the help of former dissidents and 
assistance coming from international organizations. At the beginning of the 1990s the various 
civil society organizations expanded rapidly.278 Statistical data of Woleková and Salamon 
(2000) from the second half of the 1990s show that Slovakia’s citizens were more active than 
citizenry elsewhere in Europe (9.7% of the total Slovak population as compared to 6.1% on 
average in other European countries). The authors explain this high mobilization by the rather 
dramatically changing political environment and the then ongoing power struggle. The third 
phase from 1994 to 1998 was characterized by Mečiar’s attempts to reinstate state control and 
undermine civil society. As the principal cause for the changing situation of the third sector 
after 1994 Bútora (1997: 18f) highlights the strong polarization of the political scene in 
Slovakia. A situation, in which the state once again took command of numerous areas of 
social life and the civil society, became degraded to “a subject” of the state. (Macháček 2000: 
243f) He claims that the struggle was not only between the state and civic movements as such, 
but it was rather caused by the fact “that opposition forces were transferred into the sphere of 
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 Macháček talks about 9800 NGOs in the year 1995, and an increase up to 17.000 non-profit associations by 
1996.  
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the third sector. This was then the political struggle of the opposition against the ruling regime 
of the state and that was one reason why the ruling coalition was so keen on crushing the 
emergent third sector.” Bútora and Fialová (1995: 33) see the explanation for the “weakened” 
third sector partly in the fact that “Many intellectuals and leaders of the (reform) movements 
(after 1989) left their organizational activities and committed themselves to a party and 
government to be able to build up basic democratic structures in the country (during the 
period 1989-1994).” This to a certain extent weakened the potential of the emerging third 
sector. However, after 1992 elections, and in the following years, an important part of this 
political elite ‘withdrew’ itself back into the sphere of the non-government sector – as a result 
of electoral failures and disappointment – where they could make use of their abilities in 
building up democracy from ‘below’. The development and involvement of the NGO sector 
of civil society in the period of 1993-1998 has been considered an important factor of 
transformation and modernization of Slovakia. Demeš (1999: 347) argues that the NGO sector 
and volunteerism was perhaps the only area that showed a positive trend. As a consequence of 
the authoritarian rule of Vladimír Mečiar and his allies, practically all other surveyed areas of 
social, political and economic life had suffered a setback. The state pressure of Mečiar thus 
helped to increase the cohesion of the civil society. The NGOs in Slovakia changed from an 
“island of isolated idealists or the so-called island of positive deviants” to a vivid, vibrant and 
efficient “civil archipelago of hope and positive action.” (Bútora 1997) 
During the last phase, following Mečiar’s removal from power in 1998, the activists have 
once more moved from the third sector into governmental life. After 1998, the civil society in 
Slovakia became institutionalized through the creation of variety of organizations and massive 
financial support from the European Union under the PHARE programs and from the USA 
under the program Democratic Network. (Gustav Matijek, USAID, 18th September 2008) This 
support can be viewed as the need to strengthen the transformation of European post-
communist countries and their direction towards pluralistic democracy and integration in the 
EU and NATO. (Macháček 2000: 250)  
 
The following section will introduce the most influential activities organized by various civil 
society organizations before the 1998 elections with the aim to counterbalance the growing 
power of the government. Between December 1997 and September 1998, the Slovak NGO 
community started a variety of activities to use the changing mood within the society and get 
the citizens actively involved in the election process. The main aim was to ensure free and fair 
conduct of the elections and to be able to oversee all aspects of the 1998 election process. 
According to Demeš (1999: 357) the year 1998 was the most productive in terms of the 
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spectrum of civil society activities and their influence on the life of Slovak society and on 
Slovakia’s international position.  
 
5.4.3.3.1. Campaign OK ’98  
The fear of possible manipulation of the 1998 elections after the experience with the 1997 
obstructed referendum brought into life extensive civil society activities represented mostly 
through the Civic Campaign OK’98 designed to help to ensure free and fair elections. 
(personal interviews with initiators and organizers of the campaign) The campaign took 
examples from Bulgaria, Rumania, Croatia and other Eastern European countries and was at 
the beginning an initiative of just a few prominent individuals. Demeš (1999: 348) states that 
the campaign attempted to resolve fundamental social and political problems rather than the 
traditional public service and charitable activities that citizens had come to expect from civil 
society and NGOs in particular. While the 1996 “Third Sector SOS” campaign against a 
restrictive law on foundations substantially raised public awareness of the diversity of civil 
society, that campaign did not affect the wider public. However, it managed to “consolidate” 
the civil society and contributed to the creation of a tradition of civic resistance, “a tradition 
Slovak civil society was lacking when compared to neighboring countries”. (Bútora, Demeš 
1999: 155f)  
The main aim of the OK ’98 campaign was thus to improve voter awareness and information 
about elections, to increase voter turnout, to strengthen the influence of citizens on the 
preparation of election legislation and to ensure citizen supervision over the fair conduct of 
the elections. (see e.g. Berecká et al. 1999; Bútora, Demeš 1999; Demeš 1999; personal 
interviews) The aim was achieved with a voter turnout of 84.24% and Krivý (1999a: 63) talks 
of a “revolt” of the population trend.   
 
The campaign started to take shape in January 1998 (though the preparation started already in 
summer 1997), and was officially declared in March 1998 in the centrally located Slovak city 
of Zvolen. The decision was to create the campaign in a positive and pro-active spirit (as 
opposed to the 1996 SOS campaign, which was constructed in a defending manner). The 
acronym OK’98279 was intended to imply the optimistic conviction that if people got 
involved, everything would work out well in the end. (Bútora, Demeš 1999: 160; personal 
interviews with the initiators of the campaign) According to its creators, the campaign was so 
successful because it took citizens and their discontent as the main actors of the change. It was 
decentralized and consequently achieved that its message of change had an ownership idea 
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 OK (Občianska Kampan), which means Civic Campaign.  
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among the wide population. It became a mass movement not only with respect to the number 
of organizations (ca. 60) but also the number of people involved as each of the organizations 
had a different appeal. (Pufflerová Šarlota, Speaker of the OK’98 campaign, 14th July 2008) 
All involved organizations had a different mandate and focus, be it charity or environment, 
but all of them joined forces for the common purpose of democratic elections. (Novotný 
Peter, OKO, 12th September 2008) To many of the interviewees the main contribution of the 
campaign was that for the first time in Slovak history means of civic and voter education were 
used to achieve change and to show citizens that elections can be used as a democratic tool for 
realizing the desired change. (Pániková Alena, OSF, 15th July 2008) 
The campaign was defined as “non-partisan, public-political initiative of citizens grouped in 
NGOs for free and fair elections.” (Berecká et al. 1999: 14) Despite the strong impartiality, 
the conviction and perception of the involved actors was to constitute a part of the concept of 
oppositional forces – not in a party sense, but in a sense of being opposed to the authoritarian 
regime and fighting for basic moral values and democratic principles. The impartiality as 
leading principle of the campaign was crucial for the ongoing flow of donor funds into the 
campaign (Berecká et al. 1999: 30) as it was one of their conditionalities for providing 
finances. The sources for financing, as well as the know-how on how to remain impartial and 
non-partisan were coordinated through the so called Donors’ Forum, which was an informal 
group of ten grant-giving organizations.280 Information about the activities was regularly 
published in the Non Profit magazine and on the Internet. The donors came up with a flexible 
system and a simplified application form, and they frequently provided co-financing for 
different projects. (personal interviews; Bútora, Demeš 1999: 163) The Donors’ Forum was 
created out of the need to coordinate efforts, avoid duplicity, disseminate information and 
help building up philanthropic tradition in Slovak society. (Panikova Alena, OSF, 15th July 
2008) In addition to the Donors’ Forum, NGOs in Slovakia also received grants from other 
foreign foundations in the EU, US and Japan. All the interviewed representatives of involved 
civil society organizations as well as representatives of the Donors’ Forum rejected any 
claims dealing with non transparent or non legitimate way of funding their pre-electoral 
activities.   
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The funding by foreign sources was an opportunity for the ruling coalition to accuse OK ‘98 
of being under control of foreign interests.281 The organizers of the campaign were accused by 
the government of manipulating students with the aim of enforcing own interests and attempt 
to over-throw the sovereign democratically elected government. Slovenská Republika, the 
pro-government daily, shortly before elections published a statement that “[…] the aim of the 
OK’ 98 campaign […] is to convince that Slovakia is not a good country to stay in; that this 
government does not fulfill what it promised. The propagandists and activists of the campaign 
intentionally ask questions, which cannot be positively answered in any country of the world, 
like ‘are you satisfied with the health care system’?” (Siposova, E. Slovenska Republika, 9th 
September 1998) This and other articles in the pro-government newspaper listed names and 
addresses of those it believed are interfering in internal Slovak affairs. (Norris 1998: 4)  
 
One of the principles of impartiality and non-partisanship was manifested in the way that 
donors insisted on inviting representatives of all political parties to organized discussion 
panels both at regional and national level.  
 
“However, the ruling parties did not respond to our invitation as often as the 
opposition parties. They did not understand the great opportunity of the interaction, or 
they thought it is useless for their campaign or might be even negative for them. They 
considered the forum and the panels as civil society environment, in which they did 
not want to enter in, as they considered it closely connected to the opposition.” 
(Pufflerová Šarlota, Speaker of the OK’98 campaign, 14th July 2008) 
 
As Pufflerová Šarlota further confirmed to me, that the strategy of the campaign was to 
communicate to all segments of the society who were able to mobilize voters in one way or 
another. The NGO Partners for Democratic Change Slovakia (PDCS) was acting as 
facilitating, moderating and training organization among all the involved actors. Important for 
the image of the campaign was that the numerous conflicts were solved internally, so that to 
the public the campaign appeared to speak with a single voice. (Ondrušek Dušan, executive 
director of PDCS, 11th July 2008) Trade unions have been approached with the appeal to 
distribute the leaflets and information materials of the campaign among their followers; 
churches were asked to inform about various ongoing activities of the third sector. All the 
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activities were inter-connected with the common aim for increased awareness and 
participation.  
The OK’98 campaign was managed by an eleven member coordinating committee282, as it 
was necessary to quickly respond to the media. However, despite the concentration of the 
eleven member organizations in the capital of Bratislava, the campaign became efficient as it 
organized numerous discussion forums in the regions and had a strong decentralized 
character. (Pufflerová Šarlota, Speaker of the OK’98 campaign, 14th July 2008) These 
decentralized centers had stronger potential and were more likely to survive the still growing 
pressure from the government. (Ondrušek Dušan, PDCS, 11th July 2008) 
Within the framework of OK’ 98 several parallel activities283 were taking place – educational 
projects, cultural activities, get-out-the-vote concerts, distribution of brochures, TV video 
clips and films, discussions forums – open to candidates from all political parties. NGOs 
prepared almost 60 independent informational, educational and monitoring projects. Activities 
which gained widespread visibility were Road for Slovakia (Ceste pre Slovensko), a trek of 
young volunteers around the whole country, Rock the Vote (Rok volieb) concerts, Civic Eye 
(Občianske Oko ‘98), a project for civic supervision over the elections284 organized by the 
Association for Free Elections; TV spots produced by the civic association Head ’98 (Hlava 
’98), in which popular personalities from cultural, music and sports life appealed to young 
voters to go the vote with the message “I vote, therefore I am”. Košice’s Old Town Theater 
prepared the political cabaret A Velvet Checkmate (Zamatový Mat) and visited a number of 
Slovak towns and communities. (Bútora, Demeš 1999: 161) Several other NGOs were 
involved in monitoring the media. The most prominent became the project MEMO ’98. (see 
also Kužel, Mračka 1998; personal interviews.)  
 
5.4.3.3.2. Road for Slovakia 
The Road for Slovakia information campaign attracted around 350 volunteers; most of them 
young people who took part in this election project organized by the GEMMA’93 civic 
association from the town of Rimavská Sobota. In two weeks (August 18-September 3, 1998) 
the volunteers traveled through 850 villages and towns, distributing information brochures 
explaining voter rights and voting procedures as well as the importance of their participation 
in the elections. (Demeš 1999: 350; Bútora, Demeš 1999: 161) Road for Slovakia took four 
different routes visiting all cities, meeting all the mayors, organizing local discussions and 
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 More than 1700 volunteers took part in the project, which was organized by the Association for Fair 
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stations. (Demeš 1999: 350) 
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increasing awareness of the people about the benefits of a decentralized system of 
government. The success factor of Road for Slovakia lies mainly in the fact that is was 
conducted on a very individual and personal level and was based on face-to-face 
communication with voters. (Novotný Peter, OKO, 12th September 2008) 
 
5.4.3.3.3. Rock the Vote Campaign 
The Rock the Vote ‘98 campaign285, conceptualized and implemented by the Open Society 
Foundation (NOS), set out to achieve a very clear short-term goal: To increase the number of 
young people planning to participate in the 1998 Slovak parliamentary elections. Specifically, 
Rock the Vote ’98 was a non-partisan campaign targeted at voters under the age of 25, and 
particularly focused on the 380,000 first-time voters (aged 18-21). (NOS 1998: 2) The 
campaign was concentrated on this demographic group as they are believed to be the firmest 
believers in the principles of democracy and are naturally inclined to absorb new ideas. 
However, the Slovak youth had a feeling that their decisions cannot influence the ruling of the 
government and the voter turnout of the youngest voters (18-25 years) in 1994 elections was 
as low as 20%. The Rock the Vote campaign was set up with the aim of reversing the trend 
and to encourage young and first time voters to participate and to prove that they can make a 
difference. (NOS 1998: 2) The slogan was “Don’t let others decide your future” and the 
project involved passing through 22 towns, a media campaign as well as 13 rock concerts all 
around the country. (Bútora, Demeš 1999: 161) The turn-out of first-time voters who cast 
their votes was higher than 80%, which contributed to the evident victory of the opposition. 
(Krivý 1999a) Besides concerts and events, Rock the Vote ’98 organized a bus-tour 
throughout the country in order to deliver its message. Informational and motivational printed 
materials were designed and distributed specifically for the target group. The primary success 
in reaching young people was the fact that the campaign was continually supported by so 
many young and popular Slovak personalities (primarily musicians and bands). (NOS 1998: 
4)  
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 For development of the idea, strategy plan, cooperation with foreign partners, exchange of best practices with 
Bulgarian partners, logo, name and image of the campaign creation see NOS (1998: 5); for a concrete timeline of 
all Rock the Vote activities see NOS (1998: 21-26). 
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The name and logo was the very base of the 
campaign’s image. The name Rock volieb can take 
several meanings. Without the letter ’c’ in Rock, 
’rok’ means ’year’ in Slovak, hence, ’Year of 
elections.’ With the letter ’c’, it signifies ’Rock 
(music) of elections.’ Further, for those that have 
some knowledge of English, it could also mean ’To 
Rock the Elections.’ The logo, the white open palm 
on a black background, has both positive and 
negative appeal. It can be seen as an aggressive 
’STOP,’ which appeals to the spirit of resistance of 
many young people. But it can also be interpreted as 
a symbol of participation, or ’power to the people.’ 
Interestingly, an open palm, in Slovak sign language, 
is the symbol for ’voice’, which, in Slovak, also 
means ’vote’. (NOS 1998: 5)  
 
 
5.4.3.3.4. Other Important Initiatives  
Project MEMO’ 98 was established in order to monitor the key electronic and print media, 
and assess the objectivity of their reporting. Its main contribution was that it provided 
statistically based information on government’s misuse of the available airtime on the public 
TV channel and radio station. (Kužel Rastislav, MEMO’98, 12th August 2008) Občianske 
OKO’98 (Civilian Eye) organized domestic election observers and parallel vote counts. 
Training of members of electoral committees was conducted by the Anton Tunega 
Foundation. The activities started with petitions calling against the amendment of the electoral 
law by Mečiar. After the amendment went through, the association oriented its efforts on civic 
education campaigns explaining the rationality behind the amendments and provided trainings 
for members of the Electoral Commission and media campaign trainings. (Novotný Peter, 
OKO, 12th September 2008) OKO’98 did not get the needed accreditation for observing the 
counting and the tabulation process from the government, and was present at only around 50-
60% of the polling stations as the access to the polling stations depended on individual 
chairpersons of the polling stations. (Novotný Peter, OKO, 12th September 2008) 
 
The Democratic Round Table was another initiative launched by NGOs and political parties 
as a reaction to the need for preventing possible electoral fraud. The first informal meeting 
between the four opposition partners (the SDK, SDĽ, SMK, and SOP) and the four non-
partisan actors (the Gremium of the Third Sector, the Confederation of Trade Unions, the 
Union of Town and Municipalities, and the Youth Council of Slovakia) took place in June 
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1998 and proved the ability of democratic forces to form alliances. Bútora et al. (1999: 18) 
argues that “it was the bonds formed by political parties, NGOs, the independent media, trade 
unions and part of the church that ultimately brought about the fall of Mečiar’s regime.”  
 
The majority of interview partners agreed that the contribution of the civil society 
organizations to democratization in Slovakia was crucial and that the ousting of Mečiar from 
power only became possible with the help of OK’98 and other activities. Demeš (1999: 358) 
argues that “if it were not for the dozens of NGOs and hundreds of volunteers, as well as the 
participation of an unprecedented number of young people, the 1998 elections would have 
taken a different course and had a different outcome.” Bútora and Demeš (1999: 157) state 
that the third sector as a whole constituted an impressive force. In February 1998 14,400 
organizations were registered with the Interior Ministry, 12,000 civic associations, 422 
foundations, 161 non-investment funds, and 16 non-profit organizations providing general 
services.  
 
5.4.3.3.5. Cultural Personalities 
The analysis of secondary literature (see e.g. Bútora et al. 1999; Bútora, Demeš 1999; 
Porubjak 1999) and conducted primary interviews revealed extensive importance and 
prominence of involvement of personalities from cultural, sports and social life in the 1998 
election campaign. The majority of young artists (bands, artists, singers) openly and actively 
supported the SDK and appealed to first-time voters to go and cast their votes. Another 
segment was constituted out of representatives of the older-generation personalities of famous 
actors. This strategy should have demonstrated to people that Dzurinda was supported by 
“credible and successful individuals and patriots.” (Školkay 1999: 128) The roots for the 
involvement of cultural community in the oppositional space of political contestation have to 
be searched for in Mečiar’s repressive tendencies intervening into their professional as well as 
private lives. The authoritarian policies of the HZDS Minister of culture Ivan Hudec 
discouraged the young artists, and reminded the older ones of the style of communist rule. 
(Porubjak 1999: 179) In a similar way to what had happened during the former communist 
regime, in the period of 1994-1998 there were renewed attempts by the state to use culture as 
a propaganda tool. (Kollár 1999b: 365) Objections from the culturally-aware public started in 
1995 and the resistance from the cultural scene culminated in a theatre strike in March 1997. 
(Snopko, Kollár 1998) This was supported by the Confederation of Trade Unions and 
academic community. Governments’ repressive steps also founded the Let’s Save Culture 
initiative uniting artists, filmmakers, scientists, university students and writers (Bútora, 
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Demeš 1999: 158; Porubjak 1999: 181) and by 1998 the vast majority of cultural community 
clearly belonged to the space of oppositional forces. Mečiar canceled a number of very 
popular satirical political talk-shows on the public TV. The immediate reaction of the 
comedians, very critical of Mečiar’s rule and popular among the population, was to move 
their cabarets and shows both to the Czech Television and private TV Markíza. Subsequent 
step of the comedians was their open and active participation in the election campaign of the 
opposition political parties.  
One of the biggest contributions of the involvement of the representatives of cultural 
community in the oppositional space of political contestation were TV spots and programs 
calling on people to cast their vote. The mass appeal they encountered among voters 
influenced the outcome of the elections significantly. (Kotian Robert, journalist, 11th July 
2008) Another activity was a series of interviews conducted by Ľuba Lesná, journalist and 
director of the Standing Conference of the Civic Institute, a civil society body, who conducted 
interviews with 25 Slovak personalities broadcasted on Radio Twist. The topics included the 
lack of democracy, intolerance, disrespect for the constitution and rule of law, and the need 
for change. The broadest appeal among first-time voters was reached through the popular 
campaign by civic association Head ’98 “I think, therefore I vote: I vote, therefore I am”, 
broadcasted on TV Markíza and TV NAŠA. The personalities from cultural and sports 
community also got involved in the majority of other activities organized by civil society 
organizations such as Road for Slovakia, Rock the Vote, or Velvet Checkmate cabaret. As 
every other segment of society, also the artists were divided into two antagonistic camps; 
some of them belonging to the oppositional, the others to the governmental space of political 
contestation. Porubjak (1999: 184) states that the contrast of the campaigns was enormous. 
On the one hand, there were power and monopoly links and control of public media on the 
side of the government; on the other, “intellectual and artistic elite, imagination, wit and, – in 
particular – voluntary, dedicated, and unselfish civic involvement,” which seemed to appeal 
much stronger among the population. The goals and motivation for involvement of the 
cultural community included freeing Slovak culture from the influence of political ideology 
and party interests, diversification of sources of culture financing and decentralization of 
culture decision-making. (see e.g. Kollár 1999b: 369; personal interviews) The new minister 
from the opposition SDK, Milan Kňažko286, published the so called “Black Book” including 
cases of illegal acts, abuses of power and questionable economic dealings of the previous 
government. However, the expectations of the cultural community were not met fully as not 
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 Kňažko himself was a very popular actor and one of the leading personalities of the Public against Violence 
movement.  
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all of their demands were fulfilled after Dzurinda’s government was installed in power and 
they remained unsatisfied with the level of lacking reforms287. To the majority of the 
interviewed opposition politicians, the personalities of cultural and intellectual life constituted 
the most important and credible partner within the oppositional space.  
 
5.4.3.3.6. Trade Unions 
The trade unions of Slovakia are represented by the umbrella organization Confederation of 
Trade Unions (KOZ)288. Malová (1999a: 169) argues that on the one hand, the unions 
successfully reorganized and adapted to the new democratic conditions after 1989; on the 
other, even 10 years later in the 1998 election year, they kept struggling with gaining trust and 
confidence of the public because of the deteriorating social and economic conditions. In 
comparison to the pre-1989 period, the proportion of employees organized in trade unions has 
decreased significantly. (Barinych 1998a: 9) Čambaliková (1998: 628) sees the causes in the 
restructuring of the economy and “life style individualization process”. The possibilities of the 
trade unions to achieve their aims by influencing the parliamentary caucuses and individual 
deputies got more and more limited in the period following the 1994 elections with Mečiar’s 
majoritarian dominance and increasing authoritarian tendencies. Malová (1999a: 172) states 
that this method of lobbying bears fruits only when the government does not have majority 
support in the parliament. “The state/government has always got at its disposal a set of tools 
by which it can intervene – directly or indirectly – into the system of working and social 
relations. At this time it is suitable in Slovakia to distinguish between the intervention as an 
act of interference into the autonomy of social partners (i.e. curtailing their room for 
contractual freedom) and intervention of the social state into a world of capital and work.” 
Čambaliková (1998: 628)  
 
KOZ thus began to search for a position to take part in the 1998 elections as soon as 1997. 
Prior to KOZ decision to get involved in the electoral campaign, KOZ undertook several 
strategic steps and examined activities, experiences, and findings of trade union bodies from 
other countries. (Malová 1999a: 170; personal interviews) The participation of the trade 
unions in the pre-electoral activities and their cooperation with political parties and civil 
society organizations thus has to be understood as a calculated and coordinated approach and 
planned strategy.  
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constituent part of the Czechoslovak Confederation of Trade Unions. (Malová  1999: 176) 
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In order to become an important player in the electoral process, and regain the lost supporter’s 
base, the trade unions needed to extend their bargaining potential and coordinate their 
relationship to political parties. (Čambaliková 1998: 626) However, as Malová (1999a: 182) 
stated, this had to be done very carefully, as one of the ways how to gain legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public was to remain/become non-partisan289. In order to fulfill this aim, the KOZ 
assembly decided that the best strategy in the pre-election campaign was to support activities 
which enabled union members and other citizens to receive as much information as possible 
about the political parties and their relationship to trade unions as well as their position on 
crucial social and economic issues. (KOZ 1998; personal interviews) The direct involvement 
of the unions was thus aimed at encouraging the unionists to support those political parties 
that guaranteed more profitable position of the workers. (Malová 1999a: 174) In accordance 
with this strategy, KOZ launched four types of activities, including the preparation of 
analytical documents, the mobilization of the core membership, negotiations with political 
parties, interest groups and other segments of civil society and a media campaign. Barinych 
(1998b) states that the basic material for the Confederation to decide, which party to support, 
was a regular monitoring and analysis of the voting record of individual deputies and 
parliamentary caucuses290. The analysis has shown that the parties of the ruling coalition 
HZDS, SNS and ZRS did not vote for the benefit of the workers, but their interests were 
much stronger supported by the parliamentary caucuses of opposition parties. The most 
favorable parties turned out to be SDK in the economic sphere and SDĽ in the social sphere. 
The results of the analysis were given to involved civil society organizations, churches as well 
as media and thus spread among the population. KOZ produced a leaflet, which was being 
distributed at meetings and during the OK’98 campaign in order to provide the voters with 
information on the behavior of political parties in the parliament. (Malová 1999a: 174) 
Furthermore, in various dailies KOZ constantly tried to raise awareness among the population 
about increasing unemployment, shortcomings in the healthcare and housing sector, as well as 
the non-enactment of the law on tripartite negotiations and Slovakia’s delayed entry to EU 
and NATO291. An analysis on the fulfillment of Mečiar government’s program from 1995-
1998 was also published in the daily “Práca”. All these analytical materials provided a good 
argumentative base for KOZ representatives in talks with political parties, civil society and 
the population. Regarding the cooperation of trade unions with other oppositional forces, 
participation in the Democratic Round Table (Bútora, Demeš 1999) were held together with 
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opposition parties, the Union of Towns and Municipalities, the Council of Youth of Slovakia 
and the Gremium of the Third Sector. KOZ also challenged the opposition political parties to 
cooperate in the election campaign in order to win the elections. (Malová 1999a: 175; 
personal interviews)  
 
To enlarge its influence and respond to the growing discontent from the trade unions, the 
government decided to set up a new association, the Economic and Social Council, in 
December 1997. It served as a multi-partite body with membership from government 
representatives, the Slovak Association of Trade Unions, the Association of Employer 
Unions, the Union of Civic Associations and Foundations, the Union of Pensioners in 
Slovakia and the Democratic Union of Women in Slovakia292. (Čambaliková 1998: 627) As 
Mečiar’s response to the growing pressure from the trade unions was the creation of parallel 
structures, the “genuine” trade unions were forced to push even harder and eventually became 
part of the oppositional forces as their main obligation went towards workers, whose standard 
and conditions of living were deteriorating. (Leško Marian, journalist, 28th August 2008)  
 
We can summarize, that the main intention of the trade unions for participation in the 
electoral campaign was to promote the interests of its members and of other workers and thus 
improve its own position. Malová (1999a: 176) states that the trade unions significantly 
contributed to the fundamental political changes in Slovakia during 1998 and helped to 
stabilize the relationship between political and non-political actors. Despite the positive role 
ascribed to the trade unions in the democratization process ahead of 1998 elections and their 
perceived strong involvement, nearly all interview partners agreed that their motivation was 
rather pragmatic and they joined the oppositional forces only when it became clear that the 
election is not going to be won by Mečiar and his ruling coalition.293  
 
Similar to in the case of Ghana (Gyimah-Boadi, Oquaye, Drah 2000: 29), most of the trade 
union activities have not been staged in defense of any larger national purpose but for trade 
union reasons. The interviewed partners, including opposition political party representatives, 
were convinced that trade unions always tended to take rather an opportunistic stance and 
were not consistent in the counter hegemonic oppositional activities. Despite this rather 
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pragmatic stance, the trade unions’ entering into the oppositional space of political 
contestation helped to enhance the chances for the oppositional victory as the trade unions, 
being a mass organization, brought along their support base.  
 
5.4.3.3.7. The Church 
With respect to the status and position of the churches, in 1998 Slovakia was lacking adequate 
legislation defining state-churches relations. Kollár (1999a: 187) claims that no government 
can afford to disregard the importance of the church for a large segment of the Slovak 
population, and all political parties have subsequently tried to win the religious community on 
their side. The worsening of relations between most Catholic clergy and Mečiar’s government 
started, as with other situational oppositional forces, in the period after 1994 elections with 
Mečiar’s authoritarian tendencies and his ruling style. In the 1998 pre-election period the 
tensions heightened and Mečiar warned the population that many of the church officials are 
on the side of the opposition Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). In March 1998, the 
chairman of the Bishops’ Conference of Slovakia (KBS), Rudolf Baláž, spoke on TV about 
the necessity of the church to become involved in politics, as “public affairs should be run by 
people who are honest, just, who abide by firm principles, who are moral and good-hearted.” 
(quoted in Kollár 1999a: 188) Subsequently, in April 1998, nine bishops from the KBS issued 
and open letter294 to the head of the government voicing their anxiety about developments in 
Slovakia. Their main concerns included political hatred, lack of readiness to deal with 
organized crime and social problems, refusal to accept Constitutional Court rulings, attempts 
to manipulate elections through amendment of the election law, and degradation of moral 
values of the public, as well as non-transparent privatization depriving the Slovak public of 
their common property. A major concern for the churches was the extent of crimes and 
attacks on President Michal Kováč and the kidnapping of his son, as well as the related 
murder of Robert Remiáš. (see personal interviews) After having taken side of President 
Michal Kováč, Mečiar classified churches as enemies of the state. (Leško Marian, journalist, 
28th August 2008) The churches thus entered the oppositional space of political contestation 
because they perceived the government policies as a threat to democracy in general, as well as 
a threat to their own future relationship with the state in particular. (Kollár Miroslav, IVO, 
30th July 2008)  
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“The church needed strong support of the state for its policies (financing issues, 
auditing and control issues, the Vatican treaty), but there was no possibility of 
dialogue; that is why they took side of the pro-Europe oriented parties. The 
representatives of the churches thus assumed that the relationship to the new 
government will be less problematic, meaning that treaties will be easier to achieve. 
The opposition parties were easier to communicate and negotiate with, as they 
followed certain values [pro-Christian, pro-European]”. (Kollár Miroslav, IVO, 30th 
July 2008)  
 
The letter issued by the nine bishops295 was supported by the rectors of several Slovak 
universities, as well as by the majority of supporters of the opposition parties. Representatives 
of churches held various meetings with the Confederation of Trade Unions to discuss 
preparations for elections in order to encourage as many eligible voters as possible to 
participate. Consequently, a series of statements about the importance of preserving the 
dignity of political opponents was published in newspapers. The churches in general, and 
certain bishops individually, called upon the population to go and cast their votes to “signal to 
people that they should give their votes to those who have a conscience and who are honest” 
without wanting to indicate which party to vote for.296  The choice of the voters should have 
been guided solely by the principle of “electing those about whom we are convinced in our 
minds that they have a sincere desire to serve the common good of us all”297 and that 
“participation in the elections is not only our civil right, but also our Christian 
responsibility”.298 The churches’ interests in the winning of the oppositional forces got 
influenced also by the statements of some HZDS representatives about the future role of the 
church in Slovakia and its relationship with the state. Dušan Slobodník, a HZDS deputy, 
declared that after the HZDS victory in the next elections it would be necessary “to reconsider 
the activities of certain allegedly Slovak Catholic bishops and of the priests incited by 
them.”299 According to the interviewed representatives, the self-interest of churches (as 
among all other involved actors) was evident, as it was a great opportunity for them that three 
out of four new potential coalition parties (KDH, SDK and SMK) were parties announcing 
strong Christian values. (Kotian Robert, journalist, 11th July 2008) The connection between 
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KDH, as the Christian party, and the churches was for many “somehow natural”. As Ján 
Čarnogurský, former Prime Minister and chairman of KDH pointed out: 
 
 “Most of the clerics were on KDH side, not publicly but they were able to disseminate 
the message in the villages in the everyday life and through contact with the people. 
We had secretaries in every part of Slovakia; they were familiar with the situation at 
the local level. With some of them we talked with the intention to cooperate, with 
others not; it was on individual base.” (Čarnogurský Jan, KDH Party President, 23rd 
September 2008)  
 
The announcement of the results and victory of the oppositional forces were thus welcomed 
by the representatives of both catholic and evangelical churches. The participation and 
involvement of the churches in the process was viewed mostly as positive by my interview 
partners (political party representatives), though not entirely of crucial importance for the 
outcome.  
 
5.4.3.3.8. Research Institutes and Think-Tanks 
As significant actor of the civil society, the role of research institutes and think-tanks has to be 
mentioned shortly. The various research think-tanks Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), Slovak 
Foreign Policy Association (SFPA), MESA 10, and the Center for Economic Development 
played a key role in building information flows. Above all IVO, with its research studies, 
publications and public opinion polls, had a great impact on providing academic and 
statistically based findings. IVO also cooperated with OK’98 in campaigning for a fair 
electoral law. (Bútora, Demeš 1999: 162) Materials evaluating the political parties’ programs 
were presented by the F.A. Hayek Foundations as well as by IVO. These analyzed the 
election programs of the political parties and provided answers to open questions. 
Independent think-tanks and research groups published analyses of the government 
performance since the 1994 elections. All of these research activities helped to enhance the 
credibility of the opposition political parties in the eyes of the electorate, as it persuaded the 
voters that performance of the opposition was strongly constrained and disadvantaged  by the 
“menu of manipulation” (Schedler 2002a) employed by the incumbent.  
 
5.4.3.3.9. Implications 
Concluding, we can state that the alliance of a great part of civil society with the opposition is 
not surprising due to the repressive character of Mečiar’s government and the restricting 
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legislation adopted in the period between 1994 and 1997300. The government of Mikuláš 
Dzurinda promised in its government program to “create legislative and organizational 
conditions for strengthening and promoting civic initiatives and […] support the building of 
partner relations with the civil sector at all levels of public administration.” (Demeš 1999: 
361) After being labeled as “anti-government”, “anti-state”, and “Anti-Slovak”, the year 1998 
was a turning point in development of the government – civil society relations. The open 
communication and cooperation of the civil society with pro-democratic political elites301, 
who created a new government, had a substantially different character than under the previous 
government. All these activities helped to increase the voter turnout to 84% of the eligible 
voters, as they reached citizens in areas where political parties were not able to extend their 
reach. The participation of first time voters, which was of crucial importance for opposition 
victory, rose, thanks to the various activities of civil society organizations from 60% in 1994 
to over 80% in 1998 elections. (Bútora et al. 1999: 18)  
 
5.4.4. Youth and First-time Voters 
As the youth is generally associated with openness to change, the opposition’s election 
campaign of 1998 concentrated on these voters, who constituted 10% of Slovakia’s adult 
citizens. Macháček (2000: 245) claims that the young, educated and urbanized segments of 
population were at the forefront of the democratization process and showed a strong 
democratic orientation. (Gyarfášová et al. 1999: 239; Ivantyšyn, Velšic, Bútorová 1998: 146) 
The opinion polls showed that the first-time voters were very critical about the direction in 
which Slovak society was moving (Gyarfášová et al. 1999: 234) and they favored the pre-
election opposition parties302.  Their value-profile differed from the older generation and the 
adherence to principles of authoritarianism, and Anti-Westernism was less common among 
first-time than older voters. Velšic and Ivantyšyn (1998: 5) explain that only few first-time 
voters can remember that freedom of expression is not self-evident, and this must be related to 
their acceptance of democratic principles. Mečiar thus only had little chances in attracting the 
democratically oriented first-time voters.303  
Many authors (see e.g. Gyarfášová et al. 1999: 240; Macháček 2000: 246) claim that the 
campaigns of the NGOs were a key factor in influencing the first-time votes. It appealed to 
                                                 
300
 For details see e.g. Bútora, Demeš (1997); Demeš, Daniel (1997) 
301
 Several ministries started to communicate with NGOs and to appoint NGO representatives to their advisory 
bodies and commissions. The Justice Ministry accepted a proposal from the Gremium of the Third Sector’s 
legislative group and plans to draft a new law on foundations and endowments and to amend the law on non-
profit organizations. (Demeš 1999: 351) 
302
 For detailed analysis of the profile of the first-time voters see Ivantyšyn, Velšic, Bútorová (1998) 
303
 Gyarfášová and Kúska (1999: 224) confirmed that the share of first-time voters as a percentage of total HZDS 
supporters was only 4%. 
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them so strongly because the Leitmotiv of the OK’98 campaign was change, and as many as 
54% of first-time voters decided for whom to vote only during the election campaign. Demeš 
(1999) states that the Donors’ Forum of Slovakia with its leading members Open Society 
Foundation and Foundation for Development of Civil Society supported a wide range of civic 
education projects and initiatives focused on the participation of first time voters. The Slovak 
Youth Council organized a campaign called My Future, during which post-cards urging 
young people to vote, T-shirts, stickers, and mobile phones were distributed in order to 
organize rallies and meetings more efficiently in a very short time. Macháček (2000: 246) 
describes it as a fast, effective and de-centralized method of organization and thus difficult for 
the regime to control. Such strong mobilization and organization of youth structures was also 
possible thanks to the affiliation of the Youth Council of Slovakia to the European Youth 
Forum, which put strong emphasis on education for citizenship and the “uniting of national 
councils and international youth organizations in Europe”. (Macháček 2000: 248) Youth 
organizations also received specific training, know-how and seminars from their foreign 
partners and international NGOs. (Fedor Martin, member of “New Generation”, 22nd August 
2008)  
As with respect to the political youth organization New Generation, a non-partisan party 
project of young people emerged shortly before the 1998 elections. The aim was to appeal to 
the senior opposition politicians to join forces in order to be a force strong enough to remove 
Mečiar from power. (Fedor Martin, Member of New Generation, 22nd August 2008) It was an 
umbrella organization grouping several political youth associations and organizations, which 
after the 1998 elections became the official youth wing of the SDKU304, called New 
Generation SDKU. Once again the interaction was reciprocal and fruitful for both sides; the 
youth helped the party to initiate an innovative, effective and constructive campaign. In the 
framework of the campaign it organized cycle-tours around Slovakia with Dzurinda, or 
persuaded the opposition leaders to visit places of youth gatherings, such as pubs and 
discothèques. The trade-off for their engagement and support was gaining positions on the 
MP candidate’s list for parliament. (Fedor Martin, Member of New Generation, 22nd August 
2008) 
 
5.5. International Context of the 1998 Elections and Foreign Support 
The interviewed representatives of civil society agreed that this variety of activities would not 
have been possible – despite the enormous amount of voluntary work – if not for the level of 
external funding. (see also Bútora, Demeš 1999: 162) Bútora et al. (1999: 19) claim that the 
                                                 
304
 After the 1998 elections, the SDK party was renamed to SDKU.  
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fact that the democratic community in Slovakia maintained communication with Western 
democracies during the rule of Mečiar played a very important role in the political change. All 
interviewed opposition parties’ representatives confirmed to me that the will of the West 
represented a great moral support for their efforts and that the geopolitical situation of 
Slovakia played an important role. According to the conducted interviews, the international 
community was worried about the undemocratic developments in Slovakia during Mečiar 
rule. The Western European political parties wished the new coalition of opposition parties to 
act as a homogenous block and put pressure on all the opposition forces to unite. (Mikloško 
František, KDH, 20th August 2008) As Pal Csaky, the leader of the Slovak Hungarian 
Coalition stated: “We were accepted by the West only as an organic whole.” (Csaky Pal, 
SMK, 11th September 2008) The statements and analysis by Western politicians and experts, 
as well as international institutions and organizations about the level of democracy in 
Slovakia were given ample discussion opportunities in Slovak media. (Bútora, Demeš 1999: 
159) Not only the opposition political parties but also the civil society organizations and 
NGOs had their international partners abroad, which provided them with technical support, 
know-how, funding and moral encouragement. The West was emphasizing the need for 
democratization in Slovakia, and thus helping to erase the “black hole” from the map of 
Europe. (see here e.g. Marušiak et al. 1999: 167) The opposition skillfully incorporated the 
discourse of liberal democracy coming from the Western neighbors into its pre-election 
campaign rhetoric. The political parties hoped that through assimilation to and adaptation of 
the global rhetoric of liberal democracy they could enhance their competitiveness, credibility 
and legitimacy within the local electoral arena. The orientation on the West should have 
projected the parties as the ones bringing higher quality of life, better living standards, high 
employment and prosperity.  
It was also made clear that Slovakia would be invited to join the EU and NATO enlargement 
rounds only without Mečiar. His government, as Bútorová et al. (1999b: 152) stated, was 
“linked with Slovakia’s failures in its integration efforts towards Euro-Atlantic structures” and 
“the causes of these failures had a common denominator – a deficit in democratic domestic 
policy.” The argumentation for disqualification of Slovakia both from NATO and EU 
enlargements were based on the weakness of democratic institutions. Chmel, Samson and 
Duleba (1998: 273) argue that the nationalistic rhetoric used by Mečiar, caused Slovakia to be 
labeled as “problematic country with antidemocratic tendencies, having the reputation of an 
‘enfant terrible’ and of being an unstable and unreliable partner who could serve as a potential 
source of conflict in the region.” The leader of the opposition SDK used the critical 
commentaries coming from Western Europe and the USA very skillfully for his own cause. 
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His party made sure to persuade all the voters that integration into the EU and NATO will be 
realizable only with SDK in the leading seat, constantly pointing to Mečiar’s negative image 
in the West. With respect to prevailing socio-economic conditions and high unemployment 
rate (15.6% in 1998), it was not too difficult to convince the electorate to vote for alternative 
and change.  
 
The regularity of elections was in addition to domestic observer groups secured by 
international observers. Despite the unwillingness of the ruling coalition to invite international 
observers305, Mečiar finally changed his position under international pressure and invited 
OSCE306 to monitor the elections307. The opposition insisted on their presence and saw them 
as the best guarantee of fair elections.308 Mečiar kept pointing to foreign commentary on 
political developments in Slovakia as deliberate attempts to undermine Slovakia's sovereignty 
throughout his rule. The pro-government newspaper Slovenská Republika has published a 
series of articles singling out international organizations and blaming them of intentionally 
creating bad reputation for Slovakia. The National Democratic Institute (NDI), along with the 
International Republican Institute (IRI), the International Helsinki Federation, the US 
Embassy, USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy and numerous Slovak groups 
which benefited from international donor support, were strongly criticized in news articles 
published in Slovenská Republika, entitled "How to Murder Slovakia." (Berecká et al. 1999: 
42) 
 
The outcome of the 1998 elections was welcomed not only by the USA, and the EU 
(Lombardini 1999: 108) but also the neighboring countries of Slovakia. (Marušiak et al. 1999: 
175) The individual interests and motivation of the “Visegrad Four” countries for Slovakia 
joining the EU together with them were clear and pragmatic. As Bútora (1999: 79) states, 
should these three states join the EU before Slovakia (Slovakia is the only Visegrad country, 
which has a common border with all three countries), they would be obliged to implement on 
their borders with Slovakia demanding and costly Schengen regulations required by the EU. 
(Dienstbier 1999: 6)  
                                                 
305
 For details of the discussion see Druker (1999: 87-90) Mečiar was convinced that the verdict on Slovakia’s 
elections was prepared in advance as he saw a secret alliance between international actors and the Slovak 
opposition. He said “If, in quotation marks, an ‘incorrect political party’ wins the elections in Slovakia, [the 
OSCE’s] evaluation will be negative with no regard to what the real situation was and how Slovak citizens will 
evaluate the elections.” (quoted in Druker 1999: 92).  
306
 Two other international groups of observers – IRI and NDI – were denied accreditation by the Central 
Electoral Commission. (UVK) 
307
 On attempts to discredit the credibility of the mission see Druker (1999).  
308
 Mečiar was also very critical about ensuring the presence of Slovak non-government organization in 
observing elections. (for details see Druker 1999: 90; personal interviews) 
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5.6. Conclusions 
Although the HZDS won the 1998 elections in relative terms, as it gained the highest number 
of votes, its maneuvering space for political bargaining had narrowed considerably. (Krivý 
1999a: 64) The fact that the authoritarian tendencies of the incumbent can backfire at anytime 
and that the outcome of the transition process is never certain were further proven in the case 
of Slovakia, where HZDS’s confrontational style of governing created a strong network of 
oppositional forces and shut off the possibility of finding potential political as well as social 
partners for negotiating. Fialová and Bútora (1995) claim that the rejection of representatives 
of the opposition from any posts in the state sector – from institutions of research and 
education, from diplomacy and mass media – as practiced under Mečiar, helped to construct 
an opposition civil society. Macháček (2000: 244) states that “in this case experienced 
politicians and organizers move(d) into civil society and third sector organizations as a form 
of opposition.” The roots for the involvement of the actors in the oppositional space of 
political contestation thus have to be searched for in Mečiar’s repressive tendencies 
intervening into their professional as well as private lives. The pressure helped to increase the 
cohesion of the civil society and the activities and protest actions were coming from all 
directions including environmentalists, the Hungarian minority, theater actors and other 
members of the cultural community, journalist organizations and publishers as well as from 
university students and the academic community. (Bútora, Demeš 1999: 158f) 
 
With Mečiar controlling all the aspects of political, economic, social and cultural life, 
opposition political parties did not have the capacity to challenge his hegemonic position by 
their own. To enhance their competitiveness vis-à-vis the high number of legal, political and 
structural government measures, they employed a number of strategies. The most important 
strategy of the opposition political parties proved to be the interactive cooperation with 
various segments of civil society and media who mobilized the electorate. These actors 
decided to enter the oppositional space of political contestation as they felt threatened in their 
existence through the prevailing conditions in the country. The major issues at time for their 
involvement were the geo-political steering of the country, feeling of helplessness and lacking 
respect for rule of law, non compliance with the democratic rules of the game, deteriorating 
living conditions and quality of life and growing control, which reminded many of the pre-
1989 period. The government perceived the awakening oppositional space as a threat to its 
hegemonic stand and a penetration into its area of control. The increased number of initiatives 
from the side of the oppositional forces was followed by higher levels of restrictions imposed 
by the government in form of legislative barriers or creation of parallel pro-government 
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structures to enhance its decreasing legitimacy.  
The stakes of the situational oppositional forces were very high while entering the 
oppositional space of political contestation as their credibility and reputation of being non-
partisan was under question. They constantly had to explain their oppositional stance in terms 
of hegemonic tendencies instead of partisan affiliations. The return to their “normal” roles 
appeared very difficult as they got openly associated with certain political actors. The aims of 
the opposition political parties and situational oppositional forces differed significantly. While 
the aim of the political parties was to gain the ruling power; situational oppositional forces 
concentrated their efforts on voter mobilization, civic education, and transparency of the 
electoral process. Through active support of these measures they hoped to receive better 
treatment and more prosperous operational conditions for their activities from the new 
government.  
 
The main factors that contributed to Mečiar’s removal were thus a deep discontent with the 
form of his ruling; secondly, the existence of a distinct alternative provided by the democratic 
opposition parties, which decided to form a broad coalition out of the need to resist the 
authoritarian tendencies of the ruling government. And thirdly, a high degree of mobilization 
of all the key segments of the divided society thanks to numerous activities of civil society 
organizations. Why was the high voter turn-out and mobilization of the population so crucial 
for the oppositional victory? Krivý (1999a: 66; 1999c: 80) showed in his comparative analysis 
with previous elections that the support for HZDS and SNS in 1998 did not decrease in 
comparison with 1994. Their political defeat was rather due to the higher election turnout of 
those segments of the population that had prevailing opposition inclinations. Other factors of 
influence were the electoral gains by the opposition parties, wasted ballots cast for the ZRS 
(which did not capture enough support to secure representation in parliament), minimization 
of wasted ballots for opposition parties, broad pre-election and post-election party coalitions 
and the determination of each pre-election opposition party not to support a HZDS led 
government after the elections. Whereas in 1994 the election turnout was remarkably higher 
in small villages than in big Slovak cities, in 1998 the difference narrowed as a consequence 
of the higher voter participation in urban centers. The urban voters thus played, like in the 
case of Ghana, a crucial role for the victory of oppositional forces.  
 
Beside the interactive cooperation, the leading opposition party SDK used a number of 
rhetorical strategies in order to enhance its competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent. It 
constantly pointed to undemocratic performance and bad international record of Vladimír 
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Mečiar. This projection enabled the opposition to portray itself as the opposite: a party with 
democratic credentials and strong connections and support from international community. The 
opposition SDK convinced the electorate that the only way to join the EU and NATO 
“families”, and thus the Western prosperous life-style, was leading through a vote for them. 
Its slogan “Only the winner can bring change” appealed to the voters who believed in the 
existence of a distinct and real alternative to HZDS. The change was promised, both in 
economic and political terms. In economic terms it became associated with enhancing the 
quality of life, and increasing the living standards through planned market reforms. In 
political and social terms, the opposition clearly stand as representative of “real” democrats. 
However, what exactly provided for the democratic character of the opposition was neither 
further specified at that time, nor explained to me properly by the political representatives ten 
years later. It almost seems that a clear distinction from “Mečiarism” was enough to 
automatically get equated with strong democratic credentials.  
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Chapter 6: Uganda - The Unfinished Project309 
 
“[…] before the ‘mustard seed’ of freedom and democracy could be sown in Uganda, 
the land first had to be cleared of the rocks and weeds of a corrupt system, which had 
given rise by the 1970s to sectarian dictatorship and violence.” (Museveni 1997: xiii) 
 
6.1. Introduction 
When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) of President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 
came to power in 1986 (thanks to its military wing, the National Resistance Army, NRA), it 
adopted a system of so called “no-party” democracy in Uganda. The founders argued that 
multiparty politics would revive primordial identities and promote sectarianism. (Museveni 
1997; Ondoga ori Amaza 1998; Kanyeihamba 2002) This alternative to liberal Western 
democracy was, according to its founders, based on an all-inclusive principle of citizenship 
and individual merit rather than on membership in “divisive” political parties. (Ddungu 1989; 
Kabwegyere 1996) However, it soon became clear that the no-party system was misused by 
the NRM and helped to entrench a one-party (rather than a no-party) rule, which lasted 
(legally) until the referendum of 2005. (Nassali 2004) Then President Museveni was “forced” 
(internally as well as externally) to open up the political space and allow multiparty 
dispensation to replace the previous mode of governance. However, some years after the 
multiparty presidential and parliamentary election of 2006 the one-party regime in Uganda is 
still a reality. The NRM continues controlling the state apparatus (according to the “winner-
takes-it-all” principle) as well as using public resources to finance its activities. The 
Movement resisted internal democratization and retained an essential military structure. 
Above this, the Ugandan society remains divided, with no prospect of bringing the various 
actors together in a mode of interactive, participatory governance. The causes of this 
development lie partly in the political, historical and cultural legacy of “Movementocracy310” 
– a mode of governance, which is a result of combined internal (national) as well as external 
(international) forces.  
 
The primary objective of this chapter is, as opposed to the two previous chapters on Ghana 
and Slovakia, to analyze what factors hinder a complete transition towards a functioning 
                                                 
309
 Parts of this chapter are based on the article “Of Mustard Seeds and Democracy” Assessing the Impact of 
“Movementocracy” on Uganda’s Contemporary Modes of Governance published by the author in Stichproben. 
Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien, 2008, Vol.15; pp.55-86. 
310
 The term “Movementocracy” refers to the Movement or “no-party” mode of governance of President 
Museveni. (Mukwaya 2004) The specific characteristics of the Movement system will be explained later in the 
chapter.  
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multiparty system in Uganda and how the legacy of “Movementocracy” is reflected in today’s 
society.311 
The findings presented here are, as in the other two cases, based mainly on my discussions 
and open-end, in-depth interviews with various representatives of political, academic and 
social life during a field research conducted in the summer of 2007 and February 2008 in 
Uganda. In the course of my research I conducted ninety-six qualitative expert interviews 
with various key actors of political and social life. I have identified four major groups of 
actors – academics, civil society representatives and journalists, donor312 community 
representatives and politicians from all political parties represented in the 8th Ugandan 
parliament313. At the core of the agent-centered approach applied in this study is the 
consideration of agents themselves, their diversity, connectedness and levels of interactions. 
(Axelrod 1997) The conducted expert interviews are used here not solely as illustrations of 
respective experts’ positions, but at the same time serve as the main source of information for 
analysis of the hampering elements on the way to multiparty democracy, as there are, till 
present day, not many publications accessible314.  
 
The interviews have been analyzed with qualitative interpretive methods and offer reflections 
of various stakeholders on the democratization process and the transition from a one-party 
mode of governance to pluralism currently underway in their country.  
Each of the stakeholders’ stories conveys a very different view of reality and represents a 
special way of seeing. The actors “select for attention a few salient features and relations from 
what would otherwise be an overwhelmingly complex reality” (Rein, Schoen 1994: 26) to 
offer a comprehensible and for them convenient picture of their subjective reality. The stake-
holder groups interviewed by me hold conflicting interests (incumbent forces versus 
oppositional forces including not solely oppositional political parties, but also a variety of 
journalists, civil society organizations, and academia representatives) and “their problem 
formulations and preferred solutions are grounded in different problem-setting stories rooted 
in different frames.” (Rein, Schoen 1994: 29) The stronger reliance on interview data in case 
of Uganda than in other two case studies poses specific problems to my study, as the 
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 The aim of the chapter is not to question whether multi-party politics is the right political system for Uganda, 
as the formal rules have already been adopted and are at least theoretically in place.  
312
 By donors, I refer to bilateral governments and multilateral agencies that provide development assistance.  
313
 These currently comprise the incumbent NRM-O, and the opposition parties Forum for Democratic Change 
(FDC), Democratic Party (DP), Uganda Peoples’ Congress (UPC), Conservative Party (CP), Justice Forum 
(JEEMA) as well as independent candidates. 
314
 These encompass above all reports of the EU, Western donor agencies present in the country, local research 
centers and human rights organizations on the conduct of 2005 referendum and 2006 parliamentary and 
presidential elections (see below) as well as Kiiza, Makara, Rakner (2008) publication.  
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interview setting was certainly affected by my positioning within the field. The answers might 
have reflected what my interview partners assumed I wanted to know or what they thought it 
was in their interest for me to know. Rein and Schoen (1994: 41) underline this by claiming 
“all interpretations are necessarily conditioned by particular society, historical period, and 
social status, from which they originate. In other words, what you see and know depends on 
who you are, when you are, and where you sit.” The interviews used are supplemented by 
analysis of secondary literature dealing with Uganda’s political history as the current mode of 
governance has to be understood as a legacy of Uganda’s specific historical, cultural, 
political, economic and social past.  
 
However, despite the heterogeneity of the actors, it was possible to generate some common 
views from the conducted interviews and thus identify the main hampering elements on 
Uganda’s way to multiparty political system from the view of my interview partners.  
Five main hindering factors have been gathered and selected for an analysis: tight control over 
the transition process by the ruling party, poor mode of governance, shortcomings of 
oppositional forces, upwards accountability of local stakeholders towards donor community, 
and absence of culture of political tolerance. These factors have been perceived as crucial by 
all four groups of stakeholders and interpreted as obstacles to pluralism and thus effective role 
of the oppositional forces despite the introduction of multiparty politics. It has to be stated 
clearly that the majority of these actors share serious discontent with the mode of governance 
of President Museveni and are very critical about his performance. Interestingly enough, the 
interviewed representatives of the government agreed with some of these elements. They 
explained them; however, as inevitable (tight control over the transition process, absence of 
culture of political tolerance) or described them as failures of other, meaning oppositional 
actors. As a result these Uganda specific situations can be interpreted as mutually 
incompatible and more pronounced than in the other two case studies. A concrete example 
presenting different perspectives of the same problem-setting shall explain more: The 
opposition complains about teargas being used by the police and army forces to disperse 
rallies held by the opposition, which is perceived as a violation of basic human rights and 
freedoms. The government side has a completely different view and perception of the same 
situation: “…whenever they [opposition] make a rally in the centre of the city, they disrupt 
business, so they are given certain areas to carry out their activities but they disobey 
government, they are being so unreasonable, so obviously teargas must be used!” (Apolo 
Nsibambi, Prime Minister of Uganda, 21st February 2008) 
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6.2. Background to the Concept of No-party Democracy in Uganda 
Up to this date, pluralism in Ugandan politics has not been allowed to take root, as the current 
President Yoweri Museveni and his concept of “no–party democracy” has successfully 
prevented the formation and operation of political parties since he took office in 1986. 
Museveni’s arguments against a multi–party system, such as ethnicity, religious sectarianism, 
subversion and disunity have a long tradition in Ugandan political history.315 Museveni 
inherited all the cleavages and tensions (ethnic, religious, the North–South divide and the 
strong militarism of Ugandan politics) from colonial practices as well as former presidents 
Milton Obote and Idi Amin316, but instead of eliminating them, he continuously took 
advantage of these shortcomings. 
 
The Movement arrangement was introduced to Ugandan politics when President Museveni 
took power in 1986 after a five-year bush war, as an all inclusive and participatory 
arrangement, in which leadership was to be based on individual merit rather than political 
parties. Party activities were subsequently banned. The philosophy of the Movement was that 
not all types of democratic forms of governance are equally well adapted to deepen 
democracy under all kinds of socio-political conditions. The Movement system was projected 
as being homegrown and thus suitable for the specific circumstances and conditions of 
Uganda’s past. The individual merit system was considered democratic because in principle it 
provided unlimited access for all persons to political offices. Participation in practice was 
exercised through the creation of Local Councils, which made the Movement popular around 
the whole country among the general population.317 (Kasfir 2000; Oloka-Onyango 2000; 
Okuku 2002) Museveni provided for the so-called mchaka mchaka political education 
courses, which multi-partyists claimed were an unfair means of propaganda to convince 
Ugandans to vote for Movement candidates. (Hauser 1999: 627) 
 
The Movement was originally created as a temporary and transitional solution for four years 
to allow the country to recover from periods of war, crime and violence caused by Obote I, 
Amin and Obote II regimes. However, the no-party type of governance entrenched itself with 
time rather as a “one-party” system (above all through the adoption of the Movement Act in 
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 “Museveni’s claim that the opposition in Africa tends to be ethnic, and therefore by implication illegitimate, 
explains little, for where the opposition is ethnic it is more likely that the government is no less ethnic. It also 
ignores the fact that a legal ban on organizing an opposition does not remove it, it simply tends to drive the 
opposition underground.” (Mamdani 1998: 31 in Okuku 2002: 7) 
316
 See for example Hansen (1974); Kabwegyere (1974); Mamdani (1983); Mukholi (1995); Mamdani (1996); 
Oloka-Onyango (1997); Mamdani (1999); Okuku (2002); Twesiime-Kirya (2005). 
317
 The Local Council structures are still intact and provide the basis for the success of the transformed NRM-O. 
(NRM-Organization) 
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1997). Oloka-Onyango (2000: 55) claims in accordance with other Makerere University 
scholars (e.g. Kasfir; Mugaju) that the Movement was “simply a state-supported political 
organization – a single-party in all but a name.” This mutation and increased monopolization 
of power was confirmed also by the constitutional court, which ruled in 2002 that “the 
movement system had never existed and that the government of Uganda was based on a one-
party system.” (Atoo et al. 2008: 33)318  
 
The matter of the future of the political dispensation was thus put to a vote in 2005 in a 
referendum. Article 69 (1, 2) of the constitution provides that the people of Uganda shall have 
the right to choose between the movement political system, a multiparty political system or 
any other democratic and representative political system. (Constitution of the Republic of 
Uganda 1995: 58, Article 69) In 2005 two fundamental changes affecting the rules of the 
game and political contestation occurred. Firstly, Article 105 (2) of the Constitution that 
provides “a person shall not be elected under this constitution to hold office as a President for 
more than two terms as prescribed by this article”319 (Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 
1995: 77, Article 105 (2)) was lifted by way of constitutional amendment, which enabled 
President Museveni to stand for his third term. Secondly, Ugandans decided on 28 July 2005 
in a referendum with a 92.5 margin320 that the political system will be changed from a no-
party to a multiparty dispensation. The removal of term limits overshadowed the transition to 
multiparty politics and both processes have been confused with each other. The issue of a new 
head of state took the center stage and was given extraordinary importance by the 
government, to such an extent that the government was ready to bribe 200 NRM members of 
parliament with five million Ugandan shillings each to vote in favor of lifting the term limits. 
This “cash-for-votes” scandal was uncovered by the Sunday Vision newspaper and 
consequently admitted by several NRM members of parliament. (For more details see Atoo et 
al. 2008)  
It has to be mentioned here that the method used to decide on these two issues influencing the 
future mode of political governance differed significantly. The return to multi-partyism was 
put to the people in a referendum, as it was not a controversial issue and the NRM was not 
running a big risk. However, the lifting of the presidential term limits was pushed through 
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parliamentary procedures (which made buying of the votes possible), in order to enable firm 
control of the process. How exactly the process has been controlled by the ruling power, and 
which other factors played a role in preventing pluralist governance and efficient role of the 
oppositional forces to take place will be analyzed in the following.  
 
6.3. Analysis of Five Hampering Elements on the Way to Multi-Partyism from the View 
of Interviewed Stakeholders 
“When you are doing research on Uganda, you have to look what is written and what 
is practical. What is practical is not democratic at all.” (Professor Aaron Mukwaya, 
University of Makerere, 6th September 2007) 
 
As starting point of the discussion, it has to be mentioned that the majority of the interviewed 
stakeholders was convinced that no real transition was taking place in Uganda as too many 
central features of the previous system of “no-party” democracy remain intact. It was their 
conviction that the transition has not begun conceptually, because the individual merit system 
still exists and still operates under the formal multi–party rule. 
The phenomenon of not genuine or “forced” transition towards pluralistic political system, 
despite adoption of pluralistic norms, laws and institutions is not unique to the Ugandan case. 
Institutional understanding of democracy and election-focused approach has received 
prominent importance among many academic scholars.321  
However, the exclusive emphasis on elections, as the most important institution of democracy 
available to citizens, cannot answer the question concerned with the quality of democracy 
(O’Donnel, Cullell 2004; Diamond, Morlino 2005) as “many countries [in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America] adopt formal electoral institutions without becoming democratic in more 
significant ways.” (Schaffer 1998: 4) Some scholars (Gitonga 1987; Wiseman 1990; Ottaway 
1993, 1997; Bratton, van de Walle 1997; Schaffer 1998; Oloka-Onyango 2005) thus find it 
useful to distinguish between the normative meaning of democracy and formally established 
institutions of electoral democracy. Marina Ottaway (1993: 3f) talks of “limits of 
electoralism”, as it provides inadequate criteria for categorizing regimes as democratic and 
distinguishes between “the ritual of democracy” and its “substance”, given that “many 
African leaders are learning to play the election game-giving aid donors an election barely 
clean enough to receive a low-passing grade, but dirty enough to make it difficult for the 
opposition to win.” 
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Most of the academic literature that analyzes the current political situation in Uganda ascribes 
the failure for the incomplete transition322 process to undemocratic political practices of 
current President Museveni, who uses a whole variety of measures to prolong his stay in 
power and manipulates and maneuvers other key actors.323 In 2005, the presidential term limit 
was lifted due to an amendment of the 1995 Constitution, allowing the incumbent president to 
remain in office for more then two terms. We can observe an ongoing process of 
“autocratization” of democracy, whereby representative democracy puts itself above the rule 
of law. The consequences of such a procedure, meaning when the ruling party is “allowed” to 
amend existing laws and the Constitution due to a high number of its representatives in 
Parliament324, might become very dangerous for the consolidation of multi-party democracy. 
Legislative dominance by one party over time is often associated with misuse of state 
resources and authoritarian tendencies, access to public funds and use of state instruments to 
own advantage. (Randall, Svasand 2002; van de Walle 2003; Manning 2005) Several other 
institutions besides parliament, being of great importance for the functioning of democracy, 
are under the control of the government and not sufficiently independent. The members of the 
Electoral Commission (including the chairperson) have been appointed under the Movement 
system by the President and are thus responsive to the ruling party. Laws are being passed 
with significant time lags so that the opposition does not have time to sufficiently prepare for 
elections. Political campaigns and rallies are being dispersed and radio stations closed. 
Numerous intelligence services intimidate and harass people in rural parts of Uganda who do 
not have access to basic resources, education and information. The NRM–Organization (the 
Movement was renamed after the opening up of the political space) is a product of the NRA 
(National Resistance Army) and thus, its fundamental ideology is based on military control. 
The role of the army and military forces is crucial in Ugandan politics and President 
Museveni manages to hold a very tight grasp of it. The state funds and structures (in this case 
mainly the Local Councils) are used to ensure smooth running of the NRM-O and the 
mobilization of the population. So, conceptually it can be stated that the transition to multi–
party democracy and allowance of a meaningful role of oppositional forces has not begun yet, 
as it is still the Movement system operating under multi–party dispensation. On the theoretical 
or “ritual” level Uganda is an established democracy with all rights and freedoms being 
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guaranteed by the constitution. On the practical or “substance” level, there are many 
constraints such as personalization of power, absence of the rule of law, corruption, 
politization of ethnicity, which are slowing down the process of democratization. 
Theoretically, there are multiple parties present, practically pluralism and oppositional forces 
are absent from Ugandan politics. With reference to academic literature and identified 
interview partners the following section will try to identify the factors constraining the 
operational space of the opposition and the transition process towards multiparty democracy. 
 
6.3.1. Tight Control over the Transition Process towards Multiparty Democracy 
“Time was ripe and he [Museveni] did not think he was running a big political risk.” 
(Niels Hjortdal, DANIDA, 27th August 2007) 
All groups of interview partners commonly agreed (even among the NRM representatives 
including the prime minister and several other ministers) that even after opening up the 
political space as a result of the 2005 referendum, President Museveni was not committed to 
the principles of multiparty democracy and saw himself “forced” to allow them to operate. In 
Professor Simba Kayunga’s opinion “the allowance of multi–party politics was just a question 
of legitimatization, not a question of trust in political parties as institutions of governance” 
(Professor Sallie Simba Kayunga, Makerere University, 7th September 2007). Pressures from 
the international community, regional partners within the East African Community as well as 
from members of his own Movement were increasingly growing. The justification for a no-
party system of governance ran out and could no longer be used, because it was not 
convincing enough. An agreement among interviewed stakeholders prevailed that it would be 
increasingly difficult to continue with the “no-party” system in the global era of multiparty 
electoral democracy. Also, the internal pressure and growing discontent within the NRM 
called for a radical solution. Professor Simba Kayunga talks of “betraying the promise of 
inclusiveness”. President Museveni dealt with the “unreasonable ones” in his own way and 
decided to “mubaleke bageende” or “let them go”. 
 
“Some people are confusing issues. Especially some of our very committed Movement 
supporters think that the coming Referendum is a contest between Movement and 
Multi-partyism. They think that the Referendum is designed to find out what the people 
prefer: Movement or Multi-partyism. This, in fact, is not the issue. There is no doubt 
that the Movement is much better than the Parties that we have ever known here in 
Uganda past and present. There is nothing wrong with the Movement. It is the best. 
The question, then, is: How long should we go on with trying to wrestle (okumegana) 
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with the uncommitted who are forced to stay with us in the Movement because of the 
Ssemateeka (Constitution)? Do you want us to continue with this lack of cohesion 
kujegyemba in our Movement? My answer is: No, mubaleke bageende! Our anti-
sectarianism medicine has cured those who wanted to be cured. However, our 
patience with those who do not want to be cured has run out. That is why we say: 
mubaleke bageende!” (Speech by President Museveni ahead of the 2005 referendum) 
 
However, a quick reality check before allowing “those who do not want to be cured” to 
establish their own political parties allowed Preseident Museveni to easily assess that 
alternative forces with a chance to challenging him successfully and threatening his power 
base were practically inexistent within the country; thus he did not need to be afraid of 
permitting the formal existence of political parties. (Professor Aaron Mukwaya, Makerere 
University, 6th September 2007). Makara, Rakner and Kiiza (2008: 277) thus claim in this 
context that “[…] the decision to reintroduce the multiparty system was intimately linked with 
the kisanja issue: the lifting of term limits on the election of president, ensuring the re-
election of Museveni.” Furthermore, despite the fact that the referendum took place on 28 
July 2005, the political activities at the local level were permitted only on 21 November 2005 
with the enactment of the new Political Parties and Organizations Act (PPOA 2005). This 
time delay limited the campaign possibilities of the opposition parties to organize 
countrywide and guaranteed a significant advantage to NRM. “As a result of the late opening 
of the ‘operating space’ for the political parties, only the NRM […] was able to nominate a 
candidate in all 215 directly contested constituencies and all 69 districts […] signaling how 
well entrenched the Movement is through the country.” (EU 2006: 5) 
In the course of 2006 pre-election campaign President Museveni managed to persuade the 
voters that a double transition, not only that of a political system (from no–party to multi–
party), but even an additional change of guards (from an old to a new president), would lead 
the country into chaos and the possibility of another civil war. The guiding element of the 
2006 elections thus became the slogan “do not risk instability”. This psychological effect of 
creating fear in the minds of Ugandans serves as a very effective means for demonizing 
political parties and ascribing to them several negative events that occurred within Ugandan 
society.325 
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 For historical background see Mamdani (1976, 1983); Barya (1993); Hansen, Twaddle (1995); Mugaju, 
Oloka-Onyango (2000); Okuku (2002); Carbone (2003); Odoki (2005).  
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Museveni thus silenced two oppositional forces, international and national, with one decision. 
As Makara, Rakner and Svasand (2008: 276) expressed it: “Opening the political space would 
silence the donors and the opposition groups within as well as outside the Movement itself, 
while lifting the term limits would mean the return of incumbent leadership.”  
These reasons were confirmed during interviews with members of the ruling cabinet. Minister 
for General Duties and NRM representative Adolf Mwesige put the “forced transition” as 
follows:  
 
“There were people within the Movement, about twenty-five percent that were 
agitating for the return to multiparty democracy and you can’t just ignore them. We 
also had our friends, our development partners, who were of the view that they would 
work better with us if we were in multiparty dispensation. So, for those two reasons to 
accommodate our people here (although in the minority), but also to continue 
cooperation with our development partners, we accepted.” (Adolf Mwesige, Minister 
for General Duties, 7th September 2007) 
 
One can say that the campaign for President Museveni was supported by the argument that it 
would not be wise at all to remove the driver of the transition from the driving seat.  
It was further interesting to observe that the perspective NRM leaders openly explained the 
necessity of lifting the presidential term limits and thus allowing President Museveni to stand 
for another term. Besides the issue of security and stability, NRM cadres presented the 
presidential candidature of Museveni as the will of the people and the authority the people 
were able to use over the government. “As long as people see you as the answer and as an 
instrument that can move society forward, you are there. So, at the time we amended the 
constitution it was clear that we did not have an alternative leader.” (Professor Tarsis 
Kabwegyere, Minister for Relief and Disaster Preparedness, 25th February 2008)326  The 
Ugandan Prime Minister adds in accordance: “We needed an experienced person to assist us 
to move from Movement to multiparty.” (Apolo Nsibambi, Prime Minister, 21st February 
2008) 
 
One of the biggest achievements commonly ascribed to the person of President Museveni is 
his contribution to increased security in the country and delivery in some of the social 
programs, education and health being the most prominent ones. (see e.g. Kasfir 2000) 
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Speaker of Parliament Rebecca Kadaga or Minister for General Duties Adolf Mwesige.  
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Stability and “taming of the undisciplined army” (Prof. Sallie Simba Kayunga, Makerere 
University, 26th February 2008) has become the crucial issue for Museveni’s prolonged stay 
in power. “If stability is a high value, then whoever brought the society together is 
important.” (Prof. Tarsis Kabwegyere, Minister for Relief and Disaster Preparedness, 25th 
February 2008) President Museveni understood perfectly what opportunities lay in chaos and 
(mis)used them in a very pragmatic and opportunistic way. Cecilia Ogwal, former prominent 
UPC (Uganda Peoples Congress) party member claims: 
 
“You were supposed to ignore all the human rights abuses, that were taking place, 
because the current government, the Movement political system was all embracing, 
was bringing peace and  unity, but you could see it everywhere […] but you were not 
supposed to talk about it.” (Cecilia Ogwal, UPC, 13th February 2008) 
 
Because of the absence of institutions and an anti-organization philosophy (Prof. Aaron 
Mukwaya, Makerere University, 6th September 2007) of the no-party era, people relate most 
things to the individual person of President Museveni. The situation of peasants in rural areas 
is crucial in this kind of situation as they tend to look at the state in terms of provision of legal 
security, and not so much in terms of increased pluralism or the way modern economy 
impacts them.327   
 
The improved economic situation (GDP real growth rate of 6% for the year 2007) contributes 
to a kind of apathy among the voter population and explains, according to interviewed 
partners, low interest in political issues and a push for change in the society. Oloka-Onyango 
claims that this attitude plays into the hands of President Museveni and makes him almost 
exclusively the “only player in the game”: 
 
“For the first time people are secure in their economic lives. People are more 
satisfied, and even if they are very angry, they are in minority. Most of them are 
satisfied. They have security, which they didn’t have. For those kinds of people [...] 
forget anything else. That makes a very big difference in the way that people 
conceptualize and struggle for democracy. If at the end of the day, you can have your 
meal in your house, you are satisfied. So, they do not care too much about politics.“ 
(Professor Oloka-Onyango, Makerere University, 16th August 2007) 
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The transition process to multiparty politics has been especially difficult due to the fact that 
President Museveni practically had a twenty-year head start for campaigning.  It can be 
claimed that the level playing field for the election was uneven, biased and in favor of the 
NRM. (Twesiime 2003; Nassali 2004; Kiiza, Makara et al. 2008; personal interviews) The 
prevailing conviction among the representatives of academia and opposition is that one of the 
main reasons for Museveni reelection was that the Movement structures were still intact from 
grass-roots up to the national level while the incumbent possesses decentralized management 
skills as well as pressure groups in place to mobilize people. Chris Opio from UPC explains 
the historical background of this strong prevalence of NRM in rural areas when the opposition 
party activities have been banned and restricted to their headquarters for twenty years: 
 
“We [political parties] were not allowed to do political activity in the countryside, at 
the grassroots, but we were allowed to make press statements within the headquarters. 
One of the biggest problems that we have had as a political party is that whereas we 
were doing some politics at the headquarters, the grass-root was cut off from us. So, 
NRM had a monopoly of the grass-root.” (Chris Opio, UPC, 7th February 2008) 
 
The Movement with the rural state infrastructure behind it saved a lot of costs for the party 
and gave it a great strategic advantage. Mahmood Mamdani claims the Resistance Councils 
(RCs)328 were deployed as instruments of the state to hamper popular mobilization since the 
Movement gained power in 1986 (see Mamdani 1989; Oloka-Onyango, Tindifa 1991; Okuku 
2002). That, according to Makara et al. (1996) ensured that Movement candidates would be 
able to retain in power thanks to the partisan support of Local Councils. Kiiza, Makara et al. 
(2008) state that it is a big challenge for opposition parties under the multi-party dispensation, 
to undermine this strategic campaign apparatus and to penetrate the local council structures 
that agitate the rural population in support for the NRM (and are practically fused with the 
NRM). As Makara et al. (2008: 277) confirm with respect to the 2006 elections: “The NRM-
driven transition enabled the party in power to control the process. While the 2006 elections 
were competitive from a legal perspective, the weak distinctions between NRM structures and 
resources and the state structures or public resources suggest that the hegemony of the NRM 
continued into the 2006 multiparty era.”  
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6.3.2. Poor Mode of Governance 
“The road to dictatorship is paved with democracy.” (Charles Onyango-Oboo) 
 
The following elements have been named and identified by the interviewed stakeholders and 
secondary literature as being significant signs of poor mode of governance and thus hindering 
the transition towards multiparty democratic dispensation and enabling the opposition to take 
its role: personalization of power and fusion of NRM-O with the state of Uganda329, political 
monopoly and growing authoritarianism330, military structure of the Ugandan state331, misuse 
of the ethnic card332, and finally partisan and poorly organized presidential and parliamentary 
elections of 2006. (Personal interviews, reports333, Kiiza, Makara et al. 2008) As the first four 
of these elements have been established in Ugandan politics for a long time and have been 
extensively dealt with in academic literature, I concentrate on the last one, partisan and poorly 
organized elections; a topic which has, due to its relative recentness, not yet been covered 
broadly. As this study is dealing with the phenomenon of democratization by elections, it is 
more appropriate to look more deeply into this process.  
The interviewed representatives of academia, opposition political parties334 and civil society 
organizations335 as well as the donor community336 understood the course of the last 
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2006 as a demonstration of poor mode of 
governance, as it was according to them partisan337, poorly organized and included rigging338, 
vote buying339, intimidation, harassment, and deliberate delay of amended laws340.  
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“The process of amending laws was deliberately delayed, so that when space 
appeared open for the political party, it was not so valid. Let me put it this way, we 
had a constitution amendment, we had a multi-party system without functioning 
parties. Debates in parliament are delayed, and even when the laws are enacted, the 
president has to sign it. It can’t come out in sufficiently good time, to allow the parties 
to operate and have a presence.” (Prof. Fred Jjuko, University of Makerere, 20th 
August 2007) 
 
Insufficient civic education was perceived by them as being responsible for the fact that 
people did not have enough time to internalize the values of pluralism. At this point it is 
crucial to differentiate between the polling day when elections actually take place and the 
electoral processes being part of the electoral cycle, which are much more comprehensive and 
start long before elections. I argue that the new electoral cycle for the 2006 election began 
immediately after the polling of the previous elections in 2001, and was thus a long-term 
process. International election monitors often fail to recognize this fact and concentrate solely 
on the free and fair conduct of the elections shortly before and at the polling day.341 However, 
as Uganda’s case showed, the decisive planning of President Museveni’s campaign had 
started long before elections took place. (Makara, Tukahebwa, Byarugaba 2003) The EU 
election observation report (2006: 1) states that the 2006 elections “fell short of full 
compliance with international principles for genuine democratic elections, in particular 
because a level playing field was not in place. Despite the adoption of a multi-party system, 
the structures of the Movement systems and its officially sanctioned organs remained intact, 
active and funded by the state throughout the election period.” 
 
The Electoral Commission (EC), which is “mandated under Article 61 to organize, conduct, 
and supervise regular, free and fair elections and referenda” (Electoral Commission 2006: xv) 
failed according to the majority of interview partners its function and was not able to deliver 
the amended acts (allowing political parties to operate, mobilize and hold rallies) in time and 
offer a sufficient civic education program.  
The Electoral Commission does not have credibility among opposition political parties and 
civil society organizations as it is regarded by them as an arm of the Movement and thus 
partisan. They are convinced that the constitutional change to multi-partyism in 2005 was not 
reflected in the composition of the EC, which continues its work in the old composition under 
Movement system from November 2002. The time pressure resulting from the late legislation 
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constrained the establishment of the EC’s operational structures at all levels. “[…]Voter 
education began only two months before the elections, and at the local levels it started a week 
before polling day” (Makara, Rakner, Rwengabo 2008: 102). However, according to 
Professor Kiggundu, the chairperson of the EC, the failures of the EC were partly due to 
inadequate, inconsistent and late funding provided by donors. (Professor Kiggundu Chairman 
of the Electoral Commission, 3rd September 2007) The EU election observation report (2006: 
19) states that both institutions entrusted with the provision of civic education, the EC and the 
UHRC (Uganda Human Rights Commission) lacked the required funds from government to 
conduct comprehensive programs.  
The main opposition presidential candidate, Dr. Kiiza Besigye from FDC (Forum for 
Democratic Change), was accused in several controversial cases (among others rape, treason 
etc.) and brought to court, what limited the time and extent, to which he could conduct 
campaigns in the pre-election period342.  In President Museveni’s campaign he concentrated 
on his achievements of the last twenty years, focusing on education and prosperity for all. (EU 
2006: 25) Additionally, the media coverage of the presidential elections was highly 
imbalanced and uneven to the favor of President Museveni. On the state broadcaster UBC 
TV, President Museveni received 79,7% of overall election related coverage, while Dr. 
Besigye received 11,5%. (EU 2006: 27f)  
 
6.3.3. Shortcomings of Oppositional Forces  
“Political parties are not able to organize, mobilize, reach the people, set up 
branches. They don’t have the capacity, the know-how, it is just, they are there, they 
are registered, established and that’s it. And how to move forward, they do not have a 
clue.” (Maureen Nahwera, SIDA, 23rd August 2007) 
The outline of the two previous hindering elements – tight control of the transition process 
and poor mode of governance – on the way to multiparty political system, lead to the 
assumption that obstacles responsible for the protracted transition in Uganda are caused solely 
by the incumbent forces. To complete the picture, the following two points focus on the 
performance, achievements and failures of Ugandan oppositional forces. As Prempeh (2008) 
argues, the African state continues to be characterized by “untamed” presidential powers and 
the presidency influences the oppositional forces in a variety of ways, and thus the latter 
cannot be studied without reference to the former. Two crucial local groups of stakeholders – 
opposition political parties and civil society organizations and one international group – donor 
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agencies represented in Uganda343 have been selected for analysis. The complex historical 
legacy of Uganda’s politics impacts their mode of institutional functioning and operations as 
well. It is necessary to include these actors into the analysis in order to understand all 
hampering elements on Uganda’s way to multiparty governance. 
 
6.3.3.1. Political Parties  
Political parties in the Ugandan context are according to their own representatives (as well as 
observers from outside) too new, untested and ungrounded to become a real formative 
political force. Their organizational and structural base has become very weak - if existent at 
all - through the twenty years long ban of their activities. (Kiiza, Svasand, Tabaro 2008; Kiiza 
2008; personal interviews) Even though the existence of political parties is no longer 
restricted by the law (since the referendum of 2005) and they could officially form a viable 
opposition, their representatives admit that the efficiency of their playing field is minimized 
by their own weaknesses and their disability to function as real institutions.  
There was agreement among all interviewed stakeholders that political parties in Uganda are 
not stabilized organizations, but rather groups of individuals with no organizational structure 
and often lacking ideology. Their leadership – being the most crucial aspect of effective 
transition – is reputedly not committed enough to the principles of multi-party democracy. 
Due to internal factions and lack of vision the parties are not in the position to present the 
people of Uganda a viable alternative to the current government in office. According to 
interviewed political parties representatives the main challenges for the existence of the 
opposition are currently lack of funding and logistical constraints, which do not allow them to 
sustain offices at the grass-roots level and conduct their work efficiently.  
Political parties’ representatives themselves admit that they have serious problems to 
complete the transition to the multiparty system since they are not capable of organizing, 
mobilizing, or reaching the people and setting up branches outside the capital city of 
Kampala344. The interviewed academics from Makerere University as well as representatives 
of civil society draw further attention to the lack of credibility and legitimacy of the Ugandan 
political parties, as their character is essentially “electoral” and they lack essential resources. 
They point at the fact that these are not grass–roots parties, probably with exception of the 
traditional parties that emerged in response to the needs of the people or to the demands of 
local self-help groups. The political parties appear shortly before elections and disappear 
almost immediately after their unsuccessful performance. The interviewed academics and 
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analysts345 claimed that one of their major failures with respect to communication to their 
voters is that their agenda has not yet been identified, and their message has not yet been 
clearly sent and translated to the people. Uganda’s political opposition parties are apparently 
neither consistent enough to push the alternative issues forward nor willing to make sacrifices 
for it. The internal organization of the political parties is doubtful as well. It is assumed that 
the leadership cadre undertakes all decisions, forcing the ordinary members to implement 
them.  
Political parties often seek the excuse for their own failures in the concept of 
“Movementocracy” and claim their environment is not supportive of their activities and does 
not enable them to obtain sufficient funding for their operations throughout the country. 
(Ssenkumba 2007) Kiiza, Svasand, Tabaro (2008: 219) in their study confirm that “only the 
NRM entered the 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections with an institutional 
infrastructure for mobilizing votes at the local, district, and national levels.” However, many 
of my interview partners were convinced that if the local communities considered the parties 
relevant, no additional funding for their organizational structures would be necessary, as the 
people would contribute and participate voluntarily.  
 
The following section will offer a short analysis of the three main Ugandan opposition parties 
represented in the current 8th Parliament including the biggest opposition party FDC (Forum 
for Democratic Change), and the two so-called traditional parties DP (Democratic Party) and 
UPC (Uganda’s People Congress), present on the political scene since the days of Uganda’s 
independence. Despite the fact that interviews have been conducted also with representatives 
of other political parties active in the political scene, this study will, due to limited space, 
remain constrained to the above mentioned three parties as they play the most important role 
in the oppositional space of political contestation. As oppositional forces constitute the crucial 
concept of this study, the reasons behind their weak performance need to be analyzed and 
explained in more detail. However, the aim is not to offer a comprehensive analysis of the 
three named political parties and their programs, but rather to present a short overview of their 
strategies, tactics and ideological background. In the second part of this section, their 
cooperation strategies, above all the formation of the G6 coalition, its aim, purpose of 
existence as well as achievements and failures will be explored. This overview should help us 
understand the performance of the oppositional forces in the period after the transition from 
no-party to multi-party system of governance in the 2006 elections.  
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6.3.3.1.1. Historical Overview – Ugandan Political Parties 
Before proceeding with an overview of the different profiles of respective political parties in 
current political setting, a short historical background to their political history and 
development is necessary. Makara (2003: 1) claims that a culture of elections has always been 
missing, if not abused or neglected, in the political history of Uganda. He argues that the first 
elections of 1958 to elect representatives to the Legislative Council were boycotted in 
Buganda, whereas the elections of 1961 and 1962 were dominated by ethnic loyalties and 
manipulated in favor of UPC (Mugaju 2000: 20)346, those anticipated for 1967 were 
postponed, and those planned for 1971 were pre-empted by Idi Amin’s military coup. The 
1980 elections that followed the fall of Idi Amin were marked by intimidation of opposition 
and their results were rigged. Mugaju (2000: 16f) argues in accordance that genuine 
competitive multi-party politics have never been practiced before or after independence in 
Ugandan history, despite the periods of existence of multiple political parties and talks of 
“pseudo-multiparty” politics. As Ibingira (1980: 24) argued the critical issue of interest for 
Ugandan political parties before and after independence was “who was to inherit the mantle 
of power from the departing colonialists and what security there would be for each of the 
diverse ethnic groups in the new state.” Mugaju (2000: 17) further claims that “within and 
between the new political parties, the spirit of mutual respect, compromise and moderation, 
which is indispensable to the proper functioning of multiparty democracy was conspicuously 
lacking.” Kabwegyere (1995: 168) mentions the “unwillingness to compromise” as a 
dominant characteristic of Ugandan political scene. As the “final nail in the coffin of 
multipartyism” Mugaju (2000: 21) refers to the politics of “crossing the floor”, which became 
so typical for post-colonial Uganda. Mazrui and Engholm (1969) talk of politics driven be 
careerism, opportunism and irresistible power of state patronage. Between 1962 and 1966 
most of the DP and KY (Kabaka Yekka) members of the National Assembly defected to 
UPC347. (Schicho 2003: 221) After 1964 Uganda became a de facto one-party state, followed 
by an official ban of all opposition parties and detention of their leaders in 1969 during Obote 
I rule. Idi Amin excused his military coup in 1971 claiming that Obote had suppressed multi-
partyism and imposed one-party dictatorship. Amin soon became president for life and 
declared all political parties illegal. These were forced to operate from underground and some 
of them managed to survive through employment of different strategies despite the ban posed 
on their activities. Professor Simba Salim Kayunga from Makerere University explains: 
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“Despite the ban on political parties to compete for political power, the structure and 
the personalities of the traditional parties UPC, DP, and CP [Conservative Party] 
remained intact. The political parties entered the arena of civil society and were 
acting as a formal civil society challenging government on various issues, pushing for 
pluralism.” (Simba Salim Kayunga, Makerere University, 26th February 2008) 
 
Such statements and developments confirm the indispensable role the concept of oppositional 
forces play in non-democratic contexts and/or democratizing societies. To claim that 
opposition to the ruling hegemony of Oboter I, II and Idi Amin rules was not present at all 
would not offer a veritable and fair picture of the activities organized by civil society 
organizations, journalists, professional bodies and academicians who overtook the role of the 
opposition political parties in their absence.  
To Mugaju (2000: 22) the disputed elections of 1980, following Amin’s removal from power 
“broke all the principles and practices of multi-partyism.” Karugire (1988) among others 
claims these were stolen by UPC (Milton Obote’s party) from the opposition DP. Opposition 
politicians were subsequently forced to flee the country or go to the bush as also the future 
leader of the country, Yoweri K. Museveni did. After the rigged elections, Museveni fought 
for five years a guerilla war against Obote before victoriously returning to Kampala, and 
becoming the new president of Uganda in January 1986. After having grasped power, the 
NRM leadership came to the conclusion that multi-party politics was in Uganda’s political 
history one of the principal sources of disunity, conflict and instability. (Mugaju 2000: 23)  
Since 1987 the country has witnessed a series of elections; however, Makara (2003: 1) rightly 
points out that while the frequency of elections has increased, their quality has remained 
contestable. The 1996 and 2001348 elections that followed after President Museveni’s 
protracted stay in power were conducted under the no-party system of governance, which 
means that only individual candidates and not political parties as institutions could have 
contested for offices. It was only for the 2006 elections that the political parties were allowed 
to (re-)organize. The following section will offer an overview of their tactics, strategies, 
successes, failures and efforts to reorganize after a more than twenty-year ban on their 
activities. One of the questions that will try to be answered is if there exists a link between the 
organizational aspect of the parties, their political democratic legacy and tradition and their 
performance in the 2006 elections?  
The following findings are based mostly on the interviews conducted with political party 
representatives and the party chairpersons during my field research. The re-establishment of 
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Uganda’s two traditional parties DP and UPC, as well as the formation of a new political 
entity on the political party landscape, the FDC will be described. The question of interest is 
to find out how do new parties like FDC organize compared to the traditional parties, what is 
their relationship to each other and what is the potential of the traditional and newly created 
opposition parties respectively to succeed in the political struggle against President Museveni.  
Despite the fact that the political parties could organize and conduct legitimately their 
political activities in 2006 the resumption of these activities for both traditional parties, the 
UPC and DP, was difficult for different reasons.  
 
6.3.3.1.2. Democratic Party (DP) 
The official results of the 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections, as parameter of 
measuring parties’ relative strength show that the Democratic Party, founded in 1956, thus 
being the oldest and one of the two main traditional parties on Ugandan political scene lost its 
prominence from the past. The party’s chairman and presidential candidate349 Ssebana Kizito 
obtained only 1,58% of the total valid votes in the 2006 elections. (EU 2006: 34) Both 
traditional parties, DP and UPC350 are convinced to win their votes back and do not believe 
that the results of the 2006 elections reflect the reality on the ground. On the other hand, 
political analysts as well as representatives of other political parties and civil society are 
convinced that the traditional parties have false judgment about their own strength, capacity 
and potential and that they live in the illusion of the past. As the conducted interviews with 
DP representatives351 showed, the party is currently divided along several lines of antagonistic 
positions, the main three ones being ideology, leadership question and level of cooperation 
with other opposition political entities. Kiiza, Svasand, Tabaro (2008: 210) argue that the 
registration process in the run-up to the 2006 elections was affected by internal conflicts 
within the party more than in any other party. These internal factors, combined with the 
general external situation (discussed above) and twenty years ban on political parties activities 
seemed to be of crucial importance for the poor outcome of DP in the elections.  
With respect to the issue of ideology the DP being considered a catholic Baganda party, 
traditionally occupies the center-right position of the ideological scale in Uganda. (see e.g. 
Mugaju 2000; Okuku 2002; Schicho 2003:220) However, with the emergence of the party 
youth-wing UYD (Uganda Young Democrats) an ideological discrepancy is arising within the 
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party as the DP youth is advocating a leftist position, claiming that in a developing country, a 
right-wing party cannot find its broad-based support. (Interview with Sulaiman Kidandala, 
National organizing secretary of the UYD, 18th February 2008) The ideological confusion 
partly arose due to the level of cooperation with external actors, mostly European political 
parties, both of left- and right-wing orientation352. The ideological discrepancy can be 
explained by the non-existence of political structures and political parties as institutions, 
which led to the fact that the respective individuals in place decided about the ideological 
orientation of the party. When asked about the current ideology of the party, its leader 
Ssebana Kizito explained in an interview it is “truth and justice.”  
The second internal division line arose due to the question of leadership. The party is lacking 
not only financial, but also human resources. The former party chairman Paul Ssemogerere 
overstayed in power as the ban on political party activities disabled to call a National 
Delegates Conference, which is according to DP’s constitution the only eligible body to make 
a change within the leadership structures of the party. In November 2005, immediately after 
the new PPOA (Political Party and Organization Act) was made operational on the ground, 
the National Delegates Conference of the party elected Ssebana Kizito as its new leader. 
Kizito was seen as the best transitional candidate at that time, as he was economically 
independent and brought substantial financial resources for the pre-election campaign from 
his private business activities. Additionally, he acted as the Mayor of Kampala and thus had 
sufficient personal resources. Rakner and van de Walle (2009: 222) describe the mobilization 
of resources, both at personal and financial level, as one of the opposition strategies to 
overcome their electoral weaknesses. They claim that the tactics of the opposition is to seek to 
get candidates elected to office at the sub-national level as a platform, from which to compete 
at the national level. “Control of mayoral office provides significant resources for the party 
faithful as well as a core base of supporters, both of which are sure to prove very useful when 
the time comes to compete for national office.” Kizito also served as the treasurer of the 
previous DP leader Paul Ssemogerere and therewith represented an element of change and 
continuity at the same time, the later being of significant importance to the majority of DP 
representatives during the uncertain transitional period. However, some of the DP members 
claim Kizito was not elected on fair grounds and are not satisfied with his performance. Many 
wish(ed) for a younger presidential candidate from the North of the country in order to expand 
the electoral base of the party and move it beyond the boundaries of the Buganda Kingdom, 
the traditional base of the DP. They back their arguments on the low popularity of the leader, 
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who in the national presidential election polled only 1.6 % of the votes, and even in his best 
district, Moroto, only 4,4% of the population voted for him. (Kiiza, Svasand, Tabaro 2008: 
211) 
The third division line within the party, as generated from the conducted interviews, touches 
upon the issue of cooperation with other opposition political parties353.  The more progressive 
DP members favor cooperation with FDC and other oppositional parties in order to build a 
stronger block against President Museveni, the more traditional wing of the party prefers to 
act as an individual force and revive the lost strength from the past.  
Beside the problem of internal factions, the party is struggling with financial and logistical 
constraints provided for by the legal framework in the country. DP is according to its 
members financed by personal contributions of the MPs, whereby each DP MP contributes 
100.000 Shillings per month. Other forms of regular contributions or funding are practically 
non-existent. The party does not collect any membership fees. It tries to sell party cards for 
the symbolic sum (of 1.000 Shillings each); however, they are rather difficult to sell as 
President Museveni’s NRM-O is giving the party cards to the electorate for free. DP is getting 
additional forms of support from foreign civil society organizations (such as the German KAS 
and the British Westminster Foundation) in terms of organizing training, workshops, 
seminars, as well as from the Ugandan Diaspora community predominantly from the UK and 
the USA.  
As Rakner and van de Walle (2009: 222) point out, another strategy of opposition to increase 
their legitimacy is to “abandon traditional clientelistic approaches in favor of a mobilizational 
political rhetoric, which compensates for their relative inability to compete with the 
government party on material resources and improves their reputation.” The DP used several 
argumentation strategies in the 2006 elections in order to win (back) its voter base from the 
past. As it is the oldest party on the Ugandan political scene it appealed to its party tradition, 
political legacy and democratic record. However, this strategy did not become as influential, 
like for example in the case of Ghana’s NPP, as the DP could not have appealed to any 
democratic achievements or ruling performance as during its whole existence the party has 
only operated as an opposition party. Trying to get the best out of the given situation, the 
political rhetoric of DP is thus to point to the “stolen” election of 1980, which DP allegedly 
won, the victory was, however, taken by Milton Obote’s UPC. The fact that DP never 
managed to gain power serves at the same time as a rhetorical excuse to turn the inefficiency 
of the party into a positive light. The party claims to be the only peaceful party in a country, in 
which the rule of the gun and force are necessary attributes if one wants to gain the incumbent 
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seat. Kiiza, Svasand, Tabaro (2008: 215) quote one DP representative thinking the DP has the 
best chances to succeed among the voters nowadays as the party members did not have “blood 
on their hands.” DP thus distances itself from all other political parties in pointing to their 
violent means of getting into power and finding a niche, which would set the party apart and 
bring it more votes. However, the combination and employment of the various strategies did 
not seem to bring the wishful fruits – the attainment of the ruling position – which is mainly 
to be ascribed to the several internal divisions within the party described above.  
 
6.3.3.1.3. Uganda Peoples’ Congress (UPC) 
UPC, the second of the two traditional Ugandan parties analyzed here, was established on 9 
March 1960 by the later first Prime Minister and subsequent President Milton Obote. UPC 
was the dominant partner in the UPC – Kabaka Yekka coalition that formed the government 
in 1962 after independence. After the collapse of the coalition in 1964, the UPC remained in 
power and ruled until Idi Amin overthrew Obote in 1971. In 1980, UPC with Obote 
reassumed power and remained in the presidential seat until his second overthrow in 1985 by 
Yoweri K. Museveni, which forced him into exile in Zambia where he died in 2005.  
UPC is a party with a left-wing ideology, associated with the Protestant religion and strong 
voter base in the Northern parts of the country as opposed to Buganda hegemony. Similar to 
the DP, the party is characterized by several internal cleavages, which are responsible for the 
poor outcome of the 2006 elections, in which Miria Obote, the widow of Milton Obote, 
gained 0,83% of the total votes in the presidential election. (EU 2006: 34) The interviewed 
UPC representatives354 identified various levels of divisive factions, which, for simplicity 
reasons, have been grouped into three main categories: the leadership question, the 
headquarters versus grass-roots division line and lastly the diverging positions of ex-UPC 
members (liberal faction) and UPC faithful adherents (traditional pro-Obote faction). 
Again, similar to the DP, the party continues to be ruled by the old cadres, members of the 
headquarters of the party who became its leaders during the time of the ban on the political 
parties’ activities. These members were not elected through the primaries as party activities 
were prohibited, but were appointed by the chairman of the party. When UPC re-registered 
for the 2006 elections in the year 2005 it was still operating under its 1970 constitution  
(Kiiza, Svasand, Tabaro 2008: 216), whose main characteristic was strong centralization of all 
powers in the hands of the president of the party. The party members, dissatisfied with the 
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internal undemocratic structures and procedures, left UPC and became independent 
candidates or decided to join other political parties (including NRM). Many MPs who left the 
party talk for the fact that in UPC the founder of the party is the owner of the party. The 
chairmanship seems to follow family lines, with Miria Obote (the widow of late Milton 
Obote), being the current chairperson and James Akena (the son of Milton Obote) being one 
of the party’s leading personalities and earned disagreement from critics of the party. Miria 
Obote was, according to Kiiza, Svasand, Tabaro (2008: 221) (findings also confirmed in my 
interviews with “critical” UPC representatives), elected primarily on the base of the strong 
personality cult of Obote as party founder. In the end, however, this strategy did not pay off, 
and led to an electoral failure combined with UPC’s organization and mobilization capacities, 
which turned out to be very limited.  
 
UPC’s argumentation strategy in order to enhance its legitimacy and competitiveness is based 
on the consistent and coherent left-wing ideology of the party. As it is the only meaningful 
left-wing party on the Ugandan political scene, it claims to be closest to the people. The 
argumentation is founded on party members’ certainty that only a left-wing party can 
understand the development needs of the broad population in a developing country. Another 
political rhetoric strategy of the UPC to broaden its voter base is the claim that the party has 
the broadest national character among all Ugandan parties, thus distancing itself from other 
political parties who are, according to UPC, based on sectarian tendencies. An interesting 
finding with respect to employed strategy is that UPC did not try to appeal to its political past, 
historical legacy and party tradition. The assumption is that abandonment of this, otherwise 
very popular strategy, lies in the disputed democratic credentials of the party of Obote I and 
Obote II periods, during which the party was accused of abuse of human rights, ban of the 
political party activities, rigging elections and other undemocratic practices. This mistrust 
further combined with the fact that the employed strategies were not convincing enough to the 
electorate resulted in UPC’s poor electoral outcome.  
 
6.3.3.1.4. Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) 
An additional problem for the survival of the traditional political parties as political 
institutions is the emergence of relatively new body, FDC (Forum of Democratic Change) in 
2003, which occupied the available oppositional space and gained within shortest possible 
time the most prominent position. FDC was originally a coalition of three groupings: the 
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Reform Agenda (RA), the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (PAFO)355 and the National 
Democratic Forum (NDF). The president of the biggest opposition party Forum for 
Democratic Change (FDC), Dr. Kizza Besigye, is a former close ally and ideology maker of 
the Movement, often being referred to as a “clone” of Museveni and splitting from the 
President because of personal disputes. The members of his political party are often referred 
to as the “externalized faction of the Movement” or “a coalition of top hard-core Movement 
cadres”. (Anonymous source, 14th August 2007) Kiiza, Svasand, Tabaro (2008: 227) talk of a 
coalition “hastily put together for the purpose of defeating Museveni.” The biggest merit of 
Dr. Besigye in the eyes of his voters seems to be his military past. (personal interviews; Kiiza, 
Svasand, Tabaro 2008) Dr. Besigye was considered to be a front-runner of the opposition of 
the 2006 elections as he contested already the 2001 elections and won 29% of the votes. From 
2001 elections until 2005 he was in exile in South Africa, which hampered a smooth 
registration of the party and delayed the organization of its activities.  
 
Both DP and UPC representatives are convinced they will gain their votes back as FDC’s 
high results achieved in the 2006 elections are only a misconception of the situation. 
According to them this was demonstrated by the fact that Dr. Besigye gained 37% of the total 
votes in the presidential elections; however, his party FDC only 12% in the parliamentary 
election. This result can be interpreted as a continuation of the individual merit system and 
personal credits of Dr. Besigye as a former military man. According to Kiiza, Svasand, 
Tabaro (2008: 223) the party appears to have focused on presidential elections and paid little 
attention to parliamentary elections due to court battles and lack of time needed to open local 
party branches and to institutionalize the party across the country. The military past, former 
close connection to President Museveni and ethnic origin of the leader was used in the 
campaign of the 2006 elections as the main argumentation strategy of FDC:  
 
“Number one, the only thing how we can defeat NRM is to cause a split within their 
ranks through ethnic politics. Kizza Besigye is a Banyankole, or he is a Westerner, he 
is going to split NRM, two, he is a soldier. These were not really national issues, but 
very narrow based issues.” (Awori Aggrey, UPC, NRM, 11th February 2008) 
 
Paradoxically, FDC claims to be different from traditional political parties as it does not 
derive its mandate from sectarian politics based on ethnicity and religion. Here, the fact that 
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the party is newly established and thus does not have a trace and institutional legacy in 
Uganda’s political history, where political parties have been portrayed as sectarian divisive 
institutions, seems to have an advantage with respect to the voters. This political rhetoric 
strategy of being “the new force” on the political scene was used very extensively during the 
pre-election campaign. According to Kiiza, Svasand, Tabaro (2008: 203), differences in party 
formation in Uganda are reflected in differences in party structures. The party statutes of UPC 
and DP as traditional parties will thus differ from the other parties as the time and context of 
formation (1950s) is substantially different from the time the NRM or FDC were formed. The 
parties, their organization and structure, as well as formal rules and practices are thus 
profoundly affected by the context of their formation and the way the parties evolved. The 
older political parties are likely to be influenced by their previous history as they carry with 
them an established structure and a tradition of political work. The main weakness of FDC, 
despite the fact that it is currently the biggest opposition player on the ground, seems to be the 
party’s composition as its members356 are either a mix of former NRM, DP, and UPC 
members or young and inexperienced newcomers who spent their whole life under the no-
party system and have little knowledge about the functioning and principles of multi-
partyism. The party, due to the quickness and purpose of its establishments, as well as 
composition of its members lacks any grass-roots structures, party legacy, tradition and a 
coherent ideology. As Alice Alaso from FDC put it in an interview: 
 
“We will recruit anybody who will buy our policies, and party manifesto and platform, 
whether it is from the ruling Movement, or post-independence parties, we have no 
problem”. (Alice Asianut Alaso, FDC, 10th August 2007) 
 
Kiiza, Svasand, Tabaro (2008: 212) confirm with their findings that “the overwhelming 
objective uniting the new party was the struggle to unseat the incumbent president.”  
 
Very interesting is the reaction of representatives of opposition political parties when 
confronted with the question on lacking ideologies. During the interviews, the standard 
answer varied between two poles: either that the ruling NRM does not have any ideology as 
well, which means that there is no need for the opposition to have some or that after the end 
of the Cold War, the era of ideologies is over, and the political parties in developing countries 
must respond to day-to-day development issues, and not to “distant” ideologies in order to 
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appeal to electorate. All of the major political parties in Uganda developed election 
manifestos357. The analysis of these has shown that the opposition manifestos are from a large 
part devoted to criticism of the NRM government. The major differences between the parties’ 
manifestos are to be found in governance rather than in economic issues. However, Kiiza, 
Svasand, Tabaro (2008: 226) rightly point out, as their statement was confirmed also by my 
field research, that the issues in the various parties’ programs did not play a significant part in 
the campaign itself as the presidential campaign was completely dominated by an anti-
Museveni strategy among the opposition parties.   
FDC is, as the remaining opposition parties, facing severe financial constraints as it is 
financed only by individual contributions of its MPs, with each MP contributing 250.000 
Ugandan Shillings on monthly basis. Rakner and van de Walle (2009: 221) claim in their 
study that in general one of the strategies opposition parties can employ to address the 
systematic funding disadvantage is to engage private sector and business in financing political 
party activities. However, as confirmed to me in interviews with representatives of all 
oppositional political parties, this strategy cannot be applied by Ugandan opposition (or only 
to a very limited access), as the leader of the opposition in the Parliament, explains:  
 
“Our big problem is the funding, the resources. The money has been passed to us in 
the streets covered up in the newspaper because of the fear, with the wish not to 
mention the name, and because immediately the government would know that you 
have supported an opposition party. You will become an enemy, subversive element, 
and you will be targeted immediately.” (Prof. Ogenga Latigo, Leader of the opposition 
in the Parliament, FDC MP, 14th August 2007) 
 
Representatives of all three opposition parties claim that to offer an alternative to President 
Muveseni to the population is difficult, as the opposition itself is not treated as an alternative 
but rather as an enemy. Rakner and van de Walle (2009: 217) argue that in many African 
political systems the role of a legislative opposition is not yet widely accepted. The opposition 
parties claim to be constrained by the legal framework as well as logistical and financial 
circumstances. The NRM was, thanks to its previous privileged position in power, the first 
party to register for the 2006 elections after the ban on political party activities was lifted, and 
was consequently almost a year ahead of FDC, its most serious challenger. Kiiza, Svasand, 
Tabaro (2008: 215) argue that the “NRM […] did the best to undermine the credibility of the 
                                                 
357
 The limited space does not allow for a profound comparative analysis of the different party manifestos. The 
manifestos are accessible on the websites of the respective political parties.  
 210
opposition, associating it with the crimes of past regimes, as well as accusing it of fuelling 
ethnic divisions and even collaborating with rebel organizations such as the People’s 
Redemption Army (PRA). The situation for FDC was even more difficult as it was perceived 
as a serious challenger to NRM. Kiiza, Svasand, Tabaro (2008: 212) claim that “at least 60 of 
the FDC leaders and supporters were detained in prisons, with some of its members spending 
more than two years in detention without trial.”  
The relative weakness of all opposition parties is further demonstrated in their (dis)ability to 
nominate candidates for office in the parliamentary elections. It was only the NRM that 
managed to present a candidate in all but one of the 215 constituencies, followed by the FDC 
with candidates in 127 constituencies and the UPC and the DP, with 74 and 68 constituencies 
respectively. (Kiiza, Svasand, Tabaro 2008: 223) For the traditional parties, the 2006 elections 
thus seemed to be a sound defeat at both presidential and parliamentary level. Not only were 
their presidential candidates ignored by the voters, they were additionally not even able to 
nominate parliamentary candidates in the vast majority of the constituencies. However, here 
not only the internal weaknesses and cleavages within the party must be considered. A 
significant aspect of the weak performance of the opposition is the time delay caused by late 
amendments of the law restricting the possibilities of the opposition to implement 
organizational structures that could penetrate the whole country. Moreover, as Kiiza, Svasand, 
Tabaro (2008: 224) point out, finding candidates willing to run for the opposition in the 
countryside where NRM was particularly strong, posed another significant difficulty. It 
remains especially hard for the opposition candidates to find a meaningful role in the 
communities, and act as credible alternative to the government. African politicians are 
expected to act as representatives and financial providers in their communities. (Rakner, van 
de Walle 2009) Being in opposition is of limited political value because politicians are 
expected to represent and benefit their constituencies with material goods and services (see 
also Ninsin 1998a), which is only very difficult to provide for with the limited access to 
resources they enjoy. As van de Walle (2007) confirmed, individual politicians are more 
likely to gain access to state resources if they associate with the president’s party.  
 
As outcome of this short analysis it can be confirmed that the organizational aspects of the 
parties (including context of establishment), their historical background and own democratic 
or undemocratic credentials, the established structures and interconnections to the grass-root 
levels as well as the selection of strategies during the pre-election campaign strongly 
influence the performance of the opposition in the 2006 elections.  
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The elections outcome show that the newly created party, FDC, performed significantly better 
(37% of the votes for the presidential candidate) than the two traditional parties DP (1,58%) 
and UPC (0.8%). Nevertheless, it cannot be confirmed that these results are to be ascribed to 
the negative image of political parties throughout Uganda’s history and thus contextual 
advantage for a newly created party, or to the fact that the leader of FDC is a former military 
man and close ally of President Museveni. Hence, the traditional parties’ potential to revive 
their strength and re-establish themselves as meaningful entities on Uganda’s multi-party 
political scene further remains unpredictable. 
 
Before proceeding to exploring the cooperation strategies of opposition political parties in 
order to enhance their competitiveness and power position vis-à-vis the government, a short 
note on the high number of independent candidates within Uganda’s 8th parliament must be 
made. To explain and understand opposition weakness, Rakner and van de Walle (2009: 210f) 
investigate three signs of opposition party weakness: Firstly, the relatively small size of 
opposition parties as compared to the ruling party; secondly, the limited durability of the 
opposition, and; thirdly, the independent candidate phenomenon. 
In the course of the 2006 parliamentary elections, independent candidates gained the same 
number of seats as the largest opposition party, FDC. This serves as a confirmation of the 
above stated assumption that the individual merit system is still strongly present in the minds 
of the politicians as well as population despite the introduction of multi-party politics. Rakner 
and van de Walle (2009: 212) identify several individual motivations to be at the root of the 
phenomenon. Firstly, a substantial number of candidates do not think that running as part of a 
party instead of individually increases their chances on winning a seat within parliament. The 
candidates choose to run on their own, count on their own prominence and personal 
popularity within the community as well as their own resources to win. Secondly, a number of 
independents were “forced” to run as individuals, after they sought to run as party members 
but lost the party primaries or were not chosen as the party candidates. Many of the interviews 
revealed that in such a situation the politicians felt betrayed by their party, accused the party 
leadership of being undemocratic and rigging the outcome of the primaries. Dissatisfied with 
the results, they chose to run as independent candidates instead. Paradoxically, the high 
number of independents in Uganda’s parliament is seen as a challenge to functioning multi-
party politics by all interviewed MPs, including the independent ones. The practice is 
perceived by them as a continuation of no-party system of governance and thus the 
continuation of a system, which they fought against for twenty years.  
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6.3.3.1.5. Cooperation Strategies of Opposition Political Parties 
As opposition political parties in Ghana and Slovakia, also the Ugandan political parties 
decided to join their forces before elections in order to build a stronger and more coherent 
opposing block against President Museveni and enhance their competitiveness. The formation 
of the so called G6358 alliance was launched by a political pressure group Free Movement, 
formed in 1998, with the leading figures from Makerere University Fred Jjuko and John 
Barya, who initiated a dialogue between opposition political parties. Fred Jjuko, head of the 
Free Movement explains:  
 
“We said we will accept anybody who wants to create a free political space with 
distinction to the Movement with the aim to pose one common presidential candidate 
representing the opposition. The choice fell on Kiiza Besigye as it was clear that the 
FDC president would get the most opposition votes, mainly thanks to Uganda’s 
military past.” (Professor Fred Jjuko, Makerere University, 20th August 2007) 
 
To John Barya, another leading figure of the Free Movement, the aim of G6 was to remove 
the monolithic system, with the secondary aim to change the government and remove 
Museveni from power. Even if the initiative came from Free Movement, the need for 
cooperation was felt by all political parties. (John Barya, Makerere University, 21st August 
2007) As Peter Walubiri, one of the leading figures of G6 and the proposer of the 
Memorandum of Understanding between the parties explained: “we needed a vehicle, some 
institutional arrangement to coordinate our efforts as the opposition.” (Peter Walubiri, UPC, 
22nd February 2008) 
The unofficial forerunner to the G6-coalition was a DP-UPC coalition for the 1996 elections 
with the aim to confront NRM to create more operational space for the political parties, lift 
the ban and allow them to operate. A common presidential candidate, Paul Ssemogerere from 
the DP was selected and supported also by the UPC. The coalition between the DP and the 
UPC in 1996 was established under the organization of the Inter-Political Forces Cooperation 
                                                 
358
 The original members of the G7 coalition were: RA (Reform Agenda), NDF (National Democratic Forum), 
DP (Democratic Party), UPC (Uganda Peoples Congress), CP (Conservative Party), JEEMA and the pressure 
group Free Movement which initiated the talks. The coalition was later renamed G6, after the merging of the 
RA, the NDF and PAFO (parliamentary forum composed of individuals) to form a new political force and the 
strongest opposition party FDC (Forum for Democratic Change). PAFO was obliged to merge with the Reform 
Agenda, as the G7 arrangement did not want to promote individuals as part of the agreement but rather 
established political parties representing institutions, in order to counterbalance the individual merit system 
introduced by President Museveni.  
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(IPFC) as political parties were still banned. (Paul Ssemogerere, DP former President, 21st 
February 2008) 
In 2001 elections, UPC once again supported the idea of joined forces and Besigye’s 
candidature for the presidency with the only condition being the allowance of political parties 
to operate in case Besigye should win and remove Museveni. Despite Besigye’s failure to 
remove Museveni (mostly to uneven level playing field and unfair conduct of the electoral 
process), the opposition parties decided to cooperate in a more formalized manner. 
G6 was formed in 2002 after the 2001 (for the opposition unsuccessful) elections. Free 
Movement representatives acted as the coordinators of the cooperation between the parties. 
The activities of G6 included among others the initiation of dialogue with the government. 
For this purpose, fourteen members formed a committee, encompassing two representatives 
from each political grouping involved. The talks, which were led by Professor John Barya, 
did not bring a fruitful solution as the two sides, government and opposition, disagreed on all 
points of the program, including the time plan for the reform and lifting the ban on the 
activities of the political parties. The negotiations faced disagreements on procedures, as the 
government side insisted on chairing the meetings; whereas, the opposition proposed a neutral 
secretary leader.359 G6 representatives insisted on making the agreements binding; however, 
the government merely accepted them as an advisory. Subsequently, government decided to 
create fake or alternative parties, with which it initiated dialogue to gain legitimacy. The 
dialogue lost its purpose as none of the main political parties participated in it anymore and 
the fake parties disappeared soon after the talks were finished. 
One of the challenges of the G6 agreement and cooperation is the fact that the aim and 
purpose of its existence differs with respect to an individual interview partner or specific 
political grouping. The answers of the various politicians differed slightly and included 
reasons such as: to form one presidential candidate against the government; to formalize the 
opposition; to consolidate the entire opposition as a homogenous body; to break the 
monolithic political system; to replace the no-party with the multi-party system; to open up 
the political space; to remove President Museveni from power; to form a force that would be 
in a position to win the elections; to dismantle the Movement and force the government to let 
the political parties operate; to cause change and bring the country back to political pluralism; 
to fight for principles of multi-partyism together. Despite the fact that the purpose of creating 
G6 might seem very similar, if not identical, there is a slight difference, which caused the 
actual disintegration of G6 before the 2006 elections.  
                                                 
359
 As was the case in Ghana, where such talks IPAC (Inter-Party Advisory Committee) were moderated and 
chaired by the Electoral Commission.  
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The purpose of G6 has for some of its members (mostly the traditional parties DP and UPC) 
been achieved with the opening up of the political space and official return of Uganda’s 
political system towards a multi-party dispensation. For these two traditional parties it was 
obvious that the 2006 elections brought an opportunity to contest as individual parties with 
the aim of trying to revive their party structures and voter base. At the same time a revival of 
individual political parties was further considered indispensable in order to revive multi-
partyism as a whole. (James Akena, UPC, 8th February 2008) Therefore, in the end FDC and 
its main presidential candidate received support only from the two smaller parties CP and 
JEEMA from the G6 establishment as well as the pressure group Free Movement. DP and 
UPC, in their efforts to revive their past glory, presented their own presidential candidates, 
Ssebana Kizito and Miria Obote respectively, and created divisions among the electorate 
votes for opposition.  
As neither a legally binding framework of cooperation had been established nor an agreement 
had been signed between the individual parties, the decision to leave the agreement was left 
with the political parties. The only document ever presented was the Memorandum of 
Understanding of which the two traditional parties, DP and UPC withdrew from signing in the 
last moment.  
The positions for the disintegration of G6 are divergent with respect to individual political 
parties. For the FDC representatives the main purpose of the G6 coalition was not 
accomplished, as the ultimate goal to them was the removal of President Museveni from 
power. To all interviewed FDC and JEEMA representatives the G6 coalition failed because of 
the attitude of the two traditional political parties, DP and UPC, who were for their selfish 
reasons (according to FDC) not ready to support the newly created strongest opposition party 
and its candidate. The UPC perceived itself as the legitimate follower of President Museveni 
as it had already been in power twice. DP on the other hand, never being in government, 
considered itself historically a legitimate opposition and up to this moment remains 
unprepared to share the oppositional space of political contestation with the newly created 
FDC encompassing also former NRM members.  
 
From the side of the interviewed UPC representatives, the cooperation failed because of the 
confusion FDC created among the electorate with its false statements about a signed 
agreement of cooperation between the parties presenting Kiiza Besigye as the would-be-
president and Miria Obote as the would-be-prime minister. UPC representatives further claim 
that they withdrew from signing the agreement as both, the issues at stake and ideological 
orientation of the grouping, were not clear enough. (James Akena, UPC, 8th February 2008) 
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UPC as the only left-wing party within the establishment felt, according to its own 
representatives, disadvantaged and to them the project was doomed to fail from the very 
beginning due to strong ideological differences. Additional confusion has been brought by the 
fact that all apart from the young political party representatives in Uganda tend to circulate 
between parties, often returning to their original party later on. Originally, they were members 
of the traditional parties UPC and DP, later they all became (by force) members of the 
Movement, and later returning to their original political bases after the lifting of the ban or 
splitting from the Movement as it was the case with FDC. These procedures create significant 
tensions within parties as it might occur that former NRM, DP, and UPC adversaries are to be 
found within FDC as future allies.  
However, to external analysts and observers it was the internal disputes within individual 
parties and the desire to get to power that disabled the cooperation and support for a common 
presidential candidate eventually causing the break-up of the G6 coalition.  
The coalition continues to exist on a sporadic issue-to-issue basis after the retreat of the two 
parties (DP and UPC), but is practically non present and active on the ground. Common 
strategies of cooperation might include taking the government to the court, raising protests 
and appealing to international community, organizing capacity building and training programs 
in cooperation with international NGOs, meeting with civil society organizations and 
religious organizations, cooperating with independent media, and issuing joint statements on 
certain issues. (Okello Okello Livingston, UPC, 12th February 2008; Peter Walubiri, UPC, 
22nd February 2008) 
However, despite the failing attempt to remove President Museveni, the coalition is perceived 
as successful by the majority of the interviewed politicians as it put a significant pressure on 
the government to open up the political space and forced it to remove the PPOA (Political 
Parties and Organization Act) of 2002 in 2005.  The efforts were combined with the pressure 
from the international community as well as internal opposition from the Movement itself. 
However, many still see it as a failure, as the opposition did not manage to agree on a 
common presidential candidate and subsequently remove President Museveni from power. G6 
thus contributed to the change of the system, but not to change of the regime.  
 
It is interesting to observe that the opposition politicians themselves have little faith in the 
strength and maneuver possibilities of their own parties. They rather tend to hope and wait for 
disintegration within NRM ranks instead of taking a pro-active stance. The most probable 
cause for ousting President Museveni to them seems to be the internal struggles and 
discrepancies as well as growing authoritarian tendencies of the chairman within NRM-O. 
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Even political representatives from other opposition political parties than FDC, who 
supported the presidential candidature of Kiiza Besigye do not trust in the possibility of 
Besigye bringing along the change.  
Since the 2006 elections and the opening of political space, two parallel developments on the 
political scene can be observed. On the one hand, a mushrooming of political parties360 is 
taking place; on the other hand, none of these parties were able to field candidates in all 
Uganda’s constituencies and thus pose a serious challenge to President Museveni. As opposed 
to the high number of political parties we can observe an increasing process of centralization 
of power with NRM’s absolute majority in parliament as well as in the presidential race, in 
which President Museveni gained 59% of the total votes. The fact that the term-limits were 
removed, constitution amended and President Museveni re-elected for the third time, is 
another indicator that a one-party dominated political system is currently entrenching itself on 
Uganda’s political scene despite the official return to multi-party politics. After having 
analyzed the shortcomings of, and strategies employed by the opposition political parties, the 
role and performance of civil society, another crucial actor in the oppositional space of 
political contestation will be further explored.  
 
6.3.3.2. Civil Society361 
“You have to try to open that space. It is your function, you operate within that arena. 
For me, the civil society hasn’t done enough to push that space. They are better 
embraced in the context of service delivery, but not so much in the context of 
pressure.” (Professor Oloka-Onyango, Makerere University, 16th August 2007) 
 
All four groups of interviewed actors share the view that civil society could act as a 
complementary institution to political parties towards transition to increased political 
pluralism.362 However, at the same time interviewees admit that civil society in Uganda has 
not taken up the political agenda sufficiently. Civil society organizations dealing with politics 
have been, according to Oloka-Onyango, very “coy, reluctant and unwilling” to become 
engaged in the debates on political issues. Oloka-Onyango (2006: 3) claims that after 
independence, “a lot of the civil society actors were either transformed into state agencies 
                                                 
360
 For the course of the 2006 elections, 33 political parties have been registered (Kiiza, Svasand, Tabaro 2008: 
206f). Representatives of the main opposition political parties accused the government of creating these parties 
just for the sake of increasing its legitimacy.  
361
 For an extensive report on the position of civil society organizations in Uganda, their strengths, weaknesses, 
values, structures as well as operational context and environment see report by CIVICUS (2006). 
362
 On the theoretical background and the role of civil society in democratic theory and its contribution to 
democratic transitions as well as consolidation of democracy see Fatton (1992); Bratton (1994); Harbeson 
(1994); Foley, Edwards (1996); Hadenius, Uggla (1996); Bratton, van de Walle (1997); Diamond (1999). 
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(such as the cooperatives); they were nationalized (as with the trade unions) or banned 
outright (as with the newspapers)”. For Uganda’s civil society the year 1986 meant revival of 
activities, which can be partly explained as a reaction against repression and partly as 
benevolence of the new regime of President Museveni after the rule of Idi Amin and Milton 
Obote. NRM realized the strategic importance of civil society revival (Oloka-Onyango 2006: 
3) as this was important and useful “not only in terms of allowing middle class frustrations to 
find a non-violent outlet, but also to appease the international community and the ‘donors’ 
who are a very influential part of it.” Another important factor of consideration was that the 
government realized that it would not be able to provide the country with all social services 
necessary. The organizations thus have primarily development character (Dicklitch 1996, 
1998; de Coninck 2004) and their main area of concentration is service delivery (women, 
youth and children are strong areas of influence) because in this field, they act in cooperation 
with the state (which is still lacking the capacity to deliver) and not in opposition to it. (Tripp 
1998, 2000; Bazaara 2000; Kjaer, Olum 2008) The contemporary characteristics of Ugandan 
civil society is according to Oloka-Onyango (2006: 3) its orientation towards service delivery 
and development activities; a donor-driven agenda; distance from the local communities; a 
“softly-softly” approach towards government; apolitical stance towards issues, and non-
effectiveness. All interview partners from opposition political parties agreed that the political 
active civil society is either weak or allied and fused with the government structures. To Alice 
Alaso (FDC MP, 10th August 2007) the relationship of opposition political parties and civil 
society is “a partnership of weak, intimidated people.” This opinion was shared by the vast 
majority of interviewed actors. 
The explanatory reasons for this attitude of “a culture of fear and political apathy” (Dicklitch, 
Lwanga 2003: 482; Oloka-Onyango 2000) have to be searched for in the historical 
development of civil society in Uganda and the legacy of colonialism as well as the following 
repressive regimes.363 With NRM coming to power, “civil society activity in Uganda virtually 
exploded” (Oloka-Onyango, Barya 1997: 120); however, the NRM government tolerated and 
encouraged solely apolitical and service-oriented organizations, as it did not accept the 
possibility of being challenged politically. (Bazaara 2000; Katusiimeh 2005; Kjaer, Olum 
2008) 
Even if the political realm of civil society organizations is not in direct opposition to 
authoritarian practices of the NRM and it acts rather as a watch-dog, the government side 
continues to label many civil society organizations as “opposition” and tends to repress 
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 See Mamdani (1993); Bazaara (2000); Kabwegyere (2000); Katusiimeh (2005). 
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confrontational NGOs, media, anti-corruption groups, election monitoring bodies, and human 
rights groups. (Kjaer, Olum 2008; personal interviews) 
The idea that one could be colored politically constructs fear among Uganda’s civil society 
organizations. (personal interviews; Dicklitch, Lwanga 2003; Coninck 2004) That is why the 
majority of my interview partners claimed that civil society in Uganda often tries (or is 
forced) to remain apolitical, or in other words does not try to challenge the government and 
other power stakeholders in their positions. The NRM strengthens its position with a set of 
legal practices to successfully accomplish the “ritual of democracy” and thus appear credible 
while obeying the principle of the rule of law. Bazaara (1999: 66) notes: “[T]he NRM has 
made arrangements so as to ensure that NGOs remain basically ‘economistic’ organizations 
whose activities cannot rise into politics. This has been accomplished by enacting the 1989 
NGO Registration statute allowing no NGO to operate until it is registered at the NGO 
Registration Board (Ministry of Internal Affairs).” Interviewed representatives of civil society 
organizations see the legal framework in Uganda as an obstacle to their activities, with the 
NGO Bill restricting their operational space.  
 
Other problems faced by civil society organizations, which became apparent in the interviews, 
are that civil society organizations are very often perceived as a source of income and some of 
them are developing into an industry as a means of survival. The donor-driven agenda 
constrains their activities and forces them to follow the rules set from above. (Mamdani 
1995a; Bazaara 2000; Kjaer, Olum 2008) Many do not use their own comparative advantage 
but concentrate their activities on specialized areas of work set by donors without diversifying 
their resources and stretching their capacity. (Robinson, Friedman 2005; Oloka-Onyango 
2006; personal interviews) 
There is agreement among interviewed oppositional forces that civil society organizations in 
Uganda could play a significant role in fostering democratization, as they might be able to 
mobilize the population around programs, advocate for particular positions or even oppose the 
government on some issues.  Their main area of delivery in a transition process, according to 
the secondary literature should become a proper civic education program. (Hadenius, Uggla 
1996; Kjaer, Olum 2008) However, leaders of two organizations officially responsible for 
civic education program in Uganda, Aliro Omara of UHRC (Uganda Human Rights Council) 
and Professor Kiggundu of EC (Electoral Commission) both confirmed in interviews that the 
funding from the side of the government (and donors) is not sufficient to provide civic 
education activities. Not only that the population does not seem to understand the functioning 
of the multi-party democracy, even the politicians themselves do not seem to be aware of the 
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basic principles of multi-party contestation as they joined the political life under the 
Movement system and the individual merit system is still more appealing to the majority of 
them mostly for reasons of personal benefit. As Rakner and van de Walle (2009) argue, 
political positions are often route to business opportunities, such as licenses, contracts with 
the state and donors. The predominance of personal ambition over policy platforms may be a 
driving force in the fragmentation of the party system.  
The civil society representatives themselves see the main contributions of their organizations 
in raising awareness of the population, shaping, identifying and generating debates on 
political issues, making research and providing additional, data-based information, monitoring 
elections, issuing reports and providing analysis as well as evidence-based material, and 
issuing annual reports on the performance of the government and its agencies364.  
There is a common agreement among the interviewed partners, that the strongest and most 
influential role within the Ugandan civil society is occupied by churches followed by 
independent media. (see also Oloka-Onyango 2000) Reverend Kanon Caiso, executive 
director of Uganda Joint Christian Council and leader of the domestic election monitoring 
group DEMGROUP explains the prominent position of the church with its historical role, 
great influence over and respect within the population, special position in terms of engaging 
the government and, above all, the inclusion into a global ecumenical network and close 
cooperation with the donors. Churches and religious based organizations are the only bodies 
of civil society in Uganda having at their disposal the relevant resources (both personal and 
financial), as well as the infrastructure (both at the local and global level) to provide for civic 
education and election monitoring activities. DEMGROUP, besides other activities enhancing 
the credibility and legitimacy of the opposition, published parallel results of voter tabulation 
during the 2006 elections, which helped to build confidence in the election results. (EU 2006: 
34)  
 
In the past in many cases the independent media overtook the role of the political opposition 
during the ban on political parties and should thus historically have a more prominent role 
within the space of oppositional forces. However, as Oloka-Onyango (2006) claims, since the 
media’s main function is to produce profit, the extent to which the media can be described as 
the voice of civil society or of the people is debatable. To interviewed political party 
representatives they are too intimidated to speak out loud and do not challenge the regime in 
Uganda as such. They rather concentrate on day-to-day issues such as corruption, abuse of 
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 Generated from interviews with representatives of NGO Forum, FHRI, HURINET, UJCC, Deniva and others. 
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human rights, but do not tend to put the credibility of Museveni’s regime into question as 
strongly as Ghanaian or Slovak media.  
 
The role of traditional authorities in Uganda appears to be of less importance than for instance 
in Ghana. (See also Bratton, Mattes, Gyimah-Boadi 2005: 80) In Uganda the traditional 
authorities are understood as an undemocratic institution, which might be also the result of the 
negative discourse about their role in a democratic society by all three major presidents 
Obote, Amin, and Museveni. 80% of the Ugandan population stated in the Afrobarometer 
survey that the traditional authorities are not appropriate to their contemporary needs365. 
President Museveni promised the restoration of the kingdoms, after they have been abolished 
by the preceding presidents; however, his motivation was, according to Kasfir (2000), limited 
to win votes from Buganda Kingdom on his side. Besides the churches and media, there are 
only some366 isolated advocacy NGOs, research institutions and activist groups, which are 
vocal enough and have been mentioned in conducted interviews as having influence within 
the oppositional space of political contestation. 
 
Despite the positive image of civil society created mostly by the international community, the 
task to manage the agenda of crucial importance (leading the transition to multi-party mode of 
governance and providing for civic education) alone is not imaginable due to the institutional 
and governance weaknesses as well as financial and capacity constraints mentioned above. 
Interviewed partners stressed the importance of involvement and co-governance of several 
actors367 including further international civil society organizations, grass-roots groups, 
development partners, Electoral Commission, parliament and political parties while delivering 
civic education. The majority of them thinks that the mediating role between the political 
parties should be taken by the Electoral Commission as was the case in Ghana or by 
Parliament; however, with the current composition the EC is not trusted by the oppositional 
forces.  
The challenge of political party-civil society cooperation occurs when one tries to identify the 
driving force of the transition process. The civil society representatives would like to see the 
opposition political parties in the leading seat; the political parties vice versa expect the civil 
society to take the first step and organize various activities, which would help them to 
advance their ideas as civil society is donor funded and thus allegedly better equipped to 
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 However, the situation is different in the Kingdom Buganda where the support for traditional rule is higher 
than in other parts of the country. (Bratton, Mattes, Gyimah-Boadi 2005: 80) 
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 These include among others FIDA, FOWODE – Forum for Women in Democracy, HURINET, Deniva, NGO 
Forum. 
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 On theoretical background on interactive form of governance see Kooiman (2003). 
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promote the idea of change. The political parties further await the civil society to lead the 
“change” they preach, as they are afraid of being banned from their activities, being dispersed 
with teargas during campaigns or not allowed to hold rallies at all. Moreover, there seems to 
be great conceptual confusion about the actual role and position of the civil society after the 
official transition from a no-party to multi-party system of governance vis-à-vis the political 
parties. The relation is currently in formative stages as both actors explore in what direction to 
initiate the cooperation. As Wareen Nyamugasira, executive director of NGO Forum and one 
of the leading representatives of civil society in Uganda explains:  
 
“Under the multi-party dispensation confusion has come because many civil society 
organizations were largely de facto opposition in the past. They were the voices of 
descent, of alternatives, the voices that challenged. With the political parties, we have 
not found a mechanism, in which we either create alliances or divisional roles, so that 
we are clear, when the civil society  is talking as the old civil society and when it 
wants to play the same role, as it was when parties were not active.” (Warren 
Nyamugasira, Executive Director of the NGO Forum, 2nd and 4th August 2007) 
 
Civil society is thus recognized by all actors, among others opposition political parties as a 
crucial partner for cooperation, at the same time, however, considered too weak, intimidated 
and oppressed to be able to provide any substantial contribution. What unites some of the pro-
democracy oriented civil society organizations and opposition political parties in the 
oppositional space of political contestation is that they campaign for the same cause: the 
restoration of a multi-party system on the ground and not only in theory and therefore, they 
advocate for change. Their cooperation is in many instances caused by the repressive politics 
and issues at stake are thus open to constant changes and fluctuation of actors between the 
spaces of oppositional and incumbent forces: 
 
“The cooperation is on an issue to issue basis. One day it is the political parties being 
taken to the court, [the] other day it is the press, so we need to stick together.” (Chris 
Opio, UPC, 7th February 2008) 
 
There is a clear coincidence of interests between opposition political parties and other 
oppositional forces as the majority of the people running the NGOs, research institutes, think-
tanks, domestic observation bodies are part of the educated, urban elite and oppose the 
hegemonic way of governance imposed by President Museveni. This means that the political 
 222
parties and civil society are united in their activities and efforts by one common denominator, 
being the oppression by the regime. However, there is no clear division between their roles 
and strategies and that is why their performance does not challenge the incumbent in the 
highest possible manner. 
 
As stated above, the donor community in Uganda plays, besides local stakeholders, a crucial 
role in the transition to the multiparty political system. The next factor identified as slowing 
down the process of pluralism is thus the upwards accountability of government, political 
parties and civil society organizations towards development agencies represented in Uganda.  
 
6.3.4. Upwards Accountability  
“At the superficial level [the donors] talk of democracy, at the private level, they say, 
if Museveni were not there, everything would collapse.” (Professor Sabiti Makara, 
Makerere University, 5th September 2007) 
 
According to representatives of academia, opposition political parties and civil society 
organizations the transition to multiparty political dispensation in Uganda appears even more 
unattainable when the role of the international donor community active in Uganda is taken 
into account.368 The performance of the donor community in Uganda was evaluated rather 
negatively by all interviewed actors, except parts of the ruling party who appreciate the 
contributions of donors to the development of infrastructure. The international community set 
the agenda for transition from no-party to multi-party system as there is currently no 
alternative approach globally then multi-party democracy. However, Hauser (1999:623) 
claims that Uganda was, as opposed to the neighboring countries, not threatened with political 
conditionality on the multiparty issue. In the case of Uganda, donors have opted for a 
“dialogue” rather than coercive methods due to a number of factors including the destruction, 
from which Uganda was recovering, the need to present Uganda as a success story for 
economic liberalization369, and the donors’ need to maintain good relations with Uganda in 
order to pursue their foreign policy goals and the role that President Museveni took on as a 
regional leader. President Museveni has been an ally to the USA government in its relations 
with the government of Sudan. Within the neighboring countries of Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, 
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 Okuku (2002: 27) states that, “[F]rom the early 1990s onward, the international community would tolerate the 
restriction of political rights and abuse of human rights in Uganda as long as the NRM regime pursued and 
encouraged private enterprise.”  
369
 Hauser (1999: 634) claims that “being able to point to an African success story where economic programs 
worked was very important, because failures in other African countries could then be attributed to lack of 
cooperation by recipient governments, rather than to problems with donor’s programs.”  
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Burundi and Kenya, Uganda constitutes an “island of stability in the midst of chaos.” 370 
(Hauser 1999: 634) Museveni also cooperated with Western governments by providing a 
regional hub for logistical support after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. “If donors had openly 
pressured President Museveni on the multiparty issue, a contentious one for him, they would 
have risked losing a valuable partner.” (ibid: 634) 
Hauser (1999: 634-638) identifies several dangers linked to the laissez-faire attitude of the 
donors, being firstly, lack of donor attention to how political problems threaten successful 
economic reforms. She claims that in Ugandan case, the discussion on economic policies 
between NRM government and the donors led to growing alienation and exclusion of 
opposing political forces and subsequently to increased violence. Secondly, she criticizes 
donor emphasis on the institutions of democracy instead of putting attention to managing 
conflict and building a spirit of cooperation in the political arena; thirdly, she points to the 
ways, in which donor foreign policy interests lessened the effect of the pursuit of 
democratization; and lastly, she stresses the inconsistencies in how donors handled their 
support for democratization. The effect of this is that the power dynamics in the country are 
not addressed and underlying political conflicts are not solved or cooperatively managed by 
opposing political forces.  
 
The nature of interests of the donors as well as their inconsistency in promoting rule of law, 
democracy and good governance in Uganda are seen by all actor groups as one of the biggest 
obstacles in order for the development partners to become an agent in the process of 
democratization.371 Professor Kiiza states: 
 
“They [donors] talk democracy, but often times their economic and ideological 
interests are more important than political pluralism in the countries where they 
operate. The interesting thing is that after the elections you get many of these partners 
coming back to support the government, typically as they have been doing. If you say 
this government rigged elections and the rules, there was corruption, the voter 
registers were not appropriated, why should you then say the government is 
legitimate? The process was rigged, the rules were not followed, the opposition was 
harassed, public resources were used from one party, but the conclusion is the 
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 These assumptions have been confirmed to me among others by interviewed representatives of SIDA, 
European Commission, USAID, and British High Commission. 
371
 For the nature of interests of donors in Uganda see also Hauser (1999); Haynes (2001); Okuku (2002); Barya, 
Opolot, Otim (2004); Kanyeihamba (2006). 
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outcome is legitimate.” (Professor Julius Kiiza, Makerere University, 30th August 
2007) 
 
The interviewed donors claimed in their defense that they do not fund the incumbent, but the 
government of Uganda, to support the economic development and institution-building. 
However, they are aware of the fact that there is a grey zone between the NRM party and state 
structures and that it is not possible to draw a cutting line between these two. The channels of 
funding are thus not monitored and it is not transparent how the money is being allocated at 
the local level or between different sectors. The critical voices from civil society, academia 
and oppositional political parties accuse donors of using double standards and selective 
application of values. 
The influence of development partners on Uganda’s policies is visible at various levels, the 
governmental and the non-governmental, as well as the pro-government and pro-oppositional. 
The funds provided to the state budget enable the donors to set the policy agenda. (Nassali 
2004) According to Oloka-Onyango the most revealing effect of the assistance provided by 
the donor community is the fact that it has offered an infrastructure of support for the 
government to retain itself in power and therefore to undermine the accountability of 
government to the people. (Professor Oloka-Onyango, Makerere University, 16th August 
2007) 
President Museveni even sacrificed his left oriented ideology372 for the budgetary support and 
embraced liberal economic policies directed by the World Bank to legitimize his rule and 
prolonged stay in power.  
 
“He is quite calculative. He captured power at the time when the Cold War was 
ending, so that necessitated some strategic shifts. If the Cold War has not ended [sic!], 
he would have presided over a political framework, which is not different from that of 
Castro or Mao.” (Professor Sallie Simba Kayunga, Makerere University, 6th 
September 2007) 
 
Uganda’s Prime Minister and close ally of President Museveni paradoxically agrees and 
admits the inevitability of shifting positions:  
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 On its background see Museveni (1997). 
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 “Yes, experience taught him that he must be clever, because Uganda’s economy was 
diminished, and so it required a lot of assistance to restore the economy.”(Apolo 
Nsibambi, Prime Minister of Uganda, 21st February 2007)  
 
The influence of the donor community represented in Uganda is further visible on the 
performance of oppositional forces. Academia representatives talk of adjustment of the 
policies of all political parties in order not to alienate the donors and win some, at least 
indirect capacity-building support. The effect of this assimilation is, according to them, that 
the ideologies of different parties do not differ and closely resemble each other. Also the non-
governmental level and thus civil society organizations have been affected by programs 
initiated by donors and are currently almost totally dependent on foreign funding.  
Even if the prevailing conviction among all donors active in Uganda is that the lifting of the 
presidential term limits was a wrong approach on the way to multiparty democracy, the donor 
community representatives were not prepared to talk about internal mechanisms and the 
amendment of the constitution.  
 
“There is no more civil war, and there is economic growth, level of civilization 
returning, privatization, freedom of expression. The slightest sound we made, praised 
a lot of excitement in international community. Whatever has happened in this 
country, as long as it does not take us back to what happened twenty years ago, 
international community has been able to tolerate it. That is their biggest problem. 
They put a damn about democratization, but they do not want to hurry the process and 
therefore they spoil the little achievement that is there. They sort of observe and give a 
second chance, the guy is really bad, but he is not as bad as Amin, even if they 
continued trading with him as well.” (Sam Nabaasa, Journalist, Uganda Radio 
Network, 15th August 2007) 
 
Most of the development partners have good relationships with Uganda and the fact that 
President Museveni’s personal balance sheet is not adding to his credibility will not change 
the position of the donor agencies represented in Uganda. (Nassali 2004) Emma Namuli, 
representative of the European Commission in Kampala, confirms: “So much we do not agree 
on certain decisions of the government, as long as the core agreement between EU and the 
government has not been violated, the aid will not be cut.” (Emma Namuli, European 
Commission, 23rd August 2007) 
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The donor community also appreciates the past legacy of President Museveni and currently 
does not see a credible alternative amongst the oppositional forces for him. (Nils Hjorthald, 
DANIDA, 27th August 2007) Many of the donors believe that the country was in ashes, at the 
time, when the movement came into power. They give President Museveni credit on the base 
of historical reasons as they look at the Movement in terms of history and still believe in the 
idea of a “big man”. Partly to blame are also other political parties, which may not have been 
able to convince the donors that they could offer an alternative agenda. (Prof. Sabiti Makara, 
Makerere University, 5th September 2007) 
 
6.3.5. Absence of Culture of Political Tolerance 
“It is not about closing the space; it is about closing the minds.” (Professor Susan 
Muwanga, Makerere University, 15th August 2007) 
 
One of the most striking effects of the political legacy of the Movement system and the last 
obstacle identified by groups of actors and analyzed here, making the transition to pluralistic 
political system more difficult is the absence of culture of political tolerance and of interactive 
governance within the society. Oloka-Onyango perceives a “real absence of the culture of 
pluralism” (Professor Oloka-Onyango, Makerere University, 16th August 2007) as being 
crucial, as civil society organizations, political parties, the Electoral Commission and other 
actors continue behaving in a way that does not reflect that there was an institutional 
transition in politics.  
 
As it became evident from the interviews, interest groups, predominantly political parties 
belonging to different political camps, do not possess the capacity to act together and are 
intolerant to people who belong to different political groups or are holding opposing political 
views. State apparatus serves (almost solely) as a means of accumulating wealth.373 This 
procedure leads to further disempowerment, exclusion and marginalization of antagonistic 
forces from the decision-making process and politization of ethnic lines. However, all the 
signs of poor governance, lacking tolerance and demonizing of the oppositional forces are 
being pushed aside, as President Museveni still profits from the historical turmoil of Uganda’s 
political past: 
 
“The biggest challenge we have in Uganda is that people tend to use the framework of 
Milton Obote or Idi Amin to make a judgment whether things are better or not. We 
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 For background see also point “poor mode of governance”. 
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had 20 years of president Museveni, but we compare what had happened during the 
previous regimes, not what he is actually doing.” (Prof. Ogenga Latigo, Leader of the 
opposition in the Parliament, FDC MP, 14th August 2007) 
 
The practice of politization of ethnicity with roots in colonialism, reproduced and redefined 
over Uganda’s independent history, (Kabwegyere 1974; Mamdani 1999; Okuku 2002) might 
have further reaching consequences as Henry Kasacca, Ugandan representative of “Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung” (FES) points out: 
 
“People are now increasingly raising the questions how can you have the entire high 
commando of the army coming from one area374? The whole issue is becoming a 
familiar affair, because nobody else can be trusted. So what it will promote, is 
mobilizing the rest of Uganda against [Museveni] respectively mobilizing the rest of 
the country against the West. It was like UPC politics, when dealing with Buganda 
issue.” (Henry Kasacca, FES, 3rd September 2007) 
 
The interviewed groups of actors are convinced that despite the official transition to 
multiparty dispensation that took place in 2005, President Museveni is neither ready to assure 
that the oppositional forces have the capacities to challenge him nor that he aims to provide a 
proper civic education program for the population. (Ssenkumba 1998; Nassali 2004; Oloka-
Onyango 2005) Even if the newly adopted laws (Political Parties and Organisation Act 2005 
being the most significant one) allow the political parties to operate, opposition political 
parties are almost entirely confined to bigger cities, as the strategy of the ruling party is to 
limit oppositional activities to urban areas. However, to rely solely on urban support may not 
be successful in a country with a majority of the population living in rural areas. 375 
 
In addition to that, it is interesting to analyze the different positions used in this situation by 
the antagonistic (pro-government and pro-oppositional) forces. Both sides agree that there is 
no real multi-partyism present in the society and thus the transition to pluralistic political 
system is not accomplished and both sides perceive the situation as a problem. However, their 
justification is based on different reasoning and they see the problem-setting from various 
                                                 
374
 President Museveni himself is coming from the Western region and the NRM was built around ethnic groups 
of Banyankole, Baganda and Banyarwanda all coming from South-Western Uganda. The other ethnic groups, 
especially from the North, who were very prominent under the previous governments of Obote I and II and Idi 
Amin feel a sense of marginalization that partly explains the civil war in the North. (See also Okuku 2002) 
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 For patterns of voting in selected districts see Makara, Tukahebwa, Byarugaba (2003). 
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perspectives.376 The position of the oppositional forces is that the ruling party has difficulties 
to accept that opposition has something to contribute to the governance debate. The 
government side perceives the problem differently and claims the opposition does not 
represent an alternative government, but rather is an anti-government and thus anti-state 
clique of saboteurs and destroyers of society who aim to grasp power. (Professor Tarsis 
Kabwegyere, Minister for Relief and Disaster Preparedness, 25th February 2008) In the 
context of this conflicting problem-setting, which divides pro-government and pro-
oppositional forces into two antagonistic camps, interviewed representatives of academia and 
civil society stress the importance of a genuine transition to a pluralistic political system that 
encompasses tolerance of other political opinions:  
 
“If you do not move in your mind to accept that opposition is part of the democratic 
culture and opposition is not rebellion, and opposition does not take deliberate actions 
with the aim to overthrow government [...] we haven’t made that transition.” 
(Professor Oloka-Onyango, Makerere University, 16th August 2007) 
 
6.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has analyzed five hampering elements on Uganda’s way to multiparty political 
system and meaningful role of oppositional forces within. It has shown that the historical, 
cultural, social, and political legacy of “Movementocracy”, the mode of governance 
introduced by President Museveni, is very complex and influences not only the 
representatives of the ruling power gathered around the person of President Museveni, but 
also the performance of other societal and political actors with crucial importance for genuine 
transition, such as opposition political parties, civil society organizations or Western donor 
agencies represented in Uganda. As the weakness of the opposition parties is embedded in 
excessive power concentration in the political system, the former cannot be studied without 
reference to the latter. The hampering elements, which complicate the transition process to 
multi-partyism are unique to the Ugandan context and are made up of both, the historical 
structures in place, and the current performance of the various stakeholders of the transition 
process and their interactions. The chapter has further focused on the performance, role and 
employed strategies of the oppositional forces in their efforts to enhance their legitimacy and 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent. It has been stated that the applied strategies were not 
effective due to a number of internal weaknesses of the actors as well as structural 
underpinnings of the prevailing environment.  
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Most political parties are poor, characterized by few resources, poor organizational capacity, 
and little mobilizational capability. African political parties, as Rakner and Van de Walle 
(2009: 216) argue, have only few established linkages between party structures and interest 
groups, as opposed for instance to developed party structures in Latin America tied closely to 
functional interests in society.  
There appears to be a set of factors generated from the conducted research that weaken 
opposition parties: incumbency advantages related to the dominance of the executive, limited 
access of the opposition to resources, and the low legitimacy attached to the image of and 
notion of opposition as such. 
The concept of critical citizenry could play a decisive role for the development of democracy 
as better educated citizens tend to push for further reforms, alternative solutions and hold the 
politicians accountable. However, the will of the leadership to enforce a continuous and 
comprehensive civic education program seems to be lacking.  
In order to achieve an inter-active mode of governance fostering participation of all relevant 
actors, engaging them in a dialogue, including oppositional forces into the decision-making 
processes, and reaching principle agreement on the rules of the game valid for all actors, 
significant reforms are still necessary. According to oppositional leader, Dr. Kizza Besigye, 
one possible solution is organization of a National Conference involving all critical actors, 
including civil society and traditional leaders, who might have potential contribution to 
democratization process. (Dr. Kiiza Besigye, FDC President, 21st August 2007)  
As the various strategies of oppositional forces vis-à-vis the incumbent have not been 
successful, due to a number of internal as well as external causes, this chapter is called “the 
unfinished project.” Some of the main strategies applied in order to enhance oppositions’ 
credibility, legitimacy and thus competitiveness included coalition building of all opposition 
political parties, backing of a common presidential candidate, resource mobilization through 
involvement of private sector and private business bodies, using financial and personal 
resources of influential politicians from sub-national level and posing them as presidential 
candidates at the national level, political rhetoric and reference to historical legacy and 
continuation of the party tradition, and cooperation with civil society bodies and actors. The 
efforts of the oppositional forces are expected to strengthen in the pre-election period until 
they reach their peak shortly before the next parliamentary and presidential election, which is 
scheduled for 2011.  
During the course of this research it was not possible to identify a single element of crucial 
importance responsible for “protracted” transition, as all five - tight control over the transition 
process by the ruling party, poor mode of governance, shortcomings of oppositional forces, 
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upwards accountability of local stakeholders towards donor community, and absence of 
culture of political tolerance - are closely intertwined and dependent on each other. They have 
to be considered and addressed simultaneously while assessing the impact of 
“Movementocracy” on the current mode of governance in Uganda. To separate them and 
concentrate solely on a single component, while not taking into consideration its embedment 
into Uganda’s historical, political, cultural and social legacy, will not allow for genuine 
pluralism within Ugandan politics, but only at a “ritual” or institutional level. 
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Chapter 7: Comparative Perspectives and Reflections 
 
7.1. Introduction 
After having analyzed the role, strategies and performance of oppositional forces separately in 
the three previous chapters, the aim of this chapter is to generate the gained findings and 
conduct a reflective analysis of all three case studies. This should help us to find the 
similarities as well as differences between the tactics and strategies of the oppositional forces 
in different settings. The reader should be reminded at this stage that this study has an 
explorative character and is thus aimed at creating new findings instead of verifying the 
existing ones. The chapter is divided into following sections: The first part offers an insight 
into the circumstances and the context of democratization of societies in general as it is 
important to place the concrete findings into a global context and more general perspective. 
Two main general causes for democratization can be distinguished, namely, the internal or 
national and external or international. As this study is conducted in the belief that structural 
and institutional factors cannot give us full answers, other explanatory causes, such as 
individual behavior of certain groups of actors must be analyzed. That is why the second 
section explores the strategic choices of the oppositional forces in order to enhance their 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent in an authoritarian setting. Focus will be given on 
similarities as well as differences between the three case studies, Ghana, Slovakia and 
Uganda. The type of oppositional space, selection of strategic choices, main argumentation 
strategies, composition of oppositional forces, as well as their expectations and gained 
rewards will be explored in a comparative manner. The performance of the oppositional 
forces will be analyzed as well. As the premise of this study is that oppositional forces play a 
crucial role in democratizing societies, the performance in Ghana and Slovakia will be 
analyzed as opposed to the performance of oppositional forces in Uganda who failed to 
achieve their biggest objective, namely removing President Museveni from power. To be able 
to explain the “success” of the two former case studies, the so called “electoral model” by 
Bunce and Wolchik (2009) will be made use of, as it helps to explain the new approach to 
winning elections by the opposition without being too context bounded. The contribution and 
input of the selected oppositional forces will be outlined as from the viewpoint of my 
interview partners. As Prempeh (2008) argues, the incumbent powers influence the 
oppositional forces in a variety of ways; thus, the latter cannot be studied without reference to 
the former. As democratization in this study is understood as an interaction between the 
opposition and the incumbent (see Schledler 2002a), strategic choices selected by the three 
respective incumbents in order to counter-balance the awakening opposition and its activities 
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will be presented. Similar to the oppositional forces, the ruling forces selected alike strategies 
and had similar profile of followers as well as nature of ruling style. As the large number of 
interview partners might suggest (see also chapter on methodology) the perceptions and views 
of individual actors were in many cases divergent or even conflicting depending on the issues 
of interest. Therefore, the last part of this chapter explores four main conflicting perceptions 
as generated from the conducted interviews.  
 
7. 2. Democratization: How and Why? 
In order to fully understand the strategies and tactics of the oppositional forces, we firstly 
need to comprehend the internal and external causes for democratization of societies in 
general as these factors influence the performance of oppositional forces in a variety of ways. 
In a post-authoritarian setting there is a growing conflict between the development of society 
and the development of politics, as the latter is characterized by constant non-democratic 
practices and misuse of incumbency.  
 
7.2.1. Internal Impetus for Democratization  
According to a significant number of academic literature (see e.g. Segert, Machos 1995; 
Abrahamsen 1997, 2000; Bútora et al. 1999; Lindberg 2006) it is the internal impetus for 
democratization that is decisive for further democratic development of societies. Many post-
authoritarian societies follow a similar pattern of development. The main indicator for 
changing state-society relations is generally the loss of credibility and legitimacy of the semi-
authoritarian incumbent (Segert, Machos 1995: 275), which is caused by: a) modernization of 
societies and “popular desire for change”; b) vulnerability of the regime and c) economic 
decline as well as worsening living conditions377. These factors have been generated from the 
general secondary literature (see below) on post-authoritarian, democratizing, transiting 
societies as well as gathered from the conducted expert interviews in three specific settings. 
However, the selected factors are not claimed to be exclusive as there might be a wide variety 
of context-bounded causes explaining democratization in other settings. The first point to be 
described is the modernization of societies.  
 
As societies develop, “social structure becomes complex, labor processes begin to require the 
active cooperation of employees, and new groups emerge and organize378. As a result the 
system can no longer be effectively run by command: the society is too complex, 
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 The striking feature of economic crisis as Przeworski and Limongi (1997: 169) claim is that the political 
effects of these are immediate and occur one year later.  
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 For this argumentation see also Segert, Machos (1995: 37f). 
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technological change endows the direct producers with some autonomy and private 
information, civil society emerges, and dictatorial forms of control lose their effectiveness. 
Various groups, whether the bourgeoisie, workers, or just the amorphous ‘civil society’, rise 
against the dictatorial regime and it falls.” (Przeworski, Limongi 1997: 157) Almond and 
Verba (1963) argue that if the structure of the government conflicts with the political culture, 
regimes then lack legitimacy to tide them over bad times, which may produce serious 
problems to stability of the government. The need for opposition is thus a combination of an 
internal impulse coming from a still developing society and external circumstances, described 
later in the chapter. As societies modernize and peoples’ needs grow, they organize and 
cooperate in various associations in order to have more voice.  Modernization thus consists of 
“a gradual differentiation and specialization of social structures that culminates in a separation 
of political structures from other structures and makes democracy possible. The specific 
causal chains consist of sequences of industrialization, urbanization, education, 
communication, mobilization, and political incorporation, among innumerable others: a 
progressive accumulation of social changes that ready a society to process to its culmination, 
democratization.” (Przeworski, Limongi 1997: 158)  
With respect to African societies, Chazan et al. (1999: 77) state that the African social 
structure is based on the group-concept, while the associational basis of social life continued 
and often intensified in the colonial period. However, colonialism provided also for new 
opportunities through spread of Western education and different modes of economic 
production. The society developed and modernized, the interests of various groups specified. 
The introduction of cash crops in the rural areas fueled the growth of farmer organizations and 
migrant associations; the expansion of commerce provided for increased numbers of trader 
groups; the gender differences took organizational shape in women’s associations and market 
women cooperatives.379 In urban areas, trade unions, secret societies, saving clubs, ethnic and 
religious associations, literary societies, sports clubs and other networks emerged in every 
African city. These voluntary organizations and social and economic groups became, due to 
repressive character of colonial state, also political frameworks in which anti-colonial ideas 
emerged and leaders were schooled (Chazan et al. 1999: 77) and subsequently became the 
cornerstones of party structures and political movements. (Tangri 1985: 127)380 The potential 
and role of the non-political, societal actors such as media, churches, universities, or, in 
general, civil society organizations in the quest for democratization thus becomes even more 
significant as it is in these societal institutions where the aspirations for more democracy 
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grow. These developments increase the chances and potential of the oppositional forces to 
succeed, as the society is getting more diversified and can therefore not be easily put under 
restrictive control of the incumbent any longer.  
 
Another significant development undermining the credibility and legitimacy of the incumbent 
is the increasing vulnerability of the authoritarian regimes. Due to a lack of legitimation 
principles for authoritarian forms of rules, most regimes try to justify their rule through 
promises of economic growth, development, or stability. (Hyden 2006) As such hopes remain 
often not realized; popular dissatisfaction begins to mount and erodes the legitimacy of 
political systems as such. Bútorová (1999a: 195) claims for instance that the 1998 elections in 
Slovakia became “a tale of the unintended effects of an arrogant and all too evident 
undermining of democracy that brought the citizens to effective self-defense, where free and 
fair elections were changed from a simple matter-of-course into an endangered value that had 
to be defended.”  
Regime vulnerability can be caused by a combination of a number of factors such as poor 
economic performance, decreasing legitimacy, withdrawal of support for the regime by the 
international community (or parts of it), growing isolation, both at national and international 
level, more despotic and desperate actions, and leadership violations of political norms and 
the failure to institutionalize power. (see Bunce, Wolchik 2009; Way 2005a, 2005b) The 
violation of widely accepted norms and the behavioral pattern of the incumbent leading to the 
crucial elections seemed to have, from the perspectives of the interviewees, crucial impact on 
the decreasing legitimacy of the incumbent, both in Ghana and Slovakia.381 My interview 
partners in both countries agreed that the authoritarian leaders just went “too far” in the abuse 
of their powers (murdering; introducing constitutional changes to prolong their stay in 
power), and thus actually caused their own defeat, as their network of supporters shrank 
constantly, unintentionally forcing the various actors to enter the  oppositional space of 
political contestation. Vladimír Krivý from the Slovak Academy of Sciences puts it for the 
case of Slovakia as follows:  
 
“Mečiar helped in the sense that everything what he threatened, helped us to define 
more precisely our own efforts for democracy. Unity is a crucial element of every 
conflict situation; it is full of illusions, full of ideological compromises. The idea is to 
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from their interview partners; however, they admit at the same time that it is very difficult to “nail it down.” 
 235
forget everything what might separate us; and create the illusion of the bad and the 
good guys”.  (Krivý Vladimír, SAV, 18th September 2008)  
 
All interviewed actors in the Slovak context agreed that if it was not for Mečiarism, the 
respective oppositional forces would not join strengths and come together. “In the context of 
authoritarian and brutally behaving regime, the oppositional forces searched for means and 
instruments of common interest.” (Bútora Martin, IVO, 30th July 2008) Strong authoritarian 
acts can thus promote popular resistance as using extreme measures to prolong the stay in 
power at any cost is a clear sign of the incumbent losing power and legitimacy. (Lichbach 
1998; Wintrobe 1998) 
 
Another reason for the weakened regime is, according to Bunce and Wolchik (2009: 259) the 
fact that in post-authoritarian regimes there is often no precedent for ambitious campaigns, 
meaning, that whereas incumbents continue to behave “as usual”, the opposition is moving in 
a new direction and gathering strength. The incumbents in post-authoritarian regimes do not 
seem to be aware of the fact that fragmented and ineffective oppositions can change 
strategies, and gather forces. Certain unwillingness to campaign for power could have been 
observed above all in the case of Ghana, where the ruling party was so sure of winning that it 
did not put any special effort in conducting the electoral campaign. Many (see e.g. Frempong 
2001; Gyimah-Boadi 2001; Ayee 2002; personal interviews) thus talk of complacency and 
arrogance of the NDC as the main cause for its defeat. This observation is, however, not 
applicable to the case of Slovakia, where Mečiar’s HZDS invested enormous efforts and 
financial means into the 1998 electoral campaign, including inviting prominent figures from 
West-European countries to open new highways in Slovakia shortly before elections. 
(Školkay 1999: 125) 
 
The third cause identified here and the most obvious threat to incumbents’ survival is 
probably the question of economic hardship (see Przeworski, Limongi 1997; Bunce, Wolchik 
2009), as the long-term economic decline and worsening living conditions of the population 
make it harder for “patrons” to maintain their networks with “clients” in order to win their 
political support. (For this argument see e.g. Abrahamsen 1997, 2000; Hale, 2004, 2005, 
2006; Hyden 2006 and others) The regimes become weakened by the withdrawal of external 
support from the ruling elite and growing pressures on the government for reform including 
improving electoral practices. This pressure put on the government from both, internal and 
external sources was confirmed in all three case studies.  
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The legitimacy base of the incumbent is thus eroding due to economic stagnation and 
unfulfilled promises on development; however, some authors (e.g. Segert, Machos 1995; 
Abrahamsen 1997, 2000; Hyden 2006) point out that it is crucial to stress that in many cases 
this development is caused by the changing global conditions and in the case of African 
countries, above all, through the introduction of SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programs). 
Structural adjustment policies have affected the power of the state vis-à-vis the society and 
the international system, as well as the balance of power between classes and sections of the 
population. Hyden (2006) argues that, while the urban poor swelled the ranks of street 
demonstrations, the educated middle classes made up the backbone of the democracy 
movements. Given the importance of neo-patrimonial and clientelistic relationships in most of 
Africa, economic crisis and adjustment measures are also likely to have affected the cohesion 
of the national elite. Austerity may have undermined the ability of regimes to use patronage in 
order to stem the opposition, and reduced the opportunities for the favored few to collect the 
'rents' their jobs previously accorded them easy access to. In some instances, economic 
decline may have pushed political elites to oppose incumbents in order to protect their own 
sources of income. That is why the analysis of external or international level is crucial at this 
point. 
 
7.2.2. External Impetus for Democratization 
With the end of the Cold War democracy remained the only model of government with any 
broad ideological legitimacy and appeal in the world. (Huntington 1991; Diamond et al. 1997) 
The argumentation for the domino effect was that democratic movement in one part of the 
world can draw encouragement and inspiration from successful struggles elsewhere, and 
earlier transitions can stimulate and provide models for subsequent efforts at political change. 
(Abrahamsen 1997: 132) Soon, democratization efforts became a political conditionality for 
providing financial assistance to “developing” parts of the world.  
In the case of Ghana, for instance, coincidence of popular will, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the global momentum for democratization forced PNDC to accept the new 
conditions. (E.g. Austin 1964; Jeffries 1980; Chazan 1987, 1988; Awoonor 1990; Aubynn 
2002: 79) However, the elections during transition periods may be flawed, irregular, 
orchestrated, or dominated by the incumbent party; electoral rules may be devised to disfavor 
the opposition’s chances of winning; or elections may even be more or less free and fair while 
periods between them are characterized by denial of political rights and civil liberties with 
autocratic behavior on the part of the incumbent regime. (Schedler 2002b; Lindberg 2006: 
124) Also in Ghana the imposition did not go far enough and introduced only “a self-
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entrenching transitional arrangement that made fair electoral competition almost impossible.” 
(Agyeman-Duah 2005: 8)  
 
The global Zeitgeist of democracy in the early 1990s caused democratic diffusion and 
promotion of liberal market economy worldwide. However, various groups have responded to 
the changing conditions in different ways, with a variety of survival strategies and coping 
mechanisms. Over time, Abrahamsen (1997, 2000) argues that the internal and the external 
have become interwoven and interlinked in such complex ways, that we cannot with any 
degree of certainty say where one begins and the other ends. This can be shown on the 
example of structural adjustments programs (SAPs) and adopted economic policies in Africa 
or on political and social developments in Central and Eastern European countries as explored 
by Segert and Machos (1995: 295f). For instance in Ghana, the explanation for a shift in 
voters’ preferences has to be searched for, above all, in the economic circumstances, as urban 
wage earners felt the economic situation mostly together with the unemployed youth. The 
implementation of SAPs since 1983 meant a U-turn in economic policy of Ghana as it 
alienated the urban working class and students, on whom Rawlings initially drew for his 
support. (Aubynn 2002: 93) The security and predictability of the state-society relations on 
the national level thus got undermined at the international level, which created legitimacy for 
the new opposition and led to subsequent reconfiguration of state-society relations. (Chazan 
1987; Jeffries, Thomas 1993; Oquaye 1995; Aubynn 2002) 
 
The global political-economic situation thus changed in the early 1990s and the international 
community abandoned the former allies as it had a keen interest in promotion of economic 
liberal environment. The drivers of the change should have become, in accordance with the 
new Zeitgeist, the opposition political parties associated with liberal ideology. Dr. Debrah, 
from the political science department of the Legon University in Accra explains:  
 
“It is not that they [international community] were more supportive of NPP but they 
also knew that when NPP gets into power, they will pursue liberal economy. For the 
international community, even if Rawlings was somehow authoritarian, they did not 
care, but once the economy was collapsing and they needed some ally, they knew NPP 
could. There is a strong coincidence of interests and level of satisfaction from the side 
of the donors that NPP is a liberal democratic party” (Emmanuel Debrah, Legon 
University, 3rd April 2009) 
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The suspension of financial flows from the IMF and the WB caused a collapse of the 
economy and subsequent alienation of the masses at the grass-roots level, which originally 
constituted the electoral base of populist leaders such as Rawlings or Museveni. From 2001, 
after the victory of the oppositional forces following liberal democracy policies, Ghana 
received prominent support from international community and donor partners and was 
celebrated as the “shining star” – leader for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa both in economic 
and political terms. Stoess and Segert (1997: 379) argue for the case of CEE countries that the 
linkages to the Western European countries were an important driving force for the former 
communitst countries on their path towards democratization and liberalization. The transition 
was further facilitated by provision of material resourses, geo-political and strategic 
considerations as well as “import” of various experts from the Western countries. (Segert, 
Machos 1995: 281) The pressure on President Museveni in Uganda from the international 
community was/is not as strongly present, as it was in Slovakia and Ghana382. The 
international community was satisfied by the lift of the ban on political parties in 2005 and the 
subsequent official return to “multi-partyism”; however, did not show any interest in 
replacing the “guards”. President Musevenis’ skillfully applied rhetorical strategy of the 
dangers incorporated in a double transition, of a political regime and the leading personality at 
the same time, persuaded not only the voters, but also the international community 
representatives that such a transition would inevitably return the country to periods of 
constant chaos and violence. Furthermore, Uganda, with President Museveni as its leader, is 
seen as a strategic ally of the USA in the region in the war against terrorism. (Mukwaya 2004) 
President Museveni sent peace-keeping troops to Sudan, and Somalia, countries of great 
geopolitical strategic interest to the USA. Therefore, the attitude of many Western countries is 
“let him try” and see if the “African” model of democracy can work. We should not forget 
that President Museveni was, together with other revolutionary leaders in the 1980s 
(including Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Isias Afewerki of Eritrea), 
called by the West “the new leaders of Africa”(Hyden 2006); another rhetorical advantage, 
which he can still skillfully use for his cause.  
 
However, in none of the three analyzed case studies the international community declared any 
official and/or open financial support for a particular political party. As Carothers (2006) 
states, while international donors finance as much as 50% of the budget in many African 
countries, financial support to political parties has remained a marginal and controversial area 
of aid. In most of the cases the support came/comes in form of training, providing know-how, 
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organizing seminars and stimulating civil society groups “just in hope that the right thing will 
be done when the elections come; that they will be credible. They [international community] 
would wish that the results would be the way they want, but they will respect whatever results 
will come.” (John Larvie, CDD, 20th March 2009)  
 
When analyzing the national and international context and their interconnections, the regional 
circumstances and alliances with neighboring countries cannot be left out of scope of the 
analysis. The outcome of the 1998 Slovak elections was welcomed not only by the USA, and 
the EU (Lombardini 1999: 108) but also the neighboring countries of Slovakia. (Marušiak et 
al. 1999: 175) The personal interests and motivation of the “Visegrad Four” countries, namely 
of Slovakia joining the EU together with them, were clear and pragmatic. As Bútora (1999: 
79) states, should these three states have joined the EU before Slovakia (Slovakia was the 
only Visegrad country, which had a common border with all three countries), they would have 
been obliged to implement costly border controls demanded by the EU under the Schengen 
agreement on their borders to Slovakia. (Dienstbier 1999: 6) In Ghana, the regional situation 
was of significant importance as well, as the governments of Togo, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, 
and Burkina Faso felt uncomfortable with Rawlings’ expanding policies and rather supported 
the oppositional forces. (Personal interviews) The situation in Uganda is yet again different 
from the other two case studies. This may serve as another explanatory factor for the failed 
efforts of the Ugandan oppositional forces to provoke a change of the regime and for the 
country’s protracted democratization. President Museveni has a very strong position in the 
Great Lakes Region, enjoying a high level of support from neighboring leaders. He further 
received support from President Kagame of Rwanda, who fought on Museveni’s side in the 
bush war of 1981-1986 against the Obote II government and later also was helped by 
Museveni in bringing him into power. Good relationships have also been established with the 
governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, as President Museveni is 
implementing his model of incumbency in these countries (see Mukwaya 2004). The pressure 
on President Museveni is thus not present – neither on regional nor on international level – as 
it was in Slovakia and Ghana preceding 1998 and 2000 elections respectively.  
 
This short analysis has shown that countries exist in an interactive system and not in isolation 
from each other. This implies that politics cannot meaningfully be separated into distinct 
categories as national and international. Abrahamsen (1997, 2000) continues to argue that the 
interdependence between states and societies is now greater than ever before and the state as 
well as the groups associated with the state frequently uses their international role and 
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recognition to consolidate their own internal position. National actors and structures have 
various international conditions of existence, which ensure their functioning and reproduction, 
in the same way as the global system is conditioned by complex domestic configurations and 
circumstances. 
 
Closing the circle of this research and returning to the main questions of interest for this 
study: How can oppositional forces in a setting of adverse ruling conditions (when the “rules 
of the game” are not yet fully established) trigger political change? How do oppositional 
forces gain power and operational potential to peacefully replace the semi-authoritarian 
incumbent? 
 
Firstly, opposition replaces the incumbent and comes to power when it constitutes a credible 
alternative. Secondly, it constitutes a credible alternative when it is seen as a legitimate actor 
by both the national and the international actors. The prevailing discourse is thus combined at 
both the international and national level, whereby by the end of the twentieth century, 
overwhelming support is given to the principle of democracy as an ideal form of government, 
even among citizens living under flawed regimes characterized by widespread abuse of 
human rights and civil liberties. (Norris 1999)  
The enhancement of the competitiveness of the opposition can be promoted through a variety 
of strategies. The main sub-question of interest is thus: What are the different strategies that 
the respective oppositional forces are developing and applying in order to mobilize support 
and enhance their strategic position? 
 
7.3. Strategic Choices of Oppositional Forces 
The following section will explore what is causing similarities between my three case studies, 
both at the macro and the micro level of analysis. The macro (or structural) level includes 
factors such as the global Zeitgeist of liberal democracy in the 1990s, the international 
context, and legacy of authoritarianism. These have been common to Ghana, Slovakia and 
Uganda, irrespective of geographical location or other context-bounded factors. However, 
there are substantial differences between the three case studies with respect to the role and 
performance of the oppositional forces, and their subsequent contribution to democratization 
efforts, which will now be analyzed in a more detailed manner.  
 
In Slovakia (1998) and Ghana (2000) we talk of the defeat of (semi-) authoritarian leaders and 
the victory of more democratic political forces; in the Ugandan case (2006), the opposition 
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mounted a strong challenge to dictatorial rule but, nonetheless, failed to gain power. To 
explain these divergent outcomes, a variety of structural and institutional factors are at play; 
however, they do not always posses the full explanatory power. As Bunce and Wolchik 
(2009: 247) claim that while dictators may be easier to dislodge in more democratic settings, 
they can also be defeated in relatively authoritarian contexts as the cases of Serbia and Croatia 
demonstrated (see also Ackerman and Duvall 2004). This study thus advances the argument 
that both historical legacies and actors’ strategic choices matter in the path-dependent process 
of creating new polities and economies. Kitschelt et al. (1999: 19) state that “legacies at least 
initially shape the resources and expectations that help actors to define their interests and to 
select the ways and means to acquire political power.” The variation of actors’ choices, when 
faced with the collapse of existing authoritarian regimes, is thus not random. The assumption 
here is that rational actors prefer to choose political institutions that lock in permanent gains 
and impose lasting losses on their adversaries. (Przeworski 1991; Knight 1992) This study 
thus leans on the approach based both on structural path dependency and rationality of the 
individual actors. The divergent outcomes of the authoritarian break-down cannot be 
explained uniformly. (Segert, Machos 1995; Segert 2007b) The pathways depend on the 
domestic distribution of political resources, mobilization capabilities, and cognitive 
orientations that grew out of their experiences with different modes of authoritarian rule. 
(Kitschelt et al. 1999: 29)  
 
Several studies have confirmed that there is no consistent pattern of democratic transition with 
respect to level of economic development, type of government, level of corruption, or the 
location of the regime on a continuum defined by democracy on the one end, and dictatorship 
on the other.383 In some countries, as in Uganda, relatively strong (or at least improved) 
economic performance can protect the incumbent from the defeat, as the citizens are more 
likely to embrace authoritarians if they offer them political order and economic growth after a 
period of political and social disorder, civil war, economic decline and widespread violence as 
was the case after the long rule of Idi Amin and Milton Obote regimes. As structural and 
institutional factors fail to give us complete answers, other explanatory causes must be 
searched for when trying to explain the opposition victory and removal of the incumbent from 
power.  
The argument here is that the micro level of analysis, meaning the behavior of the 
oppositional forces and their selection of rational choices and strategies, plays as equally an 
important role for the outcome of the transition process as the macro or structural level. These 
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two levels are intertwined as the strength and strategies employed by the oppositional forces 
are linked to, enabled by and embedded into the structural level. The following sub-section 
will thus explore the main protagonists of the stories, their intentions and resolutions, the 
motives for their acts, the convergence and diverging points of their efforts, as well as their 
strategic steps and tactical maneuvers.  
 
7.3.1. Selection of Strategic Rational Choices 
As the “menu of manipulation” (Schedler 2002b) at the disposal of the incumbent is much 
bigger than the strategic opportunities of the oppositional forces in democratizing societies, 
implying a greater asymmetry of resources at all levels, opposition needs to enhance its power 
positions and its competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent in order to have a chance of winning 
elections. To do so, it applies a variety of strategies. Dynamics of oppositional behavior – 
their tactics and strategies – and its role in protracted transitions is an important determinant 
of democratization by elections. The opposition’s ability to further contribute to 
democratization has been proven in several studies, among others by Dahl (1971); Schedler 
(2002a); Lindberg (2003, 2004, 2006) et al. Bunce and Wolchik (2009: 251) state that in post-
authoritarian regimes the best predictor of democratic improvement is the election of the 
democratic opposition. The operational tactics, behavior, and strategies applied by the 
oppositional forces in all selected case studies show many similarities and offer an interesting 
ground for a global type of comparison of democratization processes and societies. What are, 
therefore, the different strategies applied by the respective oppositional forces in order to 
mobilize support and enhance their strategic position? The here applied and analyzed 
strategies384 proved to be context-bounded and linked to a specific space setting and important 
issues at stake at a given period of time. However, despite the local divergences, which are 
portrayed in detail in the individual chapters, the research revealed also a set of similarities.  
 
The oppositional forces in all three settings used the same kind of reasoning in order to 
project themselves as the credible alternative to the ruling incumbent; however, they 
supported their reasoning with different, context-dependent, argumentation strategies. 
Credible alternative can for the purpose of this study be identified as the ability to project 
oneself as the “real” or “true” democratic party with liberal credentials; a party capable of 
bringing “change” and improving the deteriorating living standards. As further explored in the 
analysis, the oppositional forces in each of the three contexts appealed to and even exploited 
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the notion of liberal democracy as the new global Zeitgeist, which enabled them to gain 
credibility and legitimacy at both national and international level. In the post-authoritarian 
setting, with a deteriorating economic situation, worsening living conditions, and abuse of 
human, social and political rights, people’s hopes and expectations for change get 
automatically associated with the alternative. Opposition uses this kind of situation for their 
own benefit and portrays itself as the “apostles of human rights, democracy and good 
governance.” (Emmanuel Debrah, Legon University, 3rd April 2009) The situation is 
especially convenient for the biggest opposition party (NPP, SDK, FDC) as these political 
parties are qualified as the only forces big and strong enough to bring change. They thus 
skillfully find a niche and distance themselves from all other actors on the political scene. One 
possibility is to appeal to the voters with rhetorical slogans such as “Only the winner can 
bring change” as the Slovak SDK did ahead of 1998 elections.  
 
7.3.2. Political Rhetoric of “Apostles of Change” 
The two main issues regulating and ruling the conduct of the 1998 elections in Slovakia, 2000 
elections in Ghana, and 2006 elections in Uganda became the notions of change and 
democracy. Change became a buzzword automatically associated with the main opposition 
parties NPP in Ghana and SDK in Slovakia. Change referred, on the one hand, to realization 
of concrete changes with respect to economic situation as for example to improving the 
economic conditions and living standards, raising the employment rates, and fight against 
corruption; on the other hand, to political change encompassing the shift from authoritarian to 
more democratic form of government. In all three countries, the interviewed representatives 
often used the common expression “change for better”. Identification of change and its 
connotations with a particular opposition political party in people’s minds seemed to be a 
crucial factor for success of the opposition. Strategically very important was not only to 
portray oneself as the best democratic alternative but, at the same time, to distance the own 
party from the undemocratic practices of the incumbent and picture the prevailing tendencies 
in the worst possible light. Segert and Machos (1995: 280) argue that in the new environment 
following a transition period the actors, who were known among the population and who 
managed to persuade the voters that they were able to offer them a real alternative to the old 
regime, had the highest potential and best chances to succed. 
As Jonah (1998: 96) claims, the parties have constructed an image of the self and the other 
party, which could heighten the political tensions and ruin mutual trust as depicting oneself as 
the angel and the opponents as the devil. As Rakner and van de Walle (2009: 222) point out, a 
strategy of crucial importance for the opposition to increase their legitimacy is to “abandon 
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traditional clientelistic approaches in favor of a mobilizational political rhetoric, which 
compensates for their relative inability to compete with the government party on material 
resources and improves their reputation.” Segert and Machos (1995: 242) argue that political 
parties need to find a new legitimation strategy which is indepenendent from the 
achievements of the past regime. Oppositional forces in all three setting extensively used the 
strategy of mobilizational political rhetoric and applied it in a variety of situations.  
 
The Slovak leading opposition party, SDK used a number of rhetorical strategies in order to 
enhance its competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent. It constantly pointed to undemocratic 
performance and bad international record of Vladimír Mečiar. This projection enabled the 
opposition to portray itself as the opposite: a party with democratic credentials and strong 
connections and support from the international community. The opposition SDK convinced 
the electorate that the only way to join the EU and NATO “families”, and thus the Western 
prosperous life-style, was leading through a vote for them. Stoess and Segert (2007) claim in 
this regard that the desire to become a member of EU or NATO was one of the commonalities 
of the post-socialist countries on their way towards democratization.  SDK’s slogan “Only the 
winner can bring change” appealed to the voters who believed in the existence of a distinct 
and real alternative to HZDS. The change was promised both in economic and political terms. 
In economic terms it became associated with enhancing the quality of life, and increasing the 
living standards through planned market reforms. In political and social terms the opposition 
clearly stood for representatives of “real” democrats and, as the conducted interviews 
revealed, in the concrete settings were associated with liberal democrats. However, what 
exactly provided for the democratic character of the opposition was neither further specified 
at that time, nor explained to me properly by the political representatives and bearers of 
change during the interviews ten years later. The representatives of SDK, the main Slovak 
opposition party understood the difference between the opposition as the “real” democratic 
party and the authoritarian HZDS as follows: 
 
“We [SDK] were appealing to democratic values; HZDS was just talking democracy, 
but their activities persuaded everybody that they were not real democrats; they 
controlled the media […] They misused their majority in parliament for accepting new 
laws. We pointed to all these practices as undemocratic and told the voters how we 
would deal with it in a democratic way.” (Fedor Martin, SDKU, 22nd August 2008) 
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The chairman of SDK and later the Prime Minister of Slovakia understood the role of 
democratic opposition in a similar way: 
 
“Our strategy as opposed to Mečiar was to take Slovakia out of the isolation and steer 
it towards the integration process. [towards EU and NATO] The state involvement 
into economics was destructive; we wanted to establish standardized procedures of 
market economy. We were democratic in the area of human rights, democracy and 
minority issues; we did not kidnap, murder, collaborate with secret service or threw 
MPs out of parliament as Mečiar did. Our aim was to establish the direct opposite of 
his policies; establish standardized democratic environment with representation for 
minorities. We were democrats.” (Dzurinda Mikuláš, SDK Party President, 22nd 
October 2008) 
 
As we can see, the explanations are rather vague and it almost seems that a clear distinction 
from “Mečiarism” was, at the given time period, enough to automatically get equated with 
strong democratic credentials. 
 
Interestingly enough one could find almost entirely identical statements in the interviews done 
with the representatives of NPP, the biggest Ghanaian opposition political party. The negative 
legacy of the incumbent and the abuse of power, which went too far proved to be of strategic 
importance to the rhetorically skillful opposition: 
 
“However, it was not too difficult to destroy NDC. We were talking about people who 
killed people. It is easier to let them look bad and let the people believe that they are 
bad. So, we have explained plain democracy to people, and said look this person 
[Rawlings] is not truly democratic, he is not a natural democrat, the events were 
imposed on him.” (Dan Botwe, Secretary General of NPP for the 2000 Elections, 11th 
June 2009) 
 
The NPP in Ghana thus articulated its campaign around the message of “positive change” in a 
way that “it invited the electorate to focus on all the things they disliked about the NDC 
regime and then to imagine the opposite.” (Dan Botwe, NPP, 11th June 2009) The NPP 
highlighted the inability of NDC to manage the national crisis: “The NPP presented itself as a 
party positively overflowing with the relevant ideas and expertise, whereas the NDC was cast 
as a party of nobodies.” (Nugent 2001: 418) A clear demarcation line between the 
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undemocratic and economically incompetent ruling government and democratic and 
prosperity promising opposition was thus skillfully created and used at every opportunity.   
 
“The government was saying they are supporting private sector led development. But 
we explained the people that they [the government] are not doing it out of conviction, 
but out of compulsion. We are the ones who do it out of conviction, so you need us. We 
are the people who believe in it, you need us. We are the people who make sure that 
your living standards will improve, and they believed that!” (Kwame Pianim, NPP, 
17th June 2009) 
 
The political campaign rhetoric was thus translated into the question, “which party is able to 
bring you there?” The reasoning of the political parties in all three settings to enhance their 
competitiveness was thus the same: to appear as a credible alternative capable of bringing 
change in form of economic prosperity and democratic development. However, as stated at 
the beginning the various argumentation strategies on how to project oneself as the credible 
alternative differed and were context-dependent. The study distinguishes between long-term 
(contextual) and short-term (immediate) causes for success or failure of the employed 
oppositional strategies. The conducted field research and subsequent analysis showed that in 
Ghana the long-term causes of party democratic legacy and tradition were decisive, whereas, 
in Slovakia the short-term strategies, such as inter-active cooperation with situational 
oppositional forces shortly before elections were of prominent importance. As the premise of 
this study is that oppositional forces play a crucial role in democratizing societies, the 
performance in Ghana and Slovakia will be analyzed as opposed to the performance of 
oppositional forces in Uganda who failed to achieve their biggest objective, namely removing 
President Museveni from power and replacing him in the driving seat.  
 
The research on Ghana has shown that the primary strategy of the Ghanaian opposition was to 
rely on the political parties’ democratic tradition and legacy reaching back to the 1920s. The 
opposition NPP managed to establish its identity as a historical party with strong democratic 
credentials. As Ninsin (1998a: 2) claims, multi-party politics and spirited public debate were 
key features of the country’s politics before and immediately after independence. During the 
several bans on political parties throughout Ghanaian political history the oppositional forces 
operated underground even though under different names, which helped them to survive and 
nourish their strength. At the time of the 2000 elections the Ghanaian NPP was thus a very 
vibrant and active opposition party; a status which was enabled through the operational 
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conditions and institutional mechanisms, established far ahead of the 2000 elections. 
Compared to Slovakia and Uganda, the operational conditions for opposition were the most 
favorable ones. The party thus did not need such a strong network of actors like SDK in 
Slovakia did, as it could have relied on own past strength and credibility gained through 
democratic performance. Beside that, the strong degree of voluntarism between NPP members 
who were committed and, in their own words, sacrificed for the survival of the party because 
of its ideology and strong meaning to them, helped the party to perform successfully.  
Under the leadership of Mikuláš Dzurinda the Slovak SDK, as the strongest opposition party, 
gained assistance from all important segments of the society plus outspoken moral support 
from the “West”. The pre-electoral campaign of SDK was by far the most effective from the 
three cases, as it managed within the shortest time (starting in early 1998) to reverse the very 
inconvenient situation for the opposition and reach victory. In Slovakia, the ideology of 
liberal economy and democracy followed by the party coincided perfectly with the 
expectations of the people at the time and their hopes for inclusion of Slovakia into EU and 
NATO. (see here also Segert 2007; Stoess, Segert 1997) 
 
The appeal of the Slovak opposition to democratic history of the country through “The Magic 
Eight” campaign did not find such a strong appeal among the population as was the case in 
Ghana. Segert (1994a: 28) argues that the tendency to use historical themes for political 
mobilization of voters can be identified in all CEE countries, however only with limited 
success. This is due to the fact, continues Segert that historical myths can be successfully used 
as an additional argument for mobilization only if used by political actors with strong position 
achieved through their present achievements. In Ghana, the NPP could appeal to its own 
democratic legacy, tradition, continuity and stability and thus gain credibility and legitimacy. 
In Slovakia, the SDK merely appealed to general Slovak history and some milestones, rather 
than to the party’s tradition, as the party itself came into being only one year before the 
crucial elections. The main strategy of Slovak opposition to counter-balance the hegemonic 
position of the incumbent was thus the inter-active cooperation with other pro-democracy 
oriented actors.  
In the argumentation of Uganda’s opposition the notions of change and democracy were 
equally incorporated; however, Uganda’s opposition has not yet found the right mechanism to 
convince the general public of being able to bring change in terms of improvement of the 
economic situation and democratic governance. Besides that, Uganda is economically quite 
well off; and President Museveni has a strong record of service delivery provision in the 
country since the 1980es. Another main reason why the main opposition party FDC did not 
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enjoy such credibility and legitimacy as the Slovak and Ghanaian parties is probably the 
former close collaboration of its leader Dr. Kizza Besigye with President Museveni. Dr. 
Besigye was a long-term companion of President Museveni during the guerilla war in the 
bush as well as his personal physician. FDC is further strongly constrained by the general 
conditions and legal provisions prevailing in Uganda. Randall and Svasand (2002) among 
others have argued that functioning democracies require an institutionalized party system such 
that voters are able to choose between alternative parties and to vote on the basis of the 
parties’ performance in previous elections. Segert (1994a: 14) states that political parties need 
an established set of followers with specific party program, traditions, symbols and values in 
order to survive. However, Lindberg (2006a: 13) found out that in democratizing context 
there is a striking number of changes in parties and in the number of parties from one election 
to the next, which further undermines the potential strength of the opposition. As Segert and 
Machos (1995: 304) confirmed a political society, which is not structured along long-
established and deeply rooted relations between political parties, their followers and other 
intermediary institutions, is easily manipulated for extreme populist mobilization campaigns. 
This lack of established party politics is of particular relevance for the political developments 
in Uganda.  
 
7.3.3. New Electoral Model  
To be able to analyze the performance of oppositional forces in Ghana, Slovakia and Uganda, 
I apply the so-called “new electoral model” proposed by Bunce and Wolchik (2009), which 
serves as a very useful tool while analyzing and differentiating between successful and failed 
attempts of the opposition to gain power from dictators in the democratization by elections 
game. This tool is ideal in the context of this study as Ghana and Slovakia represent the so 
called successful models; whereas, Uganda remains struggling with its mode of protracted 
transition. The electoral model, according to Bunce and Wolchik (2009: 262), changes the 
nature of the elections themselves, and involves “specific tasks and approaches that the 
opposition and citizens can undertake to increase the likelihood that authoritarians will be 
defeated at the polls.”  
 
The electoral model is a two-stage process, which helps to explain the new approach to 
winning elections primarily through the active involvement of citizens and their willingness to 
demand democracy as well as through the innovative and creative work of civil society 
combined with the efforts by the united opposition (as was the case both in Ghana and 
Slovakia). Very important is the fact that the activities of oppositional forces are decentralized 
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to the grass-roots and spread across the country including the rural areas, as these constitute 
traditionally in all three analyzed countries the stronghold of the incumbent. The Ugandan 
oppositional forces including civil society are rather urban based and it was only the service 
delivery oriented civil society organizations which managed to find their way to rural areas.  
 
The involvement of the citizenry, support of the media and civil society organizations, and 
new tactics of the opposition in getting nationwide support are of strategic importance for 
winning new voters, as the opposition groups in post-authoritarian settings tend to have a 
legacy of being elitist, urban-centric, divided and disorganized, distanced from the electorate 
with citizens having only few logical reasons to vote for such an opposition. It remains 
especially difficult for the opposition candidates to find a meaningful role in the various 
communities, and act as credible alternative to the government. As Rakner and van de Walle 
(2009) argue, being in opposition is of limited political value because politicians are expected 
to represent and benefit their constituencies with material goods and services, which is only 
very difficult to provide for with the limited access to resources they enjoy. It is especially 
complicated for the Ugandan oppositional forces, which claim that offering an alternative to 
President Muveseni to the population is almost impossible, as the opposition itself is not 
treated as an alternative but rather as an enemy and its role is not yet widely accepted. The 
Ugandan oppositional forces are further constrained by the repressive legal framework as well 
as substantial logistical and financial circumstances.  
 
The opposition’s tactics and behavior and the respective employed strategies have to be seen 
as an outcome of the state-society dynamics as they are embedded in the latter. Opposition 
feels that the authoritarian incumbent is losing credibility and legitimacy both at national and 
international level through economic decline, worsening living conditions, abuse and/or 
denial of human rights, a deepening gap between the elite and the masses and it hence uses 
this opportunity. Strategic, rational acting thus suits the interests of the opposition and appeals 
to the majority of the voters as the gap between the development of the society and the 
development of politics is increasing. The transitioning societies modernize as peoples’ needs 
grow; they establish associations, create new opportunities, claim more rights and thus 
automatically get into conflict with the more and more repressive ruling regime trying to 
control its losing power position. The incumbents thus become too dangerous, corrupt, 
incompetent, or unaccountable. Opposition uses the mood within the society and the 
uncertainty, by which any transitional society is characterized. In such a situation, the 
incumbent does not act as a guarantor of the social order and stability anymore. (Segert, 
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Machos 1995; Bunce, Wolchik 2009) Opposition strategically exploits these changing state-
society interactions caused by altering relations, and incorporates the rising questions of 
credibility and legitimacy into their rhetoric in order to gain access to power, as political 
power is the only asset (Ake 1996) left.  
 
7.3.4. Unity of the Opposition as the Crucial Factor for Success?  
The above overview has shown that public protests and growing dissatisfaction with the 
authoritarian form of government (as confirmed also in the studies by Bunce 2003; 
Ackerman, Karatnycky 2005; Hadenius, Teorell 2007; Schedler 2009a) are of crucial 
importance for the success of the oppositional forces. Another decisive strategy accounting 
for the defeat of (semi)-dictators and oppositional victory, proved to be the unity of the 
opposition (see here also Howard, Roessler 2006; van de Walle 2006, 2007).385 The different 
opposition parties need to put aside their individual ambitions in order to increase their 
chances for winning and if possible, to agree on a common leader, as the opposition in Ghana 
and Slovakia managed to do.  
Opposition political parties in all three settings formed alliances/coalitions with the aim of 
joining forces and thus having a greater chance of removing the incumbent from power. This 
appeared to be the only possible way of replacement, due to the asymmetry of resources and 
structural advantages on the side of the incumbent. This strategy worked out very successfully 
in Ghana where all minor oppositional parties backed the NPP presidential candidate J.A. 
Kufuor in the second round of the presidential election in 2000. These developments 
enhanced the confidence of the voters to potential and real power of the opposition to offer an 
alternative. (Ahiawordor 2001: 117f; Gyimah-Boadi 2001: 62)  In Ghana, the first round of 
the 2000 elections created the sense that an opposition coalition could win the election, which 
encouraged a movement of defection from the presidential camp to the opposition as well as 
support of other oppositional parties. In addition, the vote results from the first round acted as 
a coordinating device for both the opposition and the population. These results settled who the 
most popular opposition party candidate was and thus who had the greatest claim to be the 
coalition candidate for the president. As rewards for this support key ministerial appointments 
were given to individuals from the minor opposition parties. The Great Alliance did not last 
long because of the too strong ideological differences and individual ambitions of respective 
parties to retain their identities (see here above all the CPP ambitions); nevertheless, it 
managed to fulfill the main purpose of its existence.  
                                                 
385
 Van de Walle in his study (2007) examines the question if a united opposition really “causes” electoral 
turnover or only expands optimism about the prospects for winning power. 
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The “Blue Coalition” in Slovakia, which later transformed into the main opposition party 
SDK, was characterized by the proximity of its political program and despite the center-right 
block it created it was ready to cooperate with other democratic parties, including leftist ones 
and the Hungarian Coalition. Mesežnikov (1999: 51) sees in the creation of this coalition the 
first step towards “the gradual formation of a new configuration within the Slovak party 
system.” Other institutional arrangements caused by this coalition-building, which helped to 
oust Mečiar, (the actual winner of the election), out of power were the minimization of wasted 
ballots for opposition parties, and the determination of each pre-election opposition party not 
to support HZDS led government after the elections. (Krivy 1999a) The short durability of the 
right-left coalition proved also in the Slovak case, that such alliances can work only in 
transitional settings and crisis situation – forcing all actors irrespective of ideologies to come 
together.  
 
Also in Uganda, the coalition of six oppositional parties, the so-called G6, was formed in 
order to establish a coherent block against the incumbent power of President Museveni. One 
of the challenges of the G6 agreement and cooperation was the fact that the objective and 
purpose of its existence differed with respect to specific political groupings. The purpose of 
G6 has for some of its members (mostly the traditional parties DP and UPC) been achieved 
with the opening up of the political space and official return of Uganda’s political system 
towards a multi-party dispensation. For the newly established FDC, the strongest player in the 
oppositional space of political contestation, the main aim was the removal of President 
Museveni from power. The traditional parties on the political scene were for different reasons 
not ready to support the common presidential candidate Kizza Besigye and fielded their own 
candidates in the presidential race, a move which broke the unity of the opposition. The 
Ugandan opposition political parties hoped for a second round of elections, as they claimed 
that in such a situation they would be ready to back up a common presidential candidate.386 
Van de Walle (2006) mentions that in such kind of scenario it is possible that the expanded 
opportunities of electoral success had the countervailing effect of nurturing the individual 
ambitions of the opposition representatives.  
 
It has been stated in the introductory chapter, that throughout the political developments in the 
1990s, it became clear that democratic transition is not a linear process that moves from an 
authoritarian to a democratic regime. Given the exclusive nature of authoritarian political 
systems it is bound to be “messy, fitful and frustrating” (Nasong’o, Murunga 2007:8), with 
                                                 
386
 A development we experienced in Ghana.  
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many advances and setbacks along the way. Also Ghanaian, Slovak and Ugandan opposition 
experienced several setbacks on their way towards democratization in the previous elections, 
in which their strategies were not efficient enough and/or the incumbent environment was too 
restrictive. However, what they might have learned of the failed attempts in the previous 
elections is the cost of losing. That is why cooperation with the third sector, media, youth, 
churches, civil society and other forces became a crucial strategy for the critical elections.  
 
Within a post-authoritarian transitional setting, it is the defections from the ruling circle, 
caused by the vulnerability of the regime, both by former allies and by ordinary citizens 
(former strong supporters of the incumbent), which start and raise the first suspicion. 
However, this suspicion against the incumbent does not automatically mean that the citizens 
are going to put their trust in the opposition, as there is a widespread skepticism if the 
opposition is capable of winning an election at all, and thus if it is worth supporting it. Even 
poorly performing autocracies still tend to have a hard core of supporters (as was the case in 
all three countries) that never leave their “patrons” for expectations of protection, resources, 
fear, or tradition. Beside this, scholars identify a strong passive attitude of the population in 
post-authoritarian societies to change; Bútorová (1998b: 30) states for example that 
Slovakia’s political culture has rooted passive accommodation and underdeveloped collective 
protest culture.  
 
As Bunce and Wolchik (2009: 254) put it, it is one thing that authoritarians are losing support, 
but completely another to establish the necessary conditions for oppositions to win the 
elections and take over power. Also Segert and Machos (1995) split the developments of the 
transition process into two phases, firstly trying to find out why did the authoritarian regime 
break down and secondly analyzing how did the new order emerge and how did the upcoming 
elites manage to establish their positions. Only in Ghana and Slovakia, the opposition 
managed through the employment of various strategic choices to persuade the electorate that 
they constitute a real and credible alternative being able not only to win the elections but also 
to bring along change. In the Ugandan case, the opposition did not have the potential to 
persuade its voters, which can be explained by a lacking implementation of the new electoral 
model.  
The electoral model (Bunce, Wolchik 2009) is a constellation of various tasks undertaken by 
oppositional forces with a common core including pressure on the incumbent governments to 
reform election procedures and pressure on the oppositions to unite and collaborate with each 
other and build ties with civil society organizations and media in order to claim free and fair 
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elections, run nationwide campaigns and energize voters, expand the use of the media, 
conduct public opinion polls and campaign rallies, organize parallel voter tabulation and 
others. (Garber, Cowan 1993) Bunce and Wolchik (2009: 255) claim that the electoral model 
is unique as it provides the oppositional forces with three factors, which are distinctive from 
the previous elections, in which they were not successful, namely: an electoral strategy for 
success, extensive citizen engagement in campaigns and voting, and optimism about the 
ability of oppositions and citizens to challenge authoritarian rule. These essential attributes 
can be reached through extensive cooperation with situational oppositional forces that possess 
the necessary innovative techniques to mobilize the electorate and conduct energetic electoral 
campaigns. As to overcome the apathy and alienation of citizens in post-authoritarian regimes 
(Tucker 2007) is a very challenging task for the political parties alone, it is the situational 
oppositional forces, and above all, the civil society organizations, which empowered citizens 
to take part in politics and managed to create the belief and optimism among the population 
that a change was possible. (Kuzio 2006; Bunce, Wolchik 2007) 
 
7.4. Composition and Meaning of Oppositional Forces 
As this study is concerned with the concept of oppositional forces, the following section aims 
at providing an overview of the composition of the oppositional forces in the three respective 
settings as well as their motivation and objectives for entering the oppositional space of 
contestation. Further, subsequent rewards gained for offering their services and assistance to 
opposition political parties will be outlined. Firstly, it is however important to recall why is 
the broadening of the opposition concept in democratizing societies inevitable? The main 
reason for the broadening of the definition seems to be that many opposition activities occur 
outside the framework of political parties. Furthermore, in democratizing societies, it becomes 
very difficult to assess the real strength of the opposition parties, as it is a varying mix of 
underground activity and of recognized and tolerated activity and cooperation with other non-
political actors. The situational oppositional forces thus might decide to join their activities 
with the permanent forces in the context of democratization, when the political parties do not 
have sufficient power and capacity to be able to challenge the ruling (post-)authoritarian 
government (meta-game level) on their own and thus become temporally even more 
prominent and important than the permanent ones. In accordance, Kooiman (2003: 11) argues 
that “governance issues arise in interaction between ‘the’ political and ‘the’ social”. The 
interdependencies between these actors and entities (individuals, organizations, institutions) 
must be recognized as no single actor (in this case political parties) has the knowledge and 
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information required to solve complex, dynamic and diversified societal challenges; no single 
actor has sufficient potential to dominate unilaterally”.  
 
The composition of the oppositional forces was/is very similar in all three settings with slight 
context and local bounded differences. Both, the analysis of secondary literature as well as the 
generated first hand information revealed that independent media and civil society 
organizations were the most prominent actors in the oppositional space of political 
contestation. The strategy of all three opposition leaders was to try to persuade as many 
different segments of society as possible to enter the space and thus enhance the political 
parties’ competitiveness and counter-balance the dominant position of the incumbent. As 
Mikuláš Dzurinda, the leader of the Slovak opposition stated:  
 
“I just tried to unite this establishment on the ideas of democracy, freedom and pro-
western ideological orientation. I invited to join everybody who wished to cooperate; 
we needed everybody on board. A democracy and society in transition needs this kind 
of all-encompassing approach as the conditions allow for such otherwise unusual 
steps.” (Dzurinda Mikuláš, SDK Party President, 22nd October 2008) 
 
Dan Botwe, the general secretary of the Ghanaian NPP and the main creator of the NPP 
campaign ahead of the 2000 elections confirmed: “We [NPP] have combined every effort; we 
included everybody, we were picking everything and everybody from all over the country, we 
did not tick anybody off.” (Dan Botwe, Secretary General of NPP for the 2000 Elections, 11th 
June 2009) The need for unity and support of all segments of society was clear, despite the 
fruitless efforts of Ugandan oppositional forces, also to the leader of the strongest opposition 
party FDC Kiiza Besigye, who stated: “You have to have groups, which even don’t see 
themselves as directly involved and are willing to cooperate, to discuss, to initiate a 
dialogue.” (Dr. Kizza Besigye, FDC President, 21st August 2007) 
 
Each of the actors who entered the oppositional space of political contestation brings some 
kind of resources, be it providing financial means or other form of support, such as 
mobilization of voters or civic education activities to political parties. Grote and Gbikpi 
(2002: 21) argue that any actors (persons or organizations) should be entitled to participate 
depending on their possession of some quality or resource relevant to the substance of the 
problem that has to be solved. The oppositional forces, which entered the space of political 
contestation, might act individually for their own benefit or they might decide to build up a 
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network in order to produce innovative solutions and advance their competitiveness with 
respect to the incumbent regime. The cooperation between different oppositional forces 
within the space must not be legally binding and long-lasting; on the contrary the partnership 
remains very often situational, as well as temporary and issue oriented. (Sorensen, Torfing 
2007) The space of political contestation thus becomes dynamic and fluctuant. The interplays 
seem to be the most common mode of interaction between opposition political parties and 
other oppositional forces mostly in the initial phases of their cooperation. With respect to 
decision-making rules “the most effective choice for governance arrangements seems to be 
consultation and negotiation (or in other words arguing and bargaining) aiming at reaching a 
consensus based on exchanges of differences in the intensity of preferences among 
participants, and efforts at convincing each other to change those preferences and some 
process of arriving at a compromise via mutual concessions.” (Gbikpi, Grote 2002: 21) At the 
beginning of the transition, the incumbent is controlling the space of contestation too 
extensively and possesses an exaggerated menu of manipulation strategies so that political 
parties alone could counter-balance the hegemonic power and increase their competitiveness. 
 
7.4.1. Reasons for Entering the Oppositional Space 
Why did individual oppositional forces decide to enter the oppositional space of political 
contestation? What advantages did they hope to gain and what rewards were they provided 
with for their assistance? The following overview shall offer a more complete picture on their 
main objectives and motivation for involvement.  
The analysis of the conducted interviews has shown that the motivation for involvement of 
the respective oppositional forces is, in the majority of cases, based on rational decisions of 
individual actors and their respective self-interests. The identified objectives for involvement 
of respective oppositional forces confirmed that the issues at stake, as well as the respective 
positioning within the oppositional or governmental space of political contestation, varied 
depending on personal motivation and nature of the incumbent regime. The motivation and 
advocacy of the prominent group of journalists, publishers, lawyers and businessmen was in 
many cases initially self-serving, but translated with the increasing authoritarian practices into 
a widespread agenda for freedom and democratization. The interviews revealed that the aims 
and objectives combined both, pragmatic and ideal motives. On the one hand, the oppositional 
forces aimed to achieve general changes such as more rights and liberties, commitment to the 
rule of law, or peaceful development of the society. On the other hand, they were strongly 
motivated by self-profiting reasons, which varied respectively according to the profile of the 
individual oppositional forces. Civil society organizations hoped for a better treatment as well 
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as a guarantee of security, rule of law and professionalism under the new environment. They 
expected abolition of various legal restrictions put on their activities and demanded for direct 
support for civic associations from domestic public sources. Private sector enterprises hoped 
for productive operational conditions under the new government, including improved 
financial and material environment as well as more opportunities for mobilizing revenues and 
attracting foreign investors. This should have been achieved through a stabilized political 
situation and political parties following liberal economic policies.  
Independent media for their part, awaited liberalization of the general environment, 
commitment to the principles of freedom of speech, sound investment environment for their 
activities, as well as removal of restricting laws and bills. In Ghana, for instance, as Prempeh 
(2008: 100) argues, the liberalization of Ghana’s media space, translated the “culture of 
silence” imposed by Rawlings regime into “culture of loudness”. The goals and motivation 
for involvement of the cultural community in Slovakia included freeing Slovak culture from 
the influence of political ideology and party interests, diversification of sources of culture 
financing and decentralization of culture decision-making. (Kollár 1999b: 369) The main 
intention of the trade unions for participation in the electoral campaign in Ghana and Slovakia 
was to promote the interests of its members and of other workers and thus better its own 
position. Most of the trade union activities have not been staged in defense of any larger 
national purpose but for trade union reasons. Despite this rather pragmatic stance, the trade 
unions’ entering into the oppositional space of political contestation helped to enhance the 
chances for the oppositional victory as the trade unions, being a mass organization, brought 
along their support base. The interests of churches, as another important actor, to enter the 
oppositional space were also twofold. On the one hand, they felt threatened in their existence 
through the worsening state-church relations and awaited a more prominent position under the 
new government; on the other hand, they saw themselves as the principle fighters for human 
dignity and human rights and felt obliged to oppose the authoritarian tendencies of the 
respective incumbents. In Slovakia, a major concern for the churches was the extent of crimes 
and attacks on President Michal Kováč and the kidnapping of his son, as well as the related 
murder of Robert Remiáš, a police officer who had provided information to the independent 
press. All of the above mentioned actors thus entered the oppositional space of political 
contestation because they perceived the government policies as a threat to democracy in 
general as well as a threat to their own future relationship with the state in particular. The 
actors felt threatened in their personal liberties as almost every individual got affected by the 
restrictive policies of the incumbent in one way or another.  
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7.4.2. The Most Relevant Contributions of the Involved Oppositional Forces 
Within the framework of a new electoral model, what was the biggest contribution of the 
involved oppositional forces to democratization in the three respective settings? The signs of 
increased civil mobilization began to emerge under the pressure of negative political 
developments. As Bútorova (1999a: 203) states, in Slovakia, an unprecedented number of 
protest meetings, petitions, open letters and other forms of expression in opposition to 
government policies began to mount. Alexej Fulmek, Slovak journalist explains:   
 
“It was a complementary exercise, the third sector is too small to be visible without 
the help of the media, the media are too few to be able to analyze everything, and the 
political parties do not have the professional competences in every sphere. Everybody 
played its own part.” (Fulmek Alexej, journalist, 28th August 2008) 
 
The oppositional forces in the field of political contestation played an immense role in helping 
out the opposition political parties, supporting them and thus balancing the uneven level 
playing field. Of significant importance was the fact that party members as well as supporters 
of the opposition parties were working on a voluntary basis thus enabling a very cost-effective 
campaign, which is an indispensable contribution for opposition lacking public financing. 
With respect to party financing, Ghanaian NPP had definitely the most favorable position 
among the three analyzed case studies, as it is a party with numerous important connections to 
businessmen and private sector enterprises. In order to better understand the motivation of the 
private sector for “clandestinely” entering the oppositional space of political contestation, the 
historical context of the state-private sector relationships must be taken into consideration, as 
elaborated in the individual chapters. Uganda’s FDC is suffering from constant absence of 
resources, which does not enable the party to reach all constituencies and rural areas in the 
country. According to Lindberg (2003) the rural population demands a party with resources, 
which is able to reward the electorate for their votes. In Uganda, none of the opposition 
parties has enough resources to be able to fulfill this condition, which is another difference 
when compared to the situation in Ghana and Slovakia.  
In all three countries the financial contributors (in most cases private businessmen) wanted to 
remain a secret source of funding as they were afraid of being openly associated with the 
opposition and thus being disadvantaged and hindered in their business activities. As all three 
economies were at the point of the here analyzed elections still very strongly dependent on 
state intervention, the private enterprises could not have risked restrictions posed on their 
survival. My interview partners in all three settings admitted that substantial financing is/was 
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coming from the private sources; however, none of them would provide me with any detailed 
information.  
 
Academic literature and conducted interviews with respect to Slovakia’s 1998 elections agree 
that the contribution of various oppositional forces, above all civil society organizations, was 
crucial for ousting Mečiar out of power. It was the  mobilization of the voters conducted by 
civil society campaign OK’98 and other activities, which provided for increased voter turn-
out among the young, urban population and thus for increased chances of the opposition SDK 
to win. The main contribution of the campaign was to many of the interviewees that for the 
first time in Slovak history, means of civic and voter education were used to achieve change 
and to show citizens that elections can be used as a democratic tool for realizing the desired 
change. The contribution of civil society was further partly in the fact that they initiated the 
cooperation between political parties (in form of the Blue Coalition and the Hungarian 
Coalition) as they put a strong pressure on them. (Bugár Béla, SMK, 17th September 2008) 
Bútora and Demeš (1999: 163) argue that the Democratic Round Table including 
representatives of opposition parties, trade unions, towns and municipalities, youth 
organizations and the third sector was the most important achievement of pre-elections efforts 
in Slovakia as it showed the ability to create democratic alliances. “It was in fact the alliance 
between political parties, non-governmental organizations, independent media, unions and a 
part of the church that led to the defeat of the Mečiar regime.” In some cases the cooperation 
was based on informal, unwritten alliance, in others it became more institutionalized and 
formalized.  
The research analysts and think-tank institutions provided sources and evidence for the 
general changing mood and feelings in the society. They offered credible data and 
information through extensive research and analysis, conduct of opinion polls and partly 
through overtaking the civic education role. The gained research findings were then translated 
into a common language by the civil society organizations and media and were then made 
accessible to broad parts of the population. Besides providing data, the various think-tanks 
organized discussions, forums, and conferences, which became a platform for the opposition 
to become visible. One of their main activities was inviting political representatives to take 
part in the round-table discussions, which were almost exclusively used by the oppositional 
politicians.  
 
“You had all these interest groups operating in their small corners but they all felt 
nicely for an opposing group that wanted change and they utilized it. During that time 
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in 1998 most of our workshops were all patronized by opposition MPs, it was great for 
them to use these platforms and facilities.” (Kojo Pampuni Asante, CDD, 1st April 
2009)  
 
The most prominent and influential of the research institutes and think-tanks in respective 
settings were the Center for Democratic Development (CDD) in Ghana; Institute of Public 
Affairs (IVO) in Slovakia; and Human Rights and Peace Center (HURIPEC) in Uganda. 
These produced numerous publications on actual issues and misuse of incumbency by the 
government, which were subsequently used by the opposition political parties at press 
conferences and quoted in independent media. All these activities provided the opposition 
political parties with publicity and gave credibility to their, until then implausible claims.  
 
In all three countries the media became a powerful alternative outlet for the opposition parties, 
which were restricted to the urban areas or in the worst case only to the capital city of 
Kampala such as the Ugandan FDC. Both in Ghana and Slovakia, the incumbent politicians 
after loosing the elections, attributed the ruling party’s failure to the independent media, 
which portrayed them in negative light. (Školkay 1999: 111; Gyimah-Boadi 2001) As 
interviewed journalists stated, the main contributions of the independent media who joined 
the oppositional space were to expose the malpractices of the government, increase the 
credibility of the opposition and highlight it as the possible alternative and thus create the 
atmosphere of change. This should have been reached through the provision of balanced and 
unbiased information and coverage as opposed to the biased, non-objective, propagandistic 
pro-government stance of the public media, under complete control of the government. 
Information technologies, such as mobile phone communication and nationwide FM coverage 
played an indispensable role as it immediately drew the national attention to all potential 
malpractices. Many citizens are likely to be targeted by voter education campaigns and 
information distributed by print media, radio, or TV. Media were given new rights and 
responsibilities that carry the potential of being a force for democratization at the meta-game 
level. (Lindberg 2009: 337) 
 
Great contribution to the victory of oppositional forces was provided by the monitoring 
elections initiatives. They offered exit polls, parallel voting and tabulations results to the 
official outcomes of the Electoral Commission, thus increasing the credibility of the elections 
and making the rigging by the incumbent almost impossible or at least very difficult. In 
Ghana these bodies included the NEDEO (Network of Domestic Election Observers) in 1996, 
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which was renamed into CODEO (Coalition of Domestic Election Observers) in 2000; Forum 
of Religious Bodies and Ghana Alert groups; the OK ‘98 campaign and the Civilian Eye 
(OKO’98) domestic monitoring project in Slovakia; and the NEMGROUP in 2001 in Uganda, 
which was renamed into DEMGROUP (Democracy Monitoring Group) for the 2006 
elections. All of these bodies were so-called umbrella organizations composite of different 
civil society organizations, churches, NGOs, trade unions, religious and faith-based 
associations and others. The leading actor of the Ugandan DEMGROUP was the religious 
organization UJCC (Uganda Joint Christian Council) together with a women organization 
ACFODE (Action for Development) and journalist body UJSC (Uganda Journalists Safety 
Committee). The Ghanaian CODEO was formed under the leadership of the research think-
tank CDD and comprised of twenty-six civil society and religious organizations.387 The strong 
presence of religious bodies in election monitoring activities seems to be of crucial 
importance to their credibility and monitoring potential above all in African context. The 
religious bodies and organizations are provided with better infrastructure, dispose of large 
amounts of external funding and maintain strong interconnections with the outside ecumenical 
world. Their capability to influence flow of the things is thus much greater than that of civil 
society organizations and local NGOs. In Slovakia, on the other hand, the campaigns were led 
by professional NGOs from all spheres including service delivery, lobbying, charity, 
environmental bodies and others.  
Another oppositional force of crucial importance in all three democratizing settings was the 
youth. The youth got involved into the oppositional space at two different levels: firstly, as 
potential voters and secondly, as volunteers acting for the respective opposition parties. In the 
Slovak case, the campaign of the opposition parties was oriented on gaining the votes of 
young, first-time voters as the public opinion polls showed that they are the ones with most 
democratic and liberal orientation and thus most probably ready to vote for change. The 
young generation was further persuaded by the vision of the EU membership, and free 
movement of labor force in a country with a very high unemployment rate. In the two African 
case studies, opposition parties also oriented their pre-electoral campaigns on the youth as 
they hoped that among these potential first-time voters the merits of Rawlings and Museveni 
revolutions will be forgotten with time. Besides that, the demographic profile of sub-Sahara 
African countries reveals that the orientation on the youth as potential adherents of the party is 
only a logical mirror of the reality on the ground. The second level of involvement of the 
youth was their acting as volunteers for the respective opposition party. The various activities 
included organizing campaigns, traveling to the remote rural areas and mobilizing voters, 
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doing advertisements, providing civic education, and propagating the vision of change. The 
youth came also with innovative ideas to awake the rather lethargic voters and organized a 
cycle-tour with the leader of the opposition Mikuláš Dzurinda around Slovakia or so called 
“jogging-clubs” around Ghana to motivate, and mobilize the electorate. The activities were 
designed with positive character, were very cost-efficient and inspired the older voters to vote 
for the “better future” of the youth.  
 
Beside oppositional forces, which were common for all three types of settings, there were also 
a number of specific context-bound actors entering the oppositional space. In Slovakia for 
example the spectrum of oppositional forces also included personalities of social and cultural 
life, such as actors, writers, sportsmen and others. One of the biggest contributions of their 
involvement was the TV spots and programs calling on people to cast their vote. The mass 
appeal they found among the voters influenced in a significant way the outcome of the 
elections. In the Ghanaian context for instance, an actor of critical importance proved to be 
the Ghanaian Diaspora living mostly in UK and USA donating funds as well as material 
goods for the opposition NPP. As in the case of the media, there is a natural affiliation of the 
Diaspora and business community towards NPP as they were antagonized during the PNDC 
era when they were forced to leave the country during Rawlings’ revolution and the era of 
nationalization.388 
 
It is thus this diversity and plurality of the oppositional forces, a phenomenon created by the 
given conditions and restrictive operational environment, which enabled the change. Each of 
the actors had an impact on different segments of the society and the individual interests and 
objectives converged to create one strong opposing front. The desire for change, better 
environment and liberal society, coming from all forces at the same time was so strong that it 
was almost impossible not to succeed.  
 
“The watchdog role by civic groups on the one hand and the media on the other really 
came together to give the political opposition very easy task, they more or less pushed 
them; they were really a contributory factor to the NPP coming to power.” (Daniel 
Batidam, Ghana Integrated Initiative, 21st April 2009) 
 
As stated earlier in the chapter the internal (national) and the external (international) level 
become interwoven and interlinked in such complex ways that it is merely impossible to 
                                                 
388
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distinguish where one ends and the other begins. (see here Abrahamsen 1997, 2000) The 
majority of the above described activities were possible as a result of high levels of external 
assistance and funding. Additionally to the external financial and technical support, world 
leaders and the regional community provided moral encouragement in order to try and 
influence Rawlings and Mečiar to hand over power and thus leave behind a positive historical 
legacy of peaceful turnover and respect for constitutional rule. (see e.g. Gyimah-Boadi 2001) 
Another important outcome of the elections in Ghana and Slovakia was the fact that despite 
the difficulties, the elections were judged as free, fair and transparent by both domestic and 
international observers. More importantly the results were acknowledged by both political 
contestants and the public, which helped the whole electoral process to gain legitimacy in a 
very significant way. However, the situation in Uganda was different as the opposition FDC 
mounted protests and raised petitions against the unfair outcome of the elections. 
 
7.4.3. Rewards at the Personal Level  
We have discussed above the motivation of the oppositional forces to enter the space of 
political contestation as well as their main contribution towards oppositional victory. To close 
the cycle of their assistance in a logical manner, we will now have a closer look at the rewards 
gained for their involvement and assistance.  
Beside general rewards such as living in a more free and democratic society, enjoying 
political, social, and economic rights and freedoms and profiting from improved economic 
environment, rewards at the individual personal level became very important, as in many 
cases it was individual personalities who initiated the involvement of a whole organization, 
civil society body or association. My research also confirmed that prominent, popular and 
economically well-established individuals can in some cases bring more resources into the 
oppositional space of political contestation than whole organizations. This can be true for 
religious leaders such as individual bishops or archbishops, personalities from cultural- and 
social sphere or even “neutral” political personalities as President Kováč in Slovakia who 
entered the oppositional space after a series of personal as well as institutional attacks on his 
person by Prime Minister Mečiar. The logical rule says, the better the resources of the 
involved oppositional force, the higher the chances for success of the political party and thus 
the higher the potential for repaying the contributors for their efforts.  
The rewards for the selected important individuals included in the majority of cases gaining 
new prominent positions in the state apparatus or advancement within the societal and/or 
occupational sphere. Some examples gathered from the field research in Ghana might 
illustrate the situation in more detail. Several pro-opposition journalists were promoted to 
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positions of Ambassadors389, becoming members of the Board of Ghana National Petroleum 
Congress390 or Council of the State391. Within the private sector, individuals and/or 
enterprises, which contributed to the campaign of the opposition party in financial and/or 
other terms were rewarded392 as well. However, more surprising might appear the strong 
involvement and respective rewards of representatives of academic community and various 
research think-tanks on the side of the NPP393. Such examples can also be found in the Slovak 
case study. The sportsman and famous hockey player Peter Štastný campaigned on the side of 
Mikuláš Dzurinda ahead of the 1998 elections and then became member of the SDK party and 
later gained a prominent MP seat in the European Parliament. The danger embedded into this 
pattern of rewards encouragement is a continuation and establishment of new patron-client 
structures and subsequent promotion of corruption.  
 
7.5. Profile and Similarities between the Three Incumbents  
As Prempeh (2008) argues, the African state continues to be characterized by “untamed” 
presidential powers and the presidency influences the oppositional forces in a variety of ways; 
thus the latter cannot be studied without reference to the former. As stated earlier in the theory 
chapter the process of democratization can be understood as an interaction between the 
opposition and the incumbent. This study takes into consideration the strategic 
interdependence between the game and the meta-game level of the election as described by 
Schedler (2002a). The choices and strategies of both, the opposition and the incumbent are 
embedded in given conditions and context and they shape the nature of the state-society 
relation and thus produce a longer term legacy. (Villalon, VonDoepp 1997) That is why it is 
of interest at this point to have a look at the strategic choices selected by the incumbent in 
order to counter-balance the awakening oppositional forces and their activities.  
All three incumbents, Rawlings, Mečiar, and Museveni extensively used what Schedler 
(2002a) calls the “menu of manipulation” to hinder the opposition on gaining power. All three 
leaders enjoy(ed) very strong grass-roots support and appeal(ed) in all three cases among 
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 For instance the editor of the Ghanaian newspaper “Independent” Kabral Blee Amihera, positively reporting 
about the NPP ahead of the 2000 elections and explicitly advocating Kufour’s position for the presidential 
elections, became Ambassador in Cote D'Ivoire and later in Sierra Leone after Kufour took office in 2001.  
390
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 For instance J.A. Adison from Ghana Association of Industries became prominent member of NPP; Director 
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director of Ghana Investment Promotion Center. Hackman Owusu Aqyeman, one of the main financial 
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 Prof. Daniel Adzei Bekoe became chairman of the Council of State; Prof. Fred Sai became presidential 
advisor, and senior advisor on HIV/AIDS; Prof. Kasim Kasanga gained the seat of the Minister for Lands and 
Forestry; Prof. Mike Oquaye became second deputy speaker of parliament and later High Commissioner to 
India. 
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older, less-educated, and rural voters. The respective leaders are, both in the interviews as 
well as in the secondary literature, portrayed as populist, charismatic personalities, and often 
act as protective “father of the nation” figures, which tend to appeal among the majority of the 
voters in post-authoritarian settings. All three incumbents can be further characterized by 
limited international contacts and rather weak relations with the international community.  
 
As Schedler (2002a: 106) states the manipulation strategies of the incumbent vary within 
electoral autocracies and electoral democracies; however, “the repression is not continual as 
in closed authoritarian regimes, but selective and intermittent as irregular episodes of 
harassment make fewer international headlines”. To a large extent, it is the strategic 
interaction between authoritarian incumbents and the democratic opposition that determines 
how the structural ambiguity of electoral autocracies plays out. (Schedler 2002b: 49) As in the 
case of opposition parties, all three leaders used unified form of reasoning to regain the 
decreasing credibility and accused oppositional forces of risking stability, development, and 
peace in the respective countries. They warned the population of possible disruption of 
violence in case of oppositional victory and projected themselves as the only capable 
guarantors of stability, continuity and social order. However, analogically to opposition 
parties’ strategies, also the incumbents employed different, respectively context-bounded, 
strategies. These can be seen as a product of the historical, political, social and cultural 
legacies of the given countries; embedded in the institutional, legal and structural 
environment.  
In Slovakia the application of the menu of manipulation included for instance creation of new 
legislative obstacles such as amending the elections law (Mesežnikov 1999: 50); or the reform 
of the administrative and territorial set-up signaling the intention to change the election 
proportional system into a majority model. (Lebovič 1999: 40) Mečiar amended the Electoral 
Law only three months ahead of the 1998 elections thus, disabling the opposition parties to 
enter the electoral arena as a coalition. President Rawlings in Ghana extensively misused the 
advantages of incumbency, which provided him with access to state resources, media space 
and close connection to rural, decentralized structures of government. (Gyimah-Boadi 2001; 
Ayee 2002 et al.) 
 
Another common pattern between all three ruling parties, NDC, HZDS, and NRM-O is the 
issue of internal democracy, which according to interviewed representatives coming from the 
ruling parties, got gradually lost. At the point of the critical elections the parties were led by 
one-man rule, with lacking internal democratic structures and party nominations being 
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imposed by the party headquarters instead of party members being elected into positions 
through conduct of party primaries. The lacking internal democracy can be partly explained 
by the authoritarian character of the leading personalities. All three incumbents were by the 
representatives of oppositional forces as well as the majority of the academic secondary 
literature characterized as the so called “reluctant democrats” who agreed to initiate the 
transition process of opening up the electoral arena only under the pressure coming with the 
global discourse of democratization as well as rising internal protests within the country. 
Needles to say, that all three incumbents, Rawlings, Mečiar and Museveni, suffered under a 
strong feeling of Western conspiracy against their rule and Western alliance with oppositional 
forces. They hoped to (re)gain legitimacy through opening up of the electoral arena and 
compliance to the rule of law; however, only to an extent, which would enable them to control 
the rules of the game and thus prolong their stay in power. Despite Rawlings’ alleged 
“reluctance”, credit must be given to his respect of constitutional provisions as he did not 
actively resist the democratization process, such as his counterpart in Uganda. Rawlings 
adopted the multi-party system and embraced a new constitution in 1992 and allowed the 
opening of media and civil space in 1996 and did not hesitate to hand over the power to the 
opposition party after its victory in the 2000 elections. On the other hand, the interviewed 
NDC representatives admit that P/NDC underwent the process of democratization at the 
beginning of the 1990s because of the political conditionalities imposed by the West, and 
withdrawal of the financial flow from the East.  Agyeman-Duah (2008: 29) argues that it is 
only of minor importance if Rawlings decision to democratize, was promoted by the 
circumstances or compelled by internal and external pressures394 and calculations. Decisive to 
him is the capacity of the regime to adopt and accomplish both, economic and political 
reforms, the latter manifesting in the decision to restore constitutional rule and lift the ban on 
political party activities. Analysis of primary findings and secondary literature (see e.g. 
Nugent 2001; Ayee 2002) further points to the fact that NPP was able to win the 2000 
elections partly thanks to Rawlings’ retreat out of the electoral arena and the missing of his 
charismatic appearance among population.  
The situation in Uganda was once again on the opposing side of the continuum. In 2005, the 
presidential term limit was lifted due to an amendment of the 1995 Constitution, allowing the 
incumbent president to remain in office for more than two terms and prolonging his stay in 
power. The structural and institutional advantages which President Museveni gathered during 
the twenty years of his rule disabled the oppositional forces to mount any meaningful protest 
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 Agyeman-Duah (2008: 19) talks of a combined “triple pressure” of an awakened and assertive civil society, 
the donor community that had become influential with their bankrolling and the global democratic spread after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
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actions. Through employment of different strategies, he thus made the victory of oppositional 
forces de facto impossible as the playing field was not level and evidently adjusted it to his 
advantage. According to Dahl’s definition of Polyarchy (1971), one of the crucial institutional 
characteristics is that citizens have access, and an effective enforced right to gain access to 
sources of information that are not monopolized by the government or by any other single 
group. This right was in majority of cases denied to the Ugandan oppositional forces as well 
as to the electorate. We can conclude that the opposition in Uganda had to struggle with most 
repressive legal and structural conditions of the three case studies. It can thus be stated, that 
not only the strategies of the individual actors, but also the institutional variables, such as 
electoral rules (the type of the presidential system) or established term limits, significantly 
influence the performance and chances of the opposition. Winner-take-all systems combined 
with strong presidential powers are especially inconvenient for the opposition as they mean 
that if one looses, one looses everything. The proportional representation systems are much 
more favorable to the opposition as the case of Slovakia confirms. The presidential term limits 
were introduced by the majority of the African countries in the course of 1990s 
democratization wave as a response to the prevailing one-party state and president-for-life 
figures. Maltz (2007) and Posner and Young (2007) claim that term limits may also prevent 
an electoral authoritarian regime to descent into dictatorship. As term limits mark the periodic 
exit of incumbent presidents, the opposition parties and their candidates then tend to promote 
better against successor candidates than against the incumbent as confirmed in the Ghanaian 
case. (see e.g. Nugent 2001; Ayee 2002) Also Rakner and van de Walle (2009) show in their 
study that presidential term limits reduce incumbency advantages and improve the chance of 
political alternation in power. Another structural characteristic, which influenced the outcome 
of the elections and significantly played in the hands of the oppositional forces were the 
shifting voting preferences and urban-rural pattern of voting.  
 
7.6. Urban-Rural Voting Patterns as Explaining Factor for Oppositional Victory?  
With respect to the profile of followers395, all three opposition political parties appeal(ed) 
predominantly among better educated, middle class, younger, urban and pro-reform oriented 
voters.396 In both Ghana and Slovakia, the opposition parties managed to win also thanks to 
the high mobilization and voter turn-out of the urban dwellers, which were in this context 
perceived to be the winner of the elections. (see e.g. Krivý 1999a, 1999c; Nugent 2001) 
However, an additional factor crucial for the victory in both cases was that the opposition 
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 All three leading opposition parties were for these reasons accused by respective governments as being elitist 
and disconnected from the people at the grass-roots. 
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parties, normally rooted in the urban settings also managed to strengthen their position in the 
rural environment. Both leading opposition parties, NPP and SDK respectively, adopted their 
campaigns very effective with positive slogans and managed to connect to the rural electorate. 
In Ghana and Slovakia both, the “swing/floating” and the “grass-roots” voters, being 
traditionally HZDS and P/NDC adherents, switched sides and decided to vote for change. The 
NDC’s control over the rural voters decreased due to NPP’s decision to “cut down its elitist, 
urban character and carry its campaign message to remote rural areas”. (Gyimah-Boadi 2001: 
71) To gain rural votes is especially difficult for the opposition, as the areas are strongly under 
control of the incumbent. (see e.g. Aubynn 2002)  Mesežnikov (1999: 50) claims for the case 
of Slovakia that “the positive change in Slovakia was possible also due to the fact that 
significant shifts in the political preferences of the electorate connected with changes in 
Slovakia’s socio-demographic structures and changes of socio-cultural nature influenced by 
the process of modernization of Slovak society and by globalization that took place.” How 
does the urban-rural voting pattern influence the outcome of the elections and how does it 
contribute to the oppositional victory? 
In the 1992 elections in Slovakia the most successful party in six out of the eight major towns 
was the HZDS, while SDK was strongest in the two remaining towns. In the 1998 elections, 
the SDK was the most successful party in seven of the major towns and second most 
successful party in the eighth town. (Krivý 1999a: 76) In Ghana in the 2000 elections, NPP 
won all the major cities along the coast, whereas during the previous elections of 1992 and 
1996, it was the incumbent NDC, which gained the majority of the urban votes. Nugent 
(2001: 423), among others, argues that the urban-rural divide was in 2000 most pronounced as 
the only regional capitals where NDC gained majority were Ho and Wa in Volta and Upper 
West Regions. Also the Ugandan FDC was most popular in urban areas but found only 
limited appeal in the rural areas where 70% of the Ugandan population lives. “The opposition 
strongholds remained the large municipalities, and the main cities of the country. Of the 14 
municipalities, Dr. Besigye won in nine.” (EU 2006: 35) The ruling NRM on the other hand 
spent enormous energy campaigning in rural areas and small towns. The areas won by the 
major opposition party are less densely populated and comprise of 23.9% of the electorate, 
whereas the regions won by President Museveni account for 76.1% of the registered voters. 
(EU 2006: 35) This study thus confirms Krutz’s (2006) findings, which state that opposition 
parties in post-authoritarian settings have systematically polled best relative to incumbents in 
major urban areas. This would imply that major cities and urban centers offer a natural power 
base, from which to compete for national office, also because of their attractiveness for the 
budgetary and patronage resources they offer to the opposition parties. (Rakner, van de Walle 
 268
2009) Also the adopted economic policies had a significant effect on patterns of voting and 
urban-rural divide. Several analysts (Bawumia 1998; Green 1998; Nugent 1999; Aubynn 
2002) point to the fact that the structural adjustment programs created a rural-urban 
bifurcation in Ghana and Uganda, as they had differential impact on different segments of the 
population. They claim that rural areas have benefited more from the SAPs policies and the 
increase of prices of cocoa and other cash crops. Secondly, there was a significant provision 
of service delivery such as health centers, roads, and electricity in marginalized parts of the 
country during the PNDC and NRM rule. (Ewusi 1987; Herbst 1993; Nugent 2001) 
According to Jonah (1998: 431), “Rawlings is present as the politician who stands for the 
ordinary Ghanaian, farmers, fishermen, hairdressers and mechanics; he is also given great 
credit as the one politician in Ghana’s recent history who has improved the living standards of 
Ghana’s rural population in many parts of the country.”397 The urban dwellers thus suffered 
through the high prices following the removal of subsidies and the devaluation of the 
currency, reduction of state employment, and low rates of income. (Ninsin 1991; Herbst 
1993) The explanation for a shift in voter’s preferences has thus to be searched for above all 
in the economic circumstances, as urban wage earners felt the economic situation mostly 
together with the unemployed youth. Another explanation for all three countries might be 
found in the fact that rural voters were not as much exposed to the media and other 
independent sources of information as the urban ones and thus tended to vote rather 
traditionally. We can thus state that from the demographic point of view, two mutual 
developments seem to be necessary for the oppositional victory: firstly, opposition needs to 
gain majority in its traditional strong base, the urban centers; additionally, in order to appeal 
to as many “grass-roots” voters as possible it must cut its elitist character and expand its 
sphere of influence to the rural areas of the country.  
 
7.7. Divergent Perceptions 
Considering the large number of conducted interviews, it appears only natural that there was a 
variety of conflicting views with respect to different issues of interest. Some of the adversary 
positions were visible between the two camps of the interviewed representatives belonging on 
the one side to the oppositional, on the other to the government space of political contestation. 
Others could have been identified within the space of oppositional forces itself. With respect 
to the first group of diverging views, government versus oppositional forces, two issues 
emerged repeatedly in the three analyzed settings. The first one was the conviction of the 
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former incumbents in Ghana and Slovakia, that the oppositional victory is not to be ascribed 
to improved and successful performance of the opposition. The failed incumbents claimed 
rather that the oppositional victory was achieved thanks to general (for the government 
inconvenient) political-economic conditions and significant amount of external support to 
“adversary” segments of the society. The central theme of the second group of conflicting 
views between the government and opposition was the issue of intimidation and harassment. 
Whereas, representatives of oppositional forces in all three settings complained constantly 
about the repressive conditions and endless cases of intimidation; the positions of the 
representatives of the incumbent parties took, naturally, an opposed stance. They were 
convinced that as incumbents they left even too much space for the oppositional forces to 
operate and grow: 
 
“As head of national security, I do not think that we did anything that was out of the 
ordinary to intimidate the opposition. As government, sometimes our own people 
accused us of being laissez-faire and being too benevolent with the opposition; to 
allow them easy life.” (Kofi Totobi-Kwakye, NDC, 24th June 2009) 
 
The situation both in Ghana and Slovakia went as far as that the incumbent government felt 
harassed by the opposition at a certain point before the elections, when the oppositional forces 
culminated their efforts and expanded in strength. As Rein and Schoen (1994: 29) argue, the 
high number of varying positions among diverse actors is natural and can be explained by the 
fact that “their problem formulations and preferred solutions are grounded in different 
problem-setting stories rooted in different frames.”  
With respect to the divergent positions within the oppositional space of political contestation 
two main argumentation lines could have been identified. The first one is considering the 
extent and level of contribution of individuals involved in oppositional forces leading to 
victory, the second relies to the here applied terminology of oppositional forces.  
With respect to the first line, the general impression gained in the interviews was that every 
group of actors claimed to have played a crucial role in the democratization struggle against 
authoritarian tendencies. The own role, performance and contribution are portrayed by each 
actor as indispensable to the respective victory. Clear distinction from situational oppositional 
forces was made, above all, in interviews with political parties’ representatives who in some 
cases understood the victory as their individual achievement as they were the “real 
responsible” bearers of the transition. The terminology of “oppositional forces” appeared to 
be problematic with some of my interview partners as they did not want to be associated with 
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specific political party activities. For the Slovak case Vladimír Krivý from the Slovak 
Academy of Sciences specifies:  
 
“One needs to specify that it was oppositional force in a sense of anti-Mečiarism 
force, against Mečiarism as a phenomenon. It was not only about the person. 
Mečiarism was the pressure of the whole system, which restricted basic rights and 
freedoms, which spoiled our relations with the West; a system, which accepted and 
encouraged kidnapping, suppression of the media, and strong political clientelism.” 
(Krivý Vladimír, SAV, 18th September 2008) 
 
Some of my interview partners, had objections to the proposed terminology of oppositional 
forces as they did not “volunteer” to become part of the opposition to the hegemonic regime, 
but were rather forced by the circumstances as the oppressing state started restricting their 
lives and intervening into their space of personal freedoms, both, as individuals and 
organizations. The majority of the interviewed actors wanted to preserve their neutrality and 
credibility and thus denied any close partisan connections. My interviewees considered it 
extremely important to emphasize (and asked me to explicitly state it in the writing) that their 
opposition was an opposition to authoritarian tendencies and to political hegemony of one 
man-rule and thus issue-and-time dependent.  
 
7.8. Implications 
It is important to stress in the concluding remarks of this chapter that the involved 
oppositional forces including various organizations, associations, institutions, and bodies, did 
not enter the oppositional space of political contestation with the intention of gaining political 
power. It was the specific context, existential struggle for the further development of the 
society and the unique time, issues and space setting, which influenced the composition and 
performance of the oppositional forces. Almost every individual made a negative personal 
experience with the repressive regime in one or another way, being political, economic, social 
or concerning personal freedoms and liberties. The transitional atmosphere provoked strong 
feelings of solidarity, unity and caused high mobilization among the population. Malová 
(1999a: 170) states that in general, specific interest groups differ from political parties mainly 
in the fact that they only attempt to influence or take part in political decision-making; 
whereas, political parties endeavor to gain power through electoral competition and the 
subsequent formation of a government. As shown in this study, declaration of support of 
interest groups to specific political parties during the election campaign is just one form of 
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cooperation. Political parties and leaders of interest groups often enter into informal 
agreements with each other regarding participation in elections. One example as Malová 
(1999a) argues could be, when parties incorporate top unionists among their candidates in the 
hope that they will bring with them the votes of union members. Oppositional forces often 
enter the electoral arena by providing financial means or other form of support, such as 
mobilization of voters or civic education activities to political parties. Once the supported 
party gets into government, the expectations are that it should “repay” its debt for instance by 
supplying the organization with state orders or commission projects. The better the resources 
of the involved oppositional force the higher the chances for success of the political party and 
thus the higher the potential for repaying the contributors for their efforts.  
The oppositional forces thus do not constitute (in the here analyzed settings) partisan and a 
deliberate, outspoken opposition to the government in a contested manner. They enter the 
space of political contestation in order to observe, comment happenings in their watchdog 
role, publish their commentaries, provide analysis, expose and highlight government abuses, 
shortly to assist (in direct or indirect way) the opposition political parties which they 
acknowledge as the bearers of the oppositional forces. That is why their activities may be, and 
often are, perceived by the government as oppositional. A vast majority of the interview 
partners agreed that without assistance, contribution and activities of the oppositional forces, 
the victory of the then opposition party would have been impossible as initially, none of the 
actors was strong enough to lead the struggle alone. Above all, the opposition political parties 
with their limited reach, resources and finances did not have the potential to mobilize a high 
number of voters, decisive for a victory of the opposition. The leading role of the political 
parties is confirmed also by the fact that the temporary or situational oppositional forces, tend 
to leave the oppositional space shortly after the common aim – the removal of the 
authoritarian incumbent – has been reached and subsequently return to their traditional area of 
work.  
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Chapter 8: Implications and Suggestions 
 
8.1. Introduction  
This study has concentrated on political systems, the so called electoral democracies and 
electoral autocracies (Diamond et al. 1997; Schledler 2002a; Lindberg 2006, 2009) where 
oppositional forces are still fighting over the rules of the game, where election results might 
become disputed, and elections are sometimes flawed, where oppositional groups operate 
under less than free and fair conditions and the independent media are constrained, and where 
authoritarian tendencies and practices are still strong but, most importantly, elections are 
being held. As Lindberg (2004: 24) points out, we need to better understand the dynamics of 
opposition group’s behavior and its role in protracted transitions where elections are not the 
end of the process but steps on the way to attain a minimal democracy. This PhD thesis 
analyzed elections as a core institution of representative democracy as it is believed that 
elections breed democracy through the self-reinforcing, self-improving quality of repetitive 
elections. (Lindberg 2006, 2009; Schedler 2002a, 2002b, 2009a) However, this is not to claim 
that elections are the only or even the main causal factor of democratization. Lindberg (2009: 
317) states that while actors can be thought of as self-reflexive individuals making rational 
choices in a social context, their choice is always conditioned and constrained by prevailing 
institutions. Elections offer an institutional framework for oppositional forces for making their 
choices plausible and structuring their expectations. For the study of oppositional forces it 
seems relevant to focus on both the constraining and the enabling conditions for calculation of 
rational choices. The aim of this concluding chapter is to explore what the qualitative results 
might mean for existing theories of democratization? What perspectives and further 
stimulation of new issues might the concrete findings offer to studies of opposition, elections, 
and democracy? In other words, what does the bigger picture look like? 
 
8.2. Importance of Opposition and Elections for Democratization: The Bigger Picture 
According to democratic theory, the presence of a stable and numerically viable opposition in 
the legislature is a key requisite for horizontal accountability, through legislative checks on 
executive power. Opposition behavior in the form of participation in elections has 
significantly contributed to improving the democratic qualities of elections in electoral 
regimes leading to a decline of authoritarianism (Lindberg 2006: 134) and is thus an 
important determinant of democratization by elections in the foggy zone of electoral 
authoritarianism. (Schedler 2002b) However, we do not know which concrete strategies the 
oppositions employ from its disposal in order to counter-balance the menu of manipulation of 
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the incumbent, as the vast majority of the existing studies concentrates on the strategies of the 
incumbent and analyzes opposition only as a dependent concept. The conducted research 
offers a qualitative enhancement of the existing quantitative studies. It shows that the selected 
strategies and choices of oppositional forces are of crucial importance with respect to success 
of the given transition. Rakner and van de Walle (2009: 202) claim in their study that the 
strength and strategies of opposition parties are intrinsically linked to the dynamics of 
contemporary democratization processes.  
To explain the dynamics of oppositional behavior and the interplay with the incumbent, the 
study made use of the democratization by elections phenomena, as identified by Schedler 
(2002a, 2002b, 2009a, 2009b) and Lindberg (2009). It confirmed that elections in post-
authoritarian settings can be used as a democratic tool for realizing the desired change. 
Democratization by elections as a mode of transition is characterized by the fact that for 
whatever reason, some closed authoritarian regime decides to introduce multi-party elections 
and a minimal level of political and civil rights and liberties. The multiparty elections thus 
take place before the actual process of democratization has started. Each election becomes a 
game, aiming to redefine and change the rules of the meta-game. As elections provide a time 
for change, it is during the immediate pre-election period that majority of the voters, 
organizations, civil society bodies and political parties get organized. It is also the time when 
international attention is focused on national developments, putting the legitimacy of the 
incumbent into question.  
 
The process of democratization is characterized by interaction between two main groups: the 
incumbent or the status-quo defenders and the opposition or the pro-reformers. (O’Donnell, 
Schmitter 1986; Schedler 2002a; Lindberg 2006) These two main groups, however, do not 
constitute coherent unifying blocks but are rather subdivided into smaller sub-groups. The 
only single interest unifying the pro-reform or oppositional group in the transition period is 
the wish to change the existing regime and replace the incumbent in power. The transition 
from authoritarian to democratizing society is an extreme kind of situation, in which 
individual actors are bound together by following an overarching aim – removing the 
incumbent, or at least decreasing his hegemonic position. It is highly improbable that these 
actors would also cooperate and interact in such an extensive manner under normal 
circumstances in, for example, established democracies. This has been proven in both cases of 
Ghana and Slovakia, when the cooperation of oppositional forces ceased after the aim has 
been reached, the former incumbent removed and was replaced by an opposition party. Also 
within the incumbent group, there are significant differences between individual actors. As 
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O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) found out a split in the authoritarian circles and the 
subsequent division into the so-called soft- and hard-liners is almost a necessary condition for 
democratization. The internal interactions influence the selection of strategies and affect the 
outcome of the transition game. Severe setbacks for the incumbent are the defections from the 
government space to the oppositional space of political contestation, as these fluctuations shift 
the balance of power and the parameters of the struggle move to favor the opposition. The 
role of the judiciary in Slovakia and Ghana, which decided for the first time to exercise 
independence from the incumbent government and thus significantly shifted the balance of 
power towards the oppositional space, can serve as one good example. Consequently, with an 
increasing number of defections it becomes much harder for the incumbent to exercise power 
and easier for oppositional forces to raise protests. However, this shift can also follow a 
reverse direction, when oppositional forces decide for whichever reason (mostly personal 
gains and self-profits in form of access to resources) to leave the oppositional space and join 
the incumbent. They thus weaken the oppositional camp as they provide information to the 
incumbent on the opposition’s action strategies, bring along their support base and 
subsequently enhance the popularity and legitimacy of the government. Many such defections 
happened for example in Uganda, where with time the oppositional forces got frustrated and 
discouraged after the long-lasting unsuccessful attempts to gain power. The personal 
interviews revealed that the opposition politicians saw the positioning in the incumbent space 
as a means to gain access to state resources and thus to further maintain and/or broaden their 
clientelistic networks. What happens in one game (in the government space) therefore 
influences and conditions the selection of strategies in the other game (the oppositional 
space). Both sides tend to choose the most rational strategy based on a cost-benefit 
equilibrium in order to influence the meta-game level of the elections. Both sides attempt to 
improve their image and portray themselves in the best possible light following the 
overarching aim – increasing their legitimacy. The strategies chosen by the actors at the game 
level thus influence the structures at the meta-game level of the elections. Elections are thus 
“nested” (Tsebelis 1990) into a larger frame of struggle between government and oppositional 
forces. Repetitive elections are used by both sides to influence the outcomes of the political 
struggle and effect at the meta-game level either the reproduction or the change of the regime 
respectively. The selected strategies vary according to the context and are bounded to 
resources at disposal. It is definitely easier for the oppositional forces to select the “right 
kind” of strategies if there is a strong independent middle class with economic resources, 
large urban populations, well organized opposition political parties and civil society as well as 
international attention and sanctions for the incumbent as was the case in Ghana. The political 
 275
developments in Ghana are an ideal case study for an illustration of how the chances of 
oppositional forces may increase with a series of repetitive elections. Rationally, a third actor 
entering the political arena is of crucial importance as s/he influences the meta-game level by 
joining either the oppositional or the incumbent space – namely the voters. When large 
numbers of voters are mobilized, and decide to vote for the opposition, as was the case in 
Ghana and Slovakia, the incumbent’s responding strategy is the increase of repression as he 
feels threatened in his power base and his legitimacy thus decreases.  
 
8.3. Most Useful Strategic Choices 
The existing quantitative research already provided answers to questions on the role of the 
opposition behavior and involvement in facilitating democratization and confirmed the 
significance of opposition participation in elections and its effect on regime transitions. (See 
above all Lindberg 2006) Of interest is now to summarize how do oppositional forces manage 
to win an election if the ruling power has an extensive network of supporters (clients) at its 
disposal. 
Within democratizing societies, the ideal to be achieved from the viewpoint of the opposition 
is the power reconfiguration between the opposition and the incumbent. The ways and means 
to gain this power are the enhancement of credibility and legitimacy of the respective 
opposition parties both, at national and international level. The oppositional forces in all three 
settings, irrespective of their geographical location, adopted the global rhetoric of “liberal 
democracy” and “change” in order to enhance their internal as well as external legitimacy and 
credibility. The “liberal democracy” was presented in all three settings as the “real” or “true” 
democracy, with the main opposition parties in all three countries following (or at least 
claiming to follow) the ideology of a liberal democratic party. This adaptation of the global 
democratization discourse at the micro-level is mirrored in the composition, strategies as well 
as application of the discourse by the oppositional forces in all three settings. Change, as the 
second relevant issue and campaign slogan in all three settings, was mostly associated with 
change for economic prosperity, for respecting the principles of democracy and rule of law, 
enjoying economic recognition, and, in case of Slovakia, with being included in the Western 
world. Within the framework of this study it is not possible to explore the full scope of 
strategic choices selected by the oppositional forces and their influence on the various modes 
of transition, as the opportunities are theoretically infinite. However, without wanting to be 
prescriptive in any manner, it is possible to outline the most efficient strategies, which could 
potentially serve as “best practices” for the oppositional forces in democratizing societies 
struggling with similar challenges. This study thus aims to be of practical use. The strategies, 
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which proved during the course of this research to be most efficient for the increase of 
legitimacy of the opposition and the subsequent electoral victory, are the application of 
mobilizational political rhetoric, inter-active cooperation with oppositional forces, and unity 
and coordination of the opposition political parties. With respect to the use of mobilizational 
rhetoric, Rakner and van de Walle (2009: 222) argue that it compensates for the relative 
inability of the oppositional groups to compete with the government party on material 
resources and improves their reputation. In all three settings oppositional forces extensively 
used the strategy of mobilizational political rhetoric and applied it in a variety of context-
bounded situations. Strategically very important was not only to portray oneself as the best 
democratic alternative but at the same time to distance the own party from the undemocratic 
practices of the incumbent and picture the prevailing tendencies in the worst possible light. 
The main strategy of Ghanaian opposition was the employment of political rhetoric and 
appeal to continuing tradition of human rights record and liberal democracy. Through 
referring to own democratic credentials and past records, the opposition was able to enhance 
its credibility among voters and portray itself in an entirely positive light. It thus managed to 
create an aura of stability, trust, and prosperity. This strategy appeared to be especially useful 
when combined with pointing to the negative record of abuse of human rights and misuse of 
the rule of law by the incumbent. The electorate was thus given the impression that only this 
opposition party can create a real alternative to the incumbent and therefore, bring along the 
highly anticipated “change”, both in political and economic terms. Another identified strategy 
of crucial importance is the cooperation of political parties with situational oppositional 
forces. The strategy of all three opposition leaders was to try and persuade as many different 
segments of the society as possible to enter the oppositional space and thus enhance the 
political parties’ competitiveness and counter-balance the dominant position of the incumbent. 
In Slovakia, with Mečiar controlling all the aspects of political, economic, social and cultural 
life, opposition political parties did not have the capacity to challenge his hegemonic position 
by their own. The most important strategy of the opposition political parties thus proved to be 
the interactive cooperation with various segments of civil society and media who mobilized 
the electorate. These actors decided to enter the oppositional space of political contestation as 
they felt threatened in their existence through the prevailing conditions in the country. 
Coordination and unity between opposition parties and formation of a coherent block behind 
one common candidate seems to be another absolutely inevitable strategy for oppositional 
success. As a unified block, opposition parties are in a much better position to interact and 
negotiate with the incumbent as only then they are perceived by the latter as a serious threat. 
Even more importantly, through joining forces the chances for winning and the credibility in 
 277
the eyes of the electorate enhance. The different opposition parties thus need to put aside their 
individual ambitions in order to increase their chances for winning and if possible, to agree on 
a common leader, as opposition in Ghana and Slovakia managed to do. However, as Lindberg 
(2009: 332) reminds us, coordination and unity among opposition parties is a very difficult 
exercise in post-authoritarian settings of Africa and Post-communist countries as generally 
there is a large number of newly established parties, all aiming for benefits from patronage 
sources and access to state power.  
With respect to demographic profile of voters, we can assume that the opposition on the one 
hand, needs to gain the majority in its traditional strong base, the urban centers; on the other 
hand, in order to appeal to as many “grass-roots” voters as possible it must cut its elitist, 
urban character and expand its sphere of influence to the rural areas of the country. In order to 
succeed, the oppositional forces use the prevailing discontent within the population and 
transform it, through a campaign of positive change into a popular desire for change coming 
from as many segments and groups of the society as possible. 
 
8.4. Context-Bounded Strategic Choices of Oppositional Forces 
Several studies have confirmed that there is no consistent pattern of democratic transition with 
respect to the level of economic development, type of government, level of corruption, or the 
location of the regime on a continuum defined by democracy on one end and dictatorship on 
the other. This research has shown that, whereas there are global similarities between the 
behavior, conditions and performance of oppositional forces in post-authoritarian settings, the 
various survival strategies cannot be applied in a one-to-one mode, as other, structural factors 
must be taken into consideration. The structures are produced and reproduced by actors in 
interaction and these two aspects are then mutually influencing.  As an example could serve 
the developments in Central and Eastern European countries where the state socialism shaped 
the institutional framework of political parties, which consequently conditioned the profile, 
values, and behaviour of political actors (inclusive the political parties). (Segert, Machos 
1995: 53) As Kooiman (2003: 19) states “the activities of governing actors co-influence the 
structural conditions within which they govern by changing or conserving them, while these 
structural conditions co-determine these governing activities by enabling or controlling them.” 
The various elements, which account for oppositional victory are context-bounded and made 
up of the historical structures in place, institutional provisions, as well as the current 
performance of the various stakeholders of the transition process and their interactions. 
During the course of this research, it was not possible to identify a single element of universal 
importance responsible for success and victory of oppositional forces, as all of them are 
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closely intertwined and dependent on each other. It is thus the combination of several factors: 
the existence of a distinct alternative provided by the democratic opposition parties, which 
decide to form a broad coalition out of the need to resist the authoritarian tendencies of the 
ruling government; high degree of mobilization of all the key segments of the divided society 
thanks to numerous activities of civil society organizations; and extensive citizen engagement 
through employment of innovative techniques and procedures, which converge and provide 
for oppositional victory. The structural legacy and the contextual factors condition the 
institutional provisions and thus the existence and type of oppositional space. They account 
for the issues of interest and composition of oppositional forces, which both influence the 
context specific meaning making and performance of oppositional forces in a unique time and 
space setting. The more “threatening” the issues for the survival of democracy and personal 
freedoms and liberties, the more individuals and various segments of society join the 
oppositional space of political contestation. Having more high-profile and more committed 
actors thus increases the chances for more enduring achievements.  
 
The various strategies combine into an effective whole, and it is only the interaction and 
congregation of various structural variables and performance activities that cause oppositional 
victory. This can be illustrated on the example of the unity of the opposition, often called in 
literature, the crucial factor for success in democratizing societies. (see e.g. Howard, Roessler 
2006; van de Walle 2006, 2007) In all three case studies, the opposition political parties used 
the strategy of joining forces in order to enhance its competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent 
already in the previous elections, in Slovakia in 1994, in Ghana in 1996, and in Uganda in 
2001. They formed coalitions and alliances, and agreed on one oppositional leader for the 
purpose of elections to form a more coherent block. However, their efforts remained fruitless 
due to other factors, such as too restrictive legal environment, monopoly of the incumbent 
over media and civil society, apathy and resignation of the population, or lacking financial 
and personal resources. In Bunce’s and Wolchik’s (2009) vocabulary the “new electoral 
model” was not applied or one of its crucial components was missing. In Ghana, after several 
attempts of the oppositional forces in the previous years, it was only in the 2000 elections that 
the constitution, the electoral laws and procedures also allowed for fair procedures. (Gyimah-
Boadi 2001: 61; Ayee 2002: 158) However, the factors that favored the successful 
performance of the oppositional forces in Ghana when compared to those of Slovakia and 
Uganda are not exclusively of immediate nature. The reasons for oppositional success have to 
be looked at as equally in the short-term as in the long-term causes. The political 
environment, legacy of multi-party democratic tradition present since 1920s, and democratic 
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experience reaching back to the second half of the 19th century; the adoption of legal 
provisions and institutional mechanisms that allowed opposition to actively participate in the 
political arena; the existence of a meaningful political dialogue; the liberalization of the space 
of media and civil society during the late Rawlings era; and the repetitiveness of electoral 
exercise, all contribute to leveling the playing field and interactive game between the 
opposition and the incumbent. Ghana’s democratic tradition was thus before the critical 
elections more favorable towards performance of oppositional forces when compared with 
Uganda and Slovakia. The Ugandan oppositional forces, on the other hand, had to struggle in 
the 2006 elections with intimidation, unleveled playing field, and amendment of the 
constitution in favor of the incumbent and too late passing of the electoral laws. (Kiiza, 
Makara 2008) These shortcomings have to be analyzed as an outcome of Uganda’s political 
and social legacy, absence of the idea of multi-partyism, long authoritarian rules, a more than 
twenty-year long ban posed on political party activities, and general mistrust towards the role 
of institutionalized opposition in the society. Slovak opposition managed to counterbalance 
the disadvantages posed by the incumbent, including, among others, the restrictive legal 
provisions shortly before the 1998 elections, only thanks to extensive collaboration with local 
oppositional forces as well as moral and financial support from regional and international 
actors. The strong position of Mečiar was a consequence of firmly rooted state socialism, and 
very orthodox, rigid and inflexible regime within the region.  As Bútorová and Bútora (1995: 
124) claim the tolerance for former communist elites in top positions in the post-communist 
situation in independent Slovakia remained high as people rested mentally rooted in 
communist collectivism and adherent to traditional values.  (Krivý 1998a)  
 
Therefore, the various strategies and situational conditions have to be considered and 
addressed simultaneously while assessing the impact and contribution of the oppositional 
forces towards democratization processes worldwide. To separate them and concentrate solely 
on a single component, while not taking into consideration its embedment into historical, 
political, cultural and social legacy, will not allow for complete answers. Structure and 
process are a precondition for understanding outcomes and politics becomes a manifestation 
of the exercise of choice by multiple actors within existing parameters. (Chazan et al. 1999: 
24) Political factors account for many social and economic realities but are themselves 
informed by historical, demographic, cultural, ecological, ideological, and international 
factors. These form together the constraints on choices that can be made by individual actors. 
The selection of strategic choices and options available to governments, oppositional forces, 
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social groups, regional organizations and international agencies must be understood, 
examined and their implications assessed within this context.  
 
8.5. Challenges while Studying Oppositional Behavior and Dynamics 
The literature on democratization seems to assume that oppositional groups and parties are 
always pro-democratic actors. However, as Lindberg’s quantitative study (2006) proved, 
losing opposition parties use disputation of elections results, thereby questioning the 
legitimacy of the process and of the winning candidate’s access to power, all too often. The 
qualitative findings of this research confirmed that not all oppositional forces can 
automatically be qualified as pro-democratic actors. Some of the oppositional forces might be 
genuine democrats; others might aim for access to power and state resources. The 
collaboration of oppositional forces, their positioning and repositioning within the space of 
government or opposition depends mainly on the benefits, rewards and expectations for self 
profits that can be gained from the cooperation. As self-profit and intentional level in 
governing interactions are very dominant, we have to bear in mind that various 
representatives of the same actor group, for instance, civil society organizations can thus 
belong at the same time to the space of the oppositional forces as well as to the space of the 
ruling power and thus constitute part of different networks.  
When studying opposition, it needs to be taken into account that it is a dependent concept and 
its profile changes with time even within a single political system depending on current power 
sharing relations, strategies of the actors undertaken or the structure of the party system in a 
given context to name just a few. The concept of opposition and oppositional forces is thus 
time-issue-and space dependent, which makes any generalizing claims especially challenging.  
 
Another challenge while analyzing the performance and selected strategies of the oppositional 
forces is that the cost-benefit formula is in many cases subjective to the individual actors. 
What oppositional forces in one setting may perceive as acceptable conditions in order to 
achieve electoral victory, may appear as an unacceptable sacrifice under different 
circumstances. In the case of Uganda, the specific political history and long absence of 
political parties from the political scene (see also Mugaju 2000) did not enable a strong 
cooperation of opposition political parties and support for one presidential candidate, as it was 
in Ghana and Slovakia. After a twenty-year long ban on political parties’ activities, the minor 
Ugandan political parties felt a strong need to re-establish their structures and support base as 
soon as the political arena was reopened notwithstanding the possibility of wasted votes and 
loosing elections.  
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Another challenge we have to be aware of is the possible existence of a variety of an 
unforeseen chain of actions and reactions as democratization is a long-term process and not 
one short event. It is possible that the outcomes of the selected strategies by both, the 
incumbent and the oppositional forces become visible only years after they have been applied. 
All three case studies confirmed that the unity of the political parties and the established 
coalitions for the purpose of election do not tend to last long as they were created only for the 
purpose of elections and out of a combination of strong internal and external pressure. The 
smaller opposition political parties tend to feel left out and betrayed, as they have to 
subordinate their ideologies and identities to those of the leading party. A possible outcome is 
also that coalition-building might lead to polarization/dichotomization of the political scene 
and the establishment of two strong bodies on the political scene, followed by a subsequent 
disappearance of genuine multi-partyism, as actually happened in Ghana. The victory of the 
oppositional forces does not automatically mean that the country is on a direct path towards 
democratization as setbacks are possible at any stage of the transition process. Oppositional 
forces, as soon as they get into power, might turn to incumbents with authoritarian tendencies, 
or in a better case scenario, they might ignore and disrespect the new opposition (former 
incumbent). The consequence of and (at the same time) the cause for such behavior is absence 
of oppositional culture and presence of two strong adversary blocks of opponents as both 
cases of Ghana and Slovakia confirmed. In Slovakia, the victorious opposition did not find 
efficient means of communication with the post-election opposition led by the former 
incumbent Vladimír Mečiar during two subsequent periods in power from 1998-2006. Also 
the relationship of the post-2000 Ghanaian government towards the new opposition remained 
strained and full of tensions during the eight years of rule. We thus need to be reminded of the 
fact that the oppositional forces cannot be romanticized as entirely pro-democratic actors and 
are only as democratic as their practitioners on the ground. In the transition process, different 
actors engaged in the process normally espouse different political agendas. In terms of 
objectives in the transition politics, these different forces pursue a democratic project that has 
different meanings.  
Another challenge arises when one takes into consideration the actual “winners” of the 
transition process and/or the change. Segert (2007) and Segert and Machos (1995: 43) argue 
that the transition in CEE countries had brought along so-called “dual democracy” at it 
simultaneously produced winners and losers of the transition. The majority of the population 
got excluded from the new opportunities, which remained reserved for a handful of selected 
groups of elites who managed to establish their position in the late phases of state-socialism. 
As people’s expectations have not been fulfilled the majority of them remained disappointed 
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and frustrated. (Segert 2007b: 2) The frustration grew even bigger when one takes into 
account the legacy of state-socialism, which offered a high standard of social protective 
mechanisms and guarantees. (Segert, Machos 1995: 48) Not only that the transformation to 
market economy thus did not provide for the expected benefits and Western economic 
welfare, but at the same time it deprived the people of their social benefits and guarantees. 
The specific societal conflicts of the post-authoritarian countries are thus based on the gap 
between people’s expectations and the actual outcomes of the transition process. (Segert 
2007) 
 
Additional challenge and a side effect of the very close cooperation of the opposition political 
parties with situational oppositional forces is that the latter are very often muted in their 
criticism of the new government. On the one hand, the involved actors, such as media, trade 
unions, churches and civil society bodies expect rewards for their contribution and assistance; 
on the other hand, the new government expects not to be criticized in its position as it 
perceives the situational oppositional forces as its allies. The danger embedded into this 
pattern of rewards encouragement is the continuation and establishment of new patron-client 
structures and subsequently, the promotion of corruption. That voters do not want the return 
of corrupt leaders into the office seems to be confirmed by the fact that anticorruption slogans 
and rhetoric have been prominent in winning parties’ campaign, both, in Ghana and Slovakia. 
However, the numerous new oppositional forces also tend to be dependent on patronage 
networks and multiparty elections might even spur political clientelism as confirmed in 
Lindberg’s (2003) study on Ghana. Nevertheless, Rakner and van de Walle (2009: 223) stress 
the importance of compensation for other structural weaknesses with a rhetoric strategy, 
rather than the belief in the sincerity of such rhetoric promises or that the opposition 
politicians will resort less to traditional forms of clientelism if and when they get to power.  
 
Another dominant feature of the analyzed transitions discovered during the conduct of the 
research is the actual weakness of the civil society and the high level of fluctuation between 
the political and non-political spheres. The weakness is manifested at two different levels. 
Firstly, in all three cases, the majority of civil society bodies, who overtook the role of the 
opposition political parties and operated clandestinely during the authoritarian rule, 
transformed into political parties immediately after the ban on political party activities was 
lifted. Subsequently, the space of civil society was shrinking, characterized by high 
fluctuation and brain-drain as majority of civil society activists tried to find their fulfillment in 
the political sphere. The mobility between political and social space is a repetitive event as 
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proved in the case of Slovakia. Bútora and Fialová (1995: 33) see the explanation for the 
“weakened” third sector partly in the fact that “many intellectuals and leaders of the (reform) 
movements (after 1989) left their organizational activities and committed themselves to a 
party and government.” This to a certain extent weakened the potential of the emerging third 
sector. However, after 1992 elections, and in the following years, an important part of this 
political elite ‘withdrew’ from the government sector – as a result of electoral failures and 
disappointment – into a non-governmental sphere where they could make use of their abilities 
in building up democracy from ‘below’. These developments suggest that civil society in 
democratizing societies is often too weak, economically and politically impoverished, and too 
dependent on the political structures. Scholars thus remind us (see e.g. Ninsin 1998a: 5) that it 
is especially dangerous, particularly in post-authoritarian contexts, to attribute to civil society 
intrinsic democratic tendencies as the emerging social forces lack sufficient autonomy from 
the state and can easily become instruments for enforcing the political domination of the 
incumbent power. Civil society in such social formations thus cannot always function as free 
agents capable of transforming the authoritarian political structures of society to democratic 
ones.  
 
8.5.1. Importance of Informal Structures 
Another significant factor making the research in democratizing settings more challenging is 
the high presence of informal mechanisms and institutions and their co-existence with the 
formal ones. (see here e.g. Segert, Machos 1995; Frank, Segert 2007; Segert 2007b) Each of 
the above discussed factors is a result of both, informal and formal mechanisms that serve to 
weaken or to strengthen the oppositional forces. It has been stated that oppositional forces 
apply a variety of strategies to overcome their electoral weaknesses; however, at the same 
time they often accept the nature of the formal rules as given. (Rakner, van de Walle 2009) In 
such a scenario, with prevailing disadvantageous formal rules, the oppositional forces appear 
very pragmatic and focus instead on informal mechanisms that will allow them to compete in 
elections. For example in Ghana and Slovakia, to counterbalance the systematic funding 
disadvantages they had to face the oppositional forces adopted pragmatic approaches such as 
financing of parties by private businesses. In Uganda and Slovakia, the opposition political 
parties used successful candidates from the sub-national level (Mayor of Kampala Ssebana 
Kizito; Mayor of Košice Rudolf Schuster) in order to become elected as party leaders and 
presidential candidates at the national level. Rakner and van de Walle (2009: 222) describe 
the mobilization of resources, both, at personal and financial level, as one of the informal 
opposition strategies to overcome their electoral weaknesses. According to Folson (1993: 32) 
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both, formal and informal links must be maintained between political parties and other 
segments of the society. “It is through these links that ‘the political will’ of the society is 
shaped in a democratic system. The formal links […] come into play at the stage when 
executive policy is being formulated or laws are being enacted. These links are thus vital to 
democratic stability. But perhaps even more vital are the informal links, as these enable the 
groups to make inputs into the formulation of basic ideas and attitudes of political parties 
which underlie much official policy.” It is thus a combination of formal and informal 
institutions and mechanisms and their relationship that contributes to democratization 
processes. The challenge in many democratizing contexts is that the informal institutions 
dominate with interpersonal network becoming more and more important (Segert, Machos 
1995); however, at the same time they are especially difficult to research. On the other hand 
the exclusive emphasis on the formal ones is problematic. (Erdmann, Basedau 2007; Frank, 
Segert 2007) Formal and informal rules interact in a variety of ways (Helmke, Levitsky 
2006). To analyze the impact of the informal institutions and relations on democratization is 
very important. It is, above all, in the uncertain democratizing settings that informal 
institutions gain such a prominence. With electoral democracies maturing, Rakner and van de 
Walle (2009: 224) claim more emphasis and weight will be given to rule-base behaviors, in 
which formal political institutions take the first place. “Nonetheless, it is important to 
emphasize that democracy will thrive in Africa only if political actors develop a set of 
informal norms, rules and standards that uphold, legitimize, and strengthen the formal rules.” 
This is true not only for African societies, but has been further confirmed in the findings of 
Bunce and Wolchik (2009); Segert (1994a); Segert and Machos (1995) and Segert (2007b) for 
the Post-communist countries or Lust-Okar’s (2009) research in the Middle East region. One 
answer for the high presence of informal institutions can be found in what Hyden (1983, 
2000) calls the “economy of affection”. In post-authoritarian settings, in response to failed 
and not responsive states, the informal sphere and personalistic networks of support and 
communication become the primary means of securing livelihoods. Segert (1994a: 23) argues 
for the post-socialist societies of Central and Eastern Europe that because of the repressive 
regime many of the values, ideas, rituals and ideological positions survived only in the private 
or informal sphere. Nevertheless, the small groups of anticommunist elites and dissidents still 
had an indirect impact on the political sphere398 and contributed to further differentiation of 
interests, value transformation and raising awareness as well as resistance of the population. 
(Segert, Machos 1995: 244) The informal relations and networks thus found their way into the 
                                                 
398
 The August 1968 events in Czechoslovakia serve in this context as one of the most elaborated liberalization 
reform attempts of the Soviet socialism.  
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new regime despite a “Systemwechsel” as the new elite did not have any other means and 
institutions at their disposal, but a weakened state apparatus. (Segert, Machos 1995: 276) The 
actors tried to adjust the competences and provisions gained in the old system to the newly 
created conditions and environment, to transform their social and political capital into an 
economic one. (Segert, Machos 1995: 51) This continuity of informal institutions represented 
through and in peoples’ daily routines, their expectations, behavioural patterns, values, but 
also rituals, myths and symbols (Segert, Machos 1995: 241) enabled the transition from 
socialism to post-socialism. The informal institutions of the old era became the formal 
institutions of the new era (Segert 2007b: 15f) and this continuity399 provided for a transition 
from socialism to capitalism400. State socialism is thus to Segert (2007b: 5-8) not only a 
political and economical but due to survival of informal institutions also a social order and 
thus shows a certain “positive legacy”.  
The informal links thus keep existing even under the new multi-party democratic era and 
regardless of level of education. As my research showed, even urban, modern and highly 
educated elites in all three settings continue to reproduce personalized networks, which serve 
to strengthen the informal as opposed to the formal sphere.  
 
8.6. Outline 
This study has shown that the efforts of oppositional forces combine into greater political 
transparency and accountability of the democratization process and provide the opposition 
political parties with greater credibility. Higher credibility enhances the competitiveness of 
the opposition vis-à-vis the government and thus the chances for electoral victory at the meta-
game level. The electoral model applied here undermines the ability of anti-democratic 
leaders to win elections, and if losing, to stay in power, as it reduces their control over 
opposition, media, civil society and citizens. In Uganda, where opposition failed to oust the 
incumbent, some parts of the electoral model were missing or were only partially applied. If 
democratizing elections fail, as was the case in Uganda in 2006, the consequence might be 
further strengthening of authoritarianism and new (more ample) opportunities for 
authoritarian incumbents to control and/or suppress the opposition. Elections can thus serve as 
both, an investment in and condition for consolidation of authoritarianism (Brownlee 2009; 
Lust-Okar 2009) as for example in Uganda, or as an institutionalized attempt of facilitating 
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 Naturally, despite existing continuites throughout the socialist period, the history of CEE countries can be 
characterized by parallel deep discontinuities such as constant political dictatorship, and the events of 1917/18 
and 1944/45 which deprived the political actors of their social base. (Segert 1994a: 23) 
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democratization (Lindberg 2006, 2009) as happened in Ghana and Slovakia. In the former 
case incumbents act skillfully to prevent the oppositional forces from changing the rules at the 
meta-game level as they constrain them to provide any meaningful activities at the game 
level.  
The detailed information provided in the study shows commonalities, allowing 
generalizations across the continents and over time. It is interesting to state that many 
oppositional forces in different countries and contexts have made similar choices. Why do 
oppositional forces in so many diverse countries tend to act similarly? We can assume that 
they adjust their behavior and strategies accordingly with level of institutionalization, in our 
case with increasing experience with elections. (Lindberg 2009) Over a few electoral cycles, 
mistrust between antagonistic groups is moderated rather than heightened. Previous negative 
experiences with elections can stimulate and provide for increased attention and unity among 
oppositional forces. Over the repetitive course of elections, political parties in Ghana and 
Slovakia became institutionalized and the balanced competition allowed either faction to win. 
(Morrison 2004: 440; Mesežnikov 1999) The success of a transition process in democratizing 
societies thus depends, among others on the extent, to which the principle political actors 
(most commonly political parties) agree on the rules of the game and negotiate them. (Stoess, 
Segert 1997: 426) Also Dahl (1971), O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Linz and Stepan 
(1996) put emphasis on elites, their beliefs, levels of trust and willingness to compromise as 
well as their coherence and interaction. Mutual understanding, cooperation and compromise 
by the political parties on divisive electoral issues in order to introduce confidence-building 
and produce elite consensus are crucial steps. It is the politics of the immediate post-transition 
election period that determines the future relationships between the incumbent and the 
oppositional forces. The transition from authoritarian rule to a multi-party constitutional rule 
“requires the re-instatement of formal opposition as an integral part of the newly established 
system of government”. (Bluwey 1993: 207; Agyeman-Duah 2005: 12) As Lindberg (2009) 
argues the institutional set-up is very important as a de jure multiparty electoral dispensation 
emphasizes a number of rights and rules, which affect the performance and capabilities of the 
actors. One example of significant actions related to electoral practices is that leaders of 
antagonistic factions converge in peaceful talks and even build coalitions shortly before 
elections, thus creating feelings of unity among population. Many scholars (see among others 
Field, Higley 1980; Sartori 1987) see as one of the most important pre-requisites of 
democratic consolidation that all important elite groups share consensus about the rules and 
codes of political conduct and the worth of political institutions. Elite consensus promotes 
compromise, flexibility, tolerance, conciliation, moderation among elites and understands 
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“politics as bargaining” rather than “politics-as-war.” (Field, Higley 1980; Sartori 1987) It 
involves formal and informal communication networks that encompass all or most elite 
groups. These networks enable them to influence decision-making and thereby defend and 
promote their factional interests peacefully. The democratic consolidation is thus conducive to 
long-term stability as the legitimacy of democratic institutions is acknowledged and rules of 
democratic procedure, which discourage the incumbent elites abusing the rights of 
oppositional groups, are respected. (Ayee 1998) Besides that, the conflict is expressed by 
peaceful institutionalized channels as widespread acceptance of norms and rules, which 
reduce mutual fears and suspicions. Burton et al. (1995: 30) argue that, “insofar as losing in a 
political conflict is not usually perceived as posing a direct threat to a physical or material 
well-being of either side, the intensity of the conflict is mitigated, and incumbents who lose 
an election are more willing to step down, confident that they will survive and perhaps return 
to power at some point in the future.” Crucial in transitions is thus the agreement, trust and 
political will among contending social and political forces – the pro-democracy and pro-
government ones – to compromise and reach consensus on the directions of a country’s 
policies as well as agreement on adequate guarantees of security and benefits for both losers 
and winners. (Ninsin 1998a: 16; Brinkerhoff 1999: 74) Diamond (1994) argues that 
democratic political systems offer a more supportive enabling environment for state-civil 
society partnerships than authoritarian or limited democratic forms of government. Also Foley 
and Edwards (1996: 48) observe “where the state is unresponsive, its institutions are 
undemocratic, or its democracy is ill designed to recognize and respond to citizen demands, 
the character of collective actions will be decidedly different than under a strong and 
democratic system. Citizens will find their efforts to organize for civil ends frustrated by state 
policy – at some times actively repressed, at others simply ignored.” Non-democratic regimes 
thus resulted in existence of oppositional forces that “evaded, opposed, or provided an 
alternative to the state.” (Gyimah-Boadi, Markovits 2008: 230) 
 
This PhD thesis examined the role of oppositional forces in selected countries in the 
democratization period and explored how oppositional behavior, i.e. choices and strategies of 
the opposition to enhance its competitiveness vis-à-vis the incumbent, increase the likelihood 
of electoral autocracies becoming electoral democracies. Dynamics of oppositional behavior 
and its role in protracted transitions is an important determinant of the processes of 
democratization by elections. Meaningful opposition constitutes one of the crucial concepts 
for societies in transition and should be given more attention in the literature on 
democratization. Rakner and van de Walle (2009: 203) argue that the continuing weakness of 
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the opposition is both, a consequence of democratic deficits in many countries and at the same 
time a cause of their continuation. Weak oppositional forces are highly correlated to imperfect 
democratization and it broadly appears that autocratic rule has prevented the emergence of a 
viable opposition, and strengthened the ruling elite. Within the “nested” game of elections, 
my study concentrated on the game level (electoral competition/opposition choices) and 
analyzed the various types of strategic choices and decisions employed by the oppositional 
forces in order to enhance their bargaining position for the inter-active dialogue with the 
meta-game level (incumbent position). I showed at the examples of Ghana, Slovakia and 
Uganda that the right selection of strategic choices enabled the opposition to improve its 
position and through the “self-reinforcing” dynamics contributed to democratization of the 
society. As the incumbent is controlling the space of contestation too extensively and 
possesses an exaggerated menu of manipulation strategies the political parties alone cannot 
counter-balance the hegemonic power and increase their competitiveness. That is why the 
main strategic choices for success are a combination of mobilizational rhetoric, inter-active 
cooperation with oppositional forces and unity and coordination of opposition political 
parties. The reconfiguration of the balance of powers thus leads to preventing reproduction of 
the incumbent regime and subsequently conditions the regime transition. The protests 
included in the new electoral model come simultaneously in many forms and from various 
segments of the society. They often combine with international mobilization of supporters, 
use of new technologies, as well as pressures from international and diplomatic community. 
Besides the national and international context, the regional implications and the neighboring 
countries with their democratic experiences encourage the oppositional forces to act. The 
variation of actors’ choices, when faced with the collapse of existing authoritarian regimes, is 
not random as legacies at least initially shape the resources and expectations that help actors 
to define their interests and to select the ways and means to acquire political power.  The 
operational tactics, behavior, and strategies applied by the oppositional forces in all selected 
case studies show many similarities and offer an interesting ground for a global type of 
comparison of democratization processes and societies. 
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